For almost two years Turkish intelligence officials have been in dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), who is sentenced to life imprisonment. As is well-known, the PKK is the main movement in Turkey’s Kurdistan representing the basic national rights of Kurds such as education in mother tongue, local autonomy and asking for the participation of guerillas fighting with the Turkish state since three decades into legal politics. About two years ago, both parties, Turkish government and PKK, declared a cease-fire and expressed their willingness to solve the Kurdish question definitely via a negotiation process. This is called “peace process.”
However nowadays everybody is more or less confused about where we have arrived along this process. The main reason of the confusion is that although Turkish government didn’t make any meaningful step till now, both parties have been generally loyal to the cease-fire. Indeed this is an odd situation which many calls rightly as neither “peace,” nor “war”.
So let’s us analyze the two main aspects of the peace process. The first one has been the local political arena of Turkey, the respective positions of the governing party AKP and the Kurdish movement which is also represented in the parliament by HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party). The second aspect of the peace process has been the situation in Rojava, i.e., Syrian Kurdistan. As the readers who are following the Kobane fighting between the Syrian Kurds and the Islamic State (IS) would know, three cantons in Rojava declared democratic autonomy at the beginning of this year, under the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Kobane is one these cantons and PYD has very close relationships with PKK.
The meaning of this declaration was that although PKK had previously some influence on other parts of Kurdistan apart from Turkey’s Kurdish region, for the first time a very close ally of PKK, the PYD claimed self-rule on another part, i.e., Syrian Kurdistan. As we all have observed since then, this was an unacceptable gain for the Kurds in the eyes of the Turkish government. Why so? Because if the Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria could consolidate itself, the whole “peace” strategy of the Turkish government and state (mostly not the same thing) which consists of the recognition of only the individual rights of Kurds would be breakdown. You can’t deny the national rights of a people which emerge as a collective entity both within and outside of your borders.
Then we witnessed how Turkey helped IS militants to cross its borders freely and provided them with arms and ammunition in order that they could crush the Kurdish resistance in Kobane. As the Kurdish defenders deprived of heavy weapons resisted for more than a month, public opinion in the West began to question why US-led coalition against IS was not helping Kobane defenders. Due to this public opinion pressure but to some other pragmatic considerations also, the United States made a shift in its policy and began to provide military equipment to Kobane. American authorities also developed a dialogue with PYD and thus came to recognize it a legitimate political actor and ally in the fight against IS.
This had been important turning point with respect to the peace process in Turkey. Until then the US policy towards the Kurds who support PKK was determined by the choices of Turkey and Western powers had never directly contacted either with PKK or any of its affiliated organizations. PKK is still on the “terrorist organizations list” of USA and European Union (EU). So the collaboration of US with PYD in the fight against IS does not mean that PKK has finally been recognized by the West. However by directly contacting with PYD, the West built up an indirect relation also with the PKK.
Some may find odd what is said above and consider the foregoing even as a pro-American stance. But no; we learned from recent history that the recognition by international powers of the liberation movements as legitimate actors has been very important for the solution of problems such as the Kurdish question. Otherwise the nation states could easily delay decent democratic solutions, while continuing to oppress the minorities.
Just before this shift on the part of US, when Kobane was about to fall in the hands of IS, PKK called Turkey’s Kurds to take streets and protest Turkish government’s policy of covertly supporting IS and not helping Kobane in any way whatsoever. Massive demonstrations in Kurdish cities and towns of Turkey took place and the pro-PKK Kurdish youth set official buildings, schools, some bank branches and shops on fire. Kurdish middle classes also participated in the demonstrations, a rare event in Turkey’s Kurdistan. Ultimately Turkish state had to declare a curfew for a couple of days and more than 40 people, mostly demonstrators, have been shot dead in most cases by the security forces. This was a real uprising though a poorly organized one by the Kurdish movement.
It seems to me that we can point out the real significance of this uprising by the following points: first, the rupture between the Kurds and Turks deepened as the majority of Turkish population believes to the government propaganda, which claims that those who demonstrated were willing to sabotage the “peace process.” First time I heard a friend saying that “I don’t give a damn what the people in the West [i.e., Turks] think about it!” Secondly, it showed that Turkish state could not control the so called “public order” in the Kurdish region.
So to sum up where we are now in the “peace process”, we may state that:
- The Kurdish side is in a more comfortable position now, as the peace process has become an integral part of the crucial developments in Middle East. It seems difficult from now on to confine the Kurdish question in Turkey within the nation sate borders.
- However the widening gap between the feelings of Turks and Kurds is not good news, since if it continues this will most likely make any peaceful solutions to the Kurdish question impossible in the future. And the recent developments show that we are proceeding towards this direction: Hundreds of Kurds have been detained and put in prison all around Turkey after the massive demonstrations for Kobene.
- In spite of all this, the government avoids resorting to severe repressive measures such as large scale military and police operations which were familiar during 90’s. What is the reason of this unusual approach? Well, general elections will be held in May 2015 and the strategy of the governing party AKP for winning the elections is to present itself as the sole defender of the “peace and brotherhood process” even as the Kurdish movement attempts to “sabotage” it. What’s strange with this strategy is that basically AKP seeks the support of Turkish population, but not the Kurds. AKP and the President Erdogan understand the “peace process” as merely “ending terrorism” and “disarming of PKK” without making any substantial compromise. On the other hand, a recent public survey about the forthcoming elections suggests that some segments of Kurdish population who previously voted for AKP will prefer HDP this time. This is mainly because of the government’s attempt to undermine the Kurdish autonomy in Rojava.
The crucial shortcoming: the lack of a peace movement
Besides all these real politic gains, policy shifts and the internationalization of the Kurdish question, it’s the active support of the society as a whole that would bring a permanent peace in Turkey. The Kurdish movement can mobilize Kurdish population on a mass scale only in times of real crisis. Hundreds of thousands Kurds demonstrated only when Kobane was about to fall and when the President Erdogan openly approved it with a sly smile on his face during a public speech.
If we turn to the Turkish society, the situation is much worse. Progressive people defending peace have been unable to build up an inclusive peace movement since the beginning of the “peace process.” They seem to have contended with watching and “analyzing” the setbacks and advances in the process.
And the support of the majority of the ordinary citizens for the peace process fades away in the face of an increasingly nationalistic and chauvinist propaganda by the government and its mass media.
Lastly, we may also mention an ominous development taking place in recent months. Facing with mass demonstrations and some violent actions by pro-PKK youth groups, the government enters into a closer collaboration with the military. Consequently the military gains grounds in politics at the disadvantage of the civil political actors. This has always been the same pattern with Turkey. Since the military has never been under the democratic control of civil governments, postponement of real, democratic solutions to crucial problems and growing concerns of the ruling elites about “public disorder” has always resulted in the increased power of military on the political area. Those who are familiar with the modern Turkish history will surely foresee where the growing weight of military will lead us.
ZNetwork is funded solely through the generosity of its readers.
Donate