A “Balkan union” is not a novel idea. It has been proposed in various forms in response to imperial aspirations, as a way for the peoples of the Balkan region to secure a more independent and, hopefully, a brighter future. Is this, however, realistic? Can the idea still, in some sense, be relevant and fruitful?
If by a “union” we mean something resembling a federal or confederal state arrangement, I don’t think that a political union of the peoples of the Balkans is, at this point, realistic. The formation of modern ethnicity and religion-based nations and their nation-states in the Balkans has been a long process, and in some of its parts, it is still ongoing. This process has never been only a matter of “self-determination” of some (imagined) pre-existing, fixed collective identity, which is only manifested once favorable historical circumstances (such as the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires) present themselves. The process is much more complicated and it includes, among other things, the influence of powerful external political actors, such as Western empires or Russia.
The formation of modern nation-states has always been violent. It requires not only submission to a specific ideology (nationalism), more effective central administration within the newly established boundaries of the nation state, it also implies the formulation of the “national interest.” Just as nationalism, the “national interest” often starts as something conflicting with the interests of the dominant imperial power in the given region (which makes it, in this respect, emancipatory), but it often ends as a narrative defending the interests of those in power and – in the case of smaller and weaker states – as a narrative promoting external interests (of an empire), conflicting that way with other local national(istic) narratives. Thus, the very narrative that is established based on the promise of more freedom and security for the people on a certain territory becomes the source of disruption, tensions, and conflicts.
In addition to traditional imperial interests in the region – Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, German, British, Russian, American (since WWI), and, most recently, Chinese as well – we have witnessed another major source of influence: global corporations, primarily the financial sector and, most recently, international mining companies. These external interests and pressures are articulated by local political elites through a complex process of negotiations between local interests, local political and financial elites, external interests, and the clash of various ideological narratives that stand for particular interest groups. These are often manifested in paradoxical ways.
This is why I think that a “Balkan union,” as a potentially powerful political entity, which would embrace the biggest part if not the entirety of the Balkans/Southern Europe, is not realistic. Yugoslavia was a project in that direction, and it did not survive (why not, I tried to explain in the book Yugoslavia: Peace, War, and Dissolution, where the reader can find both Noam Chomsky’s analyses of the external factors, and my focus on the internal dynamics). The interests, tensions, and narratives are too fragmented, too conflicting, and too easy to exploit by all those who would not be in favor of a powerful, multinational political union which would have the strength to resist some of the most detrimental processes coming from outside of the region, to which the region has been exposed.
A “union,” however, does not need to be conceived in terms of a (con)federal model. A greater level of cooperation and coordination of the activities of the states in the Balkans can be a start. Resisting powerful imperial pressures and the pressures coming from the corporate sector could be an immediate motive for initiating closer cooperation. No country alone (China may be an exception) can fight the most powerful global players today.
Preventing the ongoing tensions in the region from exploding into open conflicts could be another immediate reason for seeking a higher level of interconnectedness between the states in the region. This, however, will not be possible as long as there are countries whose governments function as exponents of imperial interests in the region. Imperial interests require that the region remains fragmented and that nationalistic and chauvinistic sentiments are cultivated in order to be triggered and exploited when needed.
Even if, by a miracle, enlightened and well-intentioned political elites, committed to the common good of the peoples of the Balkans (whatever that may imply in concrete terms) were to be established in all of the Balkan countries, this would be only the beginning. In order for such cooperation to be established on a stable, deeper, and sustainable basis (leading eventually to some kind of closer integration), a new ideological narrative would be needed.
It would be, in my view, beneficial for the people if such a narrative revolved around a leftist agenda broadly conceived. That narrative (and its operationalization) would need to avoid the deadly traps of capitalist (neo)liberal (non)democracy, just as it would need to avoid tribal, isolationist nationalist narratives (that often side with autocrats) and state-communist kind of repression.
The problem is that a meaningful leftist agenda is now very difficult to advance. One reason for this is the existence of a powerful propaganda industry that, among many of its spectacular achievements, has also managed to brand a conservative ideology of big businesses—(neo)liberalism—as a “leftist” option. So much about the absurdity in which we live. Any attempt at the formation of political structures in the region that would allow for a greater level of independence in its economic policies for instance, would be under enormous pressure primarily from the Western centers of political and economic power. All Balkan states are in huge debts, with dysfunctional economies, corrupt political elites, and under the decisive influence of privately owned mainstream media. Any more serious attempt at emancipation of individual countries or the region as a whole would expose those leaderships and countries to media, economic, and political pressures that would be difficult to resist without close cooperation with other countries in the region and a well-defined strategy for a “Balkanoexit” – the exit of the region from the grip of the corporate-state sector.
The Greek case is instructive in this regard. An attempt to renegotiate with the “Troika” led to Greece being treated with exemplary brutality. The point was not so much to make Greeks suffer (although I would not rule out the possibility that a perverse side of that pleasure also played a role), but to send a strong message to anybody else who might get similar ideas—you don’t disobey the Godfather.
Nevertheless, just because the circumstances for a “Balkanoexit,” or for the formation of a “Balkan union” (even a loose one) are not favorable, it does not mean that we should not work toward creating more favorable circumstances for such a project. All important initiatives begin with big, quality ideas.
A “Balkan union,” even if only loosely conceived and without a very high level of integration, could be based on the commitment to the following values and principles:
Freedom of Thought and Speech. Under various types of oppressive ideological narratives, combined with elite and corporate interests, various types of freedom, most notably the freedom of speech and thought, have been under assault throughout the Western hemisphere (and also in the rest of the world). Free thinking and free expression are preconditions for creating more free and more democratic societies.
Quality and Free Education. This is vital. No society has substantially developed without quality education. The system of education has been under assault for a long time now, and, in most places where it had had a more serious tradition, it has largely been replaced by either simple indoctrination or by training (or a combination of both).
Quality and Accessible Healthcare. While military budgets are skyrocketing, and the gap between the super-wealthy and the majority of the population is widening to perverse degrees, we are told that better, more efficient, and free healthcare for all is an impossibility. There is nothing impossible about it. It is an ideological choice—whether we, as a society, choose to provide good healthcare for the minority of the wealthiest or for everyone.
Reconstruction of the Public Sphere. The public (political) sphere has mostly been privatized, either by autocrats or by the corporate sector. We need to reconstruct the public sphere as the sphere of authentic political dialogue and the basis for decision-making.
Re-Affirmation of Human Rights and Expansion of Their Scope. Human rights need to be expanded and affirmed to a much greater extent than is the case in the EU, where the commitment to human rights has, by now, become mostly symbolic and rhetorical.
Rechtsstaat. Legitimate laws and the legal system as a whole need to be humane, consistent, designed for the protection of individuals and in the service of society as a whole. A system that favors the rich or the powerful is not a system of justice but a system of injustice. Despite this, a humane society is not the one where the “law rules”; it is the one based on the culture of compassion, cooperation, trust, and mutual support, where the law is there to be enacted only when we fail as human beings.
Production of Healthy Food and Care for Nature. The Balkan region has the potential to be a leader in the protection of the environment and the production of quality, organic food.
These proposals are not “revolutionary” by any means, although they conflict with the established values, principles, and the “iron laws” of the prevalent capitalist ideology. Advancing such policies would create not only stronger and more humane societies in the Balkans – this could also be a message of hope and support for similar movements across the world.
The text was originally published in Greek, in Τὸ Κοινόν Τῶν Ὡραίων Τεχνῶν, September 2024/21, 22-25.
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