AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: With unprecedented fires, floods and heat waves sweeping the globe, 2018 is on track to be the fourth-hottest year on record. The regions most affected by the disastrous effects of global warming are overwhelmingly not the countries that have contributed the most to climate change. According to the 2018 Global Climate Risk Index released by the public policy group Germanwatch, the nine countries most affected by climate change in the past 20 years are developing nations, including Honduras, Haiti, Burma, Pakistan and Bangladesh. USA Today reports that, quote, “Pakistan contributes less than 1 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases blamed for causing global warming, yet its 200 million people are among the world’s most vulnerable victims of the growing consequences of climate change.” The Indian government says more than 500 people have died as a result of flooding and heavy rains in recent weeks. In Iran, there is a chronic shortage of water, and it’s estimated there is some form of drought in 97 percent of the country.

AMY GOODMAN: Meanwhile, in the U.S., a report by Media Matters found major broadcast networks mentioned climate change just once during the 2-week global heat wave in July, despite reporting on the heat wave at least 127 times. The analysis tracked news reports by ABC, CBS and NBC.

Well, for more, we’re going to Albany, New York, to speak with Rob Nixon, professor in the humanities and environment at Princeton University, author of Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, for which he won a number of awards, including the American Book Award.

Welcome to Democracy Now!, Professor Nixon.

ROB NIXON: Thank you, Nermeen.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about, I mean, this title, Slow Violence? What do mean by it? And relate it to what is happening to the environment in the developing world.

ROB NIXON: Yes. So, by “slow violence,” I mean violence of postponed effects, so violence that typically isn’t recognizable as violence because it’s not spectacular. It may be seen in media terms as drama-deficient. So, just to take one example, something like Agent Orange, where you have a 12-year war in Vietnam, and the casualties are framed by that public perception, but the impacts, the ongoing casualties and public health effects, last for decades and generations. So I think there’s something analogous going on with climate change, is that we have the postponement of the consequences. And so, what we’re looking at, in effect, is a kind of intergenerational theft of the conditions of life itself.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: What do you mean, in the second part of the title of your book? What is “the environmentalism of the poor,” and how does it relate to slow violence?

ROB NIXON: So, you know, I think there’s still a widespread public perception that even if environmentalism is an urgent cause, it’s a relatively elite one, and it is espoused disproportionately by the well-off. And so, what I was trying to do in the course of the book is to bring to the surface some of the genealogies of environmental activism by the poor, who are the people who are most impacted by the fallout of the failures to—global failures to mitigate and forestall climate change effects. And there are these—there’s very long and deep traditions of activism among those who have contributed least, as we’ve been saying, but are most precariously positioned in the front lines of the climate change crisis.

AMY GOODMAN: Let’s turn to one of the most high-profile protests against government inaction on climate change. For the U.N. climate summit in Paris in 2015, Yeb Saño, the former lead climate negotiator for the Philippines, walked more than 900 miles, from Rome to Paris, as part of a People’s Pilgrimage for Climate Action—Saño, again, the top Philippines climate negotiator in 2013, when Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest cyclones in recorded history, devastated the Philippines, killing thousands of people, the devastation coinciding with the 2013 U.N. COP summit in Warsaw, Poland, where Yeb Saño made headlines with an emotional plea for action on climate change.

NADEREV ”YEB” SAÑO: Typhoons such as Haiyan and its impacts represent a sobering reminder to the international community that we cannot afford to delay climate action. Warsaw must deliver on enhancing ambition and should muster the political will to address climate change and build that important bridge towards Peru and Paris. It might be said that it must be poetic justice that the Typhoon Haiyan was so big that its diameter spanned the distance between Warsaw and Paris.

Mr. President, in Doha we asked, “If not us, then who? If not now, then when? If not here, then where?” But here in Warsaw, we may very well ask these same forthright questions. What my country is going through as a result of this extreme climate event is madness. The climate crisis is madness. Mr. President, we can stop this madness right here in Warsaw.

AMY GOODMAN: So that was Yeb Saño, when he was the lead climate negotiator for the Philippines in 2013, speaking in Warsaw. Of course, Democracy Now! was there, covering every COP. The next year, when we were in Lima, Peru, suddenly Yeb Saño was no longer a climate negotiator for the Philippines, and the word was that his outspokenness led to his ouster. But it hasn’t stopped him from being a climate environmentalist, as he continues to march around the environment and for climate action, Rob Nixon.

ROB NIXON: Yes, you know, I think that what we’re seeing—and there was a noticeable shift around 2011 at the Durban climate summit. What we’re seeing is alliances of figures from the Global South. And some of them, as you say, subsequently get ousted. But the creation of alliances of people, say, from small island nations, from mid-level economies, from countries in the Sahel in Africa, some of these countries that are exceedingly vulnerable, getting together and trying to create some kind of choral effect, in an effort to be heard, where the most decisive players, like the U.S. and China, are dragging their feet. So I think that there has been a shift in who is being heard, who is speaking out. And to a very large degree, the U.S. is an outlier, both in the history of institutionalized denial of climate change, the anti-science, the funding of anti-science, and also, clearly, in terms of the consequential character of what U.S. leadership would mean or would have meant.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Rob Nixon, I just want to turn to a couple of the statistics, which are so remarkable, that you’ve cited in terms of the massive disparities of countries that are responsible for—principally responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions and effects. You say California residents burn more gasoline than the 900 million inhabitants of all of Africa. That’s 54 countries combined. Meanwhile, a one-way flight from Los Angeles to New York produces more carbon emissions than the average Nigerian does in a whole year. So, could you elaborate on that and to what extent you think that’s being taken into account at all in discussions of climate change?

ROB NIXON: Right. I think there is an increasing acknowledgment that we need a concerted global effort, but within that concerted global effort we need to accommodate unequal histories of who has contributed to the greenhouse gases historically and who contribute in the present. And so, that is an absolutely critical component of what is an existential crisis for the species.

But what I would emphasize here is that the sort of institutionalized funding—if you like, institutionalized gaslighting—of America around climate science, through the funding by the right of climate skepticism, climate denial and, effectively, the bankrolling of inaction, this has coincided with a period of neoliberal globalization, so going back to, say, the late ’70s. And what we see there is the way in which the exacerbation of the climate crisis is inseparable from rising levels of inequality in society after society. So, I mean, just to take the U.S., we know that around 1980 the disparity between the average wage of a CEO and a worker was something like 1 to 80. That is now in the vicinity of 1 to 280. And this has been replicated in society after society. And so, I do think that we need to think through, simultaneously, the crisis in inequality and the climate crisis, because the people who are in the front lines are the most vulnerable, and typically they have contributed the least, historically, to the problem.

AMY GOODMAN: We want to bring in Nathaniel Rich, as well, to this conversation, writer-at-large for The New York Times Magazine, his piece “Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change” published August 1st in a special edition of The New York Times Magazine dedicated to climate change. It’s just the second time in the magazine’s history that it dedicated an issue to just one article, the story tracking the 10-year period from 1979 to 1989, the decade Nathaniel Rich claims humankind first came to a comprehensive understanding of climate change but failed to address its extreme dangers while there was still time, the story produced with the support of the Pulitzer Center.

Nathaniel, welcome to Democracy Now! It’s great to have you with us.

NATHANIEL RICH: Thanks.

AMY GOODMAN: So, talk about this major piece that you wrote and why you chose this time period, ’79 to ’89.

NATHANIEL RICH: So, by 1979, there is a strong scientific consensus about the fundamental science of climate change. And there were major reports by the—at the highest levels of the government about the problem, and there started to emerge an effort by a handful of scientists and activists and some politicians to move the issue. And over the course of the decade, they developed a plan, which was essentially a global treaty, which would become the IPCC process, and they made steady—if, you know, with some up and downs—progress towards the end of the decade.

And other things that’s significant about that period is that the issue was not a partisan issue. There were prominent Republicans in Congress and in the administration, Republican administrations, who were strongly supportive of a major climate policy. And the fossil fuel industry had not locked arms and coordinated the—what we now see as this history of propaganda, disinformation campaigns, bribing politicians and the entire Republican Party. And so that there was this 10-year period where we came very close to a serious consideration of a binding emissions treaty. And we failed. So I wanted to tell the story of how that came to be and why we didn’t succeed.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, what happened in 1989? Like, what changed so dramatically?

NATHANIEL RICH: So, there’s—I guess the most narrow political answer is that George Bush took the White House, George Bush one. In 1988, he campaigned saying things like, “Those who are worried about the greenhouse effect—solving the greenhouse effect haven’t heard of the White House effect. And when I’m in the White House, we’re going to solve it.” Dan Quayle, in the vice-presidential campaign, also spoke about this. And the head of his EPA, William Reilly, was a strong proponent of the IPCC—beginning the IPCC process.

As they start to meet at the first—the piece ends, essentially, at the first high-level diplomatic meeting, that’s held in the Netherlands, to discuss the idea of emissions reductions and hard targets for the treaty that would become the Rio—or, at the Rio Earth Summit. And within the White House, Governor John Sununu, who was the chief of staff, was very skeptical of the science, had some conspiracy theories about the whole movement, and, essentially, single-handedly won an infighting with William Reilly and others in the administration, and got—made sure that there was no binding target that the U.S. would agree with. And that is the beginning of the derailing. And shortly thereafter, the industry gets involved.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, I’d like to turn to some of the criticism that the piece, The New York Times Magazine piece that you wrote, has received from InsideClimate News, which won a Pulitzer Prize for exposing how Exxon knew fossil fuels caused global warming as early as the 1970s but hid that information from the public. In a series of tweets Wednesday, InsideClimate News wrote, quote, “The tale of U.S. climate inaction spans 70 years and it continues to this day.” In a subsequent tweet, they went on to write, quote, “Once the serious threat of political action to control GHG emissions”—that’s greenhouse gas emissions—”emerged, fossil fuel interests worked hard to undermine the scientific basis for urgent action, using tools like misinformation campaigns and campaign donations. 2) It worked,” they say, unquote. They went on to write, quote, “As early as the 1950s oil companies worked on strategies to sow doubt about science that could lead to regulation of their own air emissions. The Smoke and Fumes committee at the American Petroleum Institute (API), the oil industry’s main lobbyist, worked to discredit the science surrounding smog that its own researchers ultimately confirmed.” So, could you respond to those points?

NATHANIEL RICH: Yeah, I don’t see that as a criticism. Everything you just mentioned is in the article. You know, I don’t expect people to have read a 35-40,000-word article on the day it’s published. But I think—

AMY GOODMAN: So, explain those points.

NATHANIEL RICH: Oh, yeah, sure, absolutely. So, as I write about, you start to see industry, American Petroleum Institute, Exxon—as was well documented in their series, which is fantastic and was a great source for my piece, and I credited them—they start to understand—it’s clear they understand the science, as early as at least the 1950s. And repeatedly, over the decades, they publish re-evaluations of the science, come to the exact same conclusions, which are the same conclusions that have been reached by government scientists and independent scientists and so on, and they don’t take action. And that continues through the ’80s. There are a couple other, you know, details there.

I would distinguish that from the coordinated disinformation campaign, the bribing of scientists, the bribing of politicians, the enormous PR campaigns modeled after the tobacco industry’s efforts. And it’s certainly true that that didn’t really start happening until you get—with force, until you get in the lead-up to the Rio Earth Summit, when there’s the possibility of real action. At that point, what my reporting shows is the White House had already checked out, and there was no real desire within the White House—

AMY GOODMAN: And this was the White House of?

NATHANIEL RICH: Bush.

AMY GOODMAN: George H.W.

NATHANIEL RICH: George H.W. Bush. And so, I don’t dispute any of that. And my point is simply that by the time you get to the end of the ’80s, that the robust effort hasn’t started and that not only did Exxon know and API, but the government knew. There were articles in Time and Life in the 1950s and on through. So this wasn’t a secret. And I think there’s a confusion, even among people who follow the issue fairly closely, that this started with Jim Hansen’s testimony. And Jim Hansen is one of the two main figures in my piece.

AMY GOODMAN: This was in 1988.

NATHANIEL RICH: Sorry, 1998, a hearing during the hottest summer ever and droughts and wildfires.

AMY GOODMAN: James Hansen, a leading climate scientist, who was head of the Goddard—the NASA center for studies on climate.

NATHANIEL RICH: Right. So the piece follows his story going back to the late ’70s. And he was testifying at hearings throughout the decade. And so, there’s a long history that I find actually more damning, that leads up even to that point. So, there was a failure even before industry could then essentially cement the paralysis.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: I think some of the key points that people seem to have taken—climate researchers and activists have taken issue with is that you write, “A common boogeyman today is the fossil-fuel industry, which in recent decades has committed to playing the role of villain with comic-book bravado.” And you also say that the Republican Party cannot be blamed. So, could you explain why—why—

NATHANIEL RICH: I think that’s a bit of a—I wouldn’t say the Republican Party can’t be blamed for the inaction that we’ve seen, of course. I’m not disputing—

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Not recently, but in the period that you cover, ’79 to ’89.

NATHANIEL RICH: Oh, in the period. So, I don’t think it can—

NERMEEN SHAIKH: I mean, that’s when Reagan was in the White House—

NATHANIEL RICH: Yes, absolutely.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: —who’s apparently the most anti-environmentalist administration since Trump.

NATHANIEL RICH: Right. And I think they certainly were anti-environmental. And you saw—and there’s a major part of the piece about when the Reagan administration takes over, and it’s a all-hands-on-deck crisis within the environmental movement and anyone who cares about these issues.

So, no, they were certainly not happy with the idea of environmental regulations. But there was no denying the issue. And there were—you know, they did sign the ozone treaty. Now, there are some corporate pressures that helped along the way. But essentially, by the end of the decade, you have a Republican administration that is making regular public statements in support of signing treaties. You have people within that administration who think it’s going to happen. William Reilly was a—I spoke to at length. And there was—let’s put it this way: There was a much stronger possibility than there has been ever since. And I think that’s an important story that needs to be told.

AMY GOODMAN: And you have, by 1989, these corporations coming together, like Exxon, forming the climate change coalition.

NATHANIEL RICH: Right. And so I have the story of how that happens, which is, after 1988, Hansen testifies. I interviewed the head of the American Petroleum Institute’s environmental section and his boss, the number two in the whole company, who had been the head of the environmental program the whole decade, Bill O’Keefe. And they told me—and they’re very, you know—they don’t equivocate about what happened in the ’90s, and they’re are proud of it.

But they said, after Hansen’s hearing, people started to perk up. There started to be concern. There were 32 bills filed in Congress about climate policy. And they started to hold meetings, informational meetings at API, and similar work was being done at Exxon, to try to formulate a strategy. And that was the beginning of a hard turn. But there were—you know, it progressed. Originally, it was, “Let’s make sure to highlight uncertainty. Let’s make sure to be a participant in any conversation about regulation. And let’s make sure not to endorse any policy that hurts the bottom line.” So you see the formation of it. But then it gets into pure fantasy, denialism and all of that. And that’s a story that’s been very well told, and I felt like there was—by great reporters, and I didn’t feel like I could add anything to that narrative. But I did feel like I could add something to the prehistory of that.