On Russia’s state television channels, there was hysteria. Astonished viewers, plunged into a cold war atmosphere, learned that neighbouring Ukraine was experiencing a coup d’état planned by foreign spy services. The enemies were so cunning that they had organized violations of the electoral regulations, provoking demonstrations by the opposition. The aim of all this was to bring the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power instead of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich. If we were to ‘lose’Ukraine, Russia would never again be a great power, the commentators all concluded.
Duranti l'elezzioni, l'osservatori russi ùn pudianu falla di nutà un gran numaru di violazioni, ma anu datu l'impressione chì li vedenu solu in u punente di l'Ucraina, induve l'elezzioni sò presumibilmente rigged in favore di Yushchenko. In realtà, l'Ucraina à u cuntrariu di a Russia ùn hè micca una federazione ma un statu unitario, in quale l'amministrazioni lucali sò sottumessi à u presidente. Prima di a seconda volta di u votu, u presidente Kuchma avia rimpiazzatu i capi di l'amministrazioni in e pruvince induve l'uppusizione vinceva. À un gradu significativu, i viulazioni cusì favurevanu l'autorità micca solu in u livante, ma ancu in u punente.
Of course, it does not follow from this that the opposition was entirely blameless. Quite the reverse; in the second round the opposition bloc clearly sought to match the government’s fraud with its own ‘counterfraud’, using the same detached coupons and multiple voting. Compared to the officials of the presidential administration, however, the opposition had incomparably fewer opportunities for administrative trickery. Moreover, the tactic of ‘counterfraud’ spurred the authorities to make still more efforts to ensure the result they wanted, to the point where the whole procedure became farcical.
The Ukrainian elections were no longer like those in Russia, but like somewhere in Nigeria, featuring violence, the exclusion of observers, and control by clan chieftains over the actions of voters on ‘their’territory. Yanukovich finally gained the number of votes he needed, but his victory was Pyrrhic. Not only did the opposition take to the streets, but it had obvious moral and political grounds for refusing to accept the election results.
Ordinary Russians have followed these events far more cynically, not paying much attention to the propaganda, but gradually being drawn into observing their neighbours. From Moscow, the elections in Ukraine seem like an entertaining reality show, with millions of participants and an unprecedented fund of prizes. Despite the propaganda hysteria (and perhaps because of it), the opposition has aroused growing sympathy.
E tesi nantu à a lotta di l'uppusizione pro-americana contr'à una elite pulitica pro-Mosca ùn resistenu micca à u scrutiniu, nè l'affirmazioni sempre ripetute annantu à un scontru trà l'Occidenti ucrainu è l'Oriente russofonu. Yushchenko hè senza dubbitu un puliticu pro-americanu. Ma u listessu pò esse dettu di l'attuale dirigenti di a republica ucraina. Era l'attuale presidente Leonid Kuchma chì, inseme cù u Primu Ministru Viktor Yanukovich, hà mandatu e forze ucraine in Iraq. I stessi dui dirigenti mettenu in scena a crisa assurda in e relazioni russo-ucraina nantu à una diga à fiancu à a minuscula isula di Tuzla. Intantu, una quantità di pulitichi di l'uppusizione criticavanu l'inviu di truppe, cum'è i cumunisti, chì anu ricusatu di sustene ogni parte in u cunflittu attuale.
Same day as Ukrainian Supreme Court voted to cancel the results of the second ballot in presidential election, Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovnaya Rada) voted to pull troops out of Iraq. This was a major defeat of US policy in Ukraine, which became possible only because of a political crisis in this country. All earlier attempts to achieve parliamentary majority against intervention failed. This time majority was achieved because Communists and Socialists were joined by many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina'(Yushenko party) but also by some defectors from the pro-government camp. At the same time many deputies from ‘Nasha Ukraina’as well as Yanukovich supporters voted against the proposal or abstained.
American financial support for Yushenko is quite visible. However one can easily discover that most sponsors who contributed to his campaign also contributed generously to Kerry’s campaign (Soros, National Democratic Institute etc.). Republican funding for Yushenko was almost symbolic. There was also a lot of Western European and especially German money. But ironically, some of the biggest contributions came from Russia ‘ notably from those business groups who were not satisfied by privatization deals offered by Yanukovich and expected to rerun the process. These expectations were not unjustified.
Soon after electoral rerun was announced Yushenko promised to cancel some privatization deals fixed by the previous regime. Don’t expect anything to be returned to the public. Yushenko plans a big process, Yukos style, in which some politically incorrect oligarchs will go to jail and their property will be reprivatized.
Cum'è falsi sò i tentativi di sparte a sucetà ucraina nantu à e linee linguistiche. Kiev, a capitale, hè una roccaforte di l'uppusizione, ancu s'è a lingua chì si sente soprattuttu in i carrughji ci hè u russu. E manifestazioni di massa anu fattu in Kharkov, cunsideratu cum'è u centru di a cultura russa in Ucraina. L'azzioni in supportu di l'autorità chì sò stati urganizati in Donetsk è in altre cità industriali eranu reminiscenti di manifestazioni di l'era suviètica, à quale a ghjente era guidata cù bastoni. Quelli chì anu parlatu eranu soprattuttu dirigenti sindacali è funziunarii amministrativi, mentre chì i travagliadori anu pigliatu a prima chance per andà in casa. Malgradu l'affirmazioni chì migghiara di minatori seranu purtati à Kiev per fà a battaglia cù l'uppusizione, l'autorità anu sappiutu di mette in mostra solu una pochi decine di gangsters di Donetsk in caschi di minatori malati, cù un gruppu di cosacchi di fantasia.
With the help of Soviet-style methods, the ruling oligarchy is still able to control the industrial zones of the east, but it is incapable of mobilising mass popular support. Moreover, it is afraid of real demonstrations by the miners. If large numbers of miners were to take to the streets, this would amount to the very strike for which the opposition has been calling. Also, there are no guarantees that the bosses and bureaucrats around Yanukovich would be able to keep workers under their control.
Meno di tutti i dirigenti russi ponu esse chjamatu anti-americani o anti-occidentali. Nisunu altru ch'è u presidente russu Vladimir Putin hà dichjaratu publicamente u so sustegnu à George Bush in l'alizzioni americane di nuvembre. In u stessu tempu chì a televisione di Mosca cundannava l'interferenza americana in Ucraina, u Ministru di a Difesa Sergey Ivanov discutia cù i ghjurnalisti a pussibilità di mandà armi in Iraq per e forze irachene cuntrullate da i Stati Uniti, è ancu di mandà esperti militari. Germania, Francia è altri paesi europei anu rifiutatu e dumande americane di stu tipu.
The logic of the Cold War might have been justified when a clash of two systems was involved. But for a good while now Russia and the West have shared the same capitalist system, and the axis of opposition in world politics has not been rivalry between NATO and the Eastern bloc (which ceased to exist fifteen years ago), but rivalry between the blocs of the Euro and the Dollar. In this contest, the Kremlin leadership is quite unable to decide where it stands. It tries clumsily to manoeuvre between Brussels and Washington, but in such a way as to bang its head first on one side, then on the other, dooming itself to a series of one-sided concessions to each of the contending groups. The Kremlin goes unrewarded for these concessions, since any shifts it makes in the direction of Berlin or Paris are immediately cancelled out by its demonstrative expressions of loyalty to Washington.
It is also unclear how Russia in 2004 might ‘lose’Ukraine. After all, our own state long ago recognised Ukrainian independence. If we are talking not of control but of Russian political, moral and cultural influence on the neighbouring republic, it would be hard to think of any worse means for achieving this than what the Kremlin has done in recent months. If someone had set out deliberately to undermine Russia’s position in Ukrainian society, he or she could scarcely have achieved more than the Kremlin administration has managed through its work with Kuchma and Yanukovich. The Kremlin has not only shocked everyone with its crude and unconcealed meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state, but more importantly, has done this so ineptly that it has finished up harming its own cause.
Most comic of all has been the way Putin, addressing journalists in Portugal, called on them not to use ‘scarecrows’from Cold War times, even though his own propagandists have been doing this. Putin’s speeches on the topic of Ukraine betray his confusion. On one occasion he will adopt an extremely aggressive tone, hinting at the evil intent of the West; then he will try to justify himself to these same Westerners, explaining that he congratulated Yanukovich not as the new president, but (and this is something absolutely new in world diplomacy) ‘on the basis of the results of the exit polls’.
L'accadimenti in a lotta pulitica in Ucraina sò enormi, ancu per u Kremlin. Ma isse scumesse ùn anu nunda à fà cù l'interessi naziunali, nè cù a lotta ormai longa trà Oriente cumunista è Occidente burghese. I clan semi-criminali chì in u cursu di a privatizazione anu pigliatu u cuntrollu micca solu nantu à l'industria in l'Ucraina orientali, ma ancu in un gradu significativu nantu à a pupulazione, anu strettu ligami cù i gruppi burocratici-oligarchichi chì tenenu a dominazione in Mosca.
These groups are united not only by business links, but also by a common fear: that sooner or later they will have to answer for the plunder of their countries’ collective wealth, for the rigging of elections, and for the suppression of political freedoms. For precisely this reason, the rise to power of the opposition in Ukraine will set an ominous example for Russia’s new elites, even if this Kiev opposition is extremely moderate, promising neither nationalisation nor a redistribution of incomes.
A capitale russa principia una espansione massiva in Ucraina. I discorsi sò cuminciati nantu à l'acquistu di cumpagnie di telecomunicazioni, di e piante metallurgiche, è ancu di birrerie. I clani di Donetsk chì si sò uniti intornu à Yanukovich anu bisognu di mantene u putere, per assicurà chì l'accordi pianificati passanu bè.
The Western political elites as well are thinking far more strategically. While Moscow commentators continually cite the ousting of the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia as an example of a secret American plan providing backing for a democratic revolution, the past also contains other instances in which democratic revolutions have received support from Washington – in the Philippines against the dictator Marcos, and in Indonesia against the decades-long rule of the armed forces. In all these cases, as in Georgia, the US supported the overthrow of a pro-American regime.
Ùn ci hè micca paradossu quì. A crisa di una elite dirigente hà un caratteru objettivu, abbastanza separatu da l'intrighi di Washington. Tuttu ciò chì a diplomazia di i Stati Uniti face hè di ponderà in modu realisticu a situazione esistente, è dopu, invece di piglià una pusizione nantu à ciò chì hè ovviamente u latu perdente, di selezziunà partenarii novi è più promettenti trà l'uppusizioni. Ciò chì hè impurtante per i Stati Uniti in tali casi hè di assicurà chì quandu a nova dirigenza vene à u putere, u cursu di a pulitica estera di u paese in quistione ferma cum'è prima. In altri palori, Washington sustene e rivoluzioni demucratiche cun un unicu scopu: chjappà li di u so putenziale radicale.
In this situation, the impotence of the Ukrainian left is especially tragic. In condemning both candidates, the Communist Party of Ukraine has taken an irreproachable position from an ideological point of view. This position, however, has not been followed by independent action; instead, the Communist Party has simply vanished from the political scene.
Many of the party’s supporters acknowledge that this situation is lamentable. Hence we read on a leading communist website: ‘The working class and its party have been unable to act as an independent political force, as an organised, conscious subject of the historical process. It has not been communists who have led the working class, but the bourgeoisie with its candidates and organisations. This is simply a fact. Meanwhile, the communists have been driven onto the sidelines of the struggle, forced into the position of onlookers, incapable of influencing the outcome in any way.'(http:///www.communist.ru/lenta/index.php?10168).
On the moral level, the authorities have already lost the struggle in Ukraine. The only way they could restore their political control would be to resort to violence on a scale tantamount to catastrophe. The agreement on new elections reached between the authorities and the opposition will, if fulfilled, merely ensure a smoother and more legitimate handover of power.
Quale chì vince, una di e vittime principali di a crisa ucraina serà Vladimir Putin. Sostenendu apertamente u regime ucrainu, investendu una grande quantità di soldi in ellu, è mandendu un esercitu tutale di cunsiglieri è tutori pulitichi, u Kremlin hà risicatu solu prublemi in ritornu. Ancu s'è Yanukovich vince, a so principale preoccupazione serà di ricustruisce e relazioni cù l'Occidenti. À a so riunione cù l'Unione Europea in l'Aia, Putin duverà pruvà à ghjustificà si, perdendu l'ultimi bricioli di a so autorità. U più impurtante, davanti à u so propiu populu, e forze armate è a pulizzia in Russia, hà tornatu dimustratu per esse un puliticu debule è incompetente. È in Russia, i debbuli ùn prevale micca.