According to most mainstream media accounts, a “political earthquake” has taken place in Hungary. The European far right’s poster boy and MAGA darling Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was defeated in a landslide on Sunday by political upstart Péter Magyar. The outcome of this election is indeed politically significant, as the ousting of Orbán by Hungarian voters will curtail Donald Trump’s foreign policy efforts to undermine the European Union (EU) by using Hungary as a Trojan horse in Brussels.

The Trump administration has made it abundantly clear that it wants to see a “nationalistic” Europe ruled by far right leaders. Its real interests, however, lie in weakening the EU as part of Washington’s new national security strategy in which the U.S. reasserts itself as a global hegemon. In forging a new world order, the Trump administration wants allies who are obedient subordinates. Trump’s support for Orbán was not based solely on ideological grounds but was also driven by a specific strategy for Europe, one in which the continent was to be subordinated to the interests of U.S. imperialism.

That said, the key question is this: Could the end of Orbán’s 16-year reign also mark the beginning of the end of the far right’s modern political surge? Indeed, the far right has faced other major setbacks across Europe in recent days and Donald Trump’s approval rating in the U.S. has taken a significant hit in recent surveys. The problem with concluding that the defeat of Orbán somehow represents the start of a new political era marked by the decline of right-wing authoritarianism, however, is that while the far right may currently be experiencing setbacks, the left is still struggling to articulate an alternative vision attractive enough to capture the public’s interest.

Moreover, the winner of Hungary’s so-called historic election is a former Orbán loyalist who ran on a pledge to rebuild Hungary’s relationships with the EU and NATO. Magyar also campaigned on an anti-corruption and anti-state-capture platform, which is rather typical of every mainstream politician in central and eastern Europe, but it is highly unlikely that he will shift away from Orbán’s reactionary policies on immigration. In fact, as researchers Eric Maurice and Levente Kocsis have shown, Magyar’s Tisza party’s voting behavior in the European Parliament reveals a strong convergence with Orbán’s own Fidesz party on “politically sensitive issues” such as Ukraine and immigration and “opposing language on rights and equality.” And while Magyar has spoken of wanting to move Hungary closer to the EU, he has avoided taking a clear stance on LGBTQ+ rights. This is hardly a political vision for a progressive future.

Since the early 2010s, far right parties and movements have gained significant political traction throughout Europe. Their success has been driven by a variety of social, economic, political, and cultural factors, just as in the case of the MAGA movement in the United States. Using radical and forthright political rhetoric to take advantage of ordinary people’s concerns and fears over the consequences of neoliberal globalization, as well as the impotence of liberal and socialist parties in articulating a meaningful socioeconomic alternative, far-right leaders have been able to connect with the politically discontent among working- and middle-class voters as well as younger generations. In this context, quasi-fascist demagoguery, once considered a political taboo in postwar Western polities, has emerged as an ideological weapon designed to alter political norms and “transform the morally extraordinary into the ordinary,” as Jason Stanley put it in his book How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them.

Viktor Orbán’s first term as prime minister of Hungary was from 1998 to 2002, but it was during his second term, starting in 2010, that he emerged as a strongman leader. Since then, he and his party, Fidesz, promoted the most successful variant of right-wing authoritarianism in the West by dismantling the country’s legal system and suppressing opposition. His government did so by winning four straight elections. This is no small feat and speaks volumes of the power of demagoguery in capitalist societies. Orbán’s political rhetoric relied on the spread of fear and misinformation, proving yet again that democracy erodes from the top. He kept hammering away at the EU’s approach to immigration, which he claimed threatened Hungary’s national sovereignty and cultural identity. But he also differentiated between migrants from other Eastern European countries and those from the Middle East and Africa, as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. He described Muslim migration as an “invasion.” This anti-migration position, playing on the racist fears of the population, undoubtedly helped Orbán win successive elections.

But it was Orbánomics, a form of economic nationalism, that motivated Hungarian voters to keep reelecting Orbán and his Fidesz party. Using unorthodox economic policies, Orbán succeeded in reducing unemployment and stimulating growth under favorable economic conditions. He also placed families with children at the center of his economic policy by offering various tax benefits and a long line of subsidies. At the same time, the economy shifted under his reign to a form of crony capitalism that had detrimental effects on economic performance and increased corruption. From 2020 to 2025, the Hungarian economy experienced significant decline and entered a period of “stable stagnation.” Orbánomics had reached the end of the line and Hungarian voters were finally ready to ditch Orbán and his Fidesz for a new government.

The election of Péter Magyar does not appear to represent an ideological shift among Hungarian voters. Magyar is not a liberal, let alone a progressive. Aside from his stance toward the EU, he did not directly challenge Orbán’s policy agenda during his campaign but simply confined himself to talking about corruption and governance. It isn’t even clear that his position on the Ukraine war will be any different from Orbán’s, or that he will stand up to Trump.

That said, the political elite of the EU are surely elated over Magyar’s election. They will most likely show their satisfaction with the electoral outcome in Hungary by releasing frozen funds.

All in all, it is too early to draw conclusions about the consequences of Hungary’s election for the EU and the U.S., as well as for the political fortunes of the global far right. But it is essential to add that a loss for one European far-right party is not necessarily a win for the European and global left.

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