Taylan Dogan, interviewed Haluk Gerger on how Turkey’s insistence on solving the Kurdish problem through military means is going to shape the process ahead. We are here presenting the interview held on November 22nd, with a historical count of the evolution Kurdish Problem in Turkey in last ten years.

 

 

Historical background

  

In 1999 Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish Liberation Movement, PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party), was captured by an operation conducted allegedly by CIA and handed over to Turkey.

 

In his trial, he called on the Kurdish Movement to abandon the armed struggle against the Turkish state and to pursue a peaceful, civil rights struggle in order to obtain the basic identity and cultural rights of Kurds living in Turkey.

 

The Movement responded positively to his call and the civil war which started in 1984 and had continued for 15 years was terminated unilaterally by the Kurdish Liberation Movement about eight years ago.

 

The Kurdish guerrilla forces did not abandon their arms, but they withdrew beyond the Turkish borders and located themselves in Northern Iraq. They demanded of the Turkish state that an amnesty should be declared and channels opened that would enable them to participate in peaceful political activity in Turkey.

 

As the process of membership negotiations with the European Union sped up, hope for a peaceful solution increased. The Turkish state made minimal improvements of regulations in the area of cultural rights, but during this eight-year period, not much progress was made concerning the Kurdish problem and the military operations continued uninterrupted.

 

Between 1999, when Ocalan asked for removal of armed guerilla forces from Turkey’s territories to Northern Iraq and 2004, when PKK decided to escalate armed struggle, Kurdish Movement passed through a period in which legal and democratic struggle was the primary strategy.

 

However, the Kurdish Movement could not succeed in establishing a democratic and participatory struggle, in which the political activity of the masses is channeled through participatory political institutions to a legal political process.  As originally proposed by Ocalan, this process aimed constitutional recognition of the existence of Kurds, their language and cultural rights and a general amnesty for all political prisoners and guerillas to facilitate their inclusion into this political process.

 

There are three basic dynamics that has been determining the evolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey for last four years: 1) the rise of a Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq, 2) the political stance of the European Union towards Turkey and 3) the change of balance of political forces in Kurdish regions of Turkey.

 

The rise of the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq is conceived as the violation of the “red lines” of the military-bureaucratic establishment of Turkish state. It has been thought that an autonomous or federal Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq will appeal to the national desires of the Kurds living in Turkey.

 

The European Union made it clear that a full membership of Turkey to the Union will not be realized in the foreseeable future, and this gave a strong hand to the military-bureaucratic establishment for increasing the repression within the country.

 

The last elections held in July 2007 showed a change of balance of the political forces in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. The political parties that are supported by military-bureaucratic establishment lived through a shameful defeat, and showed almost no presence in Kurdish regions. The pro-Kurdish party DTP, has lost significant votes as compared to the previous elections. The lost of electoral dominance of DTP and the defeat of the parties supported by military-bureaucratic establishment has shown that the period of warfare has not yielded favorable outcomes for warring parties.

 

The pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), which used to be at odds with the military-bureaucratic establishment, won by an absolute majority of 48 percent in July 2007 elections, with a substantial increase of votes in Kurdish regions. The electoral propaganda adopted by Prime Minister Erdogan was clearly against a cross-border operation to Northern Iraq which was vehemently wanted by the Chief of Staff.

 

During the 2004-2007 period, PKK moved to overcome the stalemate that the Kurdish Movement was living by escalating the armed struggle. The increase of causalties of Turkish armed forces inflicted by PKK is exploited and manipulated by the military-bureaucratic establishment to engineer a “mass reaction against terror” which culminated in mass demonstrations. This pressure is directed towards the newly elect government, and the government yielded to the political pressure and asked the parliament for a warrant to cross-border operations. The parliament gave the authorization to the government, and hence the military is now free to organize a military campaign to Northern Iraq.

 

The escalation of the armed struggle by PKK and the increase of causalties is just what Turkish military wanted. This has given an excuse to the Turkish military to crash down the Kurdish Movement led by PKK in Turkey together with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. The mass protests are directed against the Kurds living in Turkey, as well as the Kurdish Regional Government. The spokespersons of the military-bureaucratic establishment were talking about “teaching Barzani a lesson” whom they think is harboring PKK and inspiring the national desires of Kurds in Turkey.

 

This nationalistic hysteria which climaxed by plundering of shops owned by Kurds, or lynching attempts directed to youngsters listening Kurdish music has now calmed down. The aggressiveness has been deflated by the same people who engineered its inflation. The main reason for this retract is the realization by the military-bureaucratic establishment that a cross-border operation to Northern Iraq to crash down PKK, which would also include a “lesson” to Kurdish Regional Government, is impossible since it will never be authorized by United States who hardly controls Iraq, and found its only ally in Northern Iraq. Given the difficulties it is encountering in Iraq, United States does not want to open a new front by attacking PKK as demanded by Turkish military. US can also see that a military campaign by Turkish army will destabilize Northern Iraq where a relative stability is established as compared to rest of the country.

 

The plan possibly proposed by United States, is suffocating PKK by cutting logistic supplies, and providing intelligence to Turkish military to carry out targeted operations. Turkish military is now has to satisfy itself and the nationalistic public hysteria with “point operations”, not a full-scale war against Kurds. Another reason for the deflation of the nationalistic hysteria is the realization, again by the military-bureaucratic establishment, of a prospect of bloody ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, which may possibly claim several lives.

 

Now it is claimed that the war is declared not against Kurds, but specifically against PKK. The legal representative of the Kurdish Movement, DTP which has 20 members in the parliament is asked to distance itself from PKK by declaring PKK a terrorist organization. A lawsuit is brought against DTP with an indictment of being “the focus of separatist activities” and demanding the closure of the party and immediate banning of most political activities of the party and its members as a precautionary measure.

 

The relationship of PKK and DTP is like the one which used to be between IRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, and they have overlapping popular grassroots support in Kurdish regions of Turkey. PKK can only be channeled to an unarmed legal political process by negotiating with DTP, as it had happened in Northern Ireland. It seems that Turkey is loosing that chance once again.

 

We are know discussing this issue with Dr. Haluk Gerger, who is a dissident intellectual in Turkey, Dr. Gerger is a well-known intellectual and a respected writer on nuclear weapons and strategy. He was educated at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of John Hopkins University in Washington, DC, Stockholm University in Sweden, and Herford College in Oxford, England. A founding member of the Turkish Human Rights Association, Dr. Gerger has written extensively on the Kurdish issue and has criticized governmental policies. He has likened the Turkish government’s treatment of the Kurds to Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia.  He has been imprisoned and heavily fined by Turkish courts for writing letters and articles expressing his political opinions. He can be reached at [email protected]

 

Taylan Dogan: Mr Haluk Gerger, In recent years, the Kurdish problem has begun to be presented in a different way in Turkey. “Cursing terror” demonstrations involving the participation of hundreds of thousands of people are being held, the likes of which we hadn’t seen even in the most intense periods during the civil war in our country in the 90’s.  In fact, going beyond the anti-PKK statements of organisations close to the state, a propaganda mechanism that can easily be turned to anti-Kurdish statements is widely being employed. Indeed, in some places, attacks on Kurds have become an issue. How do you explain this change?

 

Haluk Gerger: I think this aggressive chauvinism in Turkey is not new. Likewise, neither are features such as dependence on militaristic values, addiction to violence, or seeing all those who are different as enemies. These features, the roots of which extend back to the Union and Progress period of the Ottoman era and forming a part of the “values system” at the foundations of the Republic, have, especially in the last 20 years, that is, with the rise of the PKK, been systematically brought more to the fore by the state.

 

The difference must therefore, be sought in the attitude of the state. Until recently, the state would keep provocations under some control to keep them from getting to this point. However, now it is actually organising the developments which you mentioned. Previously it was necessary, from the hegemonic viewpoint of reducing the issue to “terror”, to portray the Kurdish problem, especially to the outside world, as a simple policing matter and to restrain chauvinist attacks and provocations that had the potential to generate clashes creating “civil war” images to a certain degree. Moreover, it was feared that collective attacks could create a “Kurdish defensive reaction” giving rise to uncontrollable tendencies in the Western metropolises, which could then come to be reflected back in the Kurdish regions. The system trusted that, against all these pressures, the Kurdish problem would be kept under control on a regional basis through Arab Baathism, Turkish militarism, Iranian religious fundamentalism and imperialist support. When this status-quo changed, the system’s attitude also began to change. Plans for an external war, tightly interwoven with a civil war began to be implemented. In other words, the existence of Southern Kurdistan and the regional situation created by the American occupation have created strategic effects.

 

It is, moreover, necessary to connect this situation to the internal struggle for political power. In order to squeeze the AKP government and to move for an election under the shadow of the gun, the military party and its allies considered, as one solution, filling the streets with chauvinist reactions. This was, at the same time, useful from the point of view of creating the social base for a fascist coup, especially from among the middle class. Without a doubt, the AKP’s position on the Kurdish problem was no different from that of the opposition; however, as a government they had to shoulder the burdens of escalation and were responsible for the negative reactions of their imperialist supporters and thus were left highly vulnerable in the face of these kinds of developments.

 

Thirdly, the fact that the pressure on the system from the Kurdish problem has finally reached its apex has had a huge effect. In this situation, the emergence of an ineluctable necessity to push towards a final stance concerning the problem, has given birth to a need among the hegemonic forces to move on to the realisation of “solution” scenarios. In other words, “the sea has come to an end” at last and everyone is faced with the need to drop the stones from their skirts. The hegemonic system’s mainline “solution” project has, since the beginning, been to create a kind of “Armenian model” using unlimited force, or, if not that, was at least on the way to using the sword to cut the knot to make a 40-50 year breathing space for itself. This was also, as I said, a quest for a way out through combining the external and internal war. From the point-of-view of these forces, the fact that the system’s vulnerability and deep crises in other areas were becoming obvious, made a violent internal -external assault more appealing. In this way, the sword aimed at the Kurds could also provide an excuse and legitimacy for attacks on the working class, labour organisations and all foci of opposition (especially those outside the system) at the same time. This would win for the system, the tactical-strategic flexibility to implement anything from martial law through to direct military coups.

 

Why did the US occupation in the Middle-East in 2003 resulted in fundamental changes in Turkey’s classical approach to the Kurdish problem? What fundamental transformations in Turkey’s relationship with its neighbours did this give rise to?

 

The two fundamental external pillars of Turkey’s Kurdish problem have been the alliance formed with regional militarist regimes since as early as the 1920’s and imperialist support. At the root of the latest developments lie serious changes in both of these factors. Firstly, the regime in Iraq was destroyed and moreover the foundations for a Kurdish state have been laid there. Secondly, Syria and Iran have been besieged by imperialism. Finally, the Turkish hegemonic system’s monopoly on collaboration with imperialism has been broken by the presence of a plethora of other actors, the Kurds among them. Lastly and above all, as demonstrated by the “hood incident” [arrest of a squad of Turkish special forces in Northern Iraq by US troops] , the basis on which the relationship with the US was founded, has been shaken and become fragile; that is, the rulers have become afraid of the terrain beneath their feet slipping. The rulers have become as hopeless and crippled as someone awaiting their fate in a rotten house built on a tectonic fault-line. These developments made the occurrence of panic attacks in Turkey inevitable and that’s exactly what’s happened.

 

The ultimate result of this situation has been the renunciation of the classical assimilation policy. The need to recognise the “Kurdish reality” in this manner and secondly, the need to directly turn to imperialism for shelter has been the reason for the emergence of a clear lines in the form of two factions. In the final analysis, one of these approaches based on enmity to the Kurds and violence on several levels, certainly with American support and essentially acting as US’s hit-man, is the viewpoint advancing the idea I mentioned previously, of an “internal-external war” approach. The second however, again backed by imperialism in exchange for doing the dirty work, is to extend “Turkish hegemony” over Northern Iraq’s Kurds on the basis of the US’ “Red Lines”, and keep them bottled up, breathless and under pressure in a vice without escape; after violently liquidating the PKK. The goal can be described as one of creating a vehicle for Turkish capitalism’s low-quality power and, through the dirty business of the lumpen layer, the ultimate extension of hegemony over the Southerners. In the North, a “Kurdish Orientalism” influenced by “Turkish modernisation” and with its face turned towards the European Union will dissolve the traditional structure of the South, Turkey will then use its petrol, broaden its market share and create its own kind of “Ottoman style imperialism”. In the case of both viewpoints, they ultimately believe they are pursuing different paths to the realisation of their “Mosul-Kirkuk dreams”.

 

The struggle is continuing, in the end, between two streams; chauvinist aggression and liberal cunning, however, if in the event of “over-egging the pudding”, they will unite and seek violent remedies tantamount to suicide.

 

The official powers in our country and the “non-governmental organisations” dependent on them have, claiming that US is supporting the PKK, begun an anti-American propaganda campaign. In a country such as Turkey, that is dependent, in so many ways, on the US and which is seeking American support for its “war on terror”, how should this propaganda, created through official policy, be interpreted?

 

Turkey, from the end of World War II until the present, has essentially remained standing due to imperialist support. Of course, if you pay some attention to the imperialist support given to the foundation of the state after the First World War, it is easier to understand the vital characteristics of imperialism better. Looking at all the features of the system, the fact that they all carry the imprint of imperialist, especially US support, is an undeniable fact and the essential pillar of all actors in the “solution package” to the Kurdish problem, is imperialism; essentially the USA and secondarily, the European Union. The contradiction you pointed out today is that, from the angle of reciprocal demands to the Kurdish problem, the emergence of disagreements is to do with lack of compatibility. Turkey is disgruntled with the US withdrawal of the old kind of support on the Kurdish question. That is, immoderate “Anti-Kurdish enmity” is the source of the conflict.

 

Firstly, Turkey is, from the point of view of the objective structure of today’s power relations, making unrealisable demands on the US. Even if they wanted to, today they could not fight the PKK on the mountains. The US today could not, even if they wanted to, do without the support of the Kurds in Iraq. It can not take sides against the Kurds as a whole. Moreover, irrespective of power relations, in the realisation of current US “national interest”, Southern Kurdistan holds strategic importance and it can not be sacrificed for Turkey’s sake. As a corollary, Turkey’s attempt to drum up “anti-American” sentiment, due to the end of the old “Cold-War” “blackmail” and its monopoly on collaboration, is not effective. The US has the option of “managing” both sides through fear and it will continue to use this leverage to the end. As a result, besides the “anti-Kurdish enmity” becoming obvious in the form of an anti-American discourse, the hegemonic system is full of great panic and fear manifested in social delirium. It is clear that this has no relation to anti-imperialism. On the contrary, its dependency on American support and great demands in this direction, greatly strengthen the US’ hand, a Turkey prepared to act as a trigger-man affords imperialism great strategic flexibility. The translation of Turkey’s hopeless words are thus: “For ten years we’ve served you faithfully; today we share all your strategic goals and values in their entirety. Is this then our reward?”

 

The trump in the negotiations during this process is this: The two factions, in relation to the military duties the Americans are thinking of giving to Turkey, claim that there is a widespread and active opposition in the society and claim that, in order for this to be “neutralised” or “pacified”, it is necessary to present concrete concessions to the society on the Kurdish problem. In return for this, they say there will be no obstacle for Turkey being the US hit-man in a region from Lebanon to Iran. One faction, stressing the eventual role of violence in the American strategy and that this opposition may only be able to be put down through violence, has claimed a monopoly on violence for themselves and thus seek support for their internal struggle for power. The other faction however, believing that the necessary opportunities can only be provided through a basis of support in society created through social manipulation and thus lobby to present themselves as trust worthier collaborators. In other words, in neither faction is there an anti-imperialist attitude; quite the contrary, the question is entirely one of embracing US.

 

Of course, it should also not be forgotten that, from the point of view of the hegemonic forces, as an ideological attack, fake anti-Americanism is a kind of cost-benefits approach.

 

When the Chief of Staff in Turkey  is saying that a comprehensive operation absolutely must be undertaken in Northern Iraq, who do you believe he’s targeting? Is the target the PKK or is it instead, more broadly, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)?

 

This is now obvious, an open secret. Furthermore the authorities feel no need to even hide it. “Either we take Mosul or we lose Diyarbekir” is essentially the slogan of the official cheer-squad. The target is doubtless both the PKK, and the Kurdish Regional Government, and even, from the “crazy Turk” point of view, Mosul-Kirkuk. Likewise, just yesterday, a journalist with a good relationship to the military Fikret Bila, explained his observations after speaking with some retired commanders thus: “Most commanders have anxieties about being divided. This is also a problem concerning Northern Iraq. They are of the belief that a Kurdish state will not be set up in Northern Iraq but, should it be set up … in that event they see it as a survival [of Turkish state] issue. That is, they may dare to risk a war, because in ranking threats they do not put the PKK first. The first is an independent Kurdish state. The second is the status of Kirkuk. The third, as one aspect of these, is the PKK.  The division of Iraq’s territory will also destroy the integrity of Turkey’s territory. Because the issue between both territories is one of demographic permeability “the actual risk is this” they say.”

 

Turkey says it wants to create a buffer-zone on the Iraqi border. What kind of a process is this expected to be? Is it possible to draw a parallel with Israel’s creation of a buffer-zone through its long occupation of Southern Lebanon?

 

Certainly there are similarities, and also differences. Israel, in essence, wants to divide Lebanon. As opposed to this, Turkey wants to keep Northern Iraq in a tight vice under strict scrutiny. From both positions, the word “buffer” conjures up more neutral connotations although, in essence, their intentions are not defensive but aggressive. At least, if we take account of the issue from the aspect of resources, Israel has its eyes fixed on water and Turkey on petrol. The most important thing, from the political-strategic angle, is the matter of targeting certain peoples to bring them under control. Both countries moreover, seek to set their enemies against each other.  Israel, stirs up the right-wing Christians against Hezbollah while Turkey, on one side wants to use the Southern Kurds to steamroller the PKK while, on the other hand, it tries to use the Turkomans against the Southerners. Both however, aim to control the region for the sake of their own narrow, “national” interest, and realise this in a form absolutely consistent with American aggression and conforming to the status quo. Turkey, from this perspective, is not as powerful or fortunate as Israel and would like to be in a similar position at the US’ side.

 

How do you interpret the efforts to erect an embargo against the Kurdish Regional Government? Given the Kurdish Regional Government enjoys other options such as Iran, could Turkey be the loser here?

 

These kinds of embargo have no meaning at all. These things just help to blur public opinion. Nothing serious is actually being done. In the end both sides can be damaged, but with its fragile economy, Turkey trying to play the tough guy like this has no credibility.

 

In your opinion, what was the real result of the Bush/Erdogan meeting in the USA? Would you please evaluate the possible effects on the evolution of the Kurdish problem in the region?

 

It appears that the factions are agreed on the question of accepting the US’s “red lines” in Southern Kurdistan in return for a targeting of the PKK. More correctly, the US has reined Turkey in and has had to draw its own line. In any case, given Turkey’s dependency and obvious weakness it doesn’t really have much choice. Some insane scenario is still on the cards but it’s clear that the state has, for now, fallen back on deliberation.

 

Finally, how do you see Baykal’s [main “opposition” party leader] opening to Northern Iraq. Does this reflect a change in official policy towards the KRG? If there has indeed been such a change, what do you connect its coming up on the agenda now to?

I do not think that Baykal’s opening up is independent from the state. That is, it’s like the idea of obstinacy to the American line and an enraged, all-out, internal-external war was anticipated. It’s like, while waiting for a response to “satisfy” Turkey on the PKK issue, the bait on the hook is being displayed. Turkey, on one hand is being directed to shake the hand it couldn’t bend while on the other, it is waiting for this response on the PKK question. However, it’s too early to pass certain judgements on these matters. While the hegemonic system in Turkey’s unwillingness and inability to solve the “Kurdish Problem” continues, it is full of instability and what will happen is unknowable. This situation is creating such objective and subjective dynamics that, in the end, Turkey’s decision makers and controllers are becoming hostages of the processes. Unimaginable adventures in the swirls of intractability, hopelessness and fear will drive them into an inconclusive, swamp of simplistic violence.