The situation in the Arab world and Turkey are radically different, however.  In the former case, we are witnessing transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy – transitions that are fragile and risk being aborted. In Turkey, although interrupted by military coups, multi-party democracy is firmly established

The events triggered by the Gezi Park redevelopment project in Istanbul were not a bolt out of the blue, challenging an otherwise popular government. Instead, this has been the culmination of simmering tensions that have been building up over a long period of time,’ says Deniz Kandiyoti.

Viewpoint Online conducted an exclusive interview with Deniz Kandiyoti, Emeritus Professor of Development Studies at SOAS, University of London, to seek more insight into the developments in Turkey over these past weeks.

Some of Professor Kandiyoti’s recent published papers include, 'Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam and Women's Rights.' Third World Quarterly, 28 (3).pp. 503 and 'Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan.' Development and Change, 38 (2).pp. 169-199 (both, 2007) and her publication, Women, Islam and the State; Women in the Political Economy, Temple University Press, 1991, is considered a cult feminist text.

Read on:

Introduction:

After a brutal police crack-down which shook public opinion, the Turkish PM finally met with a deputation of protesters to hear their grievances on Friday 14^th June. After a 4-hour meeting the redevelopment plans were put on hold pending a judicial review and a referendum was promised on the fate of the area. However, this was followed by an ultimatum to evict the protesters from the square and on the night of June15^th, a massive and brutal clean-up operation got under way, taking even some pro-government commentators by surprise.

At the time of writing and for the last 22 hours, police have been giving chase to protesters trying to find shelter in hotel lobbies, side streets, private homes, mosque courtyards and even shopping malls where they are being pursued and sprayed with pepper gas. Excavators and other demolition equipment have now entered Gezi Park. The unfolding events show no sign of leading to peace or compromise.

What explains the Arab Spring-like situation in Turkey?

On the face of it, the events in Taksim Square were triggered by disproportionate police brutality against a group of young environmental protesters who were trying to save the trees of the last remaining green area in central Istanbul. Many Turkish and foreign media commentators expressed the opinion that had it not been for the assault by the police on a group of peaceful protesters- news of which spread like wildfire through the social media- the protest would likely have fizzled out. In fact, the Gezi Park redevelopment project is the tip of a much larger iceberg; the government has been engaged in an extensive programme of urban renewal which involved mass evictions and construction projects benefiting powerful groups of building contractors to the detriment of less well off communities who have no voice. These developments have become a blight on the historic landscape of Istanbul. This, however, is only a small part of the story.

After three consecutive electoral victories,Erdogan interpreted his mandate at the ballot box as a licence to rule by fiat, eliminating the checks and balances necessary for a healthy democracy. These checks are seen -and deplored- as a nuisance.

One visible consequence was the “neutering” of the Turkish media with most TV channels now belonging to business conglomerates whose interests depend on government favour. One of the most inglorious chapters of Turkish media history took place when TV channels carried on showing wildlife footage and cookery programmes while a massive police crack-down was going on in Taksim Square. Social media and foreign channels started filling the gap and some TV channels ended up apologizing publicly for their “mistake”.  Many journalists bold enough to speak up had previously been jailed- making Turkey the worst offender – apparently ahead of China and Iran- in terms of violations of press freedom. Many others have lost their jobs.  The population has turned away from the mainstream media as a reliable source of information and journalists are now faced with the choice of either remaining supine or facing a witch-hunt.

A pervasive climate of fear and anxiety about extensive government surveillance and repression had been building up over some years. The trials against the military who were accused of plots to unseat the government (under the names of Ergenekon and Balyoz) were initially broadly accepted by a liberal public who wanted to get rid of the tutelage of the military and the influence so-called “deep state”. However, these trials degenerated into witch-hunts over time, targeting a wide spectrum of academics and journalists alongside military personnel, many on dubious charges. Likewise, sweeping arrests made under the anti-terrorism act (especially the mass arrests of Kurdish political figures, intellectuals and journalists) reminded the Turkish public of the bitter years of repression under the military.

Moves to confront the judiciary and endanger the separation of powers also set off alarm bells. An unedifying spectacle in the Gezi Park events was the taking into custody of some forty lawyers being dragged into police cars in their gowns while they were submitting depositions against police brutality. This was followed by disciplinary action against doctors who tended the injured. The PM interprets all foci of opposition as a source of irritation and hindrance and was banking on constitutional changes that would change the existing system to a super-presidency (with sweeping powers to suspend parliament, the ability to make appointments to the judiciary etc..), setting himself up as the next president to replace the current incumbent, Abdullah Gul, when his final term runs out.

Initiatives to enter into a dialogue with the PKK, the Kurdish separatist movement, which should have been welcomed as the first step of a peace process that could bring the decades old conflict to a close, elicited cynicism in some quarters, being seen as part of a political calculus to enlist the support of the Kurdish party for constitutional changes by trading minority rights for a revamped super-presidency.

The Syrian crisis proved to be the final nail in the coffin and the unraveling of the “zero problems” foreign policy with neighbours put in place by Foreign Minister, Davutoglu. Turkey’s harbouring of foreign fighters against the Assad regime and acting as a conduit for arms and supplies created tensions and resentment in the adjoining Turkish provinces with sizable Alevi populations, who saw themselves under threat. The influx of Syrian refugees put further pressures on the system. Especially after the Reyhanli bombing which cost numerous Turkish lives, the discontent over the Syria policy spilled over into demonstrations and unrest.

Finally, the hectoring and moralistic tone adopted by the PM attempting to regulate citizens’ private lives (from dictating how many children they should have to whether they can hold hands in public) became both an irritant and a constant source of satirical humour. More importantly, these attempts appeared to backfire spectacularly.

For example, the campaign to behave decorously in public led to a mass “kiss-in”, with couples locked in passionate embraces in public spaces like the subway and the streets. The Turkish women’s movement was incensed by attempts to control women’s bodies by trying to ban abortion and discouraging ceasarian sections. And everyone was outraged by the PM’s slurs on protesters as “drunks” and “looters”, with many promptly self-identifying as looters (with numerous satirical songs on this theme). Erdogan had earlier justified his legislation restricting the sale of alcohol by stating that his piece of legislation was no less valid than that passed by “a couple of drunks”- the innuendo against Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey and his second in command, Ismet Inonu, was not lost on anyone.

There were therefore, a myriad of constituencies that felt disenfranchised (including a labour movement that never fully recovered from the military coup of 1980 and became the target of continuing repression under the AKP, as witnessed by the brutality exhibited during the May 1^st demonstrations). These constituencies coalesced into aheterogenous publics who rose in protest. This, incidentally, includes Muslim socialists who believe the AKP has sold out on its promise to deliver social justice and has become a servant to capitalist interests therefore, betraying the spirit of Islam. These believers held Friday prayers on Taksim Square under the protection of other demonstrators who linked hands to form a protective circle around them to shield them from the police.

A very important point to bear in mind here is, that the AKP came to power on the back of the support of many voters outside its core constituency of conservative Muslims: the business community that was in favour of EU accession and the continuation of neoliberal reforms and many sections of the liberal-left, who were against military tutelage and favoured the expansion of minority rights. All these forces rallied behind the AKP. These constituencies are now peeling away, as are major sections of youth (the ‘90s generation) who have never known any other regime and who were widely dubbed as “apolitical”. However, this is also a generation whose expectations for genuine democratic governance and individual liberties are much higher than their parents’.  What they demand appears to be nothing short of a change in the political culture of Turkey.

Yet another unpredictable factor in this equation is the extent of the hemorrhaging of support among the base of the AKP itself. It is being reported that even the children of some AKP politicians were at the demonstrations. The ruling party’s MPs for Istanbul and Izmir went on record making condemnatory speeches about the way the protests were handled. The followers of Fethullah Gulen, an influential preacher based in the United States, whose supporters were among the pillars of AKP support, appear less than enthusiastic about Erdogan’s style judging by the tone of their media outlets. The response may be a pragmatic decision on the part of the PM to escalate the conflict in order to close the ranks of his supporters and put a stop to any challenges from within and without. This is a costly path that will not only increase polarization but also entrench a logic of retribution, repression and fear – cycles that, alas, the Turkish public is all too familiar with.

The global media has focused mainly on the big towns. How widespread is the movement really?

The most surprising facet of these events is that the protests went beyond Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir into the Anatolian heartland- even cities like, Konya and Kayseri, which are AKP strongholds. Over 60 locations are reported to have been affected. The dynamics appears to be different in different settings, although youth-especially youth in higher education- is centrally involved everywhere.

The Erdogan government appeared strong until recently. Now it seems to be striving for survival. What explains this ‘sudden’ decline in his popularity? Also, there is popular myth at least among middle classes in Pakistan, that Turkey under Erdogan has achieved economic miracles. Your comments?

For the reasons explained above what we are dealing with is not a “sudden” decline in popularity but an incremental build up of frustrations among diverse constituencies without adequate channels for complaint or redress. The opposition parties are weak and, in the eyes of protesters, are cast in the same authoritarian mould as the ruling party.

Opposition to government policies has thus increasingly taken the form of localized protests that have not been widely reported in the foreign media (“campus” protests, environmental protests against land privatization and hydroelectric projects, labour protests against job losses, protests against the mass arrest of Kurdish politicians and intellectuals, women’s protests  against encroachments on their rights etc..). These were localized and fragmented. The Gezi protest stood out in the sense that groups and tendencies that would not ordinarily make common cause, stood together to condemn government policies and more specifically, the leadership style of the PM.

It is absolutely correct that Turkey has known a period of unprecedented economic growth under the AKP and that new capitalist classes have arisen alongside the state-backed bourgeoisie of the import substitution policy years. But it is precisely the rise of urban middle-classes over the last decades that has heightened democratic aspirations among the children of these urban classes- and beyond. In other words, the sociological changes unleashed by globalization and economic dynamism in Turkey are now making it more problematic to revert to crony capitalism and authoritarianism- this is a paradox the ruling party seems unable to grapple with.

What about Kemalists? Are they siding with the uprising? What organized forces are backing the uprising?

It is difficult to speak of an identifiable “bloc” that we may simply designate as Kemalists (especially among the younger generation). These constituencies have themselves fragmented into “ultranationalist” groups (who are against expanding Kurdish rights, which they see as an attack on the integrity of the nation) and more “civic” Kemalists who have a more inclusive vision of the nation but who are in favour of a secular state, which allows for religious freedom but opposes religious rule.

The organized forces that backed the 2007 demonstrations against the presidency of Abdullah Gul (and had the backing of the army) were not conspicuous in the recent events. The youth were intent on keeping out the two Ps (police and politicians). One of the most arresting spectacles in Taksim Square was the image of a young woman holding a Turkish flag (the insignia of nationalist demonstrators) fleeing hand-in-hand with a boy waving the yellow BDP flag (the flag of the Kurdish party) with the police in pursuit. It is hard to talk about “organized” forces which is why, when Erdogan finally decided to have a dialogue with the protesters, he met with a deputation of the Taksim Solidarity Movement, a largely leaderless, non-hierarchical group.

In a way, Turkey was the first country to have an ‘Islamist’ party elected to power [if we discount the Algerian elections, since power was not relinquished by the Algerian military]. Is it mere coincidence that popular uprising against this government is also being witnessed in Turkey?

It is not strictly true to say that this is the first time an Islamist party was elected to power in Turkey. In fact, Islamist parties have been in coalition governments starting from 1973 and, have been present systematically through successive Nationalist Front governments . What complicated the equation was the numerous military coups that interrupted democracy. The suspension of democracy led to the closure of existing political parties-including Islamist parties which were banned regularly- which resurrected themselves under different names.

After the military coup of 1980, the government of TurgutOzal was well known for its links with the powerful Nakshibeditariqa and acted to legitimize the public role of religion in Turkey. It would be fair to say that a long-standing accommodation existed between religious communities and their leaders and centre-right political parties. This accommodation stopped short of changing the secular legal system. However, state-funded religious education increased in leaps and bounds since the mid-1970s as did state cadres trained in this system. The most egregious instance of repression of Islamist actors occurred in 1997 when on the 28^th of February, the military intervened through what became known as a “post-modern” coup ( a declaration falling short of a takeover of power) and clamped down on the main Islamist party, then in power, and Islamic actors in general. (Indeed, Erdogan himself served a prison term for declaiming a poem with Islamic imagery). This explains why AKP supporters asked the demonstrators bitterly;” Where were you on the 28^th of February?” Their response was telling: “We were in nursery school or not even born yet!”

We have seen popular unrest in Tunisia and Egypt. Do you think Muslim countries are passing through a phase whereby they are first trying and consequently rejecting, elected Islamist governments?

I don’t think what we are witnessing in Tunisia and Egypt is a process of trying and rejecting Islamic governments per se. Both popular uprisings initially started with demands for “bread, dignity and freedom” -not a demand for Islamic rule. The Egyptian and Tunisian publics were first and foremost intent on unseating unaccountable, corrupt dictators -which they did. The only organized political forces in both countries were the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda who had the added kudos of having leaders who had been jailed and in exile and could claim to represent a legitimate democratic opposition. Their credentials for inclusive democracy were as yet untested but many voters were willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

However, (and this is where the comparison with Turkey breaks down), the popular uprisings in Arab lands represented a major threat for the regimes of the Gulf. They poured important resources into backing salafi parties which garnered a surprising 25% of the vote in Egypt and which in Tunisia represent- depending on one’s interpretation- either a thorn in the flesh of Ennahda, stymieing its democratic pretensions, or a tool to expedite a more thorough progamme of Islamization. In both cases, the use of Islamic control of the population- egged on by salafi forces- in the absence of credible economic policies to address the issues of unemployment, corruption and poverty that triggered the protests in the first place, meant that disillusionment was quick to follow.

The situation in the Arab world and Turkey are radically different, however.  In the former case, we are witnessing transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy- transitions that are fragile and risk being aborted. In Turkey, although interrupted by military coups, multi-party democracy is firmly established. Under AKP rule, both the reforms under the EU accession process and substantial economic development have opened the way for another type of transition altogether- the transition from formal democracy based on the ballot box to a mature, substantive democracy that includes checks and balances and guarantees for individual freedoms and minority rights. It remains to be seen whether the AKP -that is seen by many as the midwife of some of these transformations- will have breadth of vision to see this process through or whether it will cling to power through recourse to repression and authoritarian rule. 

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