On 31 August 2014, the German government decided to supply the Northern Iraqi Kurds with arms shipments in support of their struggle against the Islamic State (IS). This is the first time in post-World War II history that Germany officially sends weapons to a conflict zone.
In fact, the German populace has been cautious about the country’s involvement in world affairs – particularly in regard to military policies. According to a poll conducted by the Federal Foreign Office in conjunction with the Körber-Foundation, 60 per cent of the German people are against increasing Germany’s “engagement” across the globe. 37 per cent are in favour of the idea. More significantly, only 13 per cent of the German populace deem military missions as an appropriate foreign policy instrument.
And yet, at the Munich Security Conference in January 2014, Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen had stressed Germany’s “responsibility to engage” in international affairs. Engagement, it should be noted, constitutes a euphemism that actually refers to strengthening Germany’s military offensive capabilities. Accordingly, the German establishment magazine Der Spiegel argues that von der Leyen “seems to have actively softened the old line of German restraint in regard to foreign deployments” adding that this policy turn would “please many here” in Germany. Those pleased by Germany’s foreign policy shift largely stem from elite circles. German Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier even acknowledged this speaking of a “deep trench” between the German public and the foreign policy elite that should be overcome.
The current policy shift can be seen in view of the fact that Germany’s elite aims to foster the country’s economic and geostrategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. Most future military involvements are likely to follow from this imperialistic imperative. The German population – conscious of the Nazi past and the plague of militarism – is at odds which such policy designs. This repugnancy was explained by Mohssen Massarrat, Professor Emeritus at the University of Osnabrück, Germany, in MRZine:
Especially since the beginning of this year, the German political élite have been agitating for “more responsibility” in world politics. For this purpose, they want to soften restrictions with regard to arms transfers to crisis regions as well as remove parliamentary barriers to so-called humanitarian interventions. Since then, there have been massive attempts to eradicate moral objections from the collective memory of Germans to be able to participate in future global military conflicts without any restraints.
The militarisation of Germany’s foreign policy goes back to at least until 1990 – the reunification that provided Germany with full sovereignty. Since then, a virtual consensus among the major political parties (aside from Die Linke) has emerged about strengthening Germany’s role as a military power and pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy, in conjunction with the priorities of NATO.
According to a study by Maybritt Brehm, Christian Koch, Werner Ruf, and Peter Strutynski, since 1990 the German military has participated in 35 foreign “operations”. They included, among others, German participation during the 1999 Kosovo War (the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia which constituted the first combat mission for the German military since World War II) and the 2001 Afghanistan War (post-2002 ISAF Forces).
Contrary to common perception, Germany had also participated in the 2003 Iraq War. While then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder rejected direct military involvement during the initial “operation”, his government had tacitly approved the war. Germany had provided significant logistic support to US troops: 80 per cent of all military transports during the Iraq War started from German airports and bases which were secured by German personnel. Furthermore, German intelligence cooperated with the US military and the DIA in Iraq. After the Iraq War, the German military trained Iraqi police and military forces. Hence, a decision of the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig in 2005 concluded that the German government was not neutral during the Iraq War.
As the late legal scholar Michael Mandel suggested, the 1999 Kosovo War, the 2001 Afghanistan War and the 2003 Iraq War were carried out against international law. In bitter irony, Germany may thus have participated in military actions similar to those for which the Nazis were prosecuted at the Nuremburg trials.
In German mainstream media and academia, the moral and legal implications of German militarism and the rise of an imperialist foreign policy have not been adequately discussed. In fact, the imperialistic foreign policy turn has been disguised under euphemistic labels such as “security” and “defense” policy. In an Orwellian sense, military operations abroad are often classified as “peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding”.
Yet, as Maybritt Brehm, Christian Koch, Werner Ruf, and Peter Strutynski point out in their study, German “defense” policy has a newly defined meaning today:
It is about energy and resource security, geopolitical goals and the protection of the economic supremacy of the countries of the First World towards the burgeoning competition of the emerging countries (i.e. the BRICS states).
Against this background, we should not be fooled in believing that sending weapons to the Kurds is primarily about fighting IS.
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