The Venezuelan government had reason to believe that some of the organizers of the September 1 āToma De Caracasā had the intention of replicating the events of AprilĀ 11, 2002. There was ample evidence to indicate that the protesters may have ended up confronting the government in order to force it to accept their demands. Whether the confrontation was to take the form of violence to achieve regime change or massive civil disobedience to force the Consejo Nacional Electoral to accept the oppositionās electoral demands was never clear.Ā Ā
But the fact is that the social media was replete with the same messages as during the āguarimbaā of 2014, when opposition leaders claimed that the government would fall within a week or so. Freddy Guevara, national deputy and leader of Voluntad Popular, declared that the march represented an āultimatumā and that protesters would not leave Caracas until their demands were met: āWe invite all people who are willing to stay on the streets peacefully and civically until we achieve change, constitutionally, democratically and pacifically.ā Indeed, the April 11, 2002 march was also supposed to be āpeaceful.āĀ
Several days prior to the protest, Henrique Capriles and ChĆŗo Torrealba of the MUD stressed the peaceful nature of the protests and claimed that hooded protestors (āencapuchadosā) would not be allowed and that the protest organizers had the means to guarantee peace. Nevertheless, encapuchados and others attempted to block traffic on the Francisco Fajardo freeway where Guevara was stationed. The MUD claims that they were āinfiltrados.ā
The foreign media reporting on the September 1 events has (true to form) conjured up the image of government repression and restriction on freedom of expression. The other side of the story ā namely that the Chavistas were also mobilized in large numbers, that the opposition leaders refuse to recognize the governmentās legitimacy, that their regime-change rhetoric comes in distinct forms, and that their past actions have on occasions erupted into violence ā was downplayed or completely ignored by the international media. It may be that the governmentās firmness and the strictness of the measures that were taken acted as deterrents and explain the more cautious pronouncements coming out of the MUD in the days prior to September 1.
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