On Russia’s state television channels, there was hysteria. Astonished viewers, plunged into a cold war atmosphere, learned that neighbouring Ukraine was experiencing a coup d’état planned by foreign spy services. The enemies were so cunning that they had organized violations of the electoral regulations, provoking demonstrations by the opposition. The aim of all this was to bring the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power instead of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich. If we were to ‘lose’Ukraine, Russia would never again be a great power, the commentators all concluded.
Tijekom izbora ruski promatrači nisu mogli ne primijetiti ogroman broj prekršaja, no ostavljali su dojam da ih viđaju samo na zapadu Ukrajine, gdje se izbori navodno lažiraju u korist Juščenka. U stvarnosti, Ukrajina za razliku od Rusije nije federacija nego unitarna država, u kojoj su lokalne uprave podložne predsjedniku. Prije drugog kruga glasovanja predsjednik Kučma smijenio je šefove uprava u pokrajinama u kojima je pobjeđivala oporba. Kršenja su tako u značajnoj mjeri pogodovala vlastima ne samo na istoku, već i na zapadu.
Of course, it does not follow from this that the opposition was entirely blameless. Quite the reverse; in the second round the opposition bloc clearly sought to match the government’s fraud with its own ‘counterfraud’, using the same detached coupons and multiple voting. Compared to the officials of the presidential administration, however, the opposition had incomparably fewer opportunities for administrative trickery. Moreover, the tactic of ‘counterfraud’ spurred the authorities to make still more efforts to ensure the result they wanted, to the point where the whole procedure became farcical.
The Ukrainian elections were no longer like those in Russia, but like somewhere in Nigeria, featuring violence, the exclusion of observers, and control by clan chieftains over the actions of voters on ‘their’territory. Yanukovich finally gained the number of votes he needed, but his victory was Pyrrhic. Not only did the opposition take to the streets, but it had obvious moral and political grounds for refusing to accept the election results.
Ordinary Russians have followed these events far more cynically, not paying much attention to the propaganda, but gradually being drawn into observing their neighbours. From Moscow, the elections in Ukraine seem like an entertaining reality show, with millions of participants and an unprecedented fund of prizes. Despite the propaganda hysteria (and perhaps because of it), the opposition has aroused growing sympathy.
Teze o borbi proameričke oporbe protiv promoskovske političke elite ne podnose sumnju, kao ni stalno ponavljane tvrdnje o sukobu zapada koji govori ukrajinski i istoka koji govori ruski. Juščenko je neupitno proamerički političar. Ali isto se može reći i za sadašnje vladare ukrajinske republike. Upravo je sadašnji predsjednik Leonid Kučma, zajedno s premijerom Viktorom Janukovičem, poslao ukrajinske snage u Irak. Ista su dva lidera inscenirala apsurdnu krizu u rusko-ukrajinskim odnosima oko brane uz sićušni otok Tuzla. U međuvremenu, brojni oporbeni političari kritizirali su slanje trupa, kao i komunisti, koji su odbili podržati bilo koju stranu u sadašnjem sukobu.
Same day as Ukrainian Supreme Court voted to cancel the results of the second ballot in presidential election, Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovnaya Rada) voted to pull troops out of Iraq. This was a major defeat of US policy in Ukraine, which became possible only because of a political crisis in this country. All earlier attempts to achieve parliamentary majority against intervention failed. This time majority was achieved because Communists and Socialists were joined by many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina'(Yushenko party) but also by some defectors from the pro-government camp. At the same time many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina’as well as Yanukovich supporters voted against the proposal or abstained.
American financial support for Yushenko is quite visible. However one can easily discover that most sponsors who contributed to his campaign also contributed generously to Kerry’s campaign (Soros, National Democratic Institute etc.). Republican funding for Yushenko was almost symbolic. There was also a lot of Western European and especially German money. But ironically, some of the biggest contributions came from Russia ‘ notably from those business groups who were not satisfied by privatization deals offered by Yanukovich and expected to rerun the process. These expectations were not unjustified.
Soon after electoral rerun was announced Yushenko promised to cancel some privatization deals fixed by the previous regime. Don’t expect anything to be returned to the public. Yushenko plans a big process, Yukos style, in which some politically incorrect oligarchs will go to jail and their property will be reprivatized.
Jednako su lažni pokušaji da se ukrajinsko društvo podijeli po jezičnim linijama. Kijev, glavni grad, uporište je opozicije, iako je jezik koji se tamo uglavnom čuje na ulicama ruski. U Harkovu, koji se smatra središtem ruske kulture u Ukrajini, održane su masovne demonstracije. Akcije potpore vlastima koje su organizirane u Donjecku i drugim industrijskim gradovima podsjećale su na demonstracije iz sovjetskog doba, na koje se ljude tjeralo motkama. Govorili su uglavnom sindikalni dužnosnici i administrativni dužnosnici, dok su radnici prvi iskoristili priliku i otišli svojim kućama. Unatoč tvrdnjama da će tisuće rudara biti dovedene u Kijev da se bore s oporbom, vlasti su uspjele prikazati samo nekoliko desetaka donjeckih gangstera u neprikladnim rudarskim kacigama, zajedno sa skupinom otmjenih Kozaka.
With the help of Soviet-style methods, the ruling oligarchy is still able to control the industrial zones of the east, but it is incapable of mobilising mass popular support. Moreover, it is afraid of real demonstrations by the miners. If large numbers of miners were to take to the streets, this would amount to the very strike for which the opposition has been calling. Also, there are no guarantees that the bosses and bureaucrats around Yanukovich would be able to keep workers under their control.
Najmanje se rusko vodstvo može nazvati antiameričkim ili antizapadnjačkim. Nitko drugi nego ruski predsjednik Vladimir Putin javno je izjavio da podržava Georgea Busha na američkim izborima u studenom. U isto vrijeme dok je moskovska televizija osuđivala američko uplitanje u Ukrajinu, ministar obrane Sergej Ivanov s novinarima je razgovarao o mogućnosti slanja oružja u Irak za iračke snage pod kontrolom SAD-a, ali io slanju vojnih stručnjaka. Njemačka, Francuska i druge europske zemlje odbile su američke zahtjeve ove vrste.
The logic of the Cold War might have been justified when a clash of two systems was involved. But for a good while now Russia and the West have shared the same capitalist system, and the axis of opposition in world politics has not been rivalry between NATO and the Eastern bloc (which ceased to exist fifteen years ago), but rivalry between the blocs of the Euro and the Dollar. In this contest, the Kremlin leadership is quite unable to decide where it stands. It tries clumsily to manoeuvre between Brussels and Washington, but in such a way as to bang its head first on one side, then on the other, dooming itself to a series of one-sided concessions to each of the contending groups. The Kremlin goes unrewarded for these concessions, since any shifts it makes in the direction of Berlin or Paris are immediately cancelled out by its demonstrative expressions of loyalty to Washington.
It is also unclear how Russia in 2004 might ‘lose’Ukraine. After all, our own state long ago recognised Ukrainian independence. If we are talking not of control but of Russian political, moral and cultural influence on the neighbouring republic, it would be hard to think of any worse means for achieving this than what the Kremlin has done in recent months. If someone had set out deliberately to undermine Russia’s position in Ukrainian society, he or she could scarcely have achieved more than the Kremlin administration has managed through its work with Kuchma and Yanukovich. The Kremlin has not only shocked everyone with its crude and unconcealed meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state, but more importantly, has done this so ineptly that it has finished up harming its own cause.
Most comic of all has been the way Putin, addressing journalists in Portugal, called on them not to use ‘scarecrows’from Cold War times, even though his own propagandists have been doing this. Putin’s speeches on the topic of Ukraine betray his confusion. On one occasion he will adopt an extremely aggressive tone, hinting at the evil intent of the West; then he will try to justify himself to these same Westerners, explaining that he congratulated Yanukovich not as the new president, but (and this is something absolutely new in world diplomacy) ‘on the basis of the results of the exit polls’.
Ulozi u političkoj borbi u Ukrajini su ogromni, uključujući i Kremlj. Ali ti ulozi nemaju nikakve veze s nacionalnim interesima ili sa sada već davno nestalim natjecanjem između komunističkog Istoka i buržoaskog Zapada. Polukriminalni klanovi koji su tijekom privatizacije preuzeli kontrolu ne samo nad industrijom u istočnoj Ukrajini, već u značajnoj mjeri i nad stanovništvom, imaju bliske veze s birokratsko-oligarhijskim skupinama koje vladaju u Moskvi.
These groups are united not only by business links, but also by a common fear: that sooner or later they will have to answer for the plunder of their countries’ collective wealth, for the rigging of elections, and for the suppression of political freedoms. For precisely this reason, the rise to power of the opposition in Ukraine will set an ominous example for Russia’s new elites, even if this Kiev opposition is extremely moderate, promising neither nationalisation nor a redistribution of incomes.
Ruski kapital počinje masovnu ekspanziju u Ukrajini. Počeli su razgovori o kupnji telekomunikacijskih tvrtki, metalurških tvornica, pa čak i pivovara. Donjecki klanovi koji su se ujedinili oko Janukoviča moraju se održati na vlasti kako bi osigurali da će planirani dogovori proći glatko.
The Western political elites as well are thinking far more strategically. While Moscow commentators continually cite the ousting of the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia as an example of a secret American plan providing backing for a democratic revolution, the past also contains other instances in which democratic revolutions have received support from Washington – in the Philippines against the dictator Marcos, and in Indonesia against the decades-long rule of the armed forces. In all these cases, as in Georgia, the US supported the overthrow of a pro-American regime.
Nema tu paradoksa. Kriza vladajuće elite ima objektivan karakter, sasvim odvojen od intriga Washingtona. Sve što američka diplomacija čini je da realno odvagne postojeće stanje, a zatim, umjesto da zauzme stav prema očito gubitničkoj strani, da iz redova oporbe izabere nove i perspektivnije partnere. Ono što je važno za SAD u ovakvim slučajevima jest osigurati da, kada novo vodstvo dođe na vlast, vanjskopolitički kurs dotične zemlje ostane isti. Drugim riječima, Washington podržava demokratske revolucije s jednim jedinim ciljem: osloboditi ih njihovog radikalnog potencijala.
In this situation, the impotence of the Ukrainian left is especially tragic. In condemning both candidates, the Communist Party of Ukraine has taken an irreproachable position from an ideological point of view. This position, however, has not been followed by independent action; instead, the Communist Party has simply vanished from the political scene.
Many of the party’s supporters acknowledge that this situation is lamentable. Hence we read on a leading communist website: ‘The working class and its party have been unable to act as an independent political force, as an organised, conscious subject of the historical process. It has not been communists who have led the working class, but the bourgeoisie with its candidates and organisations. This is simply a fact. Meanwhile, the communists have been driven onto the sidelines of the struggle, forced into the position of onlookers, incapable of influencing the outcome in any way.'(http:///www.communist.ru/lenta/index.php?10168).
On the moral level, the authorities have already lost the struggle in Ukraine. The only way they could restore their political control would be to resort to violence on a scale tantamount to catastrophe. The agreement on new elections reached between the authorities and the opposition will, if fulfilled, merely ensure a smoother and more legitimate handover of power.
Tko god pobijedi, jedna od glavnih žrtava ukrajinske krize bit će Vladimir Putin. Otvoreno podržavajući ukrajinski režim, ulažući u njega velike količine novca i šaljući mu cijelu vojsku savjetnika i političkih učitelja, Kremlj je riskirao da zauzvrat dobije samo probleme. Čak i ako Janukovič pobijedi, njegova glavna briga bit će ponovna izgradnja odnosa sa Zapadom. Putin će se na susretu s Europskom unijom u Haagu morati opravdati, izgubivši i posljednje trunke svog autoriteta. Što je najvažnije, pred vlastitim narodom, oružanim snagama i policijom u Rusiji još se jednom pokazao kao slab i nesposoban političar. A u Rusiji slabi ne prevladavaju.