The general elections in Nepal, November last year, surprised many when Maoists were relegated to a distant third position while right-wing Nepalese Congress emerged as the largest party. In an interview with Viewpoint, Feyzi Ismail explains why? 

‘The vote was used firstly to punish the Maoists and, secondly, to allow the mainstream parties an opportunity to bring a measure of stability to Nepal,’ she says.  

A Teaching Fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, Feyzi Ismail has researched on NGOs, social movements and the left in Nepal. Read on:  

The results of the general election held on 19 November in Nepal have now been finalised by the Election Commission. What was significant about these elections? What are the differences, if any, from previous general elections? 

The election results in Nepal essentially reflect a rejection of the failed promises of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN, the party that initiated a 10-year People’s War that ultimately led to the abolition of the monarchy in 2008. This disillusionment with the Maoists meant an extensive vote for the mainstream parties – the Nepali Congress and the CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or UML, which have been in power for decades – but did not mean a rejection of the political process. Although the number of registered voters was down by five million since 2008, according to much of the media voter turnout was still over 77 per cent. This isn’t to suggest that voters were inspired by the mainstream parties, nor do they necessarily trust them. The vote was used firstly to punish the Maoists and, secondly, to allow the mainstream parties an opportunity to bring a measure of stability to Nepal.  

These elections, as with the previous Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, were to elect a 601-seat Constituent Assembly that could draft a new Constitution. The CA also functions as Nepal’s parliament. The previous CA failed to draft the Constitution because of fierce differences over the modalities of restructuring the state under a republic, and how resources were to be shared across ethnic and indigenous groups. As with the previous elections, 240 seats were to be selected through first-past-the-post, and 335 through proportional representation (PR). The remaining 26 are nominated by an 11-member council of ministers, chaired by the prime minister. But there are also major differences. The elections to the Constituent Assembly in 2008 were taking place in the context of immense optimism following the 2006 democracy movement, which forced King Gyanendra – who was to be the last monarch in Nepal – not only to reinstate parliament after a more than a year of emergency rule, but to withdraw from politics. The 19 November elections came after five years of the stale politics of the mainstream, political deadlock amongst the political parties and no real change in the lives of the poor majority. Voting was instrumental, the result of disillusionment rather than inspiration. Far fewer women and ethnic minorities were put forward for this CA compared to the last one, and there were more parties to choose from in these elections – 122 parties presented candidates in these elections, whereas in 2008 there were 74 registered parties.  

Of course the other difference is that the recent elections were overshadowed by an alliance of 33 parties calling for a boycott. The 33-party alliance was led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), a significant faction that split from the UCPN in June 2012 over what they claim was the Maoists’ betrayal of the revolutionary aims of the party. The CPN claimed that these elections – and the CA that is formed as a result – are illegal because they cannot be carried out under an interim administration headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Although irregularities were reported during the election process, which was overseen by thousands of national and international observers and declared free and fair, the results stand. The formation of the CA, however, has been marred by delays in submitting the names of CA members to the Election Commission, and rows between the president and the Chief Justice over who is to call the first meeting of CA.  

The UCPN was relegated to a distant third position following the polls, while Congress emerged victorious. Why did the Maoists become so unpopular in such a short span of time? In the previous elections, their showing was impressive. Why the electoral debacle?

The UCPN garnered support over the years because they aimed to represent a genuine alternative to the decades of failed promises by the mainstream parties. They had inspired and mobilised people to fight for justice, they had established parallel institutions that posed a challenge to the status quo and for a time it seemed as if they had an uncompromising strategy that would defend the interests of the poorest. In the previous elections more than a third of the electorate voted for the Maoists. Although they won 220 seats, they were unable to form a majority in the CA. It is arguable that had been able to form a majority they could have implemented a series of limited reforms. That aside, the real problem was the decision in 2006 to engage in a peace process facilitated by India and participate in parliamentary politics while at the same time abandoning revolutionary politics.  

Since joining government the Maoists have been unable to focus on public provision, and unable to prove to the public their distinctiveness. Rather, they confirmed the widespread perception that all politicians are corrupt and uninterested in change. For this the Maoists barely mustered 80 seats. The Congress took a total of 196, 105 of which were elected through first-past-the-post. The UML also did well, taking 175 seats. The collapse of the Maoist vote is thus related to their failure to produce any tangible results: in their most recent stint in government (together with a coalition of Madhesi parties), lasting almost 20 months, the Maoists were not only unable to provide material benefits for the poorest but made only marginal progress on policy. The most visible failure was not producing the promised Constitution, which they along with others claimed would bring political stability. But perhaps part of the problem was not the failure to write the Constitution but an overemphasis on the Constitution, and not enough on providing material benefits – the roads, schools and health clinics that are sorely lacking.  

While the Maoists’ position has been to facilitate access to resources for ethnic minorities and Madhesis under a federal structure, they have been unable to withstand the pressures of the parliamentary process even on this important question. The caste and class interests of the ruling elite that are threatened by redistribution have overwhelmed the Maoists, and instead of attacking elite interests they have surrendered, becoming known for levels of corruption unmatched by the other parties. The party’s split in 2012 would have certainly also influenced the magnitude of the poor showing, while for non-core supporters, voting for the Maoists (whose support base has dwindled) was deemed no longer useful. Finally, the heavy security presence surrounding the polls affected all the parties. The government deployed nearly two-thirds of the army to provide security during the elections, and the border between India and Nepal was sealed for several days in the run-up and during the elections, with India agreeing to co-operate with security, logistics and surveillance. There were reports that this increased security presence, combined with the boycott by the 33-party alliance and the ensuing violence, persuaded at least some not to vote. 

The UML regained support and the vote for the left is still bigger than the right, in terms of seats, at least. Although there wasn’t a radical shift to the right, there was some sort of shift. How would you describe it? 

The Nepali Congress regained its position of being the largest party in Nepal, replacing the Maoists. But like the Maoists in 2008, it failed to form a majority. The monarchist parties RPP and RPP-Nepal also did far better – in the previous elections they won only 8 and 4 seats respectively, while in these elections they secured 13 and 24 seats – together almost half the number of seats the Maoists gained. India supported these elections in the hope that a clear majority for the Congress would see the Maoists out of power. Despite the relative success of this strategy and gains for the right, the vote wasn’t necessarily a reflection of voter confidence in the right, and there is no sense that restoring the monarchy and reviving the Hindu state, which the RRP-N is campaigning for, is viable. The RPP-Nepal itself also seems to have split over disagreements in the selection of names for their PR list.  

The thrust of the Congress campaign was to boost business, and its success in the elections gave confidence to the markets. The Congress has always had the most comfortable relationship with India, and aims to facilitate greater investment, aid and trade from India. The UML gained because they are seen as part of the establishment, on the one hand a relatively safe, moderate party, and on the other hand a party that at least has the vestiges of left credentials. Since 2008, either the UML or the Maoists have led government, until the Chief Justice took over temporarily. Though the Maoists and the broader left managed to break the hegemony of the Nepali Congress, it’s hardly surprising that when the radical left fails to provide a concrete and winnable strategy for realising an alternative, the right will gain. Meanwhile, the challenge of addressing the demands for representation amongst the most marginalised ethnic groups, women and Dalits, remains.  

One thing is certain: disillusionment with the political parties and politicians has been consolidated. People are fed up not necessarily with politics but with politicians. No party garnered overwhelming support and all parties continue to offer consensus. Part of the problem with consensus – particularly when the Congress is in the lead – is that not only will the pace of any change be slow but democracy will suffer. The decisions that count are currently made through a High Level Political Committee (HLPC) consisting of the top leaders of the four main parties. Now that the elections have taken place and names have been submitted, decision-making should take place through the elected CA, not the HLPC, which is neither elected nor transparent.  

An end to monarchy was an achievement of the Nepali left, particularly the Maoists. But do you think there are certain other significant achievements of the Nepali left that have ensured a broad support for the left, if not the Maoists?  

The abolition of the monarchy was a significant achievement, and the Maoists were obviously central to this achievement. The Maoists also pushed for the first CA to be representative, and played a role in ensuring that 33 per cent of seats went to women, 40 seats went to Dalits and 115 to ethnic minorities. The previous CA was considered to be the most representative body in Nepal’s history and far more representative than many other parliaments around the world. But it was not only representation or inclusion that the Maoists were fighting for, at least initially. The Maoists had recognised early on that ethnic and linguistic oppression had to be incorporated into the class struggle, and that Nepal could not be liberated without complete equality and freedom for all ethnicities. They took up the cause of self-determination as a central component of their strategy.  

Thus the Maoists, and historically the UML, influenced the development of political consciousness in Nepal. When the UML abandoned any notion of radical politics and made the decision to accept the limits of parliamentarianism, the space was left open to the Maoists. The left parties come from a much longer tradition of left-wing organising in Nepal, influenced by the independence movement in India in the 1930s and 40s. Since the subsequent formation of the first Communist Party of Nepal in 1949, left-wing ideas have been influential, whether in opposition in parliament or outside parliament. There is also a widespread perception in Nepal that the left is on the side of the poor and oppressed. Parties that claim the communist label thus draw on this history and exploit this perception.  

But the left parties have found it difficult, if not impossible, to keep promises whilst in government. If the Maoists were conscious of the UML’s shift to the right, they failed to draw the lessons in how to avoid such a shift. Their refusal to accept the election results, instead demanding an investigation into the polls and delaying the formation of the CA, only shows the depth of their entrenchment in the mainstream and a refusal to consider past strategic errors. More recently, there are indications that the UCPN may split over disagreements between senior leaders over the PR list. Since joining consensus-based politics in government and abandoning a class perspective, they have allowed procedural matters to dominate the political landscape and left their erstwhile supporters increasingly disillusioned.  

Since the entry of the Maoists into the mainstream, what do you see as the salient differences between the UCPN and the UML? 

Since the Maoists decided to join the mainstream, they have undoubtedly moved ideologically closer to the UML. The Maoists retain a measure of rhetoric about a future socialist society, unlike the UML, but for both parties the project is economic development along capitalist lines. It is debateable whether the Maoists made this compromise upon entering the mainstream or if it was latent in their strategy for revolution. The UML made this compromise in the early 1970s. Both parties talk of bringing peace and prosperity to Nepal and protecting or advancing the rights of women, ethnic groups, Madhesis and other marginalised communities, but the UML claims to have a realistic agenda and achievable goals, and that the Maoists make false promises. Yet the UML fails to articulate a clear overarching strategy for how this inclusion is to be realised, other than through a vague liberal democracy.  

On a programmatic level, there are differences between the UCPN and the UML over state restructuring. The UML proposes a model for multi-identity-based federalism, arguing that the Maoists’ ethnicity-based model has the potential to encourage disintegration and division. Here the UML is closest to the Nepali Congress, and the elections have brought them even closer. The Maoists, on the other hand, continue to argue that federalism on the basis of identity will institutionalise equality for ethnic groups, which the 1990 Constitution and efforts at decentralisation failed to do. But the elections have clearly undermined the Maoists’ confidence, and they concede that they haven’t been able to convince the public over the question of ethnicity. Perhaps it isn’t so much an inability to convince the public, however, as it is a lack of strategy in dealing with the national question: promoting the development of ethnic consciousness without a class perspective and harbouring illusions in the notion that a consensus-based constitution will adequately address historical grievances and current demands for ethnic rights. The UML has more experience as a moderate party in government, and while the Maoists have accepted moderation in politics, at times they appeal to their past as revolutionaries. Thus there are differences between the UCPN and the UML but those differences are becoming increasingly narrow.  

What future prospects do you see for the Nepali left? 

Whereas once the Maoists had polarised society along class lines, currently there is no political outlet through which the masses can be mobilised. Certainly there is political discord, but this is mainly amongst politicians, all of whom all accept the basic framework of neoliberal reforms. The CPN, which could have played an important role as an opposition force outside government, proposes that a round-table conference with all parties – including the right – be held on the Constitution and future politics, instead of the CA. While the party is clear about not joining government or participating in the CA, it has claimed that if the UCPN would join the CPN in the streets and correct past mistakes, it would reunite with the UCPN. This approach, however, still fails to take a sober look at what went wrong during the People’s War and its aftermath. Perhaps one of the weaknesses of the left then is that the leadership seems unwilling to seriously assess the mistakes of the past, though there have been calls for introspection amongst the UCPN rank and file. While there is truth in the CPN’s claims that the new Constitution will favour the status quo and that it will not be a people’s constitution, the CPN has not proven itself to be a credible opposition force. The failed attempt to disrupt the polls – first denying and then admitting to the bombings in the run-up to the elections – when the public mood was in favour of elections, could not have helped the CPN’s popularity. With the Nepali Congress and the UML and their international backers regaining the upper hand following the elections, and with India now promising further investment and trade deals as a way to peace and stability, sections of left have an opportunity. They must not only expose the failings of those in government, but also provide a vehicle through which the masses can express dissent and propose alternatives. This means neither ultra-left sloganeering nor compromising with the right, but mobilising around a set of radical, democratic demands that actually address the needs of the majority.

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