There was widespread joy amongst Australians in 2001 as East Timor became the newest independent nation in the region.  There was a ground swell of goodwill towards our neighbour, and more than a bit of self-adulation at the positive role Australia had played.

The extent of this reaction can in part be explained by the guilt, rarely acknowledged, of Australia’s’ less than helpful role in the previous 24 years of Indonesian occupation. Australia was the first country to offer recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory.  The death of five journalists covering the Indonesian invasion in 1975 at Balibo was more an irritant to the Australia-Indonesia relationship than an issue of justice for the victims.  Even today the families of the five men believe that the incident has not been investigated fully by the Australian Government.

Australia’s relationship with the former Portuguese colony has often been a troubled one. In 1989 Australia signed the Timor Gap Treaty that provided Australia with extremely favourable maritime boundaries and a sizable share of Timor Sea oil and gas.  The Santa Cruz massacres in 1991 proved to be another testing time for Australian diplomacy. The clash between outraged public opinion and continued support for the Suharto dictatorship was a challenge, but not one beyond the abilities of the Australian Government. What this did do though was to raise even further the profile of the plight of the East Timorese among the Australian public. This sharp relief between public opinion and official policy was possibly one of the greatest in modern Australian history.  The difficulties for Australia’s’ foreign policy were highlighted further with the arrival of over 1000 East Timorese asylum seekers who fled the territory post-Santa Cruz.  The government’s response was to delay processing of asylum applications, and then in a shameful and farcical episode, argue that Portugal would be the most appropriate place of asylum, as internationally, Portugal was still recognized as the colonial authority.

East Timor’s’ vote for independence and the subsequent UN monitored transition to independence, reached its culmination on May 20, 2002, when East Timor joined the club of independent nations. On the same day, the East Timorese PM, Mari Alkatiri, signed the Timor Sea Treaty to replace the previous Timor Gap Treaty. While the name changed, there was no substantial difference. This document determined the revenue sharing in the joint development zone that is located in the Bayu-Undan oil and gas field.  Australia then delayed its signing for almost a year until East Timor signed a further agreement that would allocate Australia 80% of the vastly richer Greater Sunrise field.  As the delay progressed, the project joint venture partners in Bayu-Undan made repeated public statements arguing that if the delays went beyond a certain point, the whole project would fail. This would be an insignificant loss for the Australian economy, but for East Timor, primarily dependant on foreign aid, the deal was crucial.

At the heart of the problem for East Timor lies the issue of maritime boundaries. The previous agreement between Australia and Indonesia had defined a joint exploration zone that granted Australia an extremely favourable sea-bed boundary.  The hope was that this could be continued with East Timor.  However, the East Timorese had in mind a resolution more in line with accepted international practice, which in the case of disputed maritime boundaries less than 400 miles apart, meant a median line would be drawn maybe half way between the two.  Under such an agreement, almost all the oil and gas fields would belong to East Timor and they would receive matching revenues.

Boundary negotiation was also delayed in 2002, but finally commenced on November 12, 2003. East Timor has made it clear that it believes the Timor Sea Treaty and other agreements are temporary and do not prejudice final boundary negotiations. In March 2002 Australia withdrew its recognition of the International Court Of Justice’s jurisdiction to make determinations in boundary disputes and also withdrew from the maritime boundary dispute resolution mechanism in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Australian view was explained that such disputes were best settled through direct negotiation. This is particularly true when there is a large, wealthy nation dealing with one of the smallest, and poorest in the region. This action gave some indication of what result Australia expected from an independent determination made in accordance with international law. While Australians generally ascribe to themselves the ethos of a ‘fair go’, this seems to be a clear an example of bullying, greed and narrow self-interest.

Time is on Australia’s side in the negotiations over maritime boundaries.  East Timor has requested a time line for the finalisation of these talks. Australia has thus far not agreed. As time is critical for the East Timorese, Australia understands that every delay strengthens its negotiating position. The East Timor Government may decide to agree to a generous offer, from Australia’s perspective, as soon as possible, ensuring the earliest possible payment of whatever revenues it may be granted. In the meantime, revenues will continue to flow to Australia.  Whatever policies or principles may be invoked, this is testament to the one over-riding principle that is understood by the powerful – coercion works.

‘National interest’ is the usual explanation for such morally disreputable policies.  However in this case it would seem to defy the Governments’ own recent logic.  Military intervention in the Solomon Islands and increased assistance to Papua New Guinea were made on the basis of a potential ‘arc of instability’ to Australia’s north that would open up the possibility of criminal gangs or terrorists basing themselves in these locations. With a host of small nation states in the region, Prime Minister John Howard stated that, “It is not in Australia’s interests to have failed states in our region”. (1)

Even in the narrow context of ‘national interests’, the current approach to East Timor is short-sighted and miserly, though perhaps not unexpected given the briefly reviewed history above. As the newly appointed regional “Sheriff”, according to the US President, Australia’s foreign policy can be expected to resemble a scaled down version of that practiced by the US – a  vigorous protection of economic interests, maintaining strong rhetorical commitment to human rights standards and humanitarian issues, but ignoring them in practice when they clash with higher priorities.

In light of the history up to 1999 and the self-adulation over the eventual response after 24 years of occupation, what has followed since is, perhaps, unremarkable.  The miraculous conversion theory was duly invoked – that our past deeds were a mistake and that we now march bravely into a future where we are truly committed to the rhetoric of freedom and human rights.  As one Member of Parliament noted at the time, Australia’s approach in the past had been “…quite impervious to decency or humanitarian concern…totally focused on the economic advantages…and our gains from the Timor Gap Treaty. I said then that pragmatism is really only a euphemism for allowing practical exigencies to excuse anything at all.”(2).  But now, in our enlightened state, our action “…constitutes a revolution in Australia’s foreign policy”(2).  Pragmatism of this type is a reasonable summary of successive Australian Governments’ policy on East Timor.

The current position on maritime boundaries seems starkly at odds with this proclaimed change and the recently expressed views on ‘failed states’.  Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announced that, “We will act to help ensure the stability and prosperity of our neighbourhood”(3).  Such lofty sentiment has, obviously, an alarmingly short self-life.  However, should our actions produce the outcome that we should logically expect, a ‘failed state’, there is thankfully no serious failure in policy.  Every cloud has a silver lining, which in this case is Australia’s’ new doctrine of intervention in ‘failed states’.  This presents the opportunity to ensure that such states are made to “…accept the disciplines that global trade liberalisation imposes”(4).

What this means is well-understood – increasing privitisation, economic austerity packages and a diminished public sphere.  In the part of the global trade system that Australia occupies, this presents not inconsiderable opportunities.  What the consequences may be for the people of East Timor are uncertain. One thing is clear however. Australian citizens have again the opportunity and the responsibility to act in reducing the harm of Australia’s’ foreign policy where it will, despite the “revolution”, continue to “excuse anything at all”.

References
1. John Howard, Prime Minister.  Interview on Radio 3LO – 27/6/2003.
2. Kevin Andrews, MP.  House Of Representatives, Australian Parliament – 22/9/1999.
3. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Address to National Press Club – 26/6/2003.
4. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Address to UN General Assembly – 24/9/2003.

gecko@bigpond.net.au

Michael Hodson lives in Darwin, Australia. He is involved in a local group, Darwin Refugee Action Network, focusing on public awareness of refugee issues, including the recent situation of the East Timorese asylum seekers.

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