Since Israel attacked Iran in June, the opinion sections of the United States’ two biggest newspapers have been carrying water for Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu in their efforts to overthrow Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Of the 105 opinion articles and letters to the editor published in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal since Israel’s first attack on June 13 to July 22, more than one-third (41) promoted regime change either implicitly or explicitly, while less than 10 percent (10) opposed the idea of regime change.

Regime change is problematic because it is, well, dangerous—it increases the likelihood of civil war, violent leader removal and humanitarian catastrophes. In the Middle East, those issues are amplified—underscored by the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-backed toppling of Muammar Gaddafi Libya in 2011, and most recently, the Bashar Al-Assad-led government collapsed in December 2024 during an offensive by rebel forces, supported by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.

While the Ayatollah’s government certainly has a poor human rights record, regime change in Iran could lead to similar disastrous outcomes, and therefore, should not be supported.

I conducted this analysis by searching articles including “Iran” in the newspaper websites’ search bars and analyzing articles labeled under “opinion” or “letters” (excluding news coverage, news analysis, debates, Q&As and podcasts).

Explicit pro-regime change arguments were marked as such when they supported, in some cases, a “new, free Iran,” “the emergence of a better government,” “change of government,” “popular uprising” and “coup,” “an orderly succession,” “replacing the jihadist theocracy,” “overthrowing,” “end to the regime,” “toppling of the Iranian regime,” a “permanent” occupation of Iran, or called it “likely” the “86-year-old ayatollah is either killed or sidelined,” or “after Mr. Khamenei’s regime is on the ash heap of history…” Implicit pro-regime arguments were marked as such if they alluded to the possibility of, or lent support for, regime change, such as Iran’s “nuclear weapons program” or its support of “terrorist proxies.”

Of the 37 articles the Times published about Iran, 10 explicitly supported regime change in Iran, while six implicitly supported it (43.2%). Only five opposed regime change implicitly or explicitly, while 16 took no position.

Of the 68 articles the Journal published about Iran, 13 explicitly supported regime change in Iran, while 12 implicitly supported it (36.7%). Only five opposed regime change implicitly or explicitly, while 38 took no position.

Many of the explicit pro-regime change arguments in the Times and Journal used Iran’s ‘nuclear weapons program’ and support of ‘terrorist networks’—including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis—as driving factors to support regime change in Iran.

Perhaps the most blatant example of the ‘nuclear’ and ‘terrorist’ argument was made by John Bolton, Trump’s former National Security Advisor, who wrote two articles in total for the Journal and the Times.

On June 15, Bolton wrote for the Journal that “America’s declared objective” should be “overthrowing the Ayatollahs,” citing the possibility that Iran “could rebuild its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs and terrorist networks.” On July 3, for the Times, Bolton wrote, “Washington should support” a change of government in Tehran, which requires a “real performance in denuclearizing” Iran.

It’s no surprise Bolton is calling for foreign-imposed regime change in Iran. His “long-held goal” of regime change in Iran—in addition to his lobbying to airstrike Iran in retaliation for the downing of an American surveillance drone—is, in part, what caused Trump to fire him from the National Security Advisor role, which he served in from 2016 through 2018. Bolton was also “instrumental” in the U.S. withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. Signed in 2015, the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—froze Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Bolton was not the only former U.S. government official who has called for regime change in Iran, citing the country’s alleged nuclear weapons program and support for terrorist proxies.

On June 16, Seth Cropsey—former Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush—wrote for the Journal that “crippling the nuclear program” and “damaging security infrastructure” in Iran, “would create room for unrest and fragmentation within the Iranian security state, making revolution possible.” On July 8, in an article for the Journal headlined, ‘The Perfect Time for Regime Change in Iran,’ Cropsey called for the U.S. to “decapitate” and “eliminate” the “regime led by Ali Khamenei” and to “target Mr. Khamenei” by “removing the supreme leader.”

“If unimpeded, Iran’s jihadist rulers will rebuild their nuclear program,” Cropsey wrote, adding that “the U.S. should press its advantage and work openly with Israel and the Gulf states to undermine the regime.”

“The Iranian threat to America, however, is broader,” added Cropsey. “Iran’s support for its terrorist proxies endangers regional stability and U.S. lives.”

What Bolton and Cropsey’s pieces—and most other pieces I analyzed—neglect to mention is that Iran halted its nuclear weapon program in 2003, according to U.S. intelligence agencies. Iran also proposed a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East in 1974—which it has continued to press for in recent years—and which Israel has regularly opposed. But, even if Iran does have a nuclear weapon, it may have one as a “deterrent strategy” against other countries with one, as Noam Chomsky has written.

Meanwhile, Israel has 90 to 300 nuclear bombs or more, is not a signatory to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite U.N. resolutions, and refuses to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Additionally, Israel signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but likely broke it by testing a nuclear weapon in South Africa in 1979.

As for the argument that Iran supports terrorists, “terrorist” designations are selectively applied by the U.S. to people who are against the country, while America-perpetrated violence is labeled “counterinsurgency” or “counterterror,” Chomsky has also written.

Although some commentators oppose U.S. and/or Israeli-backed regime change in Iran, they don’t necessarily oppose—and sometimes support—an Iranian-backed coup.

In all three opinion pieces the Times’ Nicholas Kristof has penned since June 13, he has referred to his “reporting trips,” “travels,” and “visits” to Iran, and his perception that the “Iranian regime” is “deeply unpopular,” and “unpopular.” To describe Iran’s government, Kristof used the exact phrasing, “corruption, hypocrisy and economic incompetence” twice and “corruption, hypocrisy and economic mismanagement” once.

Some opinion writers seem to allude to a GAMAAN Institute poll that said, in response to the question “Islamic Republic: Yes or No?” 81% of respondents inside the country responded “No” to the Islamic Republic.” The GAMAAN Institute has been called “ideological” and “not scientific” by a political science expert and has ties to U.S. government-funded, pro-regime change organizations, as reported by Noir News. Along with credibility, polling numbers are also contested. In a June 27 podcast with Counterspin, media analyst Adam Johnson said, “all other polls show that the number of Iranians who want regime change is probably closer to 40 or 50” percent.

Kristof also seems to have a fundamental misunderstanding of what sparks change in Iran: In a June 26 article, he writes, “the government’s brutal and misogynistic suppression of the Women, Life, Freedom uprising appeared to compound the anger” toward Iran’s government—without addressing the fact that supporters of the Women, Life, Freedom movement seem largely opposed to Israeli and U.S. attacks and foreign-imposed regime change.

The Journal, meanwhile, published a letter on June 24 written by the Shah’s eldest son, Reza Pahlavi, who has lived in exile from Iran in Washington D.C. since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, headlined, ‘The Islamic Republic has taken Iran hostage.’ 

“The regime survives through repression and distractions from abroad, not through any sincere base of support,” wrote Pahlavi, concluding that “after Mr. Khamenei’s regime is on the ash heap of history, the U.S. and the international community will find no better friend in peace and prosperity.”

What Pahlavi failed to mention was that his family’s dynasty also “lost the support of every sector of Iranian society” leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Among many reasons the Shah lost support among many Iranians was its own form of repression: SAVAK, its secret police force, which “tortured and murdered thousands of the Shah’s opponents,” according to a 1979 TIME article.

Multiple opinion pieces suggested economic sanctions be levied in efforts to ultimately change Iran’s regime.

One such piece was written by Karen Kramer, the deputy director at the Center for Human Rights in Iran, for the Times. Kramer wrote, “The casualty of the Islamic republic’s unchecked aggression will be Iranian civil society, which is deeply at odds with the regime’s domestic and foreign policies and, if supported, could one day form the foundation of a new, free Iran.”

Kramer argued that the U.S. should take the “lead role,” while the “broader international community, especially other democratic governments,” should “strengthen sanctions targeting human rights violators, coordinate diplomatic isolation, apply pressure at the United Nations and use public accountability measures that include prosecution of responsible officials in national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction.”

The effects of sanctions, however, can be devastating for a country’s citizens. Iran, in particular, has been under some form of U.S. sanctions since the 1979 Iranian revolution, which “have destroyed the Iranian currency, throwing many Iranians into poverty and severely impairing access to food, housing, and water,” according to research on the health effects of sanctions.

Although it’s possible to prosecute responsible officials in national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction, Kramer neglected to mention that the U.S. and Israel are not members of the International Criminal Court.

Then there is the question of Kramer’s employer, the “Center for Human Rights in Iran,” which is not based in Iran, but New York, and is funded by the National Endowment Democracy (NED). The NED “was established by and is almost exclusively funded by the U.S. government”—details the Times did not disclose, as reported by DropSite.

After the U.S. removes the Ayatollah, “European powers” should place sanctions on Iran, Cropsey wrote in the July 8 Journal piece mentioned above. Cropsey concedes that removing the supreme leader “would set off a power struggle inside Iran,” and be “unlikely” to lead to a “representative government,” but instead a “military-led regime.” Then, the U.S. “should work with” Israel and Turkey to “create a policy for a post-Khamenei Iran that could offer incentives for Tehran’s good behavior.”

While Iran’s current government certainly has various major issues, the governments that would be overthrowing it are problematic in their own right. Israel is committing an assault on Gaza that numerous human rights groups, U.N. experts, and genocide scholars deem a “genocide”—which the U.S. is helping finance, along with U.S. tech giants. This fact is simply not considered by the Times and Journal when the outlets call for regime change in Iran.

Unlike news coverage, opinion journalism empowers writers to speak their minds. But it doesn’t excuse Times and Journal writers from failing to cite facts and providing context to support their opinions. In this case, we should see more opinion journalism from the United States’ biggest newspapers that addresses the double-standard between Israel and Iran regarding nuclear weapons, gaps in what we know about the Iranian people’s support for the Iranian government and the likely human costs of increased economic sanctions, and regime change, on Iran.

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