[From Z Magazine, October 2002]
In November 1975 Morocco invaded the Western Sahara before Spain -the colonial power -could hold an overdue referendum on Sahrawi (i.e., Western Saharan) self-determination.
The month before the invasion saw the release of two key findings: the International Court of Justice’s rejection of Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara and a UN visiting mission’s conclusion that "there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the territory in favor of independence and opposing integration with any neighboring country."
The invading Moroccan forces’ brutality caused a majority of Sahrawis to flee to Tindouf, Algeria, where the Sahrawi liberation movement, the Frente Polisario (the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and the Rio de Oro), was allowed to set up a government in exile. Today more than 165,000 highly organized Sahrawi refugees live near Tindouf, surviving on dwindling international aid.
In 1991 a ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario took hold and the United Nations Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) began work on a plebiscite on self-determination that has yet to take place, largely due, as critics charge, to Morocco’s unwillingness to hold a referendum it will never win under truly free and fair conditions.
Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He also serves as a senior policy analyst and Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project and as a research associate at the Center for Global, International and Regional Studies at the University of California–Santa Cruz. He is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press). I talked with him recently about the situation in Western Sahara.
MUNDY: The story of the Western Sahara is that Morocco’s King Hassan II seized the Western Sahara with his 350,000 civilian-strong Green March, just shortly after Spain vacated its colonial possession in November 1975. However, this is contrary to the historical record. What is the real story behind Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara?
ZUNES: The world media reaction of the Green March was generally supportive, portraying it as a crusade by a Third World nation against colonialism. This perception came largely as a result of the lack of knowledge of the remote territory and the widespread antipathy over Spain’s fascist government. The image of nonviolent marchers facing down the guns of the Spanish military was a major propaganda victory for the Moroccans, though in fact the extent of the march and the turnover of control by Spanish authorities to the simultaneously advancing Moroccan troops had been secretly arranged. Similarly, there was little coverage of events across the border in Al Aioun, where many thousands of Sahrawis were demonstrating against a Moroccan takeover, despite a Spanish curfew.
There was considerable pressure from France and the United States for Spain to support Morocco’s claims, with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger twisting the arm of Spanish Foreign Minister Cortina as well as special envoy Vernon Walters going to Spain to work as an active intermediary with other Spanish officials. The United States threatened to cut off all military aid and technology assistance to Spain and to impose an even broader embargo if they confronted Morocco militarily. The U.S. also tied increased assistance to what the United States considered a more favorable outcome.
What level of monetary and diplomatic aid does Morocco get from the U.S. and what is U.S. interest in letting Morocco have its way in the Western Sahara at the expense of Sahrawis?
Morocco would never have achieved its takeover of Western Sahara without the military and financial support of the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. role was particularly crucial in the early 1980s, when direct U.S. counter-insurgency support led to a dramatic reversal of the situation on the ground. In 1981, the Polisario had liberated 85 percent of their country, forcing the Moroccan occupation forces into a tiny triangle in the northwest corner of the country and a handful of garrison towns. Within six years, Morocco had re-conquered almost the entire country, with a U.S.-designed sand "wall" lined with Moroccan troops and sophisticated electronic monitoring gear keeping Polisario forces out of their own country. Morocco for many years was one of the largest recipients of U.S. military and economic aid, which made the costly occupation possible. Since the ceasefire in 1991, direct U.S. military aid has largely ceased and has been replaced by loans and sales. Economic aid has been reduced, though crucial U.S. support through international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank has continued.
Why is Morocco’s rejectionist stance towards a Sahrawi state accepted while the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination is considered a negotiable reality?
It is primarily power politics, the same attitude that led most of the world to accept Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of East Timor for almost a quarter century. As a result, allied governments -such as the United States -are quite willing to accept Morocco’s occupation as a fait accompli. The United States has recognized Morocco’s annexation of the territory, while acknowledging that it was done so without the consent of the Western Saharan population. The American news media falsely portrays the Polisario as a "secessionist" movement despite the fact that they are an occupied country and have never legally been part of Morocco. To acknowledge the actual situation would be to admit that the United States supports the invasion and occupation of one country against another, which does not fit well with the image the U.S. puts forward as a defender of human rights and international law.
One claim against a Sahrawi state is that the fate of the long-standing, West-friendly Arab dynasty in Morocco is tied to the Western Sahara. But is there really anything to the argument that if the Sahrawis gain independence, then the "moderate" Mohammed VI will face either a military coup d’etat, an Islamic insurgency, or, heaven forbid, a democratic revolution?
There may be some truth to concerns that the "loss" of the Western Sahara could create a political crisis that could lead to the ouster of the monarchy. The invasion came in 1975, at a time when then-ruling monarch, Hassan II, had barely survived two attempted coups over the previous two years. Long seen as something of a neo-colonialist stooge, Hassan hoped his conquest of Western Sahara would bolster his nationalist credentials. The enormous costs, both financially and in Moroccan lives, that Morocco has suffered as a result of the conquest and occupation would make it extremely difficult for Morocco to give up the territory at this point. The vast majority of the population -including most leftists -supported the takeover and probably continue to do so, largely as a result of the controlled media’s insistence that the Sahrawis welcomed the takeover and that the Polisario was a tool of Algeria to control the territory. There is no certainty that a more democratic Morocco would result in a more flexible position toward Western Sahara, at least initially. However, the focus on Western Sahara for more than a generation has served to distract the population from challenging widespread domestic injustice and has retarded needed social change.
What is the human rights picture in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara and in the Sahrawi refugee camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria?
According to Amnesty International and other credible human rights monitoring groups, the human rights situation in Western Sahara remains among the worst in the world. Any demonstration of support for independence is brutally suppressed. Even displays by the Sahrawis’ of their distinct cultural identity is actively discouraged. By contrast, in the Polisario-controlled refugee camps, internal struggles a decade ago led to significant reforms, leading to significant improvements in the human rights situation for Sahrawi exiles. The self-governing structures within the refugee camps are among the most impressive examples of participatory democracy in the world. Having such a progressive and democratic model in the Arab-Islamic world may constitute what Noam Chomsky has called "the threat of a good example," which may be another reason the United States opposes an independent Western Sahara.
Why has the UN been reluctant to hold a free and fair referendum in the Western Sahara?
The Secretary General cannot take any bold initiatives without the backing of the Security Council, and the United States and France, which have veto power, have made sure that Kofi Annan does not have such authority. While there have been reports of a pro-Moroccan bias by some MINURSO officials, the primary reason is that its mandate is so limited.
What are the current international economic interests in the Western Sahara and do you think these forces will push the dispute towards a referendum or a solution more favorable to Morocco?
The economic interests of French and American firms have certainly contributed to the reluctance of their respective governments to push for a Moroccan withdrawal, though there is no reason to think they could not reach some sort of accommodation with the Polisario, which has substantially moderated the socialist orientation of its earlier years. Most EU countries outside of France have expressed concerns over Morocco’s ongoing occupation to the point of limiting certain forms of foreign investment. Similarly, the Western Sahara dispute has damaged the once-lofty goals of economic integration by the Arab Maghreb Union -the economic pact between Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya signed nearly a decade ago. These economic factors could work in favor of Western Saharan independence, but only if human rights activists in Europe and the United States provide sufficient pressure through boycotts and other initiatives like those that were so crucial in forcing an end to South Africa’s occupation of Namibia.
At the end of July, the UN Security-Council voted to extend MINURSO’s mandate until January 2003 and all but rejected James Baker’s efforts to broker some sort of limited autonomy agreement between Morocco and the Sahrawis. This decision is seen as a victory for the Sahrawis self-determination and a blow to the U.S., France, and Great Britain, who had attempted to push the Baker Plan for the Western Sahara in the Security-Council. Will a real referendum on Sahrawi self-determination be held anytime soon?
There will not be an honest referendum without the acquiescence of Morocco. That will not take place until the international community, through the United Nations or other channels, forces them to do so. That will not happen unless or until there is pressure by people concerned about human rights, international law, and basic notions of justice to force their governments to act.
You have been vocal about your support for nonviolent direct action and other forms of active resistance as a means of pressuring U.S. leaders on the issue of aid to Israel and the occupation of Palestinian lands. What course of action do you recommend for U.S.-based Sahrawi-rights activists?
The campaign waged by ETAN [East Timor Action Network] and other groups against U.S. support for Indonesia was critical in making the independence of East Timor a reality. There must be a comparable movement built if there is to be any hope for Western Sahara. Already, there is a growing solidarity movement in parts of Europe. There are a large number of English-speaking Sahrawi exiles who can be promoted by U.S. activists. The religious community -so crucial in the East Timor campaign -needs to get involved as well. Boycotts of Moroccan products and boycotts and divestment campaigns targeting firms illegally doing business in occupied Western Sahara must be organized. Protests at the Moroccan embassy and consulates must become regular occurrences.
U.S. support for Morocco’s occupation should be included along with other grievances in protests against Bush administration policies. Resolutions in support of Western Saharan independence and in opposition of U.S. support for Morocco should be pushed through progressive organizations. Members of Congress supportive of Morocco should become the targets of protests, including possible nonviolent civil disobedience in their offices. A Western Saharan solidarity campaign could actually enhance the credibility of the Palestinian solidarity campaign, since it would demonstrate that progressives are opposed to all occupations, including those by Arab countries. Like Israel, Morocco plays an important strategic role for the United States. As a result, a campaign to end U.S. support for the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara is winnable, but only if the activist community makes it a priority.
Jacob Mundy was a Peace Corps volunteer in Morocco (1999-2001) and is a graduate student in Middle East Studies at the University of Washington. He is co- founder of Friends of the Western Sahara (www. friendsofthewesternsahara.org). He has written articles for Eat the State and Clamor Magazine.
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