Gerson
President Bush’s "Star
Wars" speech reminded me of a conversation I had late in the
Clinton era with Ezra Vogel, who served headed the State Department’s Asia
intelligence during the first Clinton Administration. He had returned to
Harvard, but was deeply engaged in a wide range of trans-Pacific security
negotiations. Responding to a question about his goal for meetings to explore
creation of a U.S.-Chinese-Japanese security framework, he said he sought a
"grand bargain" with China. How? By threatening deployment of Theater Missile
Defenses (TMD) which could theoretically neutralize all China’s missiles. As the
threat became credible, China would be offered a deal: The U.S. would call off
TMD deployments if China would agree not to adopt a more aggressive military
doctrine and not to deploy weapons that increased its aggressive capabilities.
That this would leave the
nuclear-capable U.S. 7th Fleet, hundreds of U.S. forward deployed military bases
and installations, and 100,000 G.I.s and their weapons still surrounding China
concerned him not at all.
Many "interests" are
served by the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld Star Wars program, but with their strategic
focus concentrating increasingly on Asia, the fantasy of restoring power
relations similar to that following the Opium War is high on the list. By
military means and otherwise, Washington aims to integrate China into a
U.S.-Japanese dominated system on Washington’s – not China’s – terms.
Shortly after this
conversation took place, I traveled to China where Chinese strategic analysts
were fixated on the dangers of threatened U.S. T.M.D. deployments. As the
Chinese government has done many times since, they repeated that having "stood
up" after a century and a half of Western domination, they would not tolerate
such intimidation. They know that the U.S. is closer to developing TMD
technologies than the more ambitions "National" missile defenses (NMD). And,
they were unmistakably clear that if TMD are deployed, China will produce as
many missiles as needed to overwhelm them. Apparently the Bush Administration
doesn’t care. Secretary Rumsfeld has fused the technologically more feasible
concept of TMD with the NMD pipe dream, and the Administration is pushing full
steam ahead.
Major U.S. policies –
including war – are usually driven by a coalition of interests. This is
certainly the case with so-called missile defenses. Bush’s Star Wars speech was
short on details but long in terms of the interests and ambitions represented.
First and foremost, it sought to remove their major diplomatic obstacle: the
1972 A.B.M. Treaty, which precludes missile defenses and is the foundation of
the world’s nuclear arms control agreements.
Toward what end? First is
the political agenda – reinforcing the Bush Administration’s right-wing
political base by promising protection against the inflated specter of Saddam
Hussein, and simultaneously seeking to isolate Star Wars opponents as soft on
defense. Of course, Richard Butler, who headed the U.N.’s special commission to
disarm Iraq, is clear that an Iraqi nuclear threat is a "remote" danger. Star
Wars has been a political project since Reaganites invented it to marginalize
the 1980s Nuclear Weapons Freeze movement. The Freeze movement prevailed, but
Republicans and too many Democrats learned that Star Wars is good politics. Even
if the technology doesn’t work, false promises of security through missile
shields win election votes. Thus the Clinton-era debate was not about whether to
fund Star Wars research, but at what level. Democrats, for the most part, feared
making themselves politically vulnerable.
Someone, of course,
profits when Washington flushes tax payer dollars down the drain. "Free
enterprise" is good in theory, but there is a long history of Pentagon budgets
being used to subsidize covert national industrial policies. Remember the
supercomputer race? Also recall that throughout the 1990s the high tech industry
was one of Bill Clinton’s most important political bases.
The "military" part of the
military-industrial-complex must also be mollified and nourished. Bush’s vision
of land, air, sea and space-based "missile defense" platforms neatly skirts the
Pentagon’s internal turf wars by gorging all its competing empires.
Yet, the most intriguing
aspect of Bush’s speech was the olive branch proffered to Russia – not China. If
Russia will modify the ABM treaty, there are hints that some of its industries
and scientists can be integrated into the U.S.-dominated system, and its
military can dream of staying in the game. So what if that isolates China.
That’s the point. Recently Russia and China have established a weak "strategic
partnership" in response to Washington’s increasingly aggressive unilateralism.
But, with both nations dependent on, and anxious for, U.S. and Japanese
technologies and investments, the faux alliance is tenuous at best. Washington
is making Moscow an offer.
Which returns us to
extorting the "grand bargain" from China. In 1972, Richard Nixon split the
Sino-Soviet alliance, opening the way to play one against the other. The Bush
Administration appears to be tempted to try it again, this time using Moscow to
reinforce post-Cold War containment of China. This is a dangerous game. The spy
plane confrontation should have taught us the perils of arrogant disregard for
Chinese history, politics, and power.
The Cold War ended through
popular demonstrations and Realpolitik understanding that "common security" is
real security. In this regard, there is a true grand bargain to be honored: the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits the U.S. and other nuclear
powers to eliminate all their nuclear weapons. It. trumps a costly and dangerous
arms race with a nation that is the world’s oldest continuous civilization.
Dr. Joseph Gerson is
Director of Programs of the American Friends Service Committee in New England
and the author of With Hiroshima Eyes: Atomic War, Nuclear Extortion and Moral
Imagination.