This essay continues an ideology sequence excerpted from the book, Liberating Theory, which myself, Leslie Cagan, Noam Chomsky, Robin Hahnel, Mel King, Lydia Sargent, and Holly Sklar co-wrote. The prior What Is To Be Undone part of the whole ideology sequence presented and rejected Classical Marxism, Leninism, and the Bolshevik Revolution as useful guides for activism. It went publicly unchallenged. There was no rejection of the rejection. No Marxist said my rejection of dialectics and historical materialism was a horrible deviation from revolutionary reason. No Leninist obliterated my account of Lenin’s and Trotsky’s Bolshevism and my aggressive rejection of Leninist strategy.

Like all serious political and social activists, Classical Marxists and Leninists advocate what they deem ideologically useful and critique what they deem ideologically harmful. They are rarely reticent to defend their views. They are generally eager to reject contrary views. But not in this case. Why?

This ideology sequence is about the debits and virtues of theory, vision, and strategies we might use when working to stop Trump, stop fascism, stop ecological collapse and move toward new fundamental kinship, cultural, political, and economic relations for a liberated future. Here is Liberating Theory’s chapter that addresses society’s kinship, gender, and sex relations. It starts:

In our framework from forty years ago, every society has a kinship sphere which significantly determines interactions among men, women, and children. Kinship activity revolves around sexuality, procreation, child rearing, socialization, maturation, and aging. Where community, discussed last episode, focuses on language, art, ritual, and intercommunity relations, kinship focuses on the human life cycle and interpersonal relations.

The resulting kin relations not only define sexual norms, but also how children are socialized to become adult lovers, mothers, fathers, wives, husbands, uncles, aunts and so on. The kinship sphere thus sets role requirements for participation in sexual interaction and socialization and also divides people into important gender groups, just as economic relations, for example, divide people into classes.

I interject from 2026:  Remember, please, that Liberating Theory was written 40 years ago. It was up to date—so to speak—at that time regarding the essentials of feminist thinking. There has been more feminist thinking since, of course, but I think the underlying elements have persisted. At any rate, the book indicates how the seven authors then thought about kinship and offers views they were then eager to pursue as part of a larger conceptual toolbox they hoped to use in analyzing events and trends and developing vision and strategy. 

The 1986 chapter continued: It is true we are born either male or female and that biological differences alone determine who can and who cannot bear children and breast feed. But in and of itself the biological difference between being male and female determines little else. It does not determine how passive or aggressive we will be in sexual encounters. It does not determine whether we will be more attracted to members of the male or female sex. It does not determine whether we will be more proficient at “nurturing” others or at manipulating abstract concepts. It does not even alone determine one’s height, weight, or density, although there are statistically significant differences between male and female averages in these areas. Nor does being male or female alone determine strength, speed or endurance, although, here too, even with other influences equal, we might find statistically significant differences in male and female averages.

The point is that sexual biology dictates a particular “division of labor” in only two regards: giving birth and breast feeding. Beyond this, it has long since become an elementary truth, at least for informed critics of entrenched oppressive relations, that all other gender relations are socially established. What’s more, in every case where differences exist between what men and women do—including the bearing of children—the meanings given these differences are socially defined. But let us investigate this a bit further.

Socially created kin categories define particular roles in the social activity of reproduction, specify gender qualifications for filling the various roles and, most important, determine the social meaning and value associated with the different roles. The social relativity of all this must be recognized. For instance, what it means to be a “father” or “mother” can differ from society to society. The kin category of “godmother” or “maternal uncle” may be important in one society but not even defined in another. Even the degree to which “blood” relations mean more or less in a society depends on the extent to which important kinship functions are carried out by “blood” or “non-blood” “relatives.” If, for example, children are reared by unrelated nannies or other surrogate caretakers, biological motherhood and fatherhood may be of reduced significance from the point of view of kinship roles. What it means to be “heterosexual,” “homosexual,” or “bisexual”—and whether it carries any broad social significance—also varies from society to society.

How people interact with one another in kinship activity is established by the kinship institutions of the institutional boundary and the patterns developed in the human center. Every society has a kinship structure in which people engage in kinship activity and interact within the contours of families, extended families, sexual communities and sub-communities, and whatever other institutions exist in the kinship sphere. As a result, everyone identifies, in part, according to kin categories. We see ourselves as men or women (not always according to biological criteria), as having particular sexual preferences, and as being parent, child, sibling, or grandparent. Each identification affects how we view ourselves and other people and what needs and interests we develop. To the extent that kinship categories differ in different societies, the pattern of interests and needs they generate will vary as well. There is almost nothing genetic about all this. Since no specific role pattern and no particular rule of sexual assignment is biologically determined, each society must determine roles and assignments through a social process.

For this reason we can justifiably ask whether any particular set of kinship relations promotes equitable and fulfilling human socialization or whether it restricts people’s ability to fulfill all that their biological potential allows. Kinship relations are not “God-given,” or “nature-given,” but historical. If a particular set fulfills us, we can celebrate its virtues. If a particular set oppresses us, we can struggle to change it.

In spite of the many different kinds of kinship relations that have existed in different societies, there has been a remarkable continuity regarding a few important features of most kinship systems of which we have any knowledge. Since one critical kind of domination relation that has plagued human history is the domination of men over women, patriarchy, or male supremacy, has appeared as a key feature of most kinship systems to date.

“Patriarchy” is the name for any kinship system in which the role divisions between gender groups grant fewer duties and more benefits from kinship activity to men than women. “Sexism,” refers broadly to the mindset and behavior associated with and supporting patriarchy. In the words of Adrienne Rich, quoted earlier: “Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men—by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male…. Under patriarchy, I may live in purdah or drive a truck;… I may serve my husband his early-morning coffee within the clay walls of a Berber village or march in an academic procession; whatever my status or situation, my derived economic class, or my sexual preference, I live under the power of the fathers, and I have access only to so much of privilege or influence as the patriarchy is willing to accede to me, and only for so long as I will pay the price for male approval.”

Labeling a society “patriarchal” tells us that its gender relations are oppressive to women while they give power to men. Kate Millett writes: “Our society, like all other historical civilizations, is a patriarchy. The fact is evident at once if one recalls that the military, industry, technology, universities, science, political office, and finance—in short, every avenue of power within the society, including the coercive force of the police, is in male hands.”

But to label a society “patriarchal” is not comprehensive. The label fits most historical kinship forms, just as the label “class-divided” applies to feudal, slave, capitalist, and “state-socialist” economies. Calling a society “patriarchal” tells us that men dominate women, but little about the particular forms and mechanisms this relationship takes. To do better, we need more refined concepts to distinguish different types of patriarchy, just as the concepts “feudal” and “capitalist” distinguish different types of class divided societies. But, to date, feminists do not agree about how to make these finer distinctions and we will not attempt to do so here.

Patriarchal societies are characterized universally by a sexual division of labor and reward. This division has many elements of varying impact. For example, inheritance is generally man-centered, women generally take men’s names when they marry, women generally do less public tasks, women’s rewards in the form of wages and status are lower than men’s, sexual expectations are differentiated, and so on. But most important in the analyses of many feminists is that in patriarchal societies women “mother” and men “father.” Though this difference may seem obvious—of course women mother, mothers are women; of course men father, fathers are men—the fact of the matter is that “mothering” and “fathering” are social roles that both men and women are biologically capable of fulfilling. Mothering and fathering are two aspects of “parenting” which have been divided from one another and “gender-identified” to enforce social and personality divisions that would otherwise be absent. Why men do not often mother, and why women do not often father must be explained by social and historical reasons.

In traditional terms, “mother” means the female parent. But “to mother” means to provide nurturance and to care for and care about. To mother means to see the tasks of cleaning, loving, and teaching a child as one’s personal priority, and to organize one’s life, in large part, around their successful accomplishment. Mothering is a full time job. By equating “mother” and female, and “to mother” and a particular set of responsibilities and inclinations, our use of words says that women are by nature inclined toward certain types of (what we then label) “feminine” behaviors.

In contrast, in traditional terms, “father” means the male parent. But “to father” refers to a modest role that involves disciplining, playing, and sometimes teaching. Fathering doesn’t require constant attentiveness and is not nearly so central to one’s identity as mothering. One fathers a few minutes or hours a day, and frequently not for days at a time. “To father” is never more than a part time job. Identifying men with “father” and “father” with these limited responsibilities only minimally augments our understanding of what men are. This view says that men are by nature inclined toward certain types of (what we then label) “masculine” behaviors which are socially assertive and outgoing but with the nurturant element sublimated. Moreover, these divisions are communicated to children as well. As Nancy Chodorow argues in The Reproduction of Mothering: “…the contemporary reproduction of mothering … is neither a product of biology nor of intentional role training … women as mothers produce daughters with mothering capabilities and the desire to mother … [and] men whose nurturant capacities have been … suppressed. The sexual and familiar division of labor in which women mother and are more involved in interpersonal, affective relationships … produces in daughters and sons a division of psychological capacities which leads them to reproduce this … division of labor.”

Yet, none of this is biologically inevitable. It is perfectly possible to conceive of a society where women father and men mother, or, preferably, in which women and men both “parent.” Likewise, the social status and power derived from mothering, fathering, or parenting is not inherent in the roles themselves, but results from social factors. There is nothing inconceivable about a society in which women only mother and in which men only father, maintaining a gender division of labor, but in which it is women who garner higher status and social power than men from this difference, thus reversing the order of the hierarchy.

However, as biologically feasible as the above possibilities might be, none have occurred frequently—or perhaps even at all—in the human history we know. And the discovery that females “mother” and males “father” in all known patriarchal societies is highly suggestive: one foundation for male domination of women is probably the “binding” of women to mothering which “frees” men to focus their attention on non-household activities that are in turn awarded greater social status. And even beyond freeing men for more valued social activities, the different psychological dynamics of mothering and fathering produce profound differences between the psychologies of men and women, and these in turn have broad implications for the ability of men and women to achieve social recognition in a patriarchal society.

The personality traits corresponding to mothering and fathering become equated with what it is to be a man or a woman in a society where women mother and men father. Thus one basis for differential esteem in all social roles—not just the roles of mothering and fathering—is their relative demand for personality traits associated with mothering or fathering. It follows then, that even when mothers get out of the home they are seriously handicapped in competing for esteemed roles in patriarchal societies.

In this way the asymmetry between men’s and women’s parenting roles extends to the entire social division of labor. In patriarchal societies some tasks are deemed “female” and others “male.” Female tasks include cleaning, tidying, cooking, serving, and certain forms of exhibitionism, which all then appear to be as deserving of low esteem as the job of wife and mother they resemble. Male tasks include making war, governing, and producing whatever are considered the more “important” economic goods in the more “serious” and “important” ways.

Women might be allowed to succeed not only as mothers and housekeepers, but also in other sexually defined roles like nurses, teachers, actresses, or models. The specific sexual division of labor may differ from society to society and generation to generation, but women dominated fields are by definition lower-status. For example, in the United States, bank tellers and clerks had much higher status before they became female-dominated fields, with clerks transformed into secretaries. In the Soviet Union, the majority of doctors are women, but the status of the field is relatively low.

In sum, the differential human consequences of mothering and fathering and their full social extension—rather than any important biological differences between the sexes—can result in more or less differentiated male and female “modes” of existence. How we perceive and interact with the world, the kind of emotions we have and the extent to which we relate to them, and even the way we walk and talk can all come to depend on whether we adhere to the male or female “mode” of being. It follows that in order to help activists properly understand any society it is essential that among other accomplishments “liberating theory” provides concepts able to reveal the ways in which men’s and women’s lives differ, and, if patriarchy is present, what its implications are and how it is enforced and reproduced. And, in that light, an additional critical dimension of kinship relations and manifestations of patriarchy has to do with sexuality and sexual preference.

Heterosexism is the oppression of gays and lesbians and the belief that heterosexuality is superior to homosexuality. Homophobia refers specifically to anger at and the dread of homosexuality, but it is also used loosely to define heterosexist behavior, subtle or overt.

In The Homosexualization of America, Dennis Altman writes: “It is not uncommon to hear calls for castration and even the death penalty for homosexuals among some fundamentalists… The language of homophobia is remarkable for its vehemence (why was homosexuality and not rape or murder long seen as ‘the unmentionable and abominable crime’?), and its frequency—Anglo-Celtic slang, in particular, is full of references to homosexuality: ‘cocksucker,’ ‘bugger,’ ‘pansy,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘poofter’ are all common terms of abuse—is striking, as if the constant reiteration of homosexual words and references will somehow ward off the reality. Most clearly, homophobes constantly speak as if homosexuality were contagious and place great stress on ‘protecting’ children from any contact with homosexuals: it is hard to explain logically how homosexuality can at the same time be ‘disgusting’ and ‘unnatural,’ and yet so attractive that only the most severe sanctions will prevent its becoming rampant.”

In “coming out,” gay men and lesbians may risk bodily harm (“gay bashing” and rape), involuntary hospitalization in a mental institution, excommunication by the church, rejection by friends and family, dismissal from the job, eviction and, since another manifestation of heterosexism is the idea that gay men and lesbians do not and should not have children, loss of custody of children. Lesbian mothers, in particular, have fought and lost many a custody battle with former male spouses. In Boston, in 1985, two gay male foster parents had their foster children removed from their care, and the Massachusetts State Legislature passed a bill that ensures that surviving partners of gay couples who have children may find they have no parental rights with the death of the biological or adoption parent, even if they have been named the legal guardian.

In the United States, homophobia and heterosexism cross all community lines. Black nationalists have variously defined homosexuality as a ‘white man’s disease,’ a ‘decadent’ manifestation of cultural decay, or ‘genocide.’ Cherrie Moraga writes of both sexism and heterosexism within Chicano culture and la familia: “We believe the more severely we protect the sex roles within the family, the stronger we will be as a unit in opposition to the anglo threat…Living under Capitalist Patriarchy, what is true for ‘the man’ in terms of misogyny is, to a great extent, true for the Chicano. He, too, like any other man, wants to be able to determine how, when, and with whom his women—mother, wife, and daughter—are sexual. For without male imposed social and legal control of our reproductive function, reinforced by the Catholic Church, and the social institutionalization of our roles as sexual and domestic servants to men, Chicanas might very freely ‘choose’ to do otherwise, including being sexually independent from and/or with men. In fact, the forced ‘choice’ of the gender of our sexual/love partner seems to precede the forced ‘choice’ of the form (marriage and family) that partnership might take. The control of women begins through the institution of heterosexuality.”

Understanding the relationships that define sexuality and people’s reactions to different sexual preferences is part of understanding the basic defining relations of any society. Later we will return to this issue to ask whether the concept of a “kinship sphere” provides a sufficient starting point for these necessary analyses or whether instead we need to introduce still another basic defining sphere of social life based on sexuality itself.

All feminists agree that the kinship sphere radiates important influences which pervade all other aspects of social life. Feminists recognize that work, politics, and cultural activity are always carried out by people who are gender-defined so that the patriarchal division of society doesn’t stop at the bedroom or kitchen door. Feminists note how the differences between men and women’s appointed kinship activities generate different presuppositions about who they are and what their attitudes and behaviors will be which then affect all their activity. And feminists challenge the assumption that some kinds of jobs are “naturally” suited to men and others to women, arguing that the differential rewards they receive are not simply the “natural” outcome of competitive market forces.

But “radical feminists” have gone further and transformed their insights into a sex-based monist theory in which the kinship sphere is presumed to dominate all other aspects of social life. For radical feminists, the kinship sphere becomes “base” and all else “superstructure.” Patriarchal domination and gender struggle become the fundamental differentiation against which all other social differentiations must be interpreted. As Robin Morgan expressed the view: “…sexism is the root oppression, the one which, until and unless we uproot it, will continue to put forth the branches of racism, class hatred, ageism, competition, ecological disaster, and economic exploitation. No other human differentiations can be similarly powerful in reproducing oppressions,” and so, Morgan concludes, “women are the real Left.”

Shulamith Firestone summarizes the radical feminist position by paraphrasing Engels: “[Feminist] materialism is that view…of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all historic events in the dialectics of sex; the division of society into two distinct biological classes for procreative reproduction; and the struggles of these classes…in changes in the modes of marriage, reproduction, and childcare…in the first division of labor based on sex…[and] in the connected development of other physically differentiated classes [castes]…which [develop] into the [economic/cultural] class system.”

Despite the fact that some of the sharpest insights of the feminist movement have come from radical feminism, the reductionist premise radical feminism involves is no more justified or less debilitating than the reductionist premise of cultural nationalism discussed earlier. Radical feminists underestimate the importance of other spheres of social activity and other forms of domination. They overlook the profound influence of other spheres of social life on kinship relations themselves. They often over-exaggerate the influence of kinship relations on the rest of society.

Radical feminists underestimate the extent to which a working class woman, for example, is affected by her class experience as well as her gender experience. Radical feminists also minimize the extent to which the gender experience of a working class woman is different from the gender experience of an upper class woman. Similarly, a black lesbian has both racial and gender experiences that differ substantially from those of a white lesbian. Yet all these differences are obscured by a monist feminist framework. To deal with them it is essential that feminist concepts leave room to incorporate influences from other spheres of social life.

Feminists rightly assert that history is a history of gender struggle, both because gender divisions are the basis of a primary domination relation and because gender norms permeate class, political, and cultural relations. But we have already argued that history is a history of community struggle. And we will soon see that it is equally true that history is a history of class struggle and a history of political struggle—for precisely the same reasons that it is a history of gender struggle. 

There is nothing inconsistent in these claims. Instead, it is a myopic monist viewpoint that makes complementary insights appear incompatible and undermines the possibility of solidarity among diverse movements with different primary agendas. A rightful feminist critique of the ways that other monist approaches neglect gender can wrongly grow into dismissal of the importance of other facets of left thought and practice as, for example, in the following passage from Adrienne Rich: “For many of us, the word ‘revolution’ itself has become not only a dead relic of Leftism, but a key to the deadendedness of male politics: the ‘revolution’ of a wheel which returns in the end to the same place; the ‘revolving door’ of a politics which has ‘liberated’ women only to use them, and only within the limits of male tolerance.”

To develop a workable “liberating theory” in coming chapters we must incorporate the insights of feminism into a broader conceptual framework which retains the integrity of the gender focus and equally highlights the impact of forces from other spheres throughout society and within kinship as well.

Depending on the particular pattern of kinship institutions and relations, sexual needs can be developed and molded in different ways—leading to more or less satisfaction or frustration—and children can be socialized to different patterns of adult roles through different systems of assigned duties, obligations, and prerogatives—characterized by more or less repression of their potential. So every kinship system implies not only “How does it work?” questions, but “How well does it work?” questions too: How well does the system develop and satisfy human sexual potentials? How little of children’s initiative and creativity is repressed in the process of socialization?

It is true men are pressured to narrow their psychological development to accord with a patriarchal definition of what a “man” should be, specifically stunting nurturing capacities and ways of relating to their own emotions, other people, and even the physical universe, as they hone their “masculinity.” So it is also true that patriarchy entails a loss of potential sexual and social satisfaction for all men. But as we found when examining the consequences of racism for dominant and subordinate communities, patriarchy’s suppression and warping of human potentials is not symmetrical for men and women. As in all domination relations, although both parties are disfigured, the greatest burden of the system falls clearly on the subordinate group—in this case women in general, the young, the old, gay men, and lesbians.

But kinship structures are not frozen in time. Kinship systems can be thought of as kinds of dissipative systems in which alterations in institutional roles and human characteristics are most often “damped,” in Prigogine’s sense, to remain within defining norms.

Disruptive pressures can come from without, for example when a war draws more women into the work force, new economic products inundate the household with electronic gadgets, or religious upheavals lead to changes in cultural definitions that throw gender definitions into question as well. Or, pressure for change can come from within, for example when new means of birth control radically alter the consequences of sexual activities or when youth rebellion stemming from changing family patterns alters socialization processes. But these are matters we address in coming chapters on society and history.

Lastly, in comparing the kinship sphere to the community sphere—and later to economics and politics—we should recognize that each has pervasive influences on social life. Each defines critical social divisions among people. Each generates critical psychological differences between people. And each has roots in institutional and psychological aspects of society that influence one another and are influenced by other aspects of society as well. Each influences the other and is influenced by the other, and so each affects history in a complex pattern we will better understand as we proceed.

So ended chapter three of Liberating Theory. Here, however, for this excerpt, I include the dialogue which, in the book, appeared only at the end of the whole volume. 

It begins with Coho, the complementary holism advocate, summing up the kinship category: Every society has a socially determined kinship sphere which determines interactions between men and women; the nature of sexuality, childrearing, socialization, and procreation. The character of kinship spheres change over time and interact with and are influenced by economic, political, and community spheres.

Marlen, the Marxist Leninist participant, eager to begin, as usual, replies: I am glad to see, Coho, that you are aware of the profound weaknesses in current feminist thinking. I’ve read much of their literature and while sensitive to their cause, I have always argued against the ahistorical character of feminism. Patriarchy is a constant throughout time; gender dynamics are the motor force of history. Come on. They call me economistic and sex blind but their theory makes them totally blind to class differences.

Nat, the Nationalist participant, adds: Significantly, Marlen, you left out the racist nature of feminism. Most feminist analysis in the literature I’ve read uses the term “woman” the way you, Marlen, use the term “working man.” You’re both describing the experience of “white” women and “white” working men. You don’t address different circumstances for women in different communities, to use Coho’s construct. You’ll never convince women of color that feminists have any real interest in such analyses.

Ana, the anarchist participant responds: Significantly, Nat, you fail to mention that feminism has contributed much to the discussion and practice on non-hierarchical relations and processes. However, feminism has also failed, I think, to pay enough attention to the political sphere, to use Coho’s concept. A great deal of feminism idolizes “female” traits and argues for a separate superior status through institutionalized matriarchies.

C.C., the council communist participant, reacts: Besides, I just can’t see sexuality as a basic part of social theory. When parts of the women’s movement start arguing for homosexuality as the norm, or for heterosexuality as the root of all evil, they leave me behind. Or the other extreme is to elevate motherhood while denigrating lesbianism. To me the nature of sexuality in a society is determined by economic and political structures.

Ana, follows: Most authoritarian societies repress sexuality, legislate “normal sex,” and legislate against homosexuality.

Sofie, the socialist feminist, participant, wondering why she has to listen to all this again, adds: That does it. I hardly know where to begin (Her eyes search the room, finding Marlen): Marlen, your concern for history would be more compelling if you bothered to notice the historical development of thinking in the current women’s movement. Many women are attempting to conceptualize the different forms patriarchy has taken throughout predominantly male-written history.

And what’s so historical about your claims about class struggle? You don’t even look at the changing composition of the working class concept you worship. Nor do you look at changes based on gender conflict or race conflict. Besides while your concern for the working class is touching, what, as Coho has indicated, “socialist” society is run by the working class? Are you really concerned with my a-historicity or with the possibility that you may be dethroned. And by women, no less.

Radfem, the radical feminist participant, on her feet, adds: I find your concern for the plight of black women, Nat, just a bit hypocritical. And if, Nat, you think sexism is a white male construct, and if you think that white culture is so despicable, why then do you copy this sexist construct?

Sofie adds: And as a black woman, I participated in black power organizations and the oppression of black women in those movements belies the sincerity of your concern. Am I going too fast for you?

Radfem: And C.C. I am touched by your comments and support around sexuality and homophobia which has caused the persecution and deaths of large portions of history’s gay communities.

Sofie: And Ana, while I respect the anarchist tradition, I just don’t see how your exclusive focus on authoritarianism is going to help you understand gender differences. If parents are defined generally as authoritarian, what helps you look at the difference between the mother and the father?

Radfem, not to be denied: And Coho, you focus on biological differences as if even mentioning them will result in fascism. Excuse me, but men and women are different biologically. We could debate genes and sizes of brains and other such sociobiology concerns but they only obscure the fact that women have babies. Your theory leads to a culturally imposed bisexual androgynous society. I think there is a male and a female principle which have roots in biology, and that one principle is caring and the other prone to violence. Yes, men can sublimate their maleness, but I think women have got to attain greater influence then men so that the male principle can be kept under control.

Sofie, taken aback: Now hold on, Radfem, I accept the need to explore the concepts of mothering, fathering and so on but I cannot accept a society where “nature as nurture” is the watchword. Your concepts, applied to all of society, relegate men to a form of testosterone-dominated beasthood. You never accepted men’s biological arguments for women’s inferiority, why repeat their mistake by flipping that record over? Your concepts still don’t help explain why women were oppressed in the first place. Why should bearing children make women subordinate?

Radfem: But your dualistic combining of marxism and feminism has no room for understanding sexuality and sexual preference as crucial for female liberation. In fact, they have no place in your homophobic, materialistic approach.

Coho, happy to expand this point, responds: There is something in what both of you say, but, Radfem, by asserting a biological approach, you must also assert that women naturally nurture. Since in your construct, all female-defined activities have become positive, you lead women right back toward monopolizing child-rearing and other similar work. It’s as if we have moved from seeking liberation to trying to redefine our oppression as liberation itself. Moreover, the biological differences argument can lead to other problems.

Radfem: Like what?

Coho: Let’s apply the biological differences focus to the current heated issue of pornography. If men are responsible for all that’s oppressive in society, then pornography is one of the ways in which men maintain the patriarchy—that is, through the threat and practice of violence, particularly sexual, against women and children. What course of action does this analysis require of feminists?

Radfem: Eliminate the entire pornography industry along with rape.

Coho: And all forms of sexual dominance?

Radfem: You won’t get me to say that.

Coho: But you must admit that those kinds of conclusions are inherent to the biological differences argument. And I just can’t go along with it. While I agree, and my theory reflects this, that in a sexist society and in a sexually repressed society, and in a homophobic society, the free expression of sexuality is difficult if not impossible, I cannot agree that pornography, which I define as literature, art, or photography of erotic or sexual acts intended to excite lustful feelings, is inherently evil. That would be like saying because the economy is a male construct and promotes sexism, we should eliminate economics.

Marlen says:  I’m beginning to be impressed, Coho.

Coho: It’s the same thing with spirituality. Because most religions are oppressive in some way does not mean we should do away with spirituality.

Marlen reacts: You lost me.

Coho: This is why I continue to argue vehemently against monist theories. They lead you, Radfem, to ignore the liberatory possibilities of pornography and involve you in alliances with people who are homophobic and erotophobic. And they require you to engage in authoritarian struggles around censorship.

Ana responds: I’m appalled.

Radfem: I begin to see what monist thinking can lead to but I don’t think you’re aware of the dangers of your concepts. They lead you to sacrifice serious attention to violence against women on the altar of a liberal concern for a non-existent freedom of speech.

Coho: I don’t think so. I pursue an end to violence against women without denying that women’s and men’s sexual needs and desires are critical to developing a liberatory society or overlooking the dangers of censorship. If that can be done, why should you object?

Radfem: Because I don’t think it’s possible.

Sofie: I sometimes feel that men will always hold to their own self-interests.

Cyn, our cynical participant, reacts, from the corner: Excuse me but…

Nat interrupts: I knew something was missing from this discussion.

Cyn, more long-suffering than ever, says: I think it is safe to say that each discussion helps build my case. It’s never going to be possible for you all to respect each other’s concerns. You can develop the most sensitive theory, Coho. But when it comes to practice, Marlen’s going to identify with economics and the working class, paying lip service to your other spheres. Radfem will do the same for gender, and so on. Endless fighting until we wear each other down or all give up or become sectarian from the resulting cynicism. I know. I’ve been there.

Coho replies: So have I. We’ve all been there. But you see only those who have become cynical. What about those who haven’t? Besides, do you want to wallow in it forever?

Sofie: Not me.

Radfem: Do we have a choice?

Nat: Wallowing is not part of my human nature.

Ana: Nor mine.

Coho: And on that note, let’s move to the economic sphere.

Marlen: (on the edge of his seat) Finally.

(The others exchange looks as Marlen watches Coho rustle through her papers)

So ends the dialogue. I hope it is becoming clear what the seven authors were up to, forty years ago. In short, accessible chapters, they tried to survey some areas of revolutionary thought, so far community and gender, and still to come economy and polity, to discern the virtues and debits of existing conceptualizations. Then they continued on to try to remove weaknesses and add worthy helpful insights. Their aim was to offer an accessible conceptual toolbox suited to activist inclinations, existing relations, future desires, and means to reach them. A new ideology, if you will. 

So, why am I offering it all in our time? Partly for a time travel look into where we were. But mostly in the belief that the concepts and methods offered then can spur discussions leading to refinements and applications suitable now. 

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