The concept of “terrorism” is restricted, in Western academic and media discussion, to the threat or use of political violence by opponents of the current Western-dominated world order. Similarly, the concept of “nuclear terrorism” is restricted to the threat or use of nuclear weapons by opponents of the current Western-dominated world order.

The main threat of nuclear terrorism comes from Pakistan, according to the dominant discourse, where the military and intelligence establishment has close ties with al-Qa”eda-type terror groups, there is a sustained terrorist campaign against the state (including at least one attack on a base reputed to hold nuclear weapons), and the state possesses nuclear weapons. There are indeed major risks in Pakistan, as we know of two independent nuclear proliferation networks that came out of the Pakistani nuclear establishment, run by two of the founding figures in the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme: AQ Khan and Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood.

But if we use the official definitions of terrorism, we find that “nuclear terrorism” is not confined to theoretical future acts of barbarism by al-Qa”eda-type groups operating out of South Asia. It has an actually-existing history that takes in much of the world. Nuclear terrorism is not merely something that has happened in the past, it is the core of nuclear policy and doctrine for several nuclear weapon states, including the US and Britain.

In Britain, the Terrorism Act (2000) defines terrorism as the “use or threat of action” to influence government or intimidate the public, with the aim of advancing “a political, religious, racial or ideological cause,” involving “serious violence against a person,” serious damage to a property, “a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or “serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system.”

In the U.S., the U.S. Code defines ”international terrorism” as activities which involve illegal “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life”, which occur outside the U.S. or transcend national boundaries, and which appear to be intended “(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”

If we take these definitions seriously, then we find that, to take just one example, Iraq has repeatedly been subjected to nuclear terrorism by Britain and the United States. There are three main cases: 1961, 1991 and 2003.

In 1961, Britain was scaling down its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and releasing its hold on Kuwait, allowing it to become an independent state. However, British planners decided to accompany this withdrawal with a thumping message of intimidation. Britain claimed Iraq was poised to invade Kuwait, and sent in 6,500 British troops. According to an official history of the British strategic nuclear air force, the British government also “placed V-bombers at readiness in Malta. (Andrew Brookes, The History of Britains Airborne Deterrent: Force V, 1982, p 141) According to another account, a British aircraft carrier bearing a squadron of nuclear-capable Scimitar aircraft was also deployed to the Gulf. (Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam’s War, 1991, p 33)

British intelligence insider Anthony Verrier, once described as “the writer closest to MI6 thinking”, later described the incident as an “act of deterrence, in which the nuclear weapons system played a central, concealed role… directed against Nasser and, by extension, Russian ambitions in Arabia.” (Verrier, Through the Looking Glass, 1983, p 171) The nuclear threat may have indirectly been aimed at the president of Egypt and the forces of Arab nationalism generally (decoding the phrase “Russian ambitions”), but it occurred in a confrontation with Iraq. This is a clear case of attempting “to influence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion.”

Incidentally, the senior RAF officer in the Middle East admitted that the Iraqi threat had been concocted. Sir David Lee, former Air Officer Commanding (Middle East), later wrote: “HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] did not contemplate aggression by Iraq very seriously.” (Cited in Verrier, p 171)

Turning to the second case, in 1991, the U.S. and British governments were determined to punish Iraq militarily for having disobeyed orders by invading Kuwait in August 1990. They refused to allow any diplomatic solution to the crisis, and proceeded to launch a one-sided onslaught that indeed involved serious violence against a person; serious damage to a property; a serious risk to the health and safety of the Iraqi public; and serious interference with and disruption to several critical electronic systems.

The one factor that gave the U.S.-U.K. invaders pause was their fear that Iraq might use chemical weapons to even up the military odds (Iraq had the most experienced army in the world at that point, in terms of using chemical weapons on the battlefield – weapons built and used with US knowledge and support). Washington and London decided to deter Iraqi use of chemical weapons with nuclear threats; in other words, to threaten “violent acts transcending national boundaries intending to affect the conduct of a government by (threats of) mass destruction.”

On 30 September 1990, the London Observer had reported on its front page the warning of a senior British officer that Iraqi chemical attacks would be met “with battlefield nuclear forces”. On 15 January 1991, the British Prime Minister, John Major, was asked in the House of Commons whether he would reserve the option to use nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi chemical or biological attack. He replied: “We have made it very clear to the Iraqis that we would take a very serious view indeed of the use of any chemical or biological weapons, but I must say to my hon. Friend that we have a wide range of weapons and resources at our hands and I do not envisage needing to use the sanction that he suggests.” This was not ruling out the nuclear option, merely “envisaging” it to be unnecessary. Two weeks later, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd declared that a chemical attack on British forces in the Gulf would lead to a “massive response”. The London Guardian noted on 4 February 1991 that this was “language the US and Britain employ to leave open the option of using chemical or nuclear weapons.”

The US government made a number of similar nuclear threats, the most famous of which was the ultimatum from US President George H.W. Bush, handed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, on 9 January 1991 in Geneva. According to the official U.S. version of the text, Bush wrote that in the event of Iraqi chemical or biological attacks, “The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort.” Baker wrote in his memoirs that he “purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological weapons by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation.”

Once again, we see an attempt (successful, in this case) to “influence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion.”

In the run-up to the 2003 attack, there was another stream of nuclear threats issued against Iraq, including, in December 2002, the release by the White House of a document codifying the Baker threat as policy, accompanied by officials explicitly recalling the Baker precedent.

In Britain, the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon was even more explicit, telling the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, on 20 March 2002, that states like Iraq “can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons.” Four days later, Hoon appeared on ITV’s Jonathan Dimbleby show and insisted that the government “reserved the right” to use nuclear weapons if Britain or British troops were threatened by chemical or biological weapons. When asked about these nuclear threats in a House of Commons debate on 29 April 2002, Hoon said: “ultimately, and in conditions of extreme self-defence, nuclear weapons would have to be used.” He refused to clarify what the “certain specified conditions” were in which “we would be prepared to use them”.

Yet another (successful) attempt to “influence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion”.

These are not aberrations from a more pacific Western norm. They are the norm, as an honest look at the record will show. The use of nuclear coercion by the US and its allies has long roots, going right back to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Western nuclear terrorism is central to the history of the nuclear age.

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