[Excerpt from U.S. 1st Marine Division, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): LESSONS LEARNED, May 2003, pp. 33-35. Full document posted at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_brief.doc, the GlobalSecurity.org site maintained by John Pike.]
Public Affairs
Topic: Embedded Media
Discussion: On 10 March 03, the Division PA section met with the 80 reporters assigned to “embed” within tactical units of the 1st Marine Division. We met them at the Hilton Hotel in Kuwait City and began the media RSOI that focused on welcoming the media and setting the conditions for fair and balanced reporting of the Division’s combat operations. Prior to RSOI, the PA Team expressed to the unit commanders, Marines and Sailors that the media is an entirely winnable constituency. Media were not to be “escorted,” they were to be “adopted” and made members of the Division family. This subtle difference framed the Division’s desired approach to interactions between Marines and the media and resulted in quick assimilation of journalists into the ranks, rapidly establishing strong bonds. Likewise, the media agreed to established ground rules and honored them.
Embedding media assisted our mission accomplishment in several ways:
· The presence of embedded media significantly reduced the Iraqi ability to conduct a propaganda campaign. The Iraqi claims that the Coalition forces were “roasting their stomachs at the gates (of Baghdad) and committing suicide” rather than face the mighty Iraqi Army were quickly dispelled when CNN broadcasted live from 3d ID inside Saddam’s Presidential Palace in downtown Baghdad. The constant saturation of reporting from media in the field served witness to the facts of this campaign, highlighting the chaotic nature of the battlefield and the regime’s blatant disregard for the Law Of War and the Geneva Convention. The media reported on the Fedayeen’s many cowardly acts: hiding behind women and children while shooting at Marines, using mosques, hospitals and schools to store ammunition and weapons, and terrorizing the Iraqi public. The Division was able to establish a firm link between the regime and international terrorism by taking CBS, NBC and CNN to a grade school used as a Fedayeen suicide bomb vest training site and storage facility uncovered by 1/7 in central Baghdad. The presence of the media also assisted in deflating false allegations of war crimes.
· Embedding promoted bonding between the military and the media. Sharing austere living conditions, danger and loss, journalistic desires of impartiality gave way to human nature. This was evident in the sensitive way the embedded media reported on our wounded and dead and respected the ground rules for reporting. Unembedded, unilateral journalists routinely released information jeopardizing OPSEC and frequently misreported errors in fact. Embedded media were able to clarify their understanding of events with the participants before releasing their story to the world. Additionally, the trust built between the Marines and the media enabled unprecedented access and brought the lives of the individual Marine and Sailor into the living rooms of the world on a daily basis. This enabled our story to be told in a very personal, humanistic way. To the viewers and readers, the 1st Marine Division was not an anonymous killing machine, it was an 18 year-old Marine from Anywhere, USA.
· Embedding media kept the family members and friends of the Division back home in CONUS informed. This is the first time in history where media could report “live” so close to the action. Concerned family members were able to receive daily updates on their loved ones by following their unit in the press. Many family members used the reporters to pass e-mails to their Marines and Sailors and vice versa. The media also allowed the Marines to use their satellite and cellular (in Kuwait) phones to communicate with family back home. This improved the morale of our Marines and family members alike. Without the embedded media, the Division’s PA section would not have been able to accomplish its internal information mission to keep our Marines and family members informed. The Division PA section deployed with only one digital camera. The cameras, video cameras and laptops ordered by HQMC/PA for the Division in the Fall of 2002 did not arrive from MARCORPSYSCOM to the Division until one week after the suspense of combat operations in Baghdad (April 20). This lack of organic PA equipment prohibited the production of stories and photos for internal use (e.g., base paper, usmc.mil website, and Marines Magazine).
Embedded media served as a lens to focus the world’s attention on the Division’s combat story, favorable or not. When things went well, they were reported as such. When the reporter was confused about events, however, they reported skewed or inaccurate information. In the few instances when things went badly, the media reported on the killing of civilians, and in one case, the killing of Andrew Lloyd, a unilateral ITN reporter from the UK who died in a clash between the Division and Fedayeen.
Caveat: Before we as a collective military society congratulate ourselves on the “overwhelming success” of the embed program, we need to pause and remember that we were both good and lucky. We achieved victory quickly and were successful in keeping our casualties low. We took great pains to limit collateral damage and this paid off in the court of public opinion. The media brings the spotlight to our stage for good and ill. What would have been the headlines if the Coalition lost a battalion of infantrymen in a chemical attack? What if there was more nationalistic spirit in the hearts of the people of Iraq and a majority of the population fought us block-by-block? This is evidenced by the “Chicken Little” reporting in the media when the Division and 3d ID paused in the attack up Highways 1, 8 and 9. Visions of Vietnam danced in reporters’ heads. According to many pundits in the press we were bogged down, stopped cold by the Fedayeen. Nothing could have been further than the truth. The myth was quickly dispelled by our success against the Ba’ath Party and paramilitary fighters, but never forget how quickly the press jumped on the bandwagon of doom and gloom.
Recommendation: The media embed program in this campaign worked well for both the military and the media. The media received unprecedented access, and the Marine Corps was able to get its story to the American and International publics as never before. In this instance, embedding media was a limited success for the Division. This paradigm should not be blindly followed and a thorough risk-benefit analysis must be conducted before embedding media in this same fashion for future combat operations.
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