On Russia’s state television channels, there was hysteria. Astonished viewers, plunged into a cold war atmosphere, learned that neighbouring Ukraine was experiencing a coup d’état planned by foreign spy services. The enemies were so cunning that they had organized violations of the electoral regulations, provoking demonstrations by the opposition. The aim of all this was to bring the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power instead of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich. If we were to ‘lose’Ukraine, Russia would never again be a great power, the commentators all concluded.
Per rinkimus Rusijos stebėtojai negalėjo nepastebėti daugybės pažeidimų, tačiau susidarė įspūdis, kad juos mato tik Ukrainos vakaruose, kur neva rinkimai buvo klastojami Juščenkos naudai. Iš tikrųjų Ukraina, skirtingai nei Rusija, yra ne federacija, o unitarinė valstybė, kurioje vietos administracijos pavaldžios prezidentui. Prieš antrąjį balsavimo turą prezidentas Kučma pakeitė administracijų vadovus provincijose, kuriose laimėjo opozicija. Taigi pažeidimai iš esmės palankūs valdžiai ne tik rytuose, bet ir vakaruose.
Of course, it does not follow from this that the opposition was entirely blameless. Quite the reverse; in the second round the opposition bloc clearly sought to match the government’s fraud with its own ‘counterfraud’, using the same detached coupons and multiple voting. Compared to the officials of the presidential administration, however, the opposition had incomparably fewer opportunities for administrative trickery. Moreover, the tactic of ‘counterfraud’ spurred the authorities to make still more efforts to ensure the result they wanted, to the point where the whole procedure became farcical.
The Ukrainian elections were no longer like those in Russia, but like somewhere in Nigeria, featuring violence, the exclusion of observers, and control by clan chieftains over the actions of voters on ‘their’territory. Yanukovich finally gained the number of votes he needed, but his victory was Pyrrhic. Not only did the opposition take to the streets, but it had obvious moral and political grounds for refusing to accept the election results.
Ordinary Russians have followed these events far more cynically, not paying much attention to the propaganda, but gradually being drawn into observing their neighbours. From Moscow, the elections in Ukraine seem like an entertaining reality show, with millions of participants and an unprecedented fund of prizes. Despite the propaganda hysteria (and perhaps because of it), the opposition has aroused growing sympathy.
Tezės apie proamerikietiškos opozicijos kovą su promaskvietišku politiniu elitu neatlaiko ir nuolat kartojamų teiginių apie ukrainakalbių vakarų ir rusakalbių Rytų susidūrimą. Juščenka neabejotinai yra proamerikietiškas politikas. Tačiau tą patį galima pasakyti ir apie dabartinius Ukrainos respublikos valdovus. Būtent dabartinis prezidentas Leonidas Kučma kartu su premjeru Viktoru Janukovičiumi išsiuntė Ukrainos pajėgas į Iraką. Tie patys du lyderiai suvaldė absurdišką Rusijos ir Ukrainos santykių krizę dėl užtvankos šalia mažytės Tuzlos salos. Tuo tarpu nemažai opozicijos politikų kritikavo kariuomenės siuntimą, kaip ir komunistai, kurie atsisakė remti bet kurią pusę dabartiniame konflikte.
Same day as Ukrainian Supreme Court voted to cancel the results of the second ballot in presidential election, Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovnaya Rada) voted to pull troops out of Iraq. This was a major defeat of US policy in Ukraine, which became possible only because of a political crisis in this country. All earlier attempts to achieve parliamentary majority against intervention failed. This time majority was achieved because Communists and Socialists were joined by many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina'(Yushenko party) but also by some defectors from the pro-government camp. At the same time many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina’as well as Yanukovich supporters voted against the proposal or abstained.
American financial support for Yushenko is quite visible. However one can easily discover that most sponsors who contributed to his campaign also contributed generously to Kerry’s campaign (Soros, National Democratic Institute etc.). Republican funding for Yushenko was almost symbolic. There was also a lot of Western European and especially German money. But ironically, some of the biggest contributions came from Russia ‘ notably from those business groups who were not satisfied by privatization deals offered by Yanukovich and expected to rerun the process. These expectations were not unjustified.
Soon after electoral rerun was announced Yushenko promised to cancel some privatization deals fixed by the previous regime. Don’t expect anything to be returned to the public. Yushenko plans a big process, Yukos style, in which some politically incorrect oligarchs will go to jail and their property will be reprivatized.
Lygiai taip pat klaidingi yra bandymai suskaldyti Ukrainos visuomenę kalbinėmis linijomis. Sostinė Kijevas yra opozicijos tvirtovė, nors gatvėse dažniausiai girdima rusų kalba. Rusijos kultūros centru Ukrainoje laikomame Charkove vyko masinės demonstracijos. Donecke ir kituose pramoniniuose miestuose surengtos valdžios palaikymo akcijos priminė sovietmečio demonstracijas, į kurias buvo varomi su lazdomis. Kalbėjo daugiausia profesinių sąjungų pareigūnai ir administracijos pareigūnai, o darbuotojai pasinaudojo pirmąja galimybe išvykti į savo namus. Nepaisant tvirtinimų, kad tūkstančiai kalnakasių bus atvežti į Kijevą kovoti su opozicija, valdžia sugebėjo parodyti tik kelias dešimtis Donecko gangsterių su netinkamais kalnakasių šalmais ir grupe puošniai apsirengusių kazokų.
With the help of Soviet-style methods, the ruling oligarchy is still able to control the industrial zones of the east, but it is incapable of mobilising mass popular support. Moreover, it is afraid of real demonstrations by the miners. If large numbers of miners were to take to the streets, this would amount to the very strike for which the opposition has been calling. Also, there are no guarantees that the bosses and bureaucrats around Yanukovich would be able to keep workers under their control.
Mažiausiai Rusijos vadovybę galima pavadinti antiamerikietiška ar antivakarietiška. Ne kas kitas, o Rusijos prezidentas Vladimiras Putinas lapkritį vyksiančiuose JAV rinkimuose viešai pareiškė palaikantis George'ą Bushą. Tuo pat metu, kai Maskvos televizija smerkė amerikiečių kišimąsi į Ukrainą, gynybos ministras Sergejus Ivanovas su žurnalistais diskutavo apie galimybę siųsti ginklus į Iraką JAV kontroliuojamoms Irako pajėgoms, taip pat siųsti karinius ekspertus. Vokietija, Prancūzija ir kitos Europos šalys atmetė tokio tipo amerikiečių prašymus.
The logic of the Cold War might have been justified when a clash of two systems was involved. But for a good while now Russia and the West have shared the same capitalist system, and the axis of opposition in world politics has not been rivalry between NATO and the Eastern bloc (which ceased to exist fifteen years ago), but rivalry between the blocs of the Euro and the Dollar. In this contest, the Kremlin leadership is quite unable to decide where it stands. It tries clumsily to manoeuvre between Brussels and Washington, but in such a way as to bang its head first on one side, then on the other, dooming itself to a series of one-sided concessions to each of the contending groups. The Kremlin goes unrewarded for these concessions, since any shifts it makes in the direction of Berlin or Paris are immediately cancelled out by its demonstrative expressions of loyalty to Washington.
It is also unclear how Russia in 2004 might ‘lose’Ukraine. After all, our own state long ago recognised Ukrainian independence. If we are talking not of control but of Russian political, moral and cultural influence on the neighbouring republic, it would be hard to think of any worse means for achieving this than what the Kremlin has done in recent months. If someone had set out deliberately to undermine Russia’s position in Ukrainian society, he or she could scarcely have achieved more than the Kremlin administration has managed through its work with Kuchma and Yanukovich. The Kremlin has not only shocked everyone with its crude and unconcealed meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state, but more importantly, has done this so ineptly that it has finished up harming its own cause.
Most comic of all has been the way Putin, addressing journalists in Portugal, called on them not to use ‘scarecrows’from Cold War times, even though his own propagandists have been doing this. Putin’s speeches on the topic of Ukraine betray his confusion. On one occasion he will adopt an extremely aggressive tone, hinting at the evil intent of the West; then he will try to justify himself to these same Westerners, explaining that he congratulated Yanukovich not as the new president, but (and this is something absolutely new in world diplomacy) ‘on the basis of the results of the exit polls’.
Politinės kovos Ukrainoje statymai yra milžiniški, įskaitant Kremlių. Tačiau šie statymai neturi nieko bendra su nacionaliniais interesais ar su jau seniai pasibaigusia komunistinių Rytų ir buržuazinių Vakarų kova. Pusiau nusikalstami klanai, kurie privatizavimo metu užgrobė ne tik pramonės Rytų Ukrainoje, bet ir gyventojų kontrolę, palaiko glaudžius ryšius su Maskvoje viešpataujančiomis biurokratinėmis-oligarchinėmis grupuotėmis.
These groups are united not only by business links, but also by a common fear: that sooner or later they will have to answer for the plunder of their countries’ collective wealth, for the rigging of elections, and for the suppression of political freedoms. For precisely this reason, the rise to power of the opposition in Ukraine will set an ominous example for Russia’s new elites, even if this Kiev opposition is extremely moderate, promising neither nationalisation nor a redistribution of incomes.
Rusijos sostinė pradeda didžiulę ekspansiją Ukrainoje. Prasidėjo derybos dėl telekomunikacijų įmonių, metalurgijos gamyklų ir net alaus daryklų pirkimo. Donecko klanai, susivieniję aplink Janukovičių, turi išlaikyti valdžią, kad suplanuoti sandoriai vyktų sklandžiai.
The Western political elites as well are thinking far more strategically. While Moscow commentators continually cite the ousting of the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia as an example of a secret American plan providing backing for a democratic revolution, the past also contains other instances in which democratic revolutions have received support from Washington – in the Philippines against the dictator Marcos, and in Indonesia against the decades-long rule of the armed forces. In all these cases, as in Georgia, the US supported the overthrow of a pro-American regime.
Jokio paradokso čia nėra. Valdančiojo elito krizė turi objektyvų pobūdį, visiškai atskirtą nuo Vašingtono intrigų. Viskas, ką daro JAV diplomatija, tai realiai pasverti esamą situaciją, o tada, užuot ėmusis poziciją akivaizdžiai pralaimėjusioje pusėje, iš opozicijos atrinkti naujus ir perspektyvesnius partnerius. JAV tokiais atvejais svarbu užtikrinti, kad naujajai vadovybei atėjus į valdžią, nagrinėjamos šalies užsienio politikos kursas išliktų toks, koks buvo anksčiau. Kitaip tariant, Vašingtonas remia demokratines revoliucijas turėdamas vienintelį tikslą: išnaudoti joms jų radikalų potencialą.
In this situation, the impotence of the Ukrainian left is especially tragic. In condemning both candidates, the Communist Party of Ukraine has taken an irreproachable position from an ideological point of view. This position, however, has not been followed by independent action; instead, the Communist Party has simply vanished from the political scene.
Many of the party’s supporters acknowledge that this situation is lamentable. Hence we read on a leading communist website: ‘The working class and its party have been unable to act as an independent political force, as an organised, conscious subject of the historical process. It has not been communists who have led the working class, but the bourgeoisie with its candidates and organisations. This is simply a fact. Meanwhile, the communists have been driven onto the sidelines of the struggle, forced into the position of onlookers, incapable of influencing the outcome in any way.'(http:///www.communist.ru/lenta/index.php?10168).
On the moral level, the authorities have already lost the struggle in Ukraine. The only way they could restore their political control would be to resort to violence on a scale tantamount to catastrophe. The agreement on new elections reached between the authorities and the opposition will, if fulfilled, merely ensure a smoother and more legitimate handover of power.
Kas laimės, viena pagrindinių Ukrainos krizės aukų bus Vladimiras Putinas. Atvirai remdamas Ukrainos režimą, investuodamas į jį didelius pinigų kiekius, siųsdamas jam visą armiją patarėjų ir politinių dėstytojų, Kremlius rizikavo mainais gauti tik problemų. Net jei Janukovičius laimės, jo pagrindinis rūpestis bus santykių su Vakarais atkūrimas. Susitikime su Europos Sąjunga Hagoje V. Putinas turės bandyti pasiteisinti, netekdamas paskutinių autoriteto šukių. Svarbiausia, kad prieš savo žmones, ginkluotąsias pajėgas ir policiją Rusijoje jis dar kartą parodė, kad yra silpnas ir nekompetentingas politikas. O Rusijoje silpnieji nevyrauja.