THE day will probably come when encounters between the leaders of India and Pakistan will no longer be deemed historic because they will no longer be uncommon. The day will come when citizens of both countries will need no more than a valid passport to cross the border, when bustling trade between the neighbours will edge out clandestine smuggling operations, when the Indian and Pakistani cricket teams will routinely visit each other for regular fixtures, when Kashmir will once again be synonymous with natural beauty and placidity rather than conflict and bloodshed.

There’s no saying how soon that day will come. And there’s no denying the possibility that it may not come at all: after all, over the past five decades and a half, Pakistan and India have displayed an amazing propensity for defying logic, common sense and mutual interests. But if the generally bleak and unfortunate past can indeed by transcended and a new era launched, will historians tend to trace its origins to a couple of crucial days in January 2004?

That will depend on a number of factors, particularly the trajectory of progress in relations from this point onwards. Serious hiccups along the way, which could necessitate yet another new beginning, may well relegate Atal Behari Vajpayee’s Islamabad trip to a realm of relative inconsequence.

That would be a tragedy. The visit was not an effortless triumph: both sides tried very hard to make it work. And they largely succeeded. Inevitably, the requirements of diplomacy necessitated a fudge on contentious matters. Clichés were flung about almost with reckless abandon. But the atmosphere of bonhomie and mutual accommodation offered a pleasing contrast to the cantankerous point-scoring of the recent past.

What lies ahead cannot, of course, be forecast with any degree of certainty. But there are several hopeful signs, not the least of which is the apparent intention to move forward step by step. Although a great leap would not be without merit, the exercise would be fraught with risks that are unnecessary at this point. Limited goals mean that any failures would be proportionately small.

Initial measures towards a broader rapprochement are likely to revolve around trade. The scope for progress in this sphere is immense: India and Pakistan have barely had an economic relationship of any sort over the years. This politically motivated anomaly can rapidly be remedied without exposing industries in either country to any serious threat. The South Asian Free Trade Area accord signed at the Saarc summit last week leaves room for protection in sensitive areas – and, sensibly, demands less in terms of tariff reduction from the association’s less-developed countries.

It would be wise not to forget, though, that free trade in its current context is far from universally popular – and not without cause. The 10th anniversary this month of Safta’s North American model, Nafta, has been marked in a rather subdued manner, because the treaty does not have too many fans outside the United States. Such agreements tend to favour larger economies and richer nations, and American corporations have never been shy of ruthlessly exploiting opportunities for improving their bottom line.

India boasts by far the largest economy in South Asia. This immutable fact of life can be of considerable benefit to its neighbours, provided India does not attempt to establish on a regional level the sort of economic hegemony associated with the US. Saarc’s stress on the alleviation of poverty is most welcome, provided it proves to be something more than a catchphrase – and provided South Asian governments recognise that free trade isn’t of itself a panacea in this context.

As India well knows, giving free rein to large corporations can actually compound deprivation. And regardless of the IMF’s insistence to the contrary, untrammelled privatisation is liable to provoke similar consequences. One of capitalism’s most baneful aspects is the tendency of the profit motive to mutate from an incentive into an obsession. That helps to explain why, in profit-driven societies, growth in wealth is inevitably accompanied by an increase in economic disparities.

In the context of the Indo-Pak thaw, meanwhile, it is important not to lose sight of the nature of the two governments. For one, the wish list outlined at the outset could be expanded to incorporate the hope that in future Pakistan and India will both be represented at the highest level by elected leaders.

Elections do not of themselves guarantee good government, but whatever the shortcomings of bourgeois democracy – and they are legion – in most circumstances it is decidedly preferable to dictatorship as a form of governance. India has persevered as a democracy since 1947. Pakistan is a different story. The Bharatiya Janata Party intends to bank upon the hopes generated by Vajpayee’s Islamabad visit, plus a supposedly booming economy and a shambolic opposition, to test its strength in an early election. Which suggests, among other things, that the prospect of improved relations with Pakistan is broadly popular in India.

Going by the available evidence, the sense of relief and expectation is reciprocated in most quarters in Pakistan. Unfortunately for Pervez Musharraf, he cannot look forward to any sort of an electoral harvest. Musharraf may not be a tyrant, but the recent legitimacy-garnering exercise has neither added to his credibility nor affected his status as a military dictator. It remains to be seen what will happen when – and if – he keeps his promise to the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal to shed his military accoutrements by the end of the year, but thus far the general’s only party is the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

That may appear to be a useful position for negotiating any sort of settlement with India. But an autonomous civilian leadership, based on popular support, with a politically subordinate army determined to abide by, rather than rewrite, the national Constitution, would potentially be a more reliable interlocutor on the international stage.

Notwithstanding its populist stature, the nature of the BJP government in New Delhi also arouses certain misgivings. Its support was initially based on an appeal to Hindutva, and its bedfellows include some of the most deleterious elements in Indian politics. Which means, in part, that the BJP can exchange concessions with Pakistan without arousing sectarian outrage (although it’s hard to say whether a post-Vajpayee BJP would be equally inclined towards rapprochement).

Another point worth pondering is whether that leeway would extend to Kashmir – an issue on which both sides have hinted at an unfortunate degree of inflexibility. The Indian leadership has said it is willing to discuss the subject but would not countenance any change in the territory’s status. Musharraf has noted that it would be out of the question for Pakistan to accept the Line of Control as a permanent international border. The degree of open-mindedness required for a lasting solution to the conundrum has yet to be generated. A spurt in trade, cultural exchanges and tourism could vastly improve the atmosphere and enhance the spirit of mutual accommodation. But nothing thus far can be taken for granted.

Notwithstanding repeated denials from both sides of the fence, the growing bonhomie on the subcontinent is to a certain extent the consequence of pressure from Washington. That does not necessarily devalue the goodwill, but any progress will endure only if it is attempted in the best interests of the two nations, rather than to solicit brownie points from a superpower.

In Pakistan, the fundamentalist (and now crumbling) MMA, which helped Musharraf in his quest for a veneer of legitimacy, has been critical of recent development, especially the president’s assurance that he won’t permit Pakistan’s soil to be used for any terrorist activity. Sadly but not too surprisingly, that absurd reservation has also been echoed by Nawaz Sharif’s faction of the Muslim League. The Pakistan People’s Party has been altogether more positive – hopefully for the right reasons. Several Kashmiri leaders have also endorsed the initiative, but militants have shown no interest in suspending their activities. Which means that there is unlikely to be a let-up in the Indian army’s repressive operations.

So, while India and Pakistan talk trade and play cricket, Kashmiri suffering will continue. This is not to suggest that they shouldn’t pursue commercial openings or arrange sporting fixtures. And it certainly does not imply that they should try to settle the Kashmir issue by means other than purely political and peaceable ones. But they should try harder. And more selflessly.

A highly dramatic gesture could add a great deal of momentum to the incipient peace process. Musharraf said last week that Pakistan would be willing to give up its nuclear weapons, provided India were to do the same. It would be both wise and courageous of Vajpayee to take him up on that. A more effective confidence-building measure is hard to imagine. Apart from liberating South Asia from the oppressive shadow of the mushroom cloud, it would set an excellent example for the rest of the world. Washington won’t take the hint, of course. But it won’t be displeased either. What more could Musharraf and Vajpayee ask for?

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