Putting the cart before the horse is an apt expression for the tendency to stick to strictly circumstantial analyses of reality. The smoke left behind by the polarisation between Nicolás Maduro and María Corina Machado has distracted from a much-needed analysis of the real dynamics of power and social agreements within Venezuelan society today.
The fact that bosses’ organisations abstained from supporting Edmundo González’s inauguration, and the distant stance of the United States and “right-wing” governments in the region, marks a new precedent in the government-opposition confrontation of the past 27 years. On one hand, bosses’ organisations are focused on maximising benefits from their agreements with the government (tax incentives and de facto weakening of workers’ protections). [US President Donald] Trump’s soft stance simply reflects the agreements that exist between the Venezuelan state and the oil lobby, and his strategic need for cheaper oil prices. Economics drags politics with it, not the other way around. We are dealing with a balance of forces involving social as well as economic actors with social expressions.
Amid this new co-existence, Maduro assumed the presidency for a third term on January 10. Pursuing a strategy of legitimation, his government’s plan focuses on a new constitutional reform, calling for a debate among different social actors. The reform is principally centred on consolidating “popular democracy” and designing a “new economy”. We will need to see how these social forces participate in this national debate, which necessarily requires recognising all the various expressions of collective interests. Under no circumstances can we talk about a participatory democracy if the means for participation and axis of discussion are imposed and controlled by institutional bodies and economic actors that have reached prior agreements.
The reality in 2025 is very different to that of 2013, when Maduro started his first term. Back then, the opposition attempted an institutional coup using the National Assembly elected in 2015. In parallel, bosses’ organisations exercised their social force to twist the arm of the government and successfully weaken protections for the great majority. Its main strategy was practices such as speculation, hoarding and lockouts, among others.
Statements by these sectors during those years focused on petitioning for policies that gave more guarantees to capital, on requesting that the Organic Labour Law (LOTTT) be reformed, on protesting against the retroactivity of social benefits and job security, and on asking for exemptions and benefits to “resist” the crisis. Thousands of workers were sacked from companies such as Polar, Regional, Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Cargill, among others. Labour conflicts reached unprecedented levels, with disobedience and contempt for decisions made by bodies such as the Labour Inspectorate common practice.
The so-called economic war involved socio-economic crimes and fraudulent practices that went largely unpunished, in part due to a lack of political will but primarily because there was no legal framework within which to punish and regulate the economic criminals. Not even the National Constituent Assembly of 2017 passed legislation on this. As such, shareholders are protected by corporate veils while, on the other hand, legal persons are not regulated (there are no procedures for imposing penalties and economic sanctions).
Furthermore, through their belligerent actions, these economic groups were able to forge agreements of co-existence with the state after 2018. Under a policy of “turning a blind eye”, the state in practice facilitated a reconfiguration of the private sector based on diminished costs of labour via closures and mass layoffs. The so-called economic recovery is largely due to the end of hoarding (allowing goods to circulate and be bought with US dollars) and the “incentives for investment”. The foundations of the so-called “new economy” have therefore already been laid. Given this, can we say the political will exists to regulate and restrict the chaos and anarchy of the market? Or is the aim to simply consolidate policies that promote further marketisation and deregulation?
By now, it would be childish to believe that the polarisation in Venezuela is between left and right, between Machado and Maduro. In reality, behind this exists the market’s need to guarantee conditions for investment via further flexibilisation and deregulation. The LOTTT is extremely uncomfortable for bosses, even if it is only applied discretionary by the state that continues its policy of allowing others to do as they please. Everything points in the direction of a labour counter-reform more convenient for economic groups.
But achieving this will require reforming the constitution to annul certain constitutional principles on labour issues. Legitimising the reform on the basis of strengthening “popular democracy” seems like a convenient means to achieve this. It would certainly help divert the attention of different social forces towards a dead-end discussion. Or are we genuinely to think that the “new economy” will include a popular economy operating outside the market?
Translation by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.
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