1) After what critical steps did Turkey disrupt the “peace process”?
On 28th of February 2015, the governmental committee involving the deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and the committee of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) involving MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder, after a meeting in Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, together publicly declared a statement named “Dolmabahçe Consensus”. The consensus said that, now the settlement process was at the stage of disarmament, however its legal and administrative requirements should soon be met. On 21st of March, the letter from Abdullah Öcalan, read at the massive Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır emphasized the same requirement. While the government adopted the consensus, president Erdoğan publicly declared his “disapproval”. Afterwards, the process was interrupted, planned post-consensus action –like establishing of monitoring committees– was suspended, and Öcalan in İmralı prison was once again, put under isolation.

Towards the general elections on the 7th of January, Erdoğan and the Erdoğanist groups in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) calculated that the peace process was not winning votes for AKP and started to adopt an aggressive tone towards HDP and the Kurdish movement. They aimed to win the ultranationalist votes. HDP regional offices saw more than a hundred terrorist attacks. Major HDP offices in large southern cities of Adana and Mersin were attacked by explosives, and once, a massacre was avoided just by coincidence. One day before the elections, two bombs blasted in HDP’s public meeting in Diyarbakır on an attempt to create an uncontrolled public reaction prone to further provocations, four people were killed and over hundred people were seriously injured. It was generally understood that, now the “deep state” was taking control over the Kurdish question.
HDP’s electoral success of acquiring 13.1% of the national votes, and as a consequence, AKP’s loss of the majority in the parliament paved the way towards a dissolution in the peace process. Without a legitimate coalition government in office as mandated by the electoral outcome, traditional security apparatus, now under Erdoğan’s leadership took power to fill up the political vacuum. On 24th of July, USA and Turkey agreed on the use of İncirlik NATO bases in Adana to attack the Islamic State (IS). At the very start, this deal was understood by Turkey as a green light from USA to revert back to its oppression and aggression politics towards Kurds.

On 20th of July, 32 young women and man on a humanitarian mission to Kobani in accordance to a call from the Federation of Socialist Youth Associations (SGDF) were massacred after a suicide attack in Suruç, the border town in Turkey. Widespread protests against the massacre and towards Turkey’s complicity with IS was harshly attacked by the police. On 21st of July, during the clashes between Turkish military and the Kurdish guerilla (HPG), one gendarmerie was killed. On 22nd of July, two police officers were shot dead in their home in Ceylanpinar, after an attack assumed by HPG. On 23rd of July, two traffic policemen in Diyarbakır was killed, and in Adana, a member of Kalem Vakfı, an Islamist organization was assassinated. Nobody assumed the latter killing. The same they, in Istanbul’s Gazi district, according to the news reports, a man allegedly connected to IS was killed by YDG-H, an armed youth organization of PKK sympathizers. On 24th started nationwide police raids towards political activists. In Bağcılar district of Istanbul, a young woman, allegedly connected to the radical leftist organization DHKP-C was killed in her home in bed by police squads. 320 people were arrested in one day, and the raid continued afterwards.

On 25th, Turkish military bombed the PKK bases in Northern Iraq, as well as IS in Syria. This signaled that ex-parliamentary powers of Turkey, under the leadership of Erdoğan had ended the ceasefire. Immediately after the first air raids, a public meeting in Istanbul, organized by the Peace Block was banned.

Right now, the trans-border raid towards PKK is resuming, and there are claims of civilian deaths in the Kurdish village, Zergele. Political activists are being detained. HDP is calling for resuming the peace process but it does not look very likely that Turkey will respond in the near future. Turkey is being driven towards an early, “repeating” elections and in this atmosphere, it looks the warfare will continue as long as it is calculated as a factor contributing to AKP’s chances of electoral success.

2) Why did Turkey disrupt the peace process?
The achievements of Kurds in Turkey and Syria have been decisive on Turkey’s decision to break the peace process. With the elections on 7th of June, HDP passed over the 10% barrier and took 80 seats in the parliament. AKP was not able to build a single party government. The electorate revealed its discontent with the single party rule of the past 13 years and refused the “Turkish style presidential system” as advocated and symbolized by Erdoğan. The achievement of HDP also represents the level of support for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the Kurdish question, which is producing favorable outcomes the Kurds in Turkey. HDP is becoming more and more of a party supported by the vast majority of the Kurds and is also developing capacity to attract votes from secular populations living in the west of the country. Under the conditions of ceasefire, HDP has the potential to be the major democratic force against AKP / Erdoğan block. These achievements of Kurds are disturbing for the system.

Another factor shaping Turkey’s attitude towards Kurdish question is related to Turkey’s Syrian politics and the empowerment of Kurds in Syria. Syrian Kurds has declared democratic autonomy in the three Rojava cantons, Afrin, Kobane and Cezire. In Rojava, peoples organized under PYD’s leadership had created a polity respecting the ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of the region based on gender equality. Particularly the military achievements of YPG and YPJ, the armed branch of PYD, their resistance against IS in Kobane, and salvation of the city form IS siege in collaboration with the international coalition under USA leadership has cultivated grounds for PYD’s increasing legitimacy in the local and international arena. Just after the elections on 7th of June, with the Kurdish forces in Syria taking control over in Tel-Abyad from IS, Cezire and Kobane cantons had become connected to create a geographical continuum, stretching the borderline between Rojava and Turkey.
Syrian Kurds unified under PYD became the most powerful and the most effective secular force in the Middle East fighting against jihadists. On the contrary, Turkey denied the Kurdish demands for autonomy and at the different stages of the Syrian civil war, gave support to various jihadist groups. Turkey’s dislike of empowered Kurdish politics within and outside its borders is a factor explaining its pro-jihadist Syrian politics. PYD is a sister organization of PKK which has been fighting for decades within Turkey, and its increasing legitimacy in the eyes of USA and other western powers started to increasingly disturb the establishment in Turkey.

3) What are the characteristics of the power structure that disrupted the peace process?
The dissolution of the peace process, or rather the disruption of the ceasefire happened as the de-facto presidential decision-making preceding the elections was replaced with an interim regime after the elections. The absence of a coalition government created a political vacuum. Erdoğan’s stronghold on AKP is avoiding a likely AKP-People’s Republican Party (CHP) government, which indeed would be the choice endorsed by USA, EU and the international finance as well as the local elite.

While the government has resigned but was temporarily in office, and the parliament was dysfunctional, the power center under the leadership of Erdoğan staged sort of a coup. With USA, a new consensus was created. Pro-jihadist policies against Assad and PYD were abandoned. A new warfare was launched against Kurdish opposition, accompanied with a wave of arrestments and detentions.

These decisions were taken not by a legitimate new coalition government or with consultation in the parliament, but in harmony with the policies determined at the National Security Council. Arguably, now Turkey is governed by the military, National Intelligence Agency (MIT) and by some high level AKP figures all under the leadership of Erdoğan. As in all coups, democratic processes are bypassed, and to legitimize the interim regime, Davutoğlu is kept as the Prime Minister, but in reality without any executive power.

4) Why did Turkey have to join the coalition against IS?
It is well known that USA was not able to attain decisive gains over IS through bombardments and IS did not significantly retreat from its strongholds except Rojava. Although USA collaborated on the ground with Kurdish forces, it also required Turkey’s support against IS and needed to use the Incirlik base. Turkey was for long under USA pressure. It is acclaimed that this pressure has further increased after the revelation of some documents proving Turkey’s collaborations with IS. USA required Turkey to draw back from the Saudi-Qatar axis, stop the relationships with other Salafi organizations and to behave within the priorities of NATO forces.

Turkey’s strategic position in the Middle East was threatened and its Sunni-factionist Middle East politics became unfeasible by several factors: First, there has been the nuclear deal between Iran and the West which also lead the way towards lifting of sanctions over Iran and normalization of their relationships. Second, it became possible for the Assad regime to stay in power without being a target of the Western coalition. Third, PYD/ YPG in Rojava acquired achievements and proved to be a reliable force against IS. Under these conditions, now Turkey is forced to stay in the Western coalition against IS, but on the other hand undermining the Kurdish gains and pursuing its leadership fantasies in the Middle East.

5) Did Turkey really conduct raids against three terrorist organizations?
This is clearly not true. So as to create a perception of war against terror in the West, IS is also contained within the operations. Human Rights Association (İHD) reports the balance sheet for police operations between 21-28 July:

1034 arrested, 36 of them children. According to unconfirmed data, 140 of them IS members, 22 from so called “parallel structure” (the Fethullah Gulen organization), all others are members of PKK/KCK or other leftist organizations. 5 detained on charges of IS links, 49 detained on charges of KCK/PKK allegiance. [1]

It’s a question whether the West will long tolerate Turkey’s hypocrisy in the war against IS. In trans-border air raids, IS was targeted only once. Immediately after the bombings, Davutaoğlu’s public declaration saying that in Syrian border “IS targets, a potential treat against Turkey has been diligently and successfully destroyed” implied an end for the air raids against IS targets. Moreover, IS commanders said “Turkey has bombed vacant spots which has been used but now evacuated by IS”. In the meanwhile, Kandil and the PKK positions are regularly bombed.
6) How did Turkey’s “War on Terror” echoed in Europe and USA?

After Turkey started to bomb Kandil in Iraqi Kurdistan (Northern Iraq), Rojava (Northern Syria) and IS, and initiated a wave of arrests against PKK, IS and leftist group DHKP-C, the reactions in USA and Europe can be followed over official statements and through mainstream media.

USA President Obama has warned the Turkish government that the war against the Islamic State in Syria must be “carefully bound” so as not to go on the offensive against Kurdish fighters. US Department of State Spokesperson Mark Toner said in a press conference on 3rd August that the PKK has carried out attacks against Turkey and the US has defended Turkey’s right to self-defense, adding, “We want to see the violence end, we want to see the PKK cease its attacks and, as I said, the Turkish government to respond proportionately.” EU Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Johannes Hahn issued a statement pointing out: “At the same time, the commissioner expressed the EU’s deep concern about recent developments which have a negative impact on the Kurdish-Turkish settlement process. The EU acknowledges that Turkey has the right to prevent and react to any form of terrorism, which must be unequivocally condemned. The response, however, must be proportionate, targeted and by no means endanger the democratic political dialogue in the country.”

The Arab League, which has 22 members, has condemned Turkey’s operations against PKK in northern Iraq, with only Qatar underlining that Turkey has the right to protect its borders.

It seems that the main concern in official statements is the fate of the fragile peace process, the abandonment of which will add an extra layer to the chaos in Middle East and endanger the western efforts for fighting against IS. Nevertheless the response is rather timid, revealing the hypocrisy of the western powers that see PKK affiliate YPG/YPJ as the most reliable partner on the ground.

Although the official statements are timid, the opinion pieces in mainstream media are more straightforward, accusing Turkey of collaborating with IS so far, pointing out that the real aim of Turkey is Kurdish gains and Assad regime, not IS. It has been noted that Erdoğan played a gamble, however “it remains to be seen, though, whether his calculated risk will pay off in the form of greater security, more regional influence, and more power at home, or will backfire.” [2] It has been emphasized that the real aim of Erdoğan in ending the peace process is to gain advantage in the upcoming elections to realize his ambitious political plans. [3]  [4]  [5] Some accused USA for selling the Kurds out and making a big strategic mistake, which will have perilous consequences for both Syria and Middle East. [6] It seems from the backdoor information provided by media that the details of the “safe zone” have not been forged out and an arm-twisting is going on between USA and Turkey. [7] One of the biggest challenges in taking and controlling any zone in Syria will be finding the ground troops to do it. Turkey wouldn’t be happy with Kurdish forces playing that role. It has been stated that “the bigger concern is that this could be a way of getting the U.S. more involved in Syria than it intended. USA could be pulled into the fight against Assad in Syria. While so far regime aircraft have avoided U.S. warplanes in the skies of Syria, if Assad’s air force were to approach this zone, it would put the U.S. in difficult position.” [8]

The main concern of the opinion pieces in American and British mainstream media is the fact that Turkey’s assault to Kurds is counterproductive for fight against IS, and may increase the chaos in Middle East. Most emphasize that this move is a part of power struggle to realize Erdoğan’s ambitions,  however, there is no single comment on how Turkey’s new “war on terror” undermines Turkish democracy by increasing the power of military-intelligence apparatus which is called “deep state”. Actually, we are now living through an interim regime in which there is a transitional government with no power and all decision-making is concentrated in the hands of a small circle around Erdoğan including a few members of the military-intelligence apparatus.

7) What are Erdoğan’s plans for the elections?
If not influenced by Erdoğan fanaticism, everyone is aware that he is trying to draw back the votes lost to Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Moreover, with the rhetoric of “war against terror”, he is trying to break the electoral support behind HDP in western Turkey, which is estimated at the levels of 1.5-2%. If succeeds, he will be able to engineer a single party AKP government, which will favor his de-facto presidential rule over the country.
There is another aspect, which is not well reflected on by the general public. The early “repeated” election –which now has increasing chances of conduct– will help to continue the political operation aiming at redesigning the political arena in Turkey. Right now, Turkey’s Kurdish politics is created by ex-parliamentary powers, in line with the consensus between National Security Council (MGK) and Erdoğan. Early elections can help legitimize this interim regime, with a democratic facet. MGK and other security units under Erdoğan’s leadership will aim at keeping their stronghold on the decisions. AKP, the candidate for the parliamentary majority, together with MHP, will act as an extension, or offshoot of this power to legitimize it in the parliament. Shortly, the interim regime will possible be a perpetual form of government with a prolonged “war on terror”.

8) How long can Turkey maintain this warfare?
Looking at the objective conditions on the ground, it is possible to have a renewed ceasefire in the short term. Because, compared to the similar warfare in the past, the society in Turkey is less willing to provide popular support. A large population with varying political and ideological stances is aware of the fact that this war is engineered for the purposes of redesigning politics in Turkey and through illegitimate means. On the other hand, it is difficult to calculate whether this dissent can evolve into an active opposition. Also, the economic reasons that we look under the 10th question may make it hard to pursue the warfare.

The attitudes of several other subjects will be decisive on how long this current warfare can resume. These are: Power struggle within the components of security apparatus, AKP and Erdoğan, Kurdish opposition, the democracy and peace movements in Turkey, and foreign powers particularly USA, EU and Middle Eastern countries.

For AKP, one can look into two factors: First, AKP electorate for long has supported the “resolution process” for the reasons of peace, political and economic stability. They wouldn’t object to resume the process, at least by manipulating the Kurds. While almost all these reasons are still pertinent, the warfare can start disturbing the AKP electorate (except Erdoğan fanatics). AKP MPs and the old AKP founders who are now relatively distanced to Erdoğan can also start questioning this warfare. It is hard to see how the AKP executive bodies under Erdoğan’s influence will control the dissent within the party.

Second, AKP’s decisions for elections and coalition government choices and their possible outcomes are uncertain. Probably for the next couple of weeks, Erdoğan will be minding the political party polls, as he usually does. Polls will be a factor on the decision for the date of early elections. If the polls turn positive for AKP, an interim government of AKP and MHP is possible. If not, probably a longer lasting hawkish government with AKP and MHP or with AKP and a capitulated CHP will be the choice. None of them will be long lasting, since they will literally be interim regime governments.

EU is not expected to actively intervene because Turkey’s accession to EU has long been interrupted. For USA, it looks difficult to ignore Erdoğan. Both EU and USA are against Turkey’s Syrian and Middle East politics, albeit they accept Turkey’s right to defend itself against terrorism. The Incirlik accord with USA and the outcomes of the recent NATO meeting held with the call from Turkey serves for readjusting Turkey, implying that Turkey should act within the interests of the Western community.

9) Who are the democratic forces working for peace?
With a call from HDP, two labor unions, various organizations and groups built the Peace Block. Peace Block right now, is a central coordination of many organizations and is not capable of performing fast responding, creative actions. Activists are working to localize the Peace Block with roots and branches in local districts. But whether the components building the Peace Block have the capacity to follow this program is difficult to answer.

It looks that the most important actor in peace struggle is the HDP itself, which attracted about 6 million votes in the general elections. However, after the elections, HDP was rather busy with preparing itself for a struggle in the parliament rather than building stronger bridges with its electoral base. Observing that the parliament is now being by-passed in Turkey’s politics, HDP has to create the means to localize its struggle.

After the disruption of the ceasefire, the only civilian action was led by the initiative called Women for Peace (BİKG). BİKG organized a meeting on 23rd and 29th of July at various district of Istanbul and also in about 15 cities including the metropolis of Ankara, İzmir, Eskisehir, Antalya and Adana. Still, these meetings cannot be characterized as mass protests. Since 1990s, in Turkey, there has been a lack of effective, inclusive peace initiatives with a capacity to build creative civil disobedience. Culture and art organizations and other occupational groups were also week in creating peace movements. Hence this is a problem for social opposition to overcome in the near future.

10) Will the economy be affected by the warfare?
Just before the elections, Turkey was one of the most fragile countries among the emergent markets. In the first 7 months of 2015, its exports declined by 8.8%. This happened due to the crises in EU and also the government’s Middle East politics. In 2015, the growth is expected to be within the 2-2.5% band, which for Turkey literally means a recession. In the past years of AKP government, foreign currency inflow has been the driver behind economic growth. However, the global economic facts combined with the local factors created the conditions of scarce foreign resources, under the levels that can finance current deficit. Turkey was able to finance its current deficit by off-the-books currency flow from its allies in the Middle East, and by spending its Central Bank deposits. Now, low household incomes and the difficulties in furthering the household debts are drawing down the local demand. Private sector investments have stopped.[9] Erdoğan’s recent conflicts with the Central Bank for keeping the interest rates at its lowest were the final attempts to boost the local demand, which did not work. The country entered the elections through gradual devaluation of the national currency.

After the end of ceasefire, the devaluation accelerated and the international financial institutions one after another started to point towards Turkey’s economic fragilities. For example, Commerzbank warned that Turkey’s foreign currency reserves are much below the level of its short-term debts. [10] The Economist reported the concerns of foreign investors about Turkey, being driven into a chaos in Syria, facing a new Kurdish insurgency, troubled with the possibility of early elections and threatened with high foreign debt of its non-financial business. [11]

Turkey was already at the verge of economic crises. Now, add the devastating impacts of a “war economy”, which has never been experienced by AKP governments. Each and every warplane taking off, each and every bomb being dropped creates an additional cost. Investments and consumption will further be influenced. Is it rational for AKP to proceed towards elections, under deteriorating economic conditions, which so far has been its most successful realm as perceived by the electorate? Can a “repeating” election in November create counterproductive outcomes for AKP? If AKP gets involved in a prolonged interim regime with a coalition with MHP, like for example after an election in April 2016, can it see favorable outcomes? How the electoral base of AKP and the business sectors it rests on, is going to pass through an experience of a “war economy”? Answers to these questions will help highlighting the possible paths in the near future. However, it looks that the conditions of war is not sustainable in the longer term, also because of economic reasons -among the other factors.

(1)
http://www.ihd.org.tr/baris-ve-cozum-sureci-yasamsaldir-bitirilemez/ ve http://gazetekritik.com/haberdetay/IHD_-Son-bir-haftada-41-kisi-oldu-1034-kisi-gozaltina-alindi/11795

(2)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-07-29/erdogans-war

(3)

(4)
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/31/the-guardian-view-on-turkey-and-the-kurds-putting-peace-at-risk

(5)
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660123-bombing-kurds-well-islamic-state-turkey-adding-chaos-middle

(6)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephan-richter/selling-out-the-kurds_b_7908816.html

(7)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/turkey-urged-nato-meeting-not-abandon-kurdish-peace-process

(8)
http://time.com/3979906/syria-safe-zones/

(9)
http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/ugur-gurses_526/ekonominin-alarm-veren-zilleri_29710889 and http://www.bgst.org/ulke-gundem/ekonomide-2015-verileri-durgunluktan-daralmaya

(10)

Commerzbank: Türkiye daha kırılgan

(11)
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21660166-political-worries-increase-fragility-economy-badly-need?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07

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