Before World War I, American wage earners who couldnāt make ends meet before their next paycheck relied on an insidious form of loan sharks known assalary lenders. These predators lent money at an illegal rate of interest and without collateral. They often charged annual interest rates in excess of 1,000 percent. State sanctions against salary lenders were not rigorously imposed, and the industry thrived not throughĀ the threat of physical violence, but the illusion of a legal obligation.
Fast-forward one hundred years, and salary lendingĀ has expanded, but under a different name: payday lending, a wildly lucrative industry that occupies more storefronts than McDonaldās and Starbucks combined. These new loan sharks operate under the same logic as salary lenders, but specifically targetĀ more vulnerable populations like welfare recipients, and are armedĀ with new techniques to squeeze as much surplus as possible from debtors.
Payday loans are small, short-term, unsecured cash advances that are due on the borrowerās next payday (usually two weeks) or government benefit (e.g. social security or welfare check). TheĀ average profileĀ of a payday borrower is a single mother with young children earning approximately $40,000 who lives an economically precarious life in which an additional expense ā such as an illness, divorce, or seasonal financial pressures (think back-to-school supplies or Christmas expenses) ā is too much. For those struggling to get by, the industry is ready to lend, at a cost.
The dependence of the poor on this privately created money (aka ācreditā) is neither natural nor inevitable. It is a social reality manufacturedĀ by neoliberal policies. In particular, payday lendingĀ has beenĀ facilitated by an important yet largely neglected component of neoliberal governance: the debtfare state.
Alongside other components of neoliberalism such as workfarism (replacing welfare provisioning with work) and prisonfare (criminalizing poverty), debtfarism aims to regulate social insecurity byĀ expanding the credit system: payday loans, student loans,Ā credit card debt.
Simultaneously,Ā the same forces promoting debtfarism advance social and economic policies that serve to reproduce this very precariousness. Such policiesĀ include draconian bankruptcy laws (such as George W. Bushās Bankruptcy Prevention Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005), lax usury laws, and watered-down consumer-protection laws.
The rhetorical and regulative interventions of debtfarism facilitate both the widespread reliance of the poor on privately created money as well as the extraction of interest and fee-based revenue through the poverty industry, with payday lenders as its avatar.
The payday loan industry is dominated by a few players, including Advance AmericaĀ (recently purchasedĀ by Mexican billionaire Ricardo Salinas Pliego). Far from existing on the margins of the financial system, many of these large payday lenders are plugged directly into Wall Street, with banks such as Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America supplying the direct credit lines that finance this poverty industry.
When regulations and interest-rate caps have cropped up at the state level, national banks have frequently protected payday lenders ā for a price ā under ārent-a-bankā partnerships. Since national banks are not subject to the same usury laws set by states, payday lenders have been able to circumvent regulatory limits.
Eager to profit from the poverty industry, national banks such as US Bancorp and Wells Fargo created their own payday loan products (called ādirect deposit advancesā or āchecking account advancesā) with triple-digit interest rates to serve their checking account customers. (They got rid of their payday loans earlier this year under threat of federal regulation.)
Neoliberal policies have created a ludicrous situation in which payday loans appear to beĀ a rational option forĀ debt-strapped individuals, despite the exorbitant rates of interestĀ theyāre forced to pay. The average payday loan carries triple interest rates, with averages ranging from 364 to 550 APR.
And the industry makes even more off ārollover loans.ā Nearly 90 percentĀ ofĀ its revenues are based on fees stripped from borrowers who have renewedĀ their loans and are caught in a cycle of debt. A typical borrower has an outstanding payment for thirty weeks and Ā ultimatelypaysĀ $800 for a $300 loan.
Payday lenders base their business strategy on the assumption that customers will be more likely to take out paydayĀ loans if a store is close to theirĀ workplace. Some observers have even suggested that the only factors payday borrowers take into account are convenience of location, ease of process, and speed of approvals, thereby reinforcing the representation of the poor as ignorant, indolent, and irrational.
Yet debtfarism has facilitated the construction of this convenience in at least two ways. First, in a world of deregulated interest rates, national banks are permitted to charge over 4,000 percent (median) interest rates on overdraft checks ā twenty times greater than payday loans. This has createdĀ an outrageous environmentĀ in which payday loans have become a cost-effective alternative for cash-strapped workers.
Second, the payday industry actively targets particular populations, including African-American and Latino neighborhoods, and urban areas with higher concentrations of people on public assistance, people in the military, or immigrants.
In specific cases, this targeting has promptedĀ strong political responses. When the Pentagon raised concerns about the high numbers of military personnel linked to payday loans and how this dampened troop morale, interest rates for the military were suddenly capped at 36 APR through the Military Lending Act of 2006.
Efforts at the state level to instate tougherĀ restrictionsĀ have been less successful. WheneverĀ voters have pressed for interest rates caps or outright bans, legislatures have provided enough slack to allow payday lenders to keepĀ thriving.
Consider, for example, the Short-Term Loan Act, which the Ohio state legislature passed in 2008 to curb predatory payday lending. This ostensibly progressive legislation capped the maximum loan amount at $500, set a maximum APR of twenty-eight, made the maturity date a minimum of thirty days, and banned lenders from issuing more than four loans per year to the same borrower. This appeared to throw considerable sand in the industryās rollover mechanism.
But the payday lending industry found an out. They identified two major loopholes in two other pieces of state legislation. Exploiting these legal gaps, lenders charged even higher APR than previously allowed. A year later, payday lenders in Ohio were levyingĀ triple-digit interest rates, issuing loans in amounts exceeding $500, andĀ requiringĀ that loans be repaid within two weeks or less if borrowers wanted to avoid penalties.
In the aftermath of the 2008 subprime crisis, and in the renewed spirit of debtfarism in reforming predatory practices through lightweight consumer-protection laws, two federal bills were introduced in 2009 to restructure the payday lending industry: the Payday Loan Reform Act and the Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act. Unsurprisingly, neither passed. Moreover, each bill has a built-in ambiguity that allows the payday lending industry to engage in business-as-usual behavior.
In fact, the annual earnings of the payday lending industry haveĀ never been higher, revealing how financial crises canĀ strengthenĀ neoliberal capitalism. The lack of regulatory rigor promoted by debtfarism has also facilitated the rapid growth of the poverty industryās NextGen: online payday lenders such as BillFloat, Zest, Think Finance, Kabbage, and On Deck. These virtual actors will prove more difficult to regulate than their brick-and-mortar brethren.
Stronger regulation of payday lenders is an important short-term goal. But simply pushing consumer-protection legislation confines us within the limits of debtfarism and its attempts to regulate and normalize a world in whichĀ workersĀ are compelled to turn to marketized safety nets in the absence ofĀ a living wage.
We should reject a reality in which (temporary) relief from the structural violence of capitalism is available only as a point of sale at a payday lending store. Public forms of social protection should be available to all citizens, not just corporations and the wealthy in the form of tax breaks and bailouts.
We therefore need to collectively attack the roots of the poverty industry, demanding nothing less than the establishment of living wages and the eventualĀ decommodification of labor; the rejection of workfarism in favor ofĀ inclusive and non-punitive social programs;Ā and robustly funded publicĀ education, healthcare, and housing.
There is an alternative, and we shouldnāt allow the poverty industryās distorted reality to convince us otherwise.
ZNetwork is funded solely through the generosity of its readers.
Donate