On May 30th, Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced a momentous shift in American global strategic policy. From now on, he decreed, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which oversees all U.S. military forces in Asia, will be called the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The name change, Mattis paaiškino,, atspindi „didėjantį ryšį tarp Indijos ir Ramiojo vandenynų“, taip pat Vašingtono pasiryžimą išlikti dominuojančia galia abiejuose regionuose.
What? You didn’t hear about this anywhere? And even now, you’re not exactly blown away, right? Well, such a name change may not sound like much, but someday you may look back and realize that it couldn’t have been more consequential or ominous. Think of it as a signal that the U.S. military is already setting the stage for an eventual confrontation with China.
If, until now, you hadn’t read about Mattis’s decision anywhere, I’m not surprised since the media gave it virtually no attention — less certainly than would have been accorded the least significant tweet Donald Trump ever dispatched. What coverage it did receive treated the name change as no more than a passing “symbolic” gesture, a Pentagon ploy to encourage India to join Japan, Australia, and other U.S. allies in America’s Pacific alliance system. “In Symbolic Nod to India, U.S. Pacific Command Changes Name” was the antraštė „Reuters“ istorija šia tema ir, kiek buvo atkreiptas dėmesys, tai buvo tipiška.
That the media’s military analysts failed to notice anything more than symbolism in the deep-sixing of PACOM shouldn’t be surprising, given all the attention being paid to other major international developments — the pyrotechnics of the Korean summit in Singapore, the insults traded at and after the G7 meeting in Canada, or the ominous gathering storm over Iran. Add to this the poor grasp so many journalists have of the nature of the U.S. military’s strategic thinking. Still, Mattis himself has not been shy about the geopolitical significance of linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans in such planning. In fact, it represents a fundamental shift in U.S. military thinking with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Apsvarstykite pavadinimo pakeitimo foną: pastaraisiais mėnesiais JAV sustiprino savo karinio jūrų laivyno patruliavimą vandenyse, esančiuose greta Kinijos okupuotų salų Pietų Kinijos jūroje (kaip ir Kinija), padidindama ateities susirėmimų tarp JAV karo laivų perspektyvą. dvi šalys. Tokie žingsniai buvo lydimi vis grėsmingesnių Gynybos departamento (DoD) kalbų, rodančių ketinimą padaryti ne ką mažiau, kaip kariškai įsitraukti į Kiniją, jei šios šalies plėtra regione tęsis. „Kai kalbama apie tai, ką jie padarė Pietų Kinijos jūroje, tai turi pasekmių“, – Mattisas. paskelbė Shangri La strateginiame dialoge Singapūre birželio 2 d.
Kaip preliminarų nurodymą, ką jis turėjo omenyje, Mattisas nedelsdamas nekviestas kinai iš didžiausių pasaulyje daugianacionalinių karinio jūrų laivyno pratybų „Rim of the Pacific“ (RIMPAC), kasmet vykdomų globojant amerikiečiams. „Tačiau tai palyginti nedidelė pasekmė“, – grėsmingai pridūrė jis, – ir aš tikiu, kad ateityje pasekmės bus daug didesnės. Turėdamas tai omenyje, jis netrukus paskelbė kad Pentagonas planuoja vykdyti „pastovią būgnų dūzgimą“ karinių jūrų pajėgų operacijų vandenyse, besiribojančiose su Kinijos okupuotomis salomis, o tai turėtų padidinti karštį tarp dviejų šalių ir sudaryti sąlygas klaidingam apskaičiavimui, klaidai ar net nelaimingam atsitikimui jūra, kuri gali pabloginti.
In addition to its plans to heighten naval tensions in seas adjacent to China, the Pentagon has been laboring to strengthen its military ties with U.S.-friendly states on China’s perimeter, all clearly part of a long-term drive to — in Cold War fashion — “contain” Chinese power in Asia. On June 8th, for example, the DoD pradėjo Malabar 2018 – bendros Ramiojo vandenyno karinio jūrų laivyno pratybos, kuriose dalyvauja Indijos, Japonijos ir JAV pajėgos. Kadaise neutralios Indijos įtraukimas į Amerikos antikinišką „Ramiojo vandenyno“ aljanso sistemą tokiu ir kitais būdais iš tikrųjų tapo svarbiausiu XXI amžiaus Pentagono tikslu, keliančiu didelę naują grėsmę Kinijai.
Dešimtmečius pagrindinis JAV strategijos Azijoje tikslas buvo sustiprinti pagrindines Ramiojo vandenyno sąjungininkes Japoniją, Pietų Korėją, Taivaną ir Filipinus, kartu sulaikant Kinijos galią gretimuose vandenyse, įskaitant Rytų ir Pietų Kinijos jūras. Tačiau pastaruoju metu Kinija siekė paskleisti savo įtaką Pietryčių Azijoje ir Indijos vandenyno regione, iš dalies išaukštindama savo stulbinančiai ambicingą.Viena juosta, vienas kelias” trade and infrastructure initiative for the Eurasian continent and Africa. That vast project is clearly meant both as a unique vehicle for cooperation and a way to tie much of Eurasia into a future China-centered economic and energy system. Threatened by visions of such a future, American strategists have moved ever more decisively to constrain Chinese outreach in those very areas. That, then, is the context for the sudden concerted drive by U.S. military strategists to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans and so encircle China with pro-American, anti-Chinese alliance systems. The name change on May 30th is a formal acknowledgement of an encirclement strategy that couldn’t, in the long run, be more dangerous.
Girding for War with China
Norint suprasti tokių žingsnių pasekmes, gali būti naudinga šiek tiek informacijos apie buvusį PACOM. Iš pradžių žinoma kaip Tolimųjų Rytų komanda, PACOM buvo nustatytas in 1947 and has been headquartered at U.S. bases near Honolulu, Hawaii, ever since. As now constituted, its “atsakomybės sritis” encompasses a mind-boggling expanse: all of East, South, and Southeast Asia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans — in other words, an area covering about 50% of the Earth’s surface and incorporating more than half of the global population. Though the Pentagon divides the whole planet like a giant pie into a set of “unified commands,” none of them is larger than the newly expansive, newly named Indo-Pacific Command, with its 375,000 military and civilian personnel.
Before the Indian Ocean was explicitly incorporated into its fold, PACOM mainly focused on maintaining control of the western Pacific, especially in waters around a number of friendly island and peninsula states like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Its force structure has largely been composed of air and naval squadrons, along with a large Marine Corps presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Its most powerful combat unit is the JAV Ramiojo vandenyno laivynas – kaip ir plotas, kurį dabar apima, didžiausias pasaulyje. Jį sudaro 3-asis ir 7-asis laivynai, kuriuose kartu yra apie 200 laivų ir povandeninių laivų, beveik 1,200 130,000 orlaivių ir daugiau nei XNUMX XNUMX jūreivių, lakūnų, jūrų pėstininkų ir civilių.
On a day-to-day basis, until recently, the biggest worry confronting the command was the possibility of a conflict with nuclear-armed North Korea. During the late fall of 2017 and the winter of 2018, PACOM engaged in a continuing series of exercises designed to test its forces’ ability to overcome North Korean defenses and destroy its major military assets, including nuclear and missile facilities. These were undoubtedly intended, above all, as a įspėjimas Šiaurės Korėjos lyderiui Kim Jong-unui apie tai, ko jis galėtų tikėtis, jei ir toliau eis nesibaigiančių provokuojančių raketų ir branduolinių bandymų keliu. Panašu, kad bent jau kol kas tai padarė prezidentas Trumpas pakabinamas tokių pratybų dėl jo aukščiausiojo lygio susitikimo su Kim.
North Korea aside, the principal preoccupation of PACOM commanders has long been the rising power of China and how to contain it. This was evident at the May 30th ceremony in Hawaii at which Mattis announced that expansive name change and presided over a komandos pasikeitimas ceremonija, kurioje kadenciją baigęs vadas admirolas Harry Harrisas jaunesnysis buvo pakeistas admirolu Philu Davidsonu. (Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad jos misija yra orientuota į laivyną, vadovybei beveik visada vadovauja admirolas.)
Nors įžanginėje kalboje vengdamas tiesioginio Kinijos paminėjimo, Mattisas nepaliko nė trupučio netikrumo, kad naujasis vadovybės pavadinimas yra iššūkis ir raginimas ateityje sutelkti regioninę opoziciją didžiulėje planetos dalyje siekiant Kinijos svajonių ir troškimų. Kitos šalys sveikina JAV paramą tvirtino,, nes jie teikia pirmenybę „laisvos, sąžiningos ir abipusės prekybos aplinkai, nesusijusiai su jokios tautos grobuoniška ekonomika ar prievartos grėsme, nes Indo-Ramiajame vandenyne yra daug juostų ir daug kelių“. Niekas negalėjo supainioti to prasmės.
Išvykstantis admirolas Harisas buvo dar baisesnis. Nors „Šiaurės Korėja tebėra mūsų tiesioginė grėsmė“, jis paskelbė, “China remains our biggest long-term challenge.” He then offered a warning: without the stepped-up efforts of the U.S. and its allies to constrain Beijing, “China will realize its dream of hegemony in Asia.” Yes, he admitted, it was still possible to cooperate with the Chinese on limited issues, but we should “stand ready to confront them when we must.” (On May 18th, Admiral Harris was nominuotas Prezidentas Trumpas, kaip būsimas JAV ambasadorius Pietų Korėjoje, įkurdins buvusį karį JAV ambasadoje Seule.)
Harris’s successor, Admiral Davidson, seems, if anything, even more determined to put confronting China atop the command’s agenda. During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 17th, he repeatedly pabrėžė the threat posed by Chinese military activities in the South China Sea and promised to resist them vigorously. “Once [the South China Sea islands are] occupied, China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania,” he įspėjo,. „PLA [Liaudies išlaisvinimo armija] galės panaudoti šias bazes, siekdama iššūkį JAV buvimui regione, o visos salose dislokuotos pajėgos nesunkiai nugalėtų bet kurių kitų Pietų Kinijos jūros pretenzijų teikėjų karines pajėgas. Trumpai tariant, Kinija dabar yra pajėgi kontroliuoti Pietų Kinijos jūrą visais scenarijais, kol nėra karo su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis.
Is that, then, what Admiral Davidson sees in our future? War with China in those waters? His testimony made it crystal clear that his primary objective as head of the Indo-Pacific Command will be nothing less than training and equipping the forces under him for just such a future war, while enlisting the militaries of as many allies as possible in the Pentagon’s campaign to encircle that country. “To prevent a situation where China is more likely to win a conflict,” he affirmed in his version of Pentagonese, “we must resource high-end capabilities in a timely fashion, preserve our network of allies and partners, and continue to recruit and train the best soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and coastguardsmen in the world.”
Davidson’s first priority is to procure advanced weaponry and integrate it into the command’s force structure, ensuring that American combatants will always enjoy a technological advantage over their Chinese counterparts in any future confrontation. Almost as important, he, like his predecessors, seeks to bolster America’s military ties with other members of the contain-China club. This is where India comes in. Like the United States, its leadership is deeply susirūpinęs plečiantis Kinijos buvimui Indijos vandenyno regione, įskaitant būsimo uosto / karinio jūrų laivyno bazės atidarymą Gwadar, Pakistane, ir dar viena potenciali šalis saloje Šri Lanka, both in the Indian Ocean. Not surprisingly, given the periodiniai susirėmimai tarp Kinijos ir Indijos pajėgų kartu su Himalajų pasieniu ir nuolatinis dislokavimas of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi has shown himself to be increasingly disposed to join Washington in military arrangements aimed at limiting China’s geopolitical reach. “An enduring strategic partnership with India comports with U.S. goals and objectives in the Indo-Pacific,” Admiral Davidson said in his recent congressional testimony. Once installed as commander, he continued, “I will maintain the positive momentum and trajectory of our burgeoning strategic partnership.” His particular goal: to “increase maritime security cooperation.”
Taigi mes pasiekiame Indo-Ramiojo vandenyno vadovybę ir ateitį, kurią temdo didelės galios karo galimybė.
Vaizdas iš Pekino
The way the name change at PACOM was covered in the U.S., you would think it reflected, at most, a benign wish for greater economic connections between the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, as well, perhaps, as a nod to America’s growing relationship with India. Nowhere was there any hint that what might lie behind it was a hostile and potentially threatening new approach to China — or that it could conceivably be perceived that way in Beijing. But there can be no doubt that the Chinese view such moves, including recent provocative naval operations in the disputed Paracel Islands of the South China Sea, as significant perils.
Kai gegužės pabaigoje Pentagonas išsiuntė du karo laivus - USS Higgins, naikintuvas ir USS Antietam, a cruiser — into the waters near one of those newly fortified islands, the Chinese responded by sending in some of their own warships while issuing a statement condemning the provocative American naval patrols. The U.S. action, sakė Kinijos kariuomenės atstovas spaudai „rimtai pažeidė Kinijos suverenitetą [ir] pakirto strateginį abipusį pasitikėjimą“. Aprašyta Pentagonas kaip „navigacijos operacijų laisvę“ (FRONOP), Mattiso nurodymu tokius patrulius ketinama padidinti.
Žinoma, vargu ar kinai yra be priekaištų dėl didėjančios įtampos regione. Jie tęsė militarizuoti Pietų Kinijos jūros salos, kurių nuosavybės teisė ginčijama, nepaisant a pažadas kad Kinijos prezidentas Xi Jinpingas 2015 m. liepė prezidentui Obamai to nedaryti. Į kai kurias iš tų Spratlio ir Paraselio salyno salų taip pat pretenduoja Vietnamas, Filipinai ir kitos regiono šalys, todėl jos intensyvėjo, dažnai kartūs. nesutarimų among them about where rightful ownership really lies. Beijing has simply claimed sovereignty over all of them and refuses to compromise on the issue. By fortifying them — which American military commanders see as a latent military threat to U.S. forces in the region — Beijing has provoked a particularly fierce U.S. reaction, though these are obviously waters relatively close to China, but many thousands of miles from the continental United States.
From Beijing, the strategic outlook articulated by Secretary Mattis, as well as Admirals Harris and Davidson, is clearly viewed — and not without reason — as threatening and as evidence of Washington’s master plan to surround China, confine it, and prevent it from ever achieving the regional dominance its leaders Tikėti is its due as the rising great power on the planet. To the Chinese leadership, changing PACOM’s name to the Indo-Pacific Command will just be another signal of Washington’s determination to extend its unprecedented military presence westward from the Pacific around Southeast Asia into the Indian Ocean and so further restrain the attainment of what it sees as China’s legitimate destiny.
However Chinese leaders end up responding to such strategic moves, one thing is certain: they will not view them with indifference. On the contrary, as challenged great powers have always done, they will undoubtedly seek ways to counter America’s containment strategy by whatever means are at hand. These may not initially be overtly military or even obvious, but in the long run they will certainly be vigorous and persistent. They will include efforts to compete with Washington in pursuit of Asian allies — as seen in Beijing’s fervent prašymas Filipinų prezidento Rodrigo Duterte ir užtikrinti nauji baziniai susitarimai abroad, possibly under the pretext, as in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, of establishing commercial shipping terminals. All of this will only add new tensions to an already anxiety-inducing relationship with the United States. As ever more warships from both countries patrol the region, the likelihood that accidents will occur, mistakes will be made, and future military clashes will result can only increase.
With the possibility of war with North Korea fading in the wake of the recent Singapore summit, one thing is guaranteed: the new U.S. Indo-Pacific Command will only devote itself ever more fervently to what is already its one overriding priority: preparing for a conflict with China. Its commanders insist that they do not seek such a war, and believe that their preparations — by demonstrating America’s strength and resolve — will deter the Chinese from ever challenging American supremacy. That, however, is a fantasy. In reality, a strategy that calls for a “steady drumbeat” of naval operations aimed at intimidating China in waters near that country will create ever more possibilities, however unintended, of sparking the very conflagration that it is, at least theoretically, designed to prevent.
Right now, a Sino-American war sounds like the plotline of some half-baked dystopian novel. Unfortunately, given the direction in which both countries (and their militaries) are heading, it could, in the relatively near future, become a grim reality.
Michaelas T. Klare, a TomDispatch reguliarus, yra Hampšyro koledžo taikos ir pasaulio saugumo studijų profesorius ir neseniai autorius Lenktynės dėl to, kas liko. Jo knygos dokumentinio filmo versija Kraujas ir aliejus galima gauti iš Media Education Foundation. Sekite jį „Twitter“ adresu @mklare1.
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