There are two truths when it comes to addressing the climate crisis: 1) global emissions must rapidly and substantially decrease, and 2) doing so is likely to cause economic disruption, especially if it is unmanaged. To address and reconcile these two realities, advocates, scholars and policymakers increasingly call for a “just transition” to address and mitigate the socio-economic considerations of decarbonisation. The idea of the just transition originates in the labour and environmental justice movements, and describes a strategy for winding down toxic industries, principally the fossil fuel industry, without having the burden of that transition fall on workers and communities economically dependent upon these industries.

The call for a just transition is increasingly mainstream, even appearing in several UN climate agreements. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as its mainstream use and recognition increases, the idea and language are being co-opted to provide cover for continued fossil fuel use. For instance, oil major Shell’s website features a page entitled “A Fair and Just Transition”, wherein the firm nods toward the need for a just transition, stating:

Shell endeavours to work with society in its move towards a low-carbon world while supporting workers and communities in a manner that is just, fair and inclusive. We recognise that the nature and pace of change will vary between countries and regions, reflecting different types of economies and development priorities.

While the language found on the page hits the notes of the “just transition” discourse, Shell’s actual plan for its future business fails to propose or plan for a decline in the production and sale of fossil fuels. Shell is moving forward on drilling in Brazil, Australia, Qatar, off the shores of Alaska, off the coast of South Africa and more, totalling over 800 new oil and gas projects planned for the coming years. In short: despite its use of the language, Shell is signalling no intent for a “transition”, let alone one that is just.

While there may not be a uniform definition of just transition, as the term itself implies, there are two fundamental considerations. First, and all too often ignored: there must be an actual transition away from fossil fuels to the extent that fossil fuel use, economy-wide, is largely if not completely eliminated. Despite the urgency of this task, much of the research and discourse concerning the just transition ignores that a transition away from fossil fuels is not yet occurring. Indeed, while renewable energy generation may be growing around the world, fossil fuel generation is also increasing at pace as overall demand increases, meaning the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation remains roughly the same now as four decades ago. For there to be a just transition, there must be a transition away from fossil fuels — not two co-existing systems. The second consideration is that the transition must be just. Once more, this may sound obvious; however, as this essay explores, what makes a transition just is far from a given. Instead, it is a complicated analysis that varies across movements, governance structures, and spatial and temporal considerations. For an energy transition to be just, injustice must be eliminated, not merely displaced. For instance, a major scaling up of solar panel production with exploited labour or outsized damage to particular communities and ecosystems does not represent a just transition. Similarly, decarbonising energy systems in the Global North while the Global South remains underdeveloped is not a just transition. Rather, the project of advancing a just transition is transformational – moving from a world built around extraction to one built around regeneration and care, and a future where people can thrive in a world that is more just overall.

Principle one: There must be a transition

If the first principle of just transition is there must be a transition away from fossil fuels, most current climate efforts fail to pass even this first hurdle, instead using the language as a cover for continued fossil fuel extraction and use. The current policy regime is focused overwhelmingly on the supply side, in particular on policies to increase the supply of renewable energy and low-carbon technology, such as personal electric vehicles, heat pumps, and other forms of electrification. The reasoning behind this stance is that if enough renewable energy is produced, it will simply “crowd out,” fossil fuels. In other words, as renewables become cheaper and more abundant, they will displace fossil fuels without further intervention by providing the better choice for consumers. This philosophy dominates much of climate advocacy, and the focus of many climate campaigns is on building out renewable energy as quickly as possible to render fossil fuels economically unviable. 

This ideological premise is matched in political strategy. Mainstream climate change advocacy and policy positions advance technocratic solutions that rely primarily on market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading and private-sector financial subsidies to incentivise emissions reductions and clean energy expansion, in lieu of mandates for direct emissions reductions or indeed for renewable energy buildout. These strategies focus on working an insider game that sees lobbying and technocratic measures as the solutions to the climate challenge.^[1] Existing systems and institutions are largely left intact and the private sector is seen as the main, if not the sole actor in advancing an energy transition with minimal government interference. In this view, building enough renewable energy is sufficient to propel an energy transition.

However, available evidence shows renewable energy growth is not displacing fossil fuel extraction.^[2] Some impressive growth in renewable energy is not resulting in decreased fossil fuel use; instead, the growth of renewable energy is simply an “energy addition,” increasing the total amount of energy produced overall rather than displacing any fossil fuel production. As such, the growth of renewable energy by itself is not an indicator of an energy transition. In being the world’s largest single investor in renewable energy by a significant margin, as well as the leading investor in coal-fired power, China provides a striking example of this phenomenon.^[3] Globally, fossil fuels still comprise over 80 percent of the energy mix despite gains in renewable energy production.

Despite the empirical evidence, climate policies largely continue to take a “green growth” stance focused on incentivising renewable energy and on the economic and job growth that can come from building a low-carbon economy. The idea of “green growth” rests on the assumption that as economies develop, they become more efficient and require fewer resources, therefore allowing for continued economic growth with sustainable resource use and falling emissions. Moreover, green technological developments can drive economic growth.^[4] For example, adopting renewable energy technology is a strong job creator insofar as solar farms, wind farms and geothermal networks need to be built and operated. By this logic, continued economic growth is not just desirable in its own right but is also the path by which meaningful emissions reductions and an energy transition will be achieved. Focusing on economic growth and job creation could help alleviate concerns from fossil fuel communities and workers that decarbonisation will leave them without any economic opportunities. Indeed, research among participants in Appalachia shows a willingness to support climate policy if it is paired with clear just transition assistance, including healthcare and income compensation to alleviate the economic burden of transition.^[5]

However, a growing community of critics question whether economic growth, especially in perpetuity, is compatible with sustainable resource use.^[6] As economies grow, energy and resource demands also grow. Proponents of green growth nevertheless argue that efficiency gains mean we can “decouple” economic growth from resource use, such that economic growth can continue even as emissions and resource use fall. Most relevant to the discussion of a just transition is whether green growth is capable of delivering a transition away from fossil fuels. Unfortunately for the advocates of green growth, the evidence is not encouraging. 

While on paper, perpetual growth seems possible, the reality is that growth has been enabled only through intensive material and energy use. Growth increases energy demand, making the transition to renewables more difficult; increasing industrial production, required for economic growth, will also increase emissions.^[7] Moreover, despite growth in renewable energy and possibly more efficient energy systems, the existing fossil fuel system must also be maintained while renewable energy is built out to scale. Both the growth in renewable energy capacity and the maintenance of the fossil fuel system needed to deliver this require vast amounts of energy and materials. A perpetual growth mindset is thus unable to address the reality that the fossil fuel system must be scaled down — one potential outcome of which is a decrease in economic growth. Nor is it able to grapple effectively with the need to reduce energy demand overall rather than pursuing maximal renewable buildout.^[8]

More than green growth

Empirical evidence affirms that an energy transition requires more than green growth. To take one case: between 2009 and 2012, South Korea invested three percent of its GDP in green initiatives, focusing in particular on clean energy growth and green job creation.^[9] South Korea’s green economic push, which at the time was heralded for its ambition, found that “an authentic paradigm shift of the energy system depends on changing the embedded values within institutions, policies, practices, and actual projects in the field.”^[10] The green growth effort in South Korea generated modest reductions in carbon emissions, but opposition to certain green efforts led ultimately to a situation the authors described “green energy abundance,” wherein renewable energy played an increased role without driving a meaningful shift away from fossil fuel energy. The authors conclude that one of the lessons to be drawn from the South Korean example is:

Energy transformation is not a contest over the chemistry of the atmosphere but over values, ideas and ideology… Perhaps the most important lesson from the Korean GEG (green energy growth) experience is that change cannot and will not happen without fundamental changes in embedded belief of “the more energy is the better” and necessary changes in the main drivers of energy system.^[11]

Among the lessons of the South Korean example is that a green growth approach is unlikely to meaningfully reduce fossil fuel use, and in turn, unlikely to address the climate crisis. The challenges to green growth reflect the challenges facing green capitalism more broadly. In The Value of a Whale: On the Illusions of Green Capitalism, Adrienne Buller defines green capitalism as efforts to preserve the current systems and institutions of capitalism while providing new domains of accumulation in decarbonisation and ecological sustainability, to the detriment or exclusion of creative problem solving and more fundamental rethinking of approaches to societal challenges.^[12]

In practice, this means that many approaches to addressing climate and ecological crisis are constrained to market mechanisms, many of which have proven particularly effective in addressing ecological or climate challenges. For instance, a review of existing carbon pricing schemes found that the ability of these types of mechanisms to reduce emissions was extremely limited — only between  zero and two per cent per year.^[13] Similarly, the use of carbon offset programmes is a direct hindrance to the just transition, displacing responsibility for emissions and providing a justification for “business as usual” on the part of major emitters. These schemes and policy approaches are not advancing an energy transition or ambitious emissions reductions. Indeed, as Buller concludes: “At best, green capitalist solutions are a deadly distraction from the urgent task of actually slowing, reversing, and adapting to climate and ecological crisis; at worst, they are actively undermining our ability to do so.”^[14]

In line with the authors of the South Korean analysis, I argue there must be more than a transition of only energy sources in order to ensure a meaningful reduction in fossil fuel use. Depending on green growth or green capitalism alone cannot guarantee a meaningful transition away from fossil fuels because fossil fuel extraction and use is, and will continue to be, extremely profitable. There is no financial incentive to reduce fossil fuel use and we do not have time to wait decades, if not longer, for fossil fuels to become sufficiently economically undesirable or unviable. There are too many sunk costs, too much existing infrastructure and too many incentives for fossil fuels to voluntarily end. Instead, there must be a mandate for fossil fuel drawdown and a broader social undertaking that addresses the root causes of over-extraction and exploitation.

Principle two: Transition must be just

Understandings of what makes any transition “just” vary. Does “just” simply describe the integration of various strands of justice, such as a community engagement process that is accessible to all (procedural justice)?  Or does it ask which communities are exposed to disproportionate pollution burden and which are protected from pollution (distributional justice)? Does “just” mean ensuring that the individuals shaping transition efforts are those directly impacted? Is “just” focused at the level of the power plant, the community, the regional, or global level? Critically, alongside the tangible questions about what makes a transition just is the equally vital question of who decides what is “just”. Even if we are to focus on directly impacted stakeholders, for instance, does this imply the workers who will lose their jobs, the communities who have suffered the burden of pollution, or some other interest group? Among these, are all views to be equally weighted? Moreover, political opposition to just transition is exacerbated, in large part, by the fossil fuel industry.^[15] Movement in either direction — towards an energy transition or preserving the current energy system — will inevitably be seen as unjust by some stakeholders.

The challenge to transitioning fossil fuel communities and workers goes beyond the economic losses they will incur. Many fossil fuel communities have cultural ties to extraction that extend beyond their economic reliance.^[16] These cultural ties can directly influence views on an energy transition. In an analysis of public comments, scholars found that “place attachment and an emotional connection between coal and local identity” influence how residents in a coal mining community viewed opposition to expanding coal mining.^[17] This cultural tie to coal mining has been encouraged by the coal industry, which deployed a deliberate strategy to engage in cultural manipulation and tie coal mining to place identity to detract from employment losses in the industry.^[18] Sociologists Richard York and Shannon Bell detail how the West Virginia Coal Association created, “Friends of Coal,” to counter the environmental justice movement and (accurate) perceptions of the decline of coal mining in the region.^[19] Friends of Coal used several tactics to tie West Virginia identity to coal, including recruiting a popular retired West Virginia University football coach as its spokesperson, plastering the state with its logo on stickers, sponsoring events,  and introducing coal education in schools. The work successfully resulted in the identity of West Virginia as one inextricably tied economically and culturally to coal. The sense of attachment to place has led residents to stay in coal mining regions, even in areas with uncertain employment futures.^[20] Any transition away from fossil fuels can be experienced as a threat by and to these workers and communities.

At the same time, continuing fossil fuel use directly and disproportionately harms communities of colour and low-income communities — including and in addition to workers in these industries — through both the immediate pollution released from fossil fuel sites and fossil fuel-driven climate crisis in the longer term. Research has shown that people of colour are more likely to be displaced by extreme weather events and more likely to face the risks of heat waves, as redlining played a central role in the creation of urban heat islands.^[21] People of colour are often subject to multiple points of exposure and face higher rates of chronic disease and infant mortality.^[22] Black and Hispanic children are disproportionately exposed to air pollution and all impacts of climate change.^[23] Environmental racism, redlining, and structural inequality in urban planning have pushed communities of colour to be located near highways with heavy traffic and a much greater increased risk of asthma or near toxic waste disposal sites, landfills, or chemical plants. Delaying an energy transition continues exposing marginalised communities to these hazards.

These competing interests underscore the challenge of designing and advancing a “just” transition. Continuing fossil fuels is unjust to the communities bearing the environmental and social cost of fossil fuel use. Ending fossil fuels may be seen as unjust to the workers and communities economically dependent upon them. Thus, ideas about what makes transition “just” cannot be divorced from movements and politics. What makes a transition “just” will vary from region to region. While there is not a one-size-fits-all definition of justice, in the context of an energy transition, I argue that a fundamental requirement for transition to be just is to move beyond the idea that simply replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy is sufficient, rendering systemic and institutional transformation unnecessary. A failure to address systemic and institutional change allows the underlying dynamics causing inequities to continue, regardless of energy source. 

Returning to the green growth discussion highlights how ignoring systemic and institutional conditions that create inequity cannot result in just outcomes. As economic anthropologist Jason Hickel and Aljoša Slameršak argue, current mitigation scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement targets of staying below two degrees Celsius of warming all perpetuate Global North and Global South inequities.^[24] Hickel and Slameršak analysed current mitigation scenarios and found energy disparities between the Global North and Global South are persistent in all scenarios. In the most equitable scenario, the Global North is still assumed to use 40 per cent more energy than the Global South. In other words, rich countries are allowed to continue to use excessive quantities of energy while the Global South is meant to constrain its energy use. Hickel and Slameršak also warn that the negative emissions technology depended upon in most scenarios, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, allows for continued excessive energy use by the Global North while also requiring massive amounts of land. Low-carbon technologies, such as batteries and electric vehicles, also require extractive resources that, at least in the short term, will intensify mining activities.^[25] Given the political economy of mining, a just transition cannot be realised merely through net zero scenarios that depend upon the Global South to offset the excesses of the Global North or a replacement of fossil fuel extraction with exploitative mineral extraction. Depending on sacrifices of and from the Global South is not a just transition, it is merely a displacement of injustice. Growth alone cannot reduce inequity. The underlying conditions that create these inequities must be addressed.

In an inherently unjust system, not only does replacing one fuel source for another not guarantee an energy transition, it also does not address the underlying institutions and systems that drive injustice. Just transition is a broader social project of moving to a more just society, which requires an energy transition away from fossil fuels and also a transition away from the systems of wealth and resource extraction that harm both people and planet.

This piece is adapted from the upcoming book, A Just Transition for All: Workers and Communities for a Carbon Free Future, out from MIT Press this autumn.

Notes

[1] Theda Skocpol, “Naming the Problem: What It Will Take to Counter Extremism and Engage Americans in the Fight against Global Warming?”, Harvard University, 2013.

[2] Richard York and Shannon Elizabeth Bell, “Energy Transitions or Additions? Why a Transition from Fossil Fuels Requires More Than the Growth of Renewable Energy”, Energy Research & Social Science, May 2019, vol. 51, pp. 40-43.

[3] Brett Christophers, The Price is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won’t Solve the Climate Crisis, Verso, 2022.

[4] Syed Abdul Rehman Khan et al., “Renewable Energy and Advanced Logistical Infrastructure: Carbon-Free Economic Development”, Sustainable Development, 2022, vol. 30, no. 4, pp.693–702.

[5] Alexander F. Gazmararian, “Fossil Fuel Communities Support Climate Policy Coupled with Just Transition Assistance”, Energy Policy, January 2024, vol. 184.

[6] Jason Hickel and Girogis Kallis, “Is Green Growth Possible?”, New Political Economy, June 2020, vol. 25, no. 4, pp.469-486.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Joel Millward-Hopkins et al., “Providing decent living with minimum energy: a global scenario”, Global Environmental Change, 2020, vol. 65.

[9] Yoon-Hee Ha and John Byrne, “The Rise and Fall of Green Growth: Korea’s Energy Sector Experiment and Its Lessons for Sustainable Energy Policy,” WIREs Energy and Environment, 2019, vol. 8, no. 4., p.335.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Adrienne Buller, The Value of a Whale: On the Illusions of Green Capitalism, Manchester University Press, 2022.

[13] Jessica F. Green, “Does Carbon Pricing Reduce Emissions? A Review of Ex-Post Analyses,” Environmental Research Letters, March 2021, vol. 16, no. 4.

[14]  Buller, The Value of a Whale, 277.

[15] Jeffrey Alan Lockwood, Behind the Carbon Curtain the Energy Industry, Political Censorship, and Free Speech, University of New Mexico Press, 2017.

[16] Sanya Carley, Tom P. Evans, and David M. Konisky, “Adaptation, Culture, and the Energy Transition in American Coal Country”, Energy Research & Social Science, March 2018, vol. 37, pp.133–139; Hannah Della Bosca and Josephine Gillespie, “The Coal Story: Generational Coal Mining Communities and Strategies of Energy Transition in Australia”, Energy Policy, September 2018, vol. 120, 734–740.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Shannon Elizabeth Bell and Richard York, “Community Economic Identity: The Coal Industry and Ideology Construction in West Virginia”, Rural Sociology, 2010, vol. 75, no. 1, pp.111–143.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Michelle Graff, Sanya Carley, and David M. Konisky, “Stakeholder Perceptions of the United States Energy Transition: Local-Level Dynamics and Community Responses to National Politics and Policy”, Energy Research & Social Science, September 2018, vol. 43, pp.144–157.

[21] Frederica Perera and Kari Nadeau, “Climate Change, Fossil-Fuel Pollution, and Children’s Health”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 2022, vol. 386, no. 24, pp.2303–2314.

[22] Renee N. Salas, “Environmental Racism and Climate Change — Missed Diagnoses”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 2021, vol. 385, no. 11.

[23] Perera and Nadeau, “Climate Change, Fossil-Fuel Pollution, and Children’s Health”, The New England Journal of Medicine.

[24] Jason Hickel and Aljosa Slamersak, “Existing Climate Mitigation Scenarios Perpetuate Colonial Inequalities”, The Lancet Planetary Health, July 2022, vol. 6, no. 7, pp.628–631.

[25] Nicholas Bainton et al., “The Energy-Extractives Nexus and the Just Transition”, Sustainable Development, 2021, vol. 29, no. 4, 624–634.