Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says Jakarta is ready to send up to 8,000 troops to Gaza. Another 18,000 are trained and on standby. He first made the pledge at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, offering “20,000 sons and daughters” to join a United States backed International Stabilization Force.

It was designed to sound historic. It was designed to sound brave.

It was also designed to be seen.

Start with the basics. Who is this for?

It is not for Hamas. Its leaders have rejected foreign troops imposed without Palestinian consensus. They have warned that any international force coordinating with Israel risks becoming an extension of occupation. Gaza’s future, they insist, must be decided by Palestinians themselves.

Meanwhile, Israeli analysts have described the idea of Indonesian troops in Gaza as a strategic mistake. Indonesia does not recognize Israel. It has no diplomatic relations, no embassy, no formal ties. For decades, Jakarta has voted against Israel at the United Nations and supported resolutions condemning what it calls unlawful occupation. From Israel’s standpoint, Indonesian troops are not neutral peacekeepers. They are politically loaded.

So both sides that would have to live with this force have signaled rejection.

Indonesians are not demanding it either.

Public anger over Gaza has been real and sustained. But solidarity does not automatically translate into support for deploying thousands of soldiers into one of the most volatile conflict zones in the world. Many Indonesians question what 8,000 troops would actually accomplish in a territory still defined by Israeli military dominance over airspace and borders, armed factions and shattered infrastructure.

Others worry about something more direct. If stabilization requires disarming or confronting Palestinian armed groups that reject an externally imposed arrangement, would Indonesian soldiers be ordered to fight them? Would they be pulled into clashes with pro Palestinian factions in the name of order?

Any multinational force in Gaza would have to coordinate closely with the Israeli military. That coordination would shape movement, intelligence sharing and rules of engagement. In practice, Indonesian troops could end up enforcing a security framework designed in Washington and aligned with Israeli priorities. The risk is not theoretical. It is built into the structure of the mission.

Then look at Washington.

The United States initiates the stabilization concept. But it does not want to send its own troops. Donald Trump has said he does not want American soldiers dying in foreign conflicts. The political incentive in Washington is clear. Avoid American casualties. Let someone else carry the burden.

Into that opening steps Prabowo.

From a diplomatic angle, the offer sends a pointed message. America does not need to deploy. Indonesia is ready. It is a gesture crafted to resonate in Washington.

Prabowo once faced a United States entry ban over human rights allegations. When that ban was lifted in 2020 while he was serving as defense minister, it marked a significant personal rehabilitation. Since then, he has pursued greater visibility in Western defense circles and global forums. He is invited to the first meeting of the United States Board of Peace in Washington and has reportedly considered its billion dollar joining fee.

In international politics, troop commitments are a form of currency. They signal loyalty. They signal seriousness. They buy access.

Offering 8,000 Indonesian soldiers to a United States backed mission does more than address Gaza. It strengthens Prabowo’s standing in the capital that once kept him at a distance. It positions him as a leader willing to assume risks that Washington prefers to avoid.

At home, the language is sacrifice and pride. Abroad, the message is reliability and alignment.

Strip away the speeches and the framing, and the pattern is hard to ignore.

Hamas rejects the plan. Israel rejects the plan. Many Indonesians doubt its wisdom and fear their soldiers could end up fighting fellow Palestinians. The United States prefers not to send its own troops.

Yet Prabowo presses forward.

This is not about Palestinian self determination. It is not about responding to a clear demand from Gaza. It is about stature. It is about recognition. It is about ego.

Gaza becomes a backdrop. Indonesian soldiers become props.

And the question lingers, sharper each time it is asked.

Is this deployment about peace?

Or is it about Prabowo wanting to be seen as the man who mattered?

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