Abstract
The world-wide homogenisation of thinking, analysis and prescription, coupled with the de-legitimisation of social critique, dissent, and alternative thinking in the 1990s, has been key characteristics of globalisation in the current international system. The homogenisation is the outcome of global geopolitical changes and the end of the Cold War, with the ascendance of a victorious paradigm. The resulting global intellectual hegemony (GIH) is of special concern to developing countries and to the United Nations. It has undermined the goals and aspirations of the former and contributed to their intellectual disarmament and disempowerment; it has undermined the mandate and role of the latter. This essay discusses GIH in the context of international development co-operation. It is argued that the mechanisms at work are well-known in national politics, in particular in undemocratic societies, and are now projected worldwide by new technologies and through the global domination by those with power, a task made easier by the lack of organised and credible opposition. It suggests the need for further study and policy debate of this global phenomenon, which seems to have largely passed unnoticed in academic, policy and public opinion circles.
Note
This article was dedicated to the memory of the late Julius K. Nyerere, former Chairman of the South Centre. It was published originally in UNESCO’s International Social Science Journal, 166, December 2000, pp. 447-456, at the time when the author was the head of the South Centre secretariat. It is available also in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish editions of the Journal. It was reprinted in UNDP’s Cooperation South, Number 2, 2001, pp. 132-146, and in several other periodicals. Given the difficulties of obtaining online the text of this still topical article, ZNet is making it available to its network of users.
Statement of the problem
How policy issues, structures and social constructs and processes are defined, conceptualised and interpreted has always been of importance. This is much more so today, in a “globalising” world community, where “globalised” constructs and concepts shape and can even determine the nature of economic, social, political responses and outcomes at all levels of human society.
Symptomatically, the current definition of “globalisation” and its evaluation have been virtually monopolised by a relatively small number of influential actors with global reach, power and ambitions. The overarching conceptual framework and paradigm regarding globalisation have emerged from the perceptions, interests and agenda of these actors, and are inspired by neo-liberal ideological premises. For all practical purposes, this framework has been foisted on an uninformed or largely receptive international community. This has taken place partly through the very mechanisms and technologies which are making globalisation possible. This includes the increasingly widespread availability of modern communications and data processing systems and technologies, the transposition on a global scale of modern methods common in such domains as national political campaigns, marketing and advertising and – increasingly – information warfare and intelligence. It has been made possible by the increasing permeability of economies and societies, the liberalisation of markets and investment, and the related standardisation of products, entertainment, culture and education. More importantly, it was a logical occurrence and an expected outcome in the context of the post-Cold War nexus of unipolarity which effectively dispensed with credible opposition and alternative models.
What has emerged is a form of “global intellectual hegemony” (GIH), which has become one of the major characteristics of “globalisation” of the 1990s. In this paper, the focus is mainly on the means used both to influence and homogenise world public opinion such that individuals assess, interpret and explain contemporary processes and phenomena through this dominant conceptual framework, and, most importantly, to shape the analytical and cognitive frameworks relied on by governments and world élites, namely policy and decision-makers, opinion-makers and intellectuals.
It should be appreciated, however, that, whether or not GIH is the outcome of global strategy(ies), planned policies, spontaneous or consciously subversive and intentionally hegemonistic activities on the part of given actors and agents, or of the very nature of contemporary society, the persuasive power and unassailable logic and appeal of the paradigm, or a combination of some or all of these, ultimately this does not much matter, for the nature of the phenomenon and its effects are the same. GIH assumes strategic and geo-political significance, functioning much like a medieval pulpit, but with a global audience of followers.
However, although it plays a critical function in the contemporary international system, “global intellectual hegemony” has not been perceived or properly recognised. It has escaped systematic and empirical scrutiny and even the public and policy attention that it deserves. Hence its nature, scope and implications are generally poorly understood.
One of the characteristic results, and indeed the pillars of the contemporary globalisation process, is the increasing standardisation and uniformity of thinking and analysis, and intellectual homogeneity. It is promulgated by means of the frequent and widespread use of a limited number of buzz words and clichés, including “correct” phraseology which helps mask underlying issues, endows with political legitimacy and helps win approval for otherwise questionable concepts, acts, processes or institutions.
The dominant version of globalisation relies on single explanations as regards the contemporary world system and the development process, and prescribes a “one fits all” strategy in an otherwise highly heterogeneous international community as a response to the need to cope with social, economic and political, and indeed environmental challenges. The so-called “Washington Consensus”, the best known technical mantra of “globalisation”, is itself both a product and one of the main intellectual vehicles of this globally imposed standardisation, uniformity and supposed harmony. Symptomatically, the term “consensus” is frequently used to depict a product, i.e. construct or model, which has been arrived at without an opportunity for genuine debate and participation and often imposed without questions allowed or asked, even though it concerns the underlying rules, mechanisms, structures and processes. Yet, these constructs or models affect and determine the social, economic and political outcomes, including the distribution of the fruits of social and economic progress, and the dignity of individuals and peoples, worldwide.
This paper argues that GIH is a reflection, or a variant on the global scale, of the mechanisms of influencing public opinion, of the denial of social and political pluralism, and of the prevention and discouragement of dissent, which hitherto have been known and applied mostly in national contexts. To be able to project this on a global scale is a historic achievement in itself, to be envied by any agitprop machinery of yesteryear.
The mechanisms and internal logic of GIH are subtle and usually not perceived. The content of the messages it projects is thus often accepted uncritically, with the eagerness and enthusiasm of “newly born” converts or with the opportunism of apparatchiks who do not raise questions and move herd-like in the direction in which the wind is blowing. When the fact of GIH is perceived or understood, the frequent reaction is to see this manifestation of power as a fact of life which cannot be resisted or challenged effectively, while the political, economic, social and even personal costs of doing so are deemed unacceptable.
“Intellectual hegemony”, exercised at the world level, in practice often amounts to “intellectual totalitarianism” for those who have no power or insufficient intellectual capacity to resist it. It has weakened critical ability and created a growing “intellectual dependence” of the countries of the South. And it has tended to discredit, neutralise or often target anything that differs substantially from, or can seriously challenge, the current orthodox wisdom or “party line” and thus give rise to doubts regarding the prevailing order and the systemic relationships that underpin it.
GIH should be of special concern to the developing countries, individually and collectively, and to the so-called economies in transition which find themselves in a rather similar position, as they all attempt to confront and deal with the challenges and processes of globalisation. Their “intellectual dependency” means that they tend to rely wholly on a handful of “likeminded” sources in the North for data, analysis, explanation, policy and prescriptions, including in relation to their own national development. This has emerged as a major factor contributing to the erosion of their sovereignty, the weakening of their ability to respond critically and in an informed manner to globalisation challenges – domestically and internationally – or to defend and promote (and in some cases perceive) their own interests, and to their becoming mere, albeit often reluctant or ambivalent, followers.
GIH has played a major role in changing the nature, outlook, work and outputs of the United Nations and of international organisations in general, such that they become instruments increasingly under the control of powerful countries and interests from the North. Their democratic intent has thus been weakened and openly challenged, and their vital function of helping to offset and correct (to a degree) the lopsided relations and the imbalances in the global arena resulting from concentration of wealth and power in the North has been eroded. The UN responsibility to articulate, promote and advocate the needs of the overwhelming majority of humankind, which is marginalised by the workings of the international economic order, has been watered down. The United Nations institutions have in effect been tamed and the partnership with the “big business” from the North is also part of this new setting.
GIH has had the effect of sidelining and even de-legitimising whole sections of the earlier development agenda – indeed key aspects of it. It has thus helped to marginalise and neutralise developing countries’ major concerns in the global arena, in part by depriving them of the basic arguments and premises which used to underpin their national and international development agendas and demands, and which had their origins in their liberation and anti-colonialism struggles. These can no longer be accommodated within the newly dominant credo of “level playing fields”, which has remained largely unchallenged so far.
“Global intellectual hegemony” has thus emerged as one of the principal tools by which the North has dismantled and continues to neutralise the political and intellectual challenge from the South (in particular its collective action) in the development field and in the global policy arena. By the same token, GIH is used for influencing and shaping national actions and political and economic strategies, and for direct or indirect influence on the South. It has become one of the key manifestations of what has been perceived by many in the developing world as a contemporary wave of (re)colonisation of the South’s political, economic, social and cultural space, and indeed its geopolitical space.
By weakening the South’s intellectual and thus political defences, by diverting attention away from global structures and by concentrating almost entirely on the South’s own internal problems, conflicts and real or alleged shortcomings (e.g. corruption and non-transparency), GIH renders developing countries and their governments more pliable, and less able to resist or to take independent initiatives in national affairs, much less internationally. GIH has indeed contributed to the growing tendency in developing countries simply to reconcile themselves to the imperatives of power and of the new situation, even when they feel and resent its biases and effects.
In sum then, “global intellectual hegemony” influences and shapes the direction, content and structures of the current world order which impacts so profoundly on all spheres of life and society in all corners of the planet. It is therefore an issue that needs to be acknowledged and addressed, in particular by the South and by the UN family of organisations, as a priority. As a contribution to this objective, the paragraphs that follow offer an initial sketch of its nature and mechanisms.
Means for projecting global intellectual hegemony in the context of international development agenda
Contemporary global intellectual hegemony is powered and rests to a major degree on the very neo-liberal paradigm that it embodies and which it promotes. While this is not the place to discuss the nature and contents of this paradigm, it is important for the purpose of grasping the new global politics to which it has given rise to recall that it has helped shift the policy attention in the world arena away from the industrialised countries of the North and their responsibilities, and away from systemic issues and structures.
The system is not challenged, the power structures are not questioned and the hard-core economic issues are left for decision by the rich countries of the North. The onus for action as regards poverty alleviation, good governance, environment or eliminating corruption is in all cases exclusively on the developing countries. Moreover, intervention in the South by the developed countries is legitimised and they can now instruct or compel developing countries how to act and behave.
Leaving all economic problems to be solved by the market and private players, combined with an offensive on the state which markedly weakens its developmental roles and delivery capability, has also contributed to eroding the role of intergovernmental action in promoting a development-supportive international economic environment. By reducing everything to pursuit of narrow and specific interests, GIH has focused attention on micro issues and, in the process, generated conflicts within and among developing countries, thus causing them to overlook their common broader and systemic goals and problems. Problems are treated as national failures, and broader structures and systems are absolved of responsibility. The denial of priority attention to development, and replacing it with an insistence on “liberalisation” and “level playing fields” as the basic reference, has largely deprived developing countries of grounds to present arguments for systemic changes. They have been reduced to making claims for special treatment on exceptional grounds and increasingly on case-by-case basis, or for assistance from the more affluent countries and from the international community, but on both accounts they have fared poorly.
Turning attention to ways in which GIH operates, a great deal has been done through the skilled use of words and terminology, both to bolster the dominant paradigm and the current order and to endow it with positive qualities, while belittling, discrediting or demonising any questioning, challenge, or possible alternatives.
The current globalising world order is labelled as “new”, “modern”, “scientific”, “results oriented” and as the irresistible tide of history, thus making it appear as fresh and positive; any questioning or issue raised from a development perspective is depicted or dismissed as “ideological”, “old”, as belonging to the past – the past of “fossils” and “dinosaurs” – and worse, of NIEO (i.e. the New International Economic Order adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974) which seems to have achieved the status of a dirty word in the iconography currently in fashion. Using a well-tested method, disparaging words and labeling have also been used to dismiss and de-legitimise questions and arguments and, indeed, often to silence those who raise valid questions. Tagging someone with a label has emerged as an effective way of ruling them out of order and pre-empting any kind of debate. The political discomfort and embarrassment caused by being branded in this way has contributed to the defensive stance and low profile adopted by developing countries’ spokespersons and leaders, who seem often to forget that much of what is billed as “new” is in fact much “older” in terms of the origins of economic, political and social thought and structures.
The “end of ideology (or history)”, “end of conflict”, “partnership”, “stakeholders”, “opportunities and challenges”, “no more South or North”, “positive or proactive agenda”, etc. are among the frequently repeated buzz words and phrases in contemporary international and development-related discourse. The intention is to defuse issues and pre-empt any probing questions that may be posed. They are also meant to convey the basic soundness of the system, suggesting that it is the only possible one, the “best of all possible worlds”, and non-controversial with respect to basic structural issues. Since, in this setting, the basic interests and stake of the countries of the South are deemed to be the same as those of the North, there is no need to question how the dominant structures, system and processes operate or the outcomes to which they give rise. In this situation developing countries are reduced to “cutting the best possible deal”.
Co-opting selected words and terminology from the UN development discourse, and giving them an entirely or selectively different content and meaning in practice, has become a way to neutralise their political and intellectual challenge and to tame their mobilising potential. (A recent example of this is the notion of a “development round” in the WTO. The North’s view of what should be the components of such a round could very well result in a further erosion of the traditional development agenda of the South and its reinterpretation in the light of North interests and perceptions). This redefinition also explains in part the shift of the policy fulcrum and policy implementation to those institutions which are under the control of the countries of the North and which have embraced the development terminology and broadened their mandate to include development, e.g. the World Bank and even the IMF, and of late WTO.
A number of political terms which for decades were the mainstay of the UN’s work and social discourse are now frowned upon and have virtually disappeared from official usage; for example, “equity”, “self-reliance”, “public”, “exploitation”, “land reform”, and even “national sovereignty” (but only with reference to developing countries!), seem all to have been ruled out of date and politically inappropriate. At the same time, such new concepts as “investors’ confidence”, “investment friendly economic environment”, etc. have moved to the centre stage and are used as major policy levers by the developed countries. In order to please and to be seen to be in line, such politically fashionable and correct phrases are now used frequently in political discourse throughout the South, often, however, without an adequate grasp of their deeper meaning or of their implications in the context of North-South relations and global politics. “Human rights” (but defined selectively and narrowly with the North resisting their being linked to the international development agenda), and “governance”, “transparency” and “corruption”, mentioned above, have emerged as key instruments not only to keep developing countries off balance and in the dock for the accused, but also to remove the international spotlight from the developed countries’ responsibilities and from issues of key concern to the South.1
The use of complex and technical language and seemingly neutral technocratic jargon, combined with a sprinkling of ethically correct sounding language, has been one means of clouding the underlying issues and of pre-empting probing questions. Selective quantification has been another aspect of the same process; a few carefully chosen indicators – many related to performance of stock markets – are used to depict and assess global and national well-being and states of health, so that a few decimal points one or the other have become a preoccupation. Attention is thus diverted from the underlying structures and processes, and indeed from critical development indicators and values.
Closely related to the issue of terminology, support for research and teaching in such academic disciplines as “political economy” and “development economics” has weakened, as if the issues and questions that they are concerned with are no longer topical, or have been resolved. These disciplines have disappeared from the curricula in many colleges, in preference for supposedly politically neutral and technocratic disciplines such as mathematical economics, neo-classical economics and business administration, which seldom question the dominant paradigm and the status quo. Those scholars who use the politically correct language and carry our appropriate research, tend to be preferred when it comes to receiving grants and travel money, an important consideration for those who live and work in the developing countries.
A related aspect is the fact that the integrated study and analysis of certain questions or issues on the global agenda, and their cause-effect relationships, are no longer encouraged. This has affected the United Nations in particular, where there is now a marked orientation to study and deal with discreet issues, on a case-by-case or sector-by-sector basis. The focus thus tends to be on the “trees” while deliberately overlooking the “forest”, one such currently fashionable “tree” being “poverty alleviation”. This trend is particularly damaging if one is trying to understand global issues and structures and their interrelationships. With some notable exceptions, such as UNCTAD Trade and Development Report and the UNDP Human Development Report, the UN has on the whole ceased to pursue in a systematic manner one of its principal functions, namely that of adopting an integrated approach to the international development agenda, a “forest and trees” approach.
Fear and intimidation play a role in the lack of any effective official challenge to the current “global intellectual hegemony” and its underlying messages. Governments do not speak up for fear of being deprived of “goods” that they need or desire, of being subjected to sanctions, or of being overwhelmed by other economic and political pressures. These may be exerted bilaterally, multilaterally through the IMF and World Bank or the WTO, and increasingly by giant business and investment entities from the North. When countries try to resist these external conditionalities and preferred policies, they can, for example, be accused of undermining “investors’ confidence” and causing them to withdraw with the consequent domestic economic turmoil, or discouraging foreign entities from investing. Often, the broader public is intimidated as the media predicts hardship and crisis, in the hope and expectation that the population will also press their government to conform to the “new” order and desist from “rocking the boat”. In the current unipolar world of power politics, subtle or straightforward intimidation and blackmail are fast becoming the unchallenged order and practice of the day and, indeed, a constraint on freedom of speech and expression.
Though these practices are widespread, the evidence is not documented in a systematic manner or analysed. Governments often do not wish to admit to succumbing to threats and intimidation. Individuals, especially those in service of governments and international organisations, have their own reasons for not speaking up, including the understandable need to keep their jobs or the desire to get promotion. Contrary thinking and speaking out is mainly done in private, thus contributing to an image of apparent harmony, consensus and broad acceptance of the status quo at the public level.
An important aspect worth noting in the international arena is what could be dubbed the “Stiglitz syndrome”, whereby the critique of the “Washington consensus” by the chief economist of the World Bank in public speeches was perceived as a green light from the top of the mountain, thus making politically respectable and safe within the establishment the public expression of doubts and criticism. Thus many have been emboldened to begin openly to question and criticise “globalisation” and, like the chief economist of the Bank to rediscover (or reinvent for lack of awareness of previous development-related work within the UN) the value of some of the concepts and goals which had been common in earlier years but which had been obscured by the neo-liberal tide or ideologically proscribed by GIH and swept into the “end of history” dustbin (from which they were not supposed to emerge again).
“Global intellectual hegemony” has been made possible, easier and more effective by the modern technologies and by the concentration of control over the global media by a few countries and corporations from the North, which either directly, or indirectly through their function as a conduit for advertising, cultural products and other messages including the news and reporting on and interpreting world events, shape and influence, whether subtly and insidiously, the minds and outlook of a global audience, especially the young. Another important element is the increasing dominance of the English language, and thus of views and analyses emanating from the core countries where this language originates. Analyses and views in French or Spanish, not to mention other languages, seldom penetrate beyond the narrow confines of countries using these languages, and have had virtually no visibility or impact on the global scene, as has been the case, for example, with respect to the trenchant analyses of globalisation by
The discrediting of the “developmental state” (and indeed of the “welfare state” in the North), of public institutions and endeavours (that are deemed a “bad”, in contrast to the private and hence privatisation which are considered an unmitigated “good”), and of the development record of earlier decades have, together with the de-legitimisation, and making into an anathema key aspects of the UN’s development work and of the traditional North-South agenda, contributed to and constituted the outcomes of the current intellectual hegemony.
A challenge to the developing countries and to the United Nations
The erosion of the intellectual preparedness of the South, which, as mentioned earlier, is both an outcome of and a factor contributing to the current global intellectual hegemony, has lowered its defenses and weakened its initiative. Also, as mentioned above, the South’s intellectual preparedness has also been diminished as a result of the parallel weakening of the United Nations as a source of intellectually autonomous thinking, analysis and initiatives (especially on global economic issues), which were inspired by the development objectives and the basic premises and mandate of the UN Charter.
The impact and influence of the developing countries on the global scene and on the nature and content of the dominant paradigm has waned as their collective action weakened and they let slip their leadership role in the global policy domain. Hit badly by and exposed to the workings of the international economy, many developing countries have also had to give priority to seeking the best possible deal for themselves, or simply trying to remain afloat within the new world arrangements. In this context, finance and trade ministries, vulnerable to immediate and short-term concerns and pressures, and working within a technocratic mould and usually not reputed for a broader political or strategic vision, emerged as the key national actors and policy and decision-makers.
Although developing countries might broadly agree on what aspects of the new thinking they were unhappy with and could act defensively, this by itself was not enough either to counter effectively the new scheme of things and the evolving processes, or to present an alternative platform or a set of proposals. The South had no sufficiently strong or adequately staffed and equipped institutions of its own to help define and express the common interests of the developing countries and put forward proposals, or to provide them with the necessary technical and intellectual arguments to defend their common interests in their dealings with the North. Moreover, as mentioned above, the UN is no longer as free and able to offer intellectual, technical and policy back-up to the Group of 77, as it had been in earlier decades.
Atomised, developing countries have been easily steamrollered by the North, which – quite clearly and logically as part of its strategy – has worked to discourage the collective action of G77 and
In this context, it is worth recalling that the UN had played an important and fundamental role in developing the intellectual challenge to the North-dominated system by providing the analytical and empirical bases which gave substance to developing country demands for changes and new measures in international economic relations in support of development. This was most prominently reflected in the creation and work of UNCTAD, based on earlier seminal work done by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the regional context. The struggle to establish UNCTAD was instrumental in the birth of G77, and in the Group’s subsequent ability to discuss and negotiate with the North on more equal terms.
It is thus not surprising that a key objective of some in the North was to hamstring UNCTAD and the UN generally, and to reduce, dismantle or neutralise their ability to help the developing countries in those respects. Such efforts have been successful in impairing an important and respected source of intellectual and policy challenge to the system, and of intellectual support for developing countries who could translate this into an organised effort to achieve policy change at the global level. To sum up, a so-called “killing of two birds with one stone” was achieved in a number of different ways, including:
A weakening of the UN from within through direct pressures, limits on budgets and personnel, and restrictions and changes in the UN’s mandate, especially in the economic sphere;
Pruning of the traditional development agenda and the exclusion of many critical issues from research, study and debate, and the reorientation of the UN and its agencies towards issues of special concern to the North, or to matters having mainly to do with national policies in the South.
Pressures on given UN organisations, including serious proposals to close down UNCTAD, UNIDO, and even ECLAC and ECA, for having “outlived their purpose”, all organisations which were particularly seen as providing support for the South and identified with the earlier the development agenda.
The ascendance of multilateral financial institutions, and of WTO, as North-controlled international organisations to articulate in an authoritative, “multilateral” manner the intellectual underpinnings of the current paradigm. Instead of adjusting the external economic environment to make it more supportive of development and of the international objectives in the field of development, these institutions’ attention was focused on achieving the structural adjustment of developing countries’ economies and, increasingly, on their internal governance and polities, and their integration in the world economy on North’s terms. In parallel, efforts have been undertaken to mold the UN and its bodies, e.g. UNDP, in the image of Bretton Woods institutions, and as part of the supporting cast rather than potential challengers and policy leaders in the world arena.2
The lost voice of the South and the conquest of the international organisations, in particular the UN, has been in part the result of an “intellectual offensive” which resulted in the pronounced “global intellectual hegemony” of the 1990s and, in turn, they were responsible to an important degree for the lack of an effective challenge to this hegemony.
Challenging intellectual hegemony in the age of globalisation
Any specific global intellectual hegemony is a passing phenomenon, for hegemonies in general do not last. The current hegemonic paradigm appeared at a time of global power and policy imbalance and disarray, as the ascendant triumphant political forces and centres of power seized the opportunity to press their favoured theory, paradigm and model world-wide.
For a time it looked that it would be almost impossible to mount a credible challenge to this variant of Northern economic and social philosophy. The situation may be beginning to change. This potential opening for opposition is due in part to the evolving process of globalisation and its negative fallout, and in part to the fact that the many reactions, which have until recently been isolated and solitary, are multiplying and becoming linked, such that the level of global noise and dissent is steadily increasing, now that the GIH effects are beginning to wear off and salesmanship is having diminishing returns. The
However, these positive developments which are still largely spontaneous and which are likely to be subject to containment, need to be channelled and brought into a focused mutual awareness. It is thus also important to generate a much wider awareness of the existence of the current global intellectual hegemony, and of its meaning and its impact, both among those in policy making circles, the media and public opinion, as well as among the academic and intellectual communities in the South. These will need to work out South-based responses to the current situation in order to overcome what amounts to the South’s intellectual disarmament, and to achieve its intellectual rearmament and empowerment.
One crucially necessary step in this direction is to work out and to articulate the elements of the overarching framework which binds together the developing countries today in their efforts to improve and change the dominant system, to foster their national development, and to defend their political and economic sovereignty.
Another essential step is to grasp the similarities and differences in the national situations of developing countries and of the challenges facing them. An understanding of cause-effect relationships will make it easier to build a collective perception and a joint stand with respect to the global challenges, structures, regimes and indeed the intellectual paradigm that underpins them.
In practical terms, this calls for linking South brains, expertise and institutions, for structuring and linking-up analysis and research, for involvement in shared tasks and comparative studies, and ultimately for synthesising the essence of the many strands into a global South statement and platform on various issues and their interrelationships, and indeed on the major challenges facing international community and the United Nations, as the instrument for democratic multilateralism. In other words, greatly improved institutionalisation, organisation and structured relations and linkages within and between the South countries are called for.
Intellectual dependence is debilitating and the South must overcome this. It should map and structure its objectives and responses to generate greater global competition in ideas and intellectual constructs – these being of critical importance for orienting all human endeavours. This is a historical responsibility of the new generation that will lead the developing countries in the new century, a generation which has experienced the effects of GIH syndrome. This can be seen as part of the struggle for liberation and independence which continues in new forms under contemporary conditions. It is an essential part of gaining a voice – and power – in the global arena, as power is what the North establishment seems to respect and respond to. Certainly the moral case for international justice must continue to be articulated, for it is valid and already accepted by very many people in the North. But appeals to morality will not sway the power structures of the industrialised countries. South Power is the only thing which will have an effect.
Developing countries should not be content with the role of passive, naïve or ignorant consumers of attractively packaged constructs coming from the North. They must become properly equipped and sophisticated interlocutors and negotiators in the global arena (including the market place), inter alia, by understanding how the industrial North functions and how it promotes, intelligently and often ruthlessly, its own interests. They must reconquer intellectual space and build the necessary capabilities for this purpose, which includes the training and building awareness among new generations and reviving and fostering the intellectual ferment and capabilities in their institutions of higher learning. They must reject an entirely one-way and highly asymmetrical relationship with the North, which emerged during the 1990s.
While the South can gather enough power and strength to act alone, it also needs allies and support in its struggle. It is thus essential that the UN be re-equipped, appropriately staffed and its leadership encouraged and assisted to resume its earlier role of being a global intellectual powerhouse and leader in policy and research. This will enable the UN to act in accordance with the Charter objectives and in pursuit of people-centred development as well as equity and democracy in international relations. Had the UN pursued with more vigour its fundamental and unique role in promoting the common interest of humankind, and therefore in elaborating an intellectual framework that would underpin this, the global intellectual hegemony that characterised the 1990s might not have become so entrenched. But it has to be remembered that the UN is the creature of its members, such that the virtual collapse of concerted opposition from the developing countries left the organisation, and especially its secretariat so dependent on finance from the North, even more vulnerable and rather helpless in the face of the post-Cold War international power structure.
Further, although the South encompasses close to four fifths of humankind, it is not alone in recognising the injustices inherent in the currently dominant economic philosophy and the arrangements that accompany it. Many people in the North, and in what are now described as “countries in transition”, also have serious questions and doubts about the processes and direction of the kind of market-centred and market-driven globalisation that predominated in the 1990s. If South policy and intellectual leaders were to link up with such intellectual, academic and NGO resources in the North and engage in co-operation and mutual support, this could make a vital contribution to breaking the bonds of the global hegemony of ideas and socio-economic constructs, and securing their participation and influence in global thinking and discourse. The mobilising and communication potential of the Internet – and some of the same facilities that have helped the GIH of the 1990s – can serve this purpose too.
Intellectual liberation, based on a people-centred development paradigm, should be adopted as a collective project of the South at the start of the 21st century and its contribution to building a better world. It is an essential ingredient for the collective action of the South, which in turn is a pre-requisite if developing countries are to wield real influence and be able to take genuine initiatives in the global arena. It is also vital for protecting their national economic and political sovereignty, and indeed identity, which are currently under siege, and for overcoming that all too common feeling of helplessness and resignation experienced by their populations vis-à-vis the world and the direction in which it is moving.
Notes
1. It is important to note that these same “governance” and “democracy” concepts are increasingly applied, with the help of the conditionalities and cross-conditionalities implemented through the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, to extend Northern political thought and institutions to the South without any necessary adaptation. This transplantation of “democracy”, often with missionary zeal and self-righteousness, is causing social and political conflict and dislocation, increased marginalisation of large strata of the population, the demise of local political structures and networks, and the emergence of local elites that identify with and depend on North-based transnational elites and networks.
2. For a discussion concerning UN reform, see South Centre, For a Strong and Democratic United Nations, South Perspective on UN Reform, 1997, Zed Books Ltd, London and New York.
ZNetwork is funded solely through the generosity of its readers.
Donate