Another emergency summit. Another deadline. Another last chance. Will Greece “make it”? Or will there be a default? Will it crash out of the single currency? Or will there be a last-minute deal to “save the day”?

Five years into the crisis, people in Greece are weary and fed-up — and understandably so. Half a decade on, nothing is as it was; yet everything is still the same. The old political establishment has been dethroned, but the creditors are still firmly in control. The Troika has been formally ousted, but the same institutions continue to slowly strangle the country to death. Meanwhile, the little bit of hope that was rekindled by Syriza’s historic victory in January is rapidly being consumed by the existential gloom of imminent defeat.

The tragedy of the Eurozone’s never-ending crisis has long since devolved into the farce of never-ending negotiations; a theater of the absurd that only the most hardened policy wonks are still able to stomach. For five months now, Greece’s creditors have been starving the country of all credit in a blatant attempt to force Europe’s first radical left government into a humiliating surrender.

Ironically, the creditors’ extreme demands are contributing to a rapid radicalization of anti-euro sentiments inside Greece, making default and Grexit increasingly likely. But whatever the outcome will be, the negotiations have already revealed a fundamental truth about the devaluation of contemporary political life in Europe. This, if anything, is politics as spectacle; a poorly acted play in which ordinary citizens have been steadily reduced to passive spectators, staring powerlessly at the latest headlines and shouting pointlessly at their television screens — condemned to a constant guessing game about the real intentions of their elected representatives.

While Syriza’s electoral victory was a clear expression of popular empowerment, it is hard to deny that there is something profoundly disempowering about the way these negotiations have been playing out — and the left itself has been walking headlong into the trap. By focusing virtually all of its attention on concluding the talks successfully, the left risks losing sight of the way in which this preoccupation with “respectable” high politics is actively contributing to the alienation of ordinary citizens from the political life and social struggles they were supposed to partake in.

For five months now, all we have been talking about is whether or not there will be a deal. But what would happen the day after? What would Syriza do if stays in the euro? What would it do if it defaults and leaves? What are Greece’s prospects for the next years, the next decade? There is life after the talks. What will it look like?

Posing the question this way reveals just how rapidly the radical horizon has shrunk in recent years. In the early days of the crisis, people were still talking about reinventing democracy, transforming finance and production, and organizing popular power from below. Today, all the left seems to talk about is the relative merit of Varoufakis’ Plan A (to end austerity while remaining in the eurozone) versus Lapavitsas’ Plan B (a “rupture” with the creditors and an exit from the eurozone).

In the cacophony of this highly dichotomized debate, few seem to notice the fact that both plans essentially share the same top-down premise: if only the government succeeds in executing its chosen program, the economic recovery will be swift and things will quickly go back to the way they were before.

This is a dangerous illusion. Grexit or no Grexit, for the majority of Greeks there will be no going back to the halcyon days of credit-fueled consumerism. Both Plan A and Plan B — however successful either may be — will still be accompanied by great hardship for ordinary people. In reality, neither Greece’s dysfunctional state nor its depressed economy will be able to adequately meet the basic needs of the country’s millions of dispossessed workers, pensioners and unemployed youth.

Of course, imposing a debt moratorium and reintroducing the drachma may restore a much-needed sense of dignity and national autonomy, making Plan B a much more progressive option than continued debt servitude under the aegis of the country’s creditors. But in the years and decades ahead even Grexit and devaluation cannot countenance the deep structural crisis of Greek capitalism.

What is needed, then, regardless of what ends up being decided at the level of high politics, is the development of a much more imaginative vision that can actually take the country beyond the deeply embedded contradictions of its collapsing economy and state apparatus. What is needed, in short, is a Plan C: the reactivation and reinvigoration of a project of the commons — a project that was unleashed with great power and creativity in the 2010-’12 cycle of struggles but that has since subsided following the demobilization of the movements and the widespread popular anticipation of a left government.

In contrast to both Plan A and Plan B, Plan C would situate itself directly on the terrain of everyday life. It would fundamentally revolve around the mobilization of self-organized workers and local communities, the consolidation of existing grassroots organizations and the construction of new organs of popular power. Plan C would operate autonomously from either Plan A or Plan B: it would be the precondition for the success of either, yet its bottom-up approach would exist in constant tension with their dominant top-down logic.

Plan C would make at least three crucial contributions to the ongoing struggle. The first would be an enhanced potential for resilience. Those who are able to cooperate and collectively organize themselves have a much greater capacity to withstand the inevitable hardships of the long years of struggle that still lie ahead. Within or without the euro, workers and communities will need to somehow reproduce themselves under conditions of extreme precarity. Existing commons like self-organized social clinics, mutual aid networks and solidarity economies will need to be strengthened and diffused to protect human well-being and further enhance popular resilience.

But resilience alone is hardly enough. Greece’s foreign creditors and the domestic oligarchs would be more than happy to “outsource” their social responsibilities to others so they can continue their savage assault on whatever is left of the country’s anemic welfare state. This brings us to the second point: the potential for resistance. Self-organized movements, workplaces and communities can — once again — become the basis of fierce grassroots opposition to further austerity and dispossession. History has shown that, without such deeply rooted organs of popular power exerting pressure from below, even left governments are easily led astray.

Finally, the third contribution takes us beyond resilience and resistance towards the potential for revolution — not necessarily in the old-fashioned sense of a storming of the Bastille, but rather in the much more meaningful sense of a fundamental transformation of social relations. By positing a potentially transformative alternative to the stale dichotomy of state and capital, a project of the commons would contest the fundamentally anti-democratic top-down logics of both. At the same time, nothing would stop commoners from strategically allying themselves with progressive forces inside the left government to defend social advances and curb the power of capital.

Whatever the outcome of the debt talks, the left cannot limit its political imagination to the question of Tsipras’ steadfastness in the Brussels backrooms. A narrow preoccupation with the negotiations will only end up reproducing the same sense of distantiation and disempowerment that EU politics was meant to induce in the first place. Deal or no deal, a long struggle still lies ahead. Only a rapid intensification of the struggle from below can save beleaguered Greece — and turn it, once again, into a proud beacon of democracy for the rest of the world.

Jerome Roos is a PhD researcher in International Political Economy at the European University Institute, and founding editor of ROAR Magazine. Follow him on Twitter at @JeromeRoos.


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Jerome Roos is a Fellow in International Political Economy at the London School of Economics, and author of Why Not Default? The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt

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