In several European countries, parliamentary and presidential elections have become the scene of a historic contest between right-wing and left-wing forces. In Germany, state elections are underway, and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has surpassed all progressive parties in one of the states. In Sweden, the parliamentary election on September 13 is taking place with the Social Democrats and other center-left parties facing a right-wing government, and the main issue is not simply a change of government. The Sweden Democrats, the far-right party that has supported the government since 2022, are now demanding formal participation in government. In recent polls, the gap between the two camps has been narrow.

The contest is even hotter in France. The 2027 presidential election could also affect the prospects of the left in other European countries. It is no coincidence that left-wing forces across Europe are closely following the French election campaign and the ups and downs in polling for different forces, while the media are discussing various scenarios, from the danger of France’s leadership falling into the hands of the right to the left’s ability to change the current direction in Europe.

The struggle between the left and right in France has taken a different form. The far right remains at the top of the polls for the 2027 presidential election, but the left has also entered the campaign with renewed strength. The French Communist Party has nominated Fabien Roussel, Jean-Luc Mélenchon has once again become one of the main candidates, Raphaël Glucksmann is preparing for the presidency on the center-left, and the Greens and other left-wing currents are also organizing their own course. As a result, the issue is not simply whether this or that individual can reach the second round of the election. The debate is about how the French left can once again become an organizing, mobilizing and decisive political force at a time when the far right has become a dominant force.

This issue is also important for Europe. France is one of the largest countries in the European Union, a nuclear power and one of the Union’s two main pillars. If the French left can come to power in the 2027 presidential election, its impact will extend beyond France’s borders. Such a victory could change the debate over economic policy, public investment, social services, the environment, foreign policy and the fiscal rules of the European Union. For this reason, the ongoing struggle in France has become a point of hope for sections of the European left.

The Right’s Advance, the Left’s Return to the Electoral Contest

France has witnessed the erosion of traditional parties and declining confidence in the political system in recent years. Emmanuel Macron came to power in 2017 with a promise to move beyond the old divide between right and left. But his presidency gradually turned into a centrist, business-friendly policy close to sections of Europe’s center-right. The end of his presidency has also left open the question of which force can fill the political vacuum that has emerged.

On the right, the National Rally, led by Marine Le Pen, is leading the polls. On the left, the situation is more complicated. The left has no single candidate, and differences among its currents over the program, relations with Europe, economic policy and the form of an electoral alliance continue. Nevertheless, contrary to the image sometimes presented of the French left as a fragmented force without a perspective, several social and economic issues from the left’s program have moved to the center of the political struggle.

Wages are one of them. In a recent debate among candidates before representatives of employers, Mélenchon’s proposal to increase the minimum wage was met with reactions and even laughter from some of those present. But the debate did not end there. Purchasing power is now one of the main issues in the election. Inflation and economic stagnation have increased pressure on wages, and a large proportion of workers have incomes that fall short of the cost of living. According to data cited by Le Monde, half of full-time private-sector employees earn less than €2,190 net per month, while one-tenth earn less than €1,492.

This issue is also connected to one of the important differences between the right, center and left in French economic policy. Some candidates see reducing employers’ or employees’ social contributions as a way of increasing net income. Critics argue that such a policy could reduce the financial resources of the social security system. Trade unions and some left-wing forces, by contrast, call for direct wage increases and emphasize the responsibility of companies to pay higher wages.

The debate over wages, therefore, is not simply one of the promises made during an election campaign. It concerns the relationship between labor, profit, social services and the role of the state, and for this reason it has gained an important place in the political struggle of the left.

Mélenchon Is a Sign of Change, Not the Whole of It

Mélenchon’s return to the center of the electoral contest is one of the most important developments of recent months. He has been a candidate in the previous three presidential elections and received 22 percent of the vote in the first round in 2022. Polls now show that he could reach the second round again. In some scenarios, his support is estimated at around 16 to 17 percent, putting him in competition with moderate candidates for second place.

There are several reasons for this growth. La France Insoumise has an established electoral organization, and Mélenchon has a significant base among young people and sections of the urban suburbs. In recent years, he has also taken clear positions on the distribution of wealth, wage increases, public services, the environment and foreign policy.

But Mélenchon’s importance lies not only in the number of votes he can win. He is one of the few European politicians who has tried to directly connect dissatisfaction with existing policies to a different political program. He advocates higher taxes on wealth, public investment, environmental planning and broad changes to France’s political structure. In foreign policy, he has also spoken in favor of France leaving NATO, non-alignment, and greater emphasis on diplomacy and international law.

These positions have made him an important figure for one section of the French left and an obstacle to left-wing unity for another. The electoral issue is also clear: Mélenchon may be able to outpoll many of his left-wing rivals in the first round, but current polls show that he would lose by a wide margin to Le Pen in the second round. In one of the scenarios examined, Le Pen and Mélenchon’s shares of the vote were 68 to 32 percent.

The divide facing the left is not limited to differences among the various forces of the left. Whenever the center of the Republican camp has faced the far right, it has reduced the left’s role to supporting itself, without being willing in return to support the left or to give up its own claim to the presidency and governing the country in favor of a broader agreement. The left, too, cannot narrow the gap with this section of society by lowering its demands. The challenge for the left is to bring more people into the political arena without retreating from its program and demands, and to broaden its social and electoral base of support.

From this perspective, the problem for the left is not simply who can reach the second round. A candidate who has the greatest chance of reaching the second round is not necessarily the one who can win the largest number of votes in that round. The left must be able to bring more forces with it while maintaining its program, and become a force that others are also compelled to take into account in confronting the far right.

At the same time, reducing the French left to Mélenchon’s popularity or lack of popularity gives an incomplete picture of the country’s political situation. His growth is part of a broader change in which economic and social issues have once again gained a greater place in politics.

The French Communist Party and the Return of the Class Question

Fabien Roussel’s candidacy from the French Communist Party is another example of this trend. In the party’s recent internal referendum, members supported his candidacy with 72.06 percent of the vote. Roussel and party leaders say their aim is to bring class issues, employment, industry and public services back to the center of the electoral struggle.

In its program, the Communist Party emphasizes retirement at the age of 60, reindustrialization and the expansion of public services. Roussel also wants to make his campaign different from the 2022 campaign and says his aim is not to confront other left-wing candidates.

This decision reflects an important disagreement within the French left. Some Communist Party members have called for joining a unified process to select a left-wing candidate, and some have even supported Mélenchon. But the party leadership has chosen the path of an independent candidacy.

At the same time, Roussel and his campaign director emphasize that presidential candidates should not stand in the way of forming a broad alliance for the parliamentary elections. They want any possible future alliance to have deeper roots in local communities than previous alliances.

This point is important because the current disagreements on the left do not concern only the presidential election. After the presidential election, France’s political structure could once again turn toward parliamentary elections and the question of forming a majority in the National Assembly. From this perspective, each of the left-wing currents must also decide how to balance an independent candidacy with the possibility of cooperation after the election.

Another Path on the Left

Raphaël Glucksmann, representing the center-left and social-democratic current, represents another path. He advocates a pro-European left close to green policies and draws a clear line between himself and Mélenchon and La France Insoumise. Glucksmann supports increasing taxes on large inheritances and an ecological transition, and wants to link reducing carbon emissions with reindustrialization and job creation. He emphasizes forming a broad center-left with the participation of the Socialists and Greens, but is unwilling to form an alliance with Mélenchon to achieve this goal.

Glucksmann has explicitly said that he will not form an alliance with Mélenchon and that, if elected, he will seek cooperation with the Greens and Communists. This position shows that the disagreements among the left-wing currents are not merely personal differences. They also disagree over Europe, foreign policy, the economy and the form of their relations with other parties.

The Greens have also not yet made a final decision regarding their relationship with the other left-wing currents. Some members of the party leadership favor closer cooperation with Glucksmann and the Socialists, while others support talks with La France Insoumise. Some of the left-wing parties are expected to take part in a joint primary election in October, but Mélenchon, the Communist Party and Glucksmann will not participate in this joint process.

Thus, the French left is moving along several paths. One relies on Mélenchon’s electoral strength, another on rebuilding a social-democratic and pro-European left, while another emphasizes class politics and organization around labor, industry and public services. There are common points among these paths, but a shared political program has not yet emerged.

Issues That Bring the Left Closer Together

Despite these differences, the distance between the left-wing currents is not the same on every issue. Increasing taxes on wealth and large inheritances is one area where several currents have taken relatively similar positions. Mélenchon, Glucksmann and the Greens have each raised, through different proposals, the issue of transferring wealth from wealthy generations to the generations that follow.

The environment has also become another common issue, although approaches to it differ. Mélenchon speaks of an “ecological state” and a profound change in the way production and consumption are organized. Glucksmann links the ecological transition with industrialization and employment. The Greens, for their part, emphasize adapting to climate change and reducing carbon emissions.

Public services, wage increases and combating inequality are also present in the programs of different sections of the left. The greater differences concern the scale and form of state intervention, how it should be financed, and the relationship between such policies and the rules of the European Union.

This is where one of the most important issues facing the French left in the future emerges. If a left-wing force comes to power in France, it will face a set of European rules and financial constraints. This reality lies directly ahead of the left and is not an abstract theoretical debate.

France and the Boundaries of European Economic Policy

Mélenchon recently proposed cancelling around 18 percent of France’s public debt, namely the portion held by the Bank of France, so that the government would have greater fiscal space for social spending. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, has described the proposal as financially dangerous and contrary to European Union regulations. According to a Reuters report, France’s public debt has now reached around 116 percent of GDP.

Lagarde referred to Article 123 of the Treaty on European Union, which prohibits the direct financing of governments by central banks. As a result, this disagreement could become a clear example of a left-wing economic program coming into conflict with the EU’s fiscal rules.

This proposal, of course, is not the position of all currents of the French left and should not be attributed to the left as a whole. Its significance lies elsewhere. If a left-wing government in France wants to increase public spending, invest in industry, expand public services and implement a broad redistributive policy, the question of financial resources and European rules will quickly become a political issue.

France differs from Greece in 2015 in this respect. Greece had limited power in relation to the European institutions, and the Syriza government was forced to retreat in the face of pressure from the European Union and financial markets. France is the European Union’s second-largest economy and a nuclear power, and its political role within the Union cannot be compared with that of Greece.

For this reason, a victory by a left-wing force in France could open a debate that goes beyond the country’s borders: How far can the EU’s fiscal rules be changed? How much public investment is possible? Can industrial policy have a greater role in Europe? How should the relationship between debt reduction, social spending and economic growth be defined? To what extent are wage increases and the expansion of public services compatible with the existing economic rules? How will capitalists respond?

These are issues that are no longer limited to Mélenchon and France.

France in the European Perspective

The importance of France becomes clearer when it is considered alongside other developments in Europe. In Germany, the recent electoral victory of the Alternative for Germany in Saxony-Anhalt, with nearly 44 percent of the vote, has caused a wave of concern in France. French politicians from different political currents have warned about the strengthening of the far right in Europe.

In Sweden, elections are also taking place this week under conditions in which the Sweden Democrats, the country’s far-right party, after four years of supporting a right-wing government, now want to enter the government. The Social Democrats and their allied parties are seeking to return to power and are emphasizing social welfare, reducing inequality and climate policy.

Of course, France and Sweden cannot be placed within a single political framework. In Sweden, the main contest is between the Social Democrats and the right-wing bloc, and the Swedish Left Party is one of the members of the center-left camp. In France, several left-wing currents are preparing separately for the presidential election, and the boundary between the radical left, social democracy and the Green movement remains a subject of contention.

Nevertheless, a common issue can be seen in many European countries: the far right has managed to turn part of the discontent caused by economic insecurity, weak public services, immigration and distrust of traditional parties into an electoral base. The challenge for the left is to turn its own social and economic responses to these same grievances into a social force within society and to organize, along class lines, part of the social force that the far right has mobilized with populist slogans.

France is particularly important in this respect because the left remains a major electoral force there and has been able to turn part of the social discontent into organized politics. If this force can move beyond protest and competition among candidates and win a majority, its experience will also be important for other European countries.

An Opportunity, Not a Guarantee

The renewed growth of the French left does not mean that it will win in 2027. The National Rally remains at the top of the polls, and even if a left-wing candidate can reach the second round, the question of winning a majority of the vote will only then begin. The divisions among the left-wing currents also remain serious.

But the situation today is different from what it was a few months ago. Mélenchon has reached the range of the second round in several electoral scenarios. The Communist Party has begun its campaign. Glucksmann, representing the center-left and social-democratic current, is seeking to establish an independent base in the center-left. The Greens are debating how to cooperate with other currents, and issues such as wages, public services, wealth, industry and climate change have once again moved to the center of electoral debates.

From this perspective, the importance of the current struggle in France cannot be reduced to Mélenchon. He is one of the most important figures in this struggle, but the issue is broader: Can the left turn the existing discontent in society into political power? Can it offer a program on employment, wages, public services, the environment and inequality that is acceptable to a majority? And can its different currents, despite serious disagreements, remain capable of cooperation after the election?

France’s experience is important for the European left for this reason. At a time when the far right has grown in many countries, a victory by a left-wing force in a major European country could show that social discontent does not necessarily move toward nationalism and the far right. Such a victory could also create new space for debate about European economic policy, public investment, the welfare state and the environment.

But no election can create this change on its own. Even a left-wing government in France would face resistance from opposition parties, financial markets, European institutions and powerful economic interests. What is won in the election must be transformed into social and political organization if it is to withstand these pressures.

For this reason, the 2027 French election is not merely a struggle to seize the Élysée Palace and put a left-wing figure in the presidential office. It can be a test of what answer the left has to Europe’s economic and social crisis at a time when the far right has gained strength, and how it intends to mobilize its social force to put that answer into practice. Whatever the outcome, the struggle now taking place in France is one of the most important arenas of this test.

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