For those seeking to understand the roots of Canada’s latest intervention in Haiti, there appears to be no better place to begin than the central figure of the emerging Canada-Haiti controversy, Quebec MP Denis Paradis.

In recent interview aired on CBC’s ‘The Current’, journalist Michel Vastel, who had interviewed Paradis numerous times, had the following to say:

‘Denis Paradis…had been in Haiti in the year 2000. And he was shocked by the state of the people over there, and he decided, he almost made it a personal goal about the problem of Haiti. Denis Paradis wanted to have a brainstorming session with the players in Haiti.’ [1]

In this ‘brainstorming session,’ it turns out, ‘the players’ did not include a single Haitian.

It is instructive to explore the path that Denis Paradis, once considered the ‘top Canadian diplomat for the Americas,’ and former head of the Quebec Bar Association, tread preceding this meeting.

Back in 2000, the year of Haiti’s so-called ‘deeply flawed elections,’ Paradis was Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy.

In May 2000, Haiti held local and parliamentary elections. The Organization of American States (OAS) initially declared the elections to be ‘free and fair,’ but reversed course suddenly a few weeks later, reporting the election as having been ‘deeply flawed.’ Why the change?

In September 2000, Madeleine Albright convened the first ‘friends of Haiti’ meeting. [AP, September 13, 2000] The purpose of the meeting, according to the Associated Press, was to ‘pressure Haiti to strengthen democratic procedures in advance of presidential and legislative elections in November.’ That is, the elections that everyone knew Aristide was going to win in a huge landslide.

One month after this meeting, paramilitary leader Guy Philippe and six other School of the Americas graduates were arrested by Dominican Republic authorities on charges of an ‘attempted coup d’etat.’ It was later revealed by Ben Dupuy, leader of the National People’s Party, that ‘the coup d’etat was a meeting that was held in the private residence of the military attaché of the US embassy…The objective of this coup d’etat of these men was to establish a government…that would be headed by Olivier Nadal [wealthy elite] , Leon Manus [who had declared the May elections ‘fraudulent’], Jean-Claude Fignole and Guy Philippe.’ [Radio Metropole, October 26, 2000]

Philippe and company were released after Dominican authorites ‘decided not to repatriate the Haitian [former] policemen,’ a pattern that repeated itself several times over the next three years. With the failure of this coup attempt, it was back to the drawing board for the ‘friends of Haiti.’

By this point, the OAS, thanks to the efforts of Leon Manus [as Provisional Electoral Council President], had updated its view of the elections: from minor irregularites, where 10 out of 7000 overall positions were disputed due to tabulation discrepancies, to ‘serious irregularities and deficiencies.’

On this basis, and without providing any further evidence, the Clinton administration had ‘already vowed to impose economic sanctions on Haiti if it [did] not change its ways,’ as one CNN report put it. It was at this point also that Luis Lauredo, U.S. ambassador to the OAS, announced that the U.S. government would begin the economic strangulation of Haiti by sending ‘nearly all bilateral assistance… through private and nongovernmental organizations, thus bypassing the Haitian government.’ Clinton blocked Haiti from receiving international loans and aid, a policy that continued with the Bush Administration. In four years, over $300 million in aid and loans was blocked; the Haitian government’s annual budget is just over $400 million. The European Union joined the economic embargo in 2001, suspending all direct budget aid while redirecting some 44.4 million Euros from the intended recipient – the government – ‘to strengthen civil society and the private sector, and to support democratization.’ [2]

The reasons given for Clinton’s drastic actions against Haiti cannot be taken seriously. While a series of dictators were in power in Haiti in the 1980s, and the murder of dissidents was a regular occurrence, no such sanctions were imposed. Indeed, millions in US and Canadian aid flowed freely. For anyone with even a tenuous grasp of US foreign policy, it is clear that Clinton’s motives lay not in maintaining democracy, but in maintaining control of Aristide. Indeed, the Clinton administration’s rhetoric emphasizes exactly this: ‘The elation [of the elections] has turned sour as a result of the unwillingness of the Haitian authorities to address the serious irregularities and deficiencies arising in the elections’ aftermath’-so said Luis Lauredo.

Nonetheless, Axworthy (presumably with Paradis in tow) threw Canada’s weight behind the US plan to back Aristide into a corner, with the eventual goal of replacing him.

Denis Paradis was elevated from the backbenches in January 2002, to ‘Secretary of State for Latin America, Africa and La Francophonie.’ Paradis was responsible for Canada’s relations with Latin America, Africa, and the 56-member La Francophonie, where Canada, next to France, is the most powerful member.

Fittingly, the term ‘francophonie’ has colonial origins. According to Canada’s own Department of Foreign Affairs:

‘La Francophonie was not born yesterday! In fact, the term ‘francophonie’ was coined in 1880 by French geographer Onesisme Reclus (1837-1916) to designate the community of people and countries using French for various purposes… As was the case with all the great powers, France’s colonial past served as the foundation that tied France — primarily economically, but also socially and culturally — to its many colonies throughout the centuries.’

In December of 2002, Paradis introduced the idea for ‘the creation of [a] watchdog to clamp down on human rights abuses in the Francophonie grouping of French- speaking nations, some of which have been accused of serious violations,’ during a gathering of the 56-member La Francophonie group of countries in Lausanne, Switzerland. Said Paradis, ‘There are eight million French-speakers in Haiti. If there is a place on the planet where the words democracy, good governance and human rights should apply, it’s surely in Haiti.’

Prior to the December meeting, Paradis had raised the issue of employing the Bamako Declaration (made in Bamako, Mali, by La Francophonie member-countries in 2000) in the case of Haiti in the House of Commons. Referring to the upcoming meeting in Switzerland, Paradis said ‘We have proposed a mechanism, enabling the implementation of Bamako, which will allow us to quickly apply this declaration where there are problems with specific Francophone countries.’ Ominously, Paradis added, ‘Whenever the Bamako declaration and its principles are mentioned, I think of Haiti. This is a place where Bamako could be truly meaningful in terms of democracy, human rights and good governance.’

Paradis saw in the Bamako declaration an opportunity to formalize intervention so as to ‘take action against states who fail to meet those standards.’

In his interview with ‘The Current’, Michel Vastel went on to describe who participated and what the nature of the January 2003 ‘Ottawa Initiative’ meeting was:

‘France, La Francophonie, the European Union, the [U.S.] Secretary of State sent two what they call ‘high ranking officials’ [Otto Reich and the OAS’s Luigi Einaudi]. And, for Latin America there was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for El Salvador, and the idea was to just search for new ideas. So the meeting took place at the Meech Lake resort, you know the place, the last week of January 2003. It lasted three days over an extended weekend. Once again, all information that I’m giving you is coming from Paradis and from the French government. There was a consensus that ‘Aristide should go.’ But, how do you do that? This is the French government…who suggested there should be a trusteeship like there was in Kosovo. That was not an intervention, they said, that was their responsibility-all these countries-to protect.’

In Vastel’s l’Actualite article, Paradis is quoted as saying: ‘If Canadians treated their animals as the Haitian authorities treat their citizens, they [Canadian authorities] would be jailed,’ and ‘In Africa I have seen poverty with dignity… but in Haiti there’s not even dignity.’

Vastel continues: ‘Therefore, [Paradis] concludes that the international community wouldn’t want to wait for the five-year mandate of President Aristide to run its course in 2005.’ Quoting Paradis, Vastel writes ‘Although the United Nations wouldn’t wish for the intervention to lead to a military occupation… that might be inevitable until elections can be held.’

Enthusiastically and publicly leading the overthrow of a democratically elected government was a bit much for the Liberal government. Consequently, the overzealous Paradis soon faded into the background. After his interview with Vastel was published, he was quickly removed from the ‘Haiti file,’ while the plans to overthrow Aristide proceeded, albeit a couple of months behind schedule [originally designed to precede Haiti’s bicentennial celebrations]. The position of Secretary of State for Latin America was subsequently eliminated, and Paradis has since been banished-once again-to the Liberal backbenches. Subsequent meetings took place, such as the one in El Salvador; involving, according to Vastel, ‘a White House official’ and Canada’s Marc Lortie, deputy Minister for the Americas, as well as other ‘friends of Haiti.’

According to Paul Martin, Canada’s involvement in Haiti was the ‘morally responsible’ thing to do. He has also said that Haiti was a ‘failed state,’ that Canada and other ‘friends of Haiti’ intervened at just the right time to restore peace and stability to Haiti. In July, Martin addressed what the Globe and Mail referred to as an ‘exclusive gathering’ of ‘media moguls’ in Idaho. The gathering was closed to the press and the public, but the transcript of Martin’s speech noted the following about Haiti:

In short, just as companies have to improve their governance, so do countries. Better governance within fragile, failing or failed states means building effective public institutions. It is true that fragile states often require military intervention to restore stability…we saw this in Haiti. Almost 10 years ago Canada, the United States and some other countries intervened…The problem is that none of us…though all of us were involved, stayed long enough nor did we take the time and effort…to build these institutions. So 10 years later, here we are, back with the same problem and the same mess, but this time, we have got to stay until the job is done properly.

Measured against the reality on the ground, Martin’s claims take on an altogether different meaning.

On July 29th, Lt. Colonel Jim Davis, Commander of the Canadian Forces contingent in Haiti, acknowledged that at least 1000 bodies had been buried in a mass grave in Port au Prince, within one month of ‘restoring stability.’ Davis also would not deny the eyewitnesss testimony that spoke of a massacre of Aristide supporters committed by occupying forces on March 12. According to the eyewitnesses, international forces staged an attack in a Port-au-Prince slum, killing dozens of people. These international forces reportedly took all but two bodies away in ambulances. At the time, US, French and Canadian forces were stationed in Haiti, including Canada’s ‘Secret Commandos’: Joint Task Force Two. French troops had explicit rules of engagement: they were not to shoot unless they were attacked. Canadian and American occupying forces had no such burdens.

Said Davis: ‘I do not deny that these things have happened.’

* * *

Canada made itself complicit in disinformation about the Haitian elections circulated by the OAS, hosted meetings to plot the overthrow of a democratically elected government, illegally occupied the country, and knowingly participated or was complicit in the murder of Haitians opposed to the coup. For months prior to the coup, Martin’s Liberal government ignored Aristide’s requests for ‘a few dozen’ peacekeepers. On the day he was escorted out of office by US, French, and, possibly, Canadian troops, however, Canada had 500 soldiers available to occupy the country illegally, and had in fact sent a team of JTF2 commandos to Haiti four days before the coup.

These actions have been carried out openly, but opposition within Canada has been scarce or nonexistent. When asked, NDP leader Jack Layton has simply said that his party ‘has questions’ about the human rights situation; Layton agreed that Canadian troops needed to be sent. This strange position is the opposite of the NDP demands made on March 10 in the House of Commons, when they called for the tabling of the Ottawa Initiative documents, and for an investigation into Aristide’s departure. That same day, Layton referred to the siuation in Haiti as ‘very grave.’ The subsequent murder of several thousand Haitians did not compel Layton’s NDP to pursue this ‘grave’ matter, even as morgues were being filled with supporters of Haiti’s Constitution.

The Globe and Mail, CanWest newspapers, and Canadian Press have actively repeated the OAS allegations that elections were ‘deeply flawed’ as fact, while failing to mention the US funding of ‘opposition groups’ or the fact that the actual irregularites can be equated to a Canadian election riding calling for a recount, which is hardly indicative of ‘deep flaws’ and is a normal part of an election process.

Paul Martin has not been criticized at all for his use of Madeleine Albright’s ‘failed state’ rhetoric to justify ‘responsible intervention.’ Canada’s elite, it seems, is quite comfortable with its government’s increasingly overt colonial practices.

But was Canada’s pre-occupation involvement limited to the ‘diplomatic steps’ necessary to remove Aristide?

On February 5, 2004, Pierre Pettigrew met with the self-styled rebel ‘intellectual author’, Paul Arcelin. Arcelin had been arrested, along with his ‘protege’ Guy Philippe, for plotting another coup against Aristide in 2003. Why was Pettigrew, whose Montreal riding is populated by many prominent members of the Haitian diaspora, meeting with a known coup-plotter?

During an exclusive post-coup interview with the Gazette’s Sue Montgomery, Arecelin revealed that he and Philippe had ‘spent 10 to 15 hours a day together, plotting against Aristide…From time to time we’d cross the border through the woods to conspire against Aristide, to meet with the opposition and regional leaders to prepare for Aristide’s downfall.’ This admission reveals that, contrary to the corporate press version of events, there was a definite connection between Haiti’s ‘political opposition’ and the paramilitary ‘rebels.’

Arcelin also describes having ‘explained the reality of Haiti’ to Pettigrew on February 5th, the same day that his paramilitary colleagues entered and took over the city of Gonaives. Arcelin’s testimony conflicted with that of Pettigrew’s office, who downplayed the meeting in an interview with the Globe and Mail, claiming that ‘the meeting was part of the minister’s ‘open-door policy’ to the Haitian community in his constituency, and did not affect Canadian policy.’ But Arcelin, whose sister- in-law, Nicole Roy-Arcelin is a former Conservative MP, claims to have taken advantage of these ‘political connections to meet with Pierre Pettigrew.’ And, concerning Canadian policy, Arcelin says that Pettigrew ‘promised to make a report to the Canadian government about what I’d said.’

Interestingly, Pettigrew was nowhere to be seen during the crisis, but is now Foreign Affairs Minister, and recently met with Colin Powell to discuss the Haiti ‘situation.’

On August 24, Pettigrew’s Department of Foreign Affairs [DFAIT] sent out an e-mail, which stated:

‘With regard to the initiative by the Honourable Denis Paradis, former Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie), an informal consultation meeting on Haiti’s political situation was held at Meech Lake from January 31 to February 1, 2003. This informal meeting was an opportunity for participants to reiterate their support for the Haitian people, the Organization of American States and for Resolution 822. At no time during the meeting was a regime change in Haiti considered.'[3]

One would do well here to recall William Blum’s maxim: ‘Don’t believe anything until its been officially denied.’

The DFAIT e-mail appears to be little more than ‘damage control’ in response to the many calls that they and Denis Paradis have received concerning the revelations made by Michel Vastel during the August 6th CBC broadcast. Interestingly, DFAIT announces that ‘Canada will keep its troops currently deployed in Haiti until the end of August,’ contrary to the original plan which had Canada’s forces returning at the end of July. This announcement dovetails tragically with other recent l news on the ground in Haiti, which finds ‘A real increase in human rights violations in the last week…there has been a sharp increase in killing, especially in the slums…’ According to independent sources ‘less numbers [of murders] but the mutilations, techniques to kill them are increasing as a message of terror.’

Accordingly, the former army – who recently went unchallenged when 115 of them marched, heavily armed, through the streets of Port au Prince [August 15th] – are ‘the insurance policy against the return of Lavalas’ and Constituional rule. Large Constitutionalist demonstrators in Cap Haitien on August 14th were forced ‘to tuck their shirts in to make sure they’re not armed.’ This dichotomy is very telling, especially when adding the recent acquittal of mass murderer Louis Jodel Chamblain, after his fake murder trial, which has been condemned even by rightist human rights organizations and the Bush Administration.

In another expression of this tragic dichotomy, while Canada’s troops remain deployed during this ‘sharp increase in killing,’ DFAIT’s Christian Lapointe closes his e-mail chillingly: ‘Please be assured that Canada will continue to work to create a secure environment in Haiti and the region that enables respect for human rights, including the well-being of civilians.’

*The original version of this article appeared in issue #21 of The Dominion, which can be found at www.dominionpaper.ca. Anthony can be reached at [email protected]

Notes:

[1] See the entire transcript of the CBC broadcast at www.dominionpap er.ca/ weblog

[2] Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Councill Decision…concluding consulation procedure with Haiti under Article 96 of the ACP-EP Partnership Agreement,’ Brussels, December 15, 2003.

[3] To the author.

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