This column is bound to be unconvincing because we are doomed (even by the language we use) to analyze the new through the lens of the old. The new will only be analyzed on its own terms… once it becomes old. Therefore, if this column is, in general, unconvincing, it is particularly unconvincing to the protagonists of the new, especially if those protagonists are young conservatives or far-right figures.

Young People and Social Media

I’ll focus on the state of São Paulo, which accounts for 31.5% of Brazil’s GDP. The five federal deputies with the most votes are between 28 and 37 years old; all are influencers or became well-known through social media. They have between 5.4 million and 2.1 million followers on Instagram. Most are on the right or far right. Two of the five federal deputies with the most votes belong to the PSOL party, a left-wing party to the left of the Workers’ Party: Erica Hilton is a trans woman and drag queen with 5.2 million Instagram followers who has distinguished herself through anti-racist and anti-homophobic activism; Sâmia Bomfim is a feminist activist with 1.9 million followers. In addition to their youth, what sets these elected officials apart is that they built their careers on social media by predominantly advocating for identity-based causes. Let’s look at the case of the most-voted-for representatives.

The federal representative with the most votes was 28-year-old Lucas Pavanato. He received 3,038,438 votes and has 5.4 million followers on Instagram. He is the most-voted-for federal representative in the history of São Paulo. He belongs to the Liberal Party, the party of candidate Bolsonaro. Pavanato began his political career in 2016, at age 17, when he participated in demonstrations calling for the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff. Raised in a Pentecostal evangelical family, with his first speeches delivered at the Assemblies of God, Pavanato entered formal politics through the Free Brazil Movement (MBL). In an interview with GLOBO on the eve of the election, Pavanato stated that he will use his newly acquired political capital to prioritize issues of public safety and education. The main goal of his term has already been set: to work toward lowering the age of criminal responsibility. More young people in prison—of course—the American way of solving the problem of Black unemployment. ( https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/eleicoes-2026/noticia/2026/10/04/das-redes-ao-recorde-nas-urnas-quem-e-o-bolsonarista-lucas-pavanato-o-deputado-mais-votado-de-sao-paulo.ghtml).

The state representative with the most votes is 23-year-old influencer Eduarda Campopiano. She gained prominence on social media with conservative views aligned with Bolsonarism and easily surpassed established figures in São Paulo politics, winning nearly 2 million votes. She has 2.6 millions followers in the Instagram. A member of the PL, the Liberal Party, the elected representative built her state campaign largely on digital communication. During the 2026 election campaign, her content was aimed primarily at conservative voters, advocating for the traditional family, the right to life from conception, and the presence of Christian principles in politics. She also took a stand against progressive issues, contemporary feminism, and what she describes as “woke culture.”

Months before the election, a controversy involving statements by Eduarda Campopiano about the colonization of Brazil gained national attention. During an appearance on a podcast, the then-city councilwoman stated that she thanked God for the arrival of the colonizers in the country and associated Indigenous peoples with practices such as cannibalism and human sacrifice. In the debate, hosted by RedCast, Campopiano declared: “Glory to God that they colonized, glory to God that they catechized the indian women.” She then claimed that colonization had put an end to practices she attributed to Indigenous peoples, saying: “Glory to God that the far right arrived and told the Indigenous people: ‘Guys, making sacrifices and eating your little brother’s arm isn’t cool, nor is burying a child alive.’” (https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/eleicoes/2026/noticia/2026/10/04/quem-e-eduarda-campopiano-a-deputada-estadual-mais-votada-de-sao-paulo.ghtml).

The cases of the two most-voted-for representatives are paradigmatic of a certain emerging political trend: highly politicized young people—conservatives or supporters of far-right policies—who have become well-known through social media. They don’t know many people, but many people know them. They do not participate in social movements because they themselves are the social movement. They possess a keen sense of timing to tap into the anxieties and frustrations that fill the minds of receptive audiences and to amplify them by exploiting their most extreme dimensions. They have an extraordinary insight into where the winds of emerging power are blowing. They champion ruptures against anything that presents itself as continuity or gradual evolution. They blend grand issues with personalized attention to the utmost degree of (false) intimacy. Their realm is the subliminal, where the political emerges as non-political: the obvious solution, because it is natural and without alternative; indisputable, because it lies beyond good and evil.

They are a perverse phantasmagoria of democracy because they dispense with options. These exist only once they have already been made—that is, when they have ceased to be choices. Everything is thought out and ratified by the number of likes. And since everything that exists was consummated in the past, the future lies in the past—not as an unfinished task, but as the key to the original that we must copy. There has always been God, Country, Family, Property, and Freedom (if we are the ones to exercise it). “Our” truth is the truth. There are no semantic nuances or idle complexities. It’s all instantly evident. It’s important to take sides as long as the side has already been chosen. We proudly decide to be decided for by others who have thought everything through to the point where nothing remains to think about.

With this raw material, to be a democrat is to be a follower. To be a follower is to consider anyone who doesn’t follow to be unfaithful. Those who don’t follow don’t belong, and those who don’t belong are enemies. For the enemy, there is a diverse menu: hatred, oblivion, ridicule, pity, inferiority. But all of this is administered with a generous dose of jokes, testimonials, light music, and, if possible, plenty of color and speed. To think is to stop, and to stop is to stray from the herd. The herd is the path that is not made by walking, for the simple reason that it is already made.

Any connection this may have with theories of democracy is pure coincidence. If this is democracy, then democracy cannot be just this. What is missing? Or is it that, for the vast majority, this is everything and nothing is missing? A democrat trained in the democracy that existed until now misses the names of serious politicians—who were not elected—capable of enriching the democratic system. Among many others: Marina Silva, Simone Tebet, Benedita Silva, Manuela D’Ávila, Paulo Pimenta, Gleisi Hoffman, Erika Kokay, Leila do Vôlei. To a democrat schooled in the democracy that once existed, it is repugnant that people accustomed to treating democracy like trash have been elected: Michele Bolsonaro, Bia Kicis, Gustavo Gayer, Deltan Dallagnol, Sérgio Moro, Sanderson, Marcel Van Hatten, Carlos Bolsonaro, Carol de Toni.

Liberal democracy is dead. It is being temporarily replaced by electoral autocracy.

The classical theorists of liberal democracy imagined that society was made up of self-governing individuals who, incidentally, owed nothing to society and from which they expected only that it organize itself politically (States) to guarantee order and the security of their private property. As Adam Smith wrote in a moment of particular lucidity: “The State’s primary function is to allow the rich to sleep soundly in their beds.”

The liberal individual is self-determined because they are rational and free. Democracy is the result of this rationality and this freedom. Freedom is universal, but in practice it can only be exercised by those who own property—that is, by those who are in a position to decide freely. Women cannot vote because they are dependent on men; workers cannot vote because they are dependent on their employers. In the centuries that followed, much of the social struggle was aimed at enabling more people to vote. Finally, universal suffrage was established: all citizens of legal age (which has been gradually lowered) can vote. Does this mean that countries that call themselves democratic are fully democratic today? No. Why?

On Those Who Don’t Vote

A large percentage of those who could vote do not vote. In Brazil, out of a total of 157.7 million eligible voters, 33.4 million decided not to vote. Disillusioned? Cynical? Do they have more important or urgent tasks than going to the polls? Are they trying to avoid the frustration of voting for someone who, once elected, systematically forgets the promises made? Is it because all politicians are bad or corrupt, and “let the devil come and choose among them”? Or could it be that some are even better than others, but even the best can do little or nothing because everything is decided by those who have the power to rule without being elected? Is it rational to vote if you know there’s no alternative, that politicians shout about their differences to hide their similarities? If shouting has replaced debate? And if there is debate, is it rational to vote if the importance of the debate is inversely proportional to its importance in people’s lives—especially in their household budgets? Is democracy rational in a country (Portugal) where the debate over the public wearing of the burqa takes up the time of well-paid lawmakers when such wear is almost as rare as snow in Lisbon? Could we reach a situation where those who do not vote contribute more to the sustainability of democracy than those who do?

On Those Who Vote

A vote is only free and rational when it is not manipulated by either fear or misinformation. Are there invisible masters today who dictate the votes of voters who consider themselves free? They are not masters of the labor power; they are masters of the power of public opinion. If the labor power can be bought and sold, is the same thing happening to the power of public opinion? Are the voters who decide elections today not precisely the dependents whom liberal theory declared incapable of voting? Can slaves who believe themselves to be free vote against slavery? Can the poor who believe themselves to be rich in God’s blessings vote against the rich? Can a democracy—determined by individuals who have been stripped of their autonomy, who have been rendered incapable of rationally assessing their interests and aspirations, who have been cut off from the clash of ideas—be anything other than a dispossessed, incapacitated, and mutilated democracy?

Democracy has never been central to liberalism

When serious analysts examine the living conditions of the vast majority and attempt to explain their political behavior, they invariably conclude that the decisive factor is the economy—the improvement or deterioration of living conditions (inflation, debt, interest rates, etc.). There was much talk in Brazil that one of the problems with Lula da Silva’s candidacy was that he had not improved, as he had promised, the living conditions of the majority. After all, wasn’t it he who said during his previous term that if he were elected, “the people would once again be able to eat picanha” [ beef]? The truth is that electoral behavior is not confirming these economic arguments.

The SEMAFOR opinion poll conducted from September 12 to 15 described Brazilians’ concerns as follows: violence, 28%; corruption, 22%; the economy, 19%; health care, 15%; unemployment, 5%; education, 5%. The combined total for the economy and unemployment is lower than that for violence and corruption. The concrete importance of violence in people’s lives is clear. If someone’s cell phone is stolen, that person will certainly think that violence is the biggest problem, and if that person lives in a favela, that perception is exponentially greater.

In contrast, corruption is an abstract concern, in the sense that it is not directly felt in one’s body or in daily life. Why, then, is it so prominent among people’s concerns? Could it be a real concern that is amplified to hide other concerns? Isn’t the economy being sidelined to give the true power—the power of those who control those in control of government—greater freedom to continue expropriating the middle and working classes of their meager incomes?

When liberalism morphed into neoliberalism, its original purpose changed qualitatively. The contradiction between democracy (popular sovereignty) and capitalism (infinite accumulation) intensified. Neoliberalism is a gigantic mechanism for transferring income from workers and the middle classes to a minority of the rich and super-rich. If there are impoverished people, it is because there are people who have grown rich. If this mechanism is allowed to be identified and exposed, democracy becomes a threat to the “normal” survival of capitalism. That is why insecurity and the fear of violence are amplified to conceal the insecurity of an antisocial economy. That is why the illegal theft of corruption is denounced in order to conceal the legal, incessant, and systematic theft carried out by the “normal” policies of “normal” governments within the neoliberal world order.

Democracy is being distorted so that it can continue to function for a little while longer in the service of neoliberal capitalist chaos. The aim is to avoid the greater political costs of a civil or military dictatorship, which, for now, remains unpopular.

João Moreira Salles, a Brazilian filmmaker and journalist—a rebellious son of the upper bourgeoisie—wrote an article in the magazine Piauí, which he founded, that is essential for understanding the mindset of the upper bourgeoisie and how the preservation of democracy does not factor into their interests. He masterfully describes a meeting between candidate Flávio Bolsonaro and high-ranking representatives of Brazil’s industrial and financial bourgeoisie:

“Flávio Bolsonaro’s supporters within the Brazilian economic elite do not form a homogeneous bloc. Among them—and sometimes within a single individual—are intertwined the defense of particular interests rooted in the country’s old patrimonialism, a legitimate concern for the macroeconomic situation, a naive desire to ‘contribute to the dialogue,’ the almost erotic thrill of political influence, and the intellectual vanity of those who believe themselves capable of defining the best course for the nation. Setting these differences aside, there is a common vocabulary in their demands: privatization, tax cuts, regulatory relaxation, spending cuts, and downsizing the government bureaucracy…

It fell to the event’s host, banker André Esteves, to introduce an uncomfortable note… Esteves reminded those present that “the largest subsidies granted by the government actually benefit the financial market itself. ‘There’s 1 trillion in subsidies for us right here in this room—the subsidy for rentiers,’ he said, referring to tax-exempt investments”… The topic did not stir the audience as much as the prospect of cutting benefits intended for the poor…

[after referring to the far-right candidate’s ties to the criminal underworld, he adds:] It is telling that a good portion of the dinner guests I’m referring to here do not consider the facts mentioned above—whether the close friendship, the repeated defense, or the avowed admiration for people linked to the most dangerous and criminal elements—to be sufficient reason to distance themselves from the candidate. I suspect—because I’ve heard this line of reasoning countless times—that many of them have already considered making their homes in Miami their permanent residence. After all, in Brazil, “there’s too much violence”…. Historians of authoritarianism explain that one of the characteristics of such a regime is that it relies on citizens who can no longer distinguish fiction from fact, truth from lies. The people I’m talking about here know. They are well-informed people who know about Brilhante Ustra [a despicable torturer during the dictatorship (1964–1985) whom Jair Bolsonaro, when he was president, honored], know about Queiroz, know about Cláudio Castro, know about Ciro Nogueira, know about January 8th, know about the drafts printed at the presidential palace, know about the tariff conspiracy against the country, and know about the influence the father has over his son. I know they know, because I am familiar with the social world in which they live. It’s the world I was born into. I know the information that circulates within it, and it’s reliable information.

…It’s curious: these are people who won’t accept the risk of an economic crisis, yet they acknowledge—without making a fuss—the risk of a democratic crisis. The consequences of the former can be extremely serious, but they are, in principle, reversible; those of the latter can leave lasting institutional scars.”

Confirmation of this analysis lies in the behavior of the Brazilian stock market on the day following the first round of the elections:

The Ibovespa, the main index of the Brazilian stock exchange (B3), opened this Monday (Oct. 5) sharply higher. At two points, the index surpassed 209,000 points. This morning’s peak was reached at 10:40 a.m., at 209,605 points, representing a 9.1% gain. At 12:30 p.m., the index stood at 208,193 points, up 8.37%. This is the first time in history that the index has surpassed 200,000 points. (https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/bolsa-sobe-8-e-passa-dos-207-mil-pontos-embalada-pelo-1o-turno?)

Market democracy is the market of democracy. It goes to the highest bidder.

The Federal Supreme Court (STF): the main target

The STF has recently been the guarantor of democracy in Brazil. It was the STF that rescued the Brazilian judicial system after the most grotesque “lawfare” in Brazilian history (Operation Car Wash). It was the STF that defined the events of January 8, 2023, as a coup and acted accordingly. It was the STF that, especially beginning in 2011, approved measures that transformed Brazilian society, making it more egalitarian, less discriminatory, and more respectful of social and cultural diversity. Here are some landmark measures:

*Same-sex civil unions (2011): The court unanimously recognized same-sex civil unions as equivalent to heterosexual ones. The decision extended social security, inheritance, and community property rights to same-sex couples.

* Racial quotas in universities (2012): The Supreme Court upheld the system of reserving spots based on ethnic, racial, and social criteria in institutions of higher education, consolidating affirmative action as a legitimate tool for historical redress and substantive equality.

⃰Abortion of anencephalic fetuses (2012): In its ruling on ADPF 54, the STF declared that the termination of a pregnancy involving a brainless fetus (anencephaly) does not constitute the crime of abortion, thereby ensuring the pregnant woman’s right to choose under medical supervision.

⃰Unconstitutional Conditions in Prisons (2015): In its ruling on ADPF 347, the Court recognized the massive violation of fundamental rights in the Brazilian prison system. This allowed for the implementation of measures such as mandatory custody hearings within 24 hours of arrest in flagrante delicto.

⃰End of Corporate Campaign Financing (2015): The STF banned donations from legal entities (companies) to political parties and election campaigns, on the grounds that economic power undermined the democratic process.

⃰Civil Registry Changes for Transgender Individuals (2018): The STF guaranteed transgender people the right to change their name and gender in the civil registry directly at a notary’s office, without the need for gender reassignment surgery, medical reports, or judicial authorization.

⃰Criminalization of homophobia and transphobia (2019): In the absence of specific legislation, the Supreme Court ruled that acts of homophobia and transphobia should be classified as crimes under the Racism Law (Law 7,716/1989) until Congress enacts a specific law.

⃰Rejection of the “Time Frame” [Marco Temporal] Doctrine (2023): In its ruling on Constitutional Appeal No. 1,017,365, the Court overturned the “time frame” doctrine, establishing that indigenous peoples’ right to their traditional lands does not depend on their having occupied the area on the date the Constitution was promulgated (October 5, 1988).

⃰Overturning of the “Legitimate Defense of Honor” Doctrine (2023): The court permanently prohibited the use of this argument in femicide trials. The Court deemed the doctrine unconstitutional for violating human dignity and fueling gender-based violence.

⃰Possession of marijuana for personal use (2024): The Court decided to decriminalize the possession of marijuana for personal use. The Court established an objective criterion (40 grams or six female plants) to distinguish users from dealers, with the aim of reducing mass incarceration resulting from subjective criteria used by police during stops.

If Fabio Bolsonaro is elected President, he could alter the composition of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) so profoundly that the democratic achievements this court has championed in the past could be overturned one by one. Just consider that there are 54 senators who have already declared themselves in favor of impeaching STF justices. They constitute the necessary two-thirds majority to decide on impeachment. Just consider that over the course of his term, the new president could appoint four new justices—for example, as a result of retirements—and could, furthermore, push for the impeachment of some of the five STF justices implicated in the Banco Master case: Alexandre de Moraes, Dias Toffoli, Luis Fux, André Mendonça, and Kássio Nunes. In other words, the decisions of a new authoritarian president, supported by a compliant Senate, could give rise to a new Supreme Court that slavishly serves the designs of the political scum in power.

The unanswered questions:

After these elections, the Brazilian Congress is even more dominated by conservative and far-right politicians, many of them self-confessed fascists whose security policy is based on the motto “a good criminal is a dead criminal.” The PL, the party of coup plotter Bolsonaro and Co., now holds 29 seats in the Senate out of a total of 81—that is, more than one-third. The power to dismantle Congress as we know it is evident, as is the power to reduce to ashes the democratic flame that the STF has kindled.

Is it possible to govern democratically in a country with a Congress of this composition? Is it worth trying without a profound reform of the political system? Is it possible to fight for the restoration of democracy using the tools of this disfigured democracy? One thing is certain: the fascists and coup plotters will not exercise democratically the power they have democratically seized. Brazil has crossed the threshold into fascism bit by bit. It looks more like an avalanche caused by a UFO. Or a monster. Perhaps a “democradura,” perhaps a “ditamole”?

Brazilians face an immense risk: that of waking up on October 26 and realizing, amid shock and outrage, that they no longer live in a democracy after all—even though, on the surface, everything happened democratically. To avoid the shock of this surprise, they must take to the streets over the next three weeks and turn them into a 24-hour celebration of democracy. Let there be no rest for the democrats, the rappers, the singer-songwriters who know how to ward off this fate, the carnival groups, and the neighborhood associations. They must reach the end of the day exhausted so that democracy may be reborn the next day.

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