In recent international debate around Iraq and the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, South Africa has been cited frequently as an exemplary case in nuclear disarmament.  Local media have been quick to pick up on the issue, and we have been treated to interviews with FW de Klerk, Pik Botha and others about the Apartheid state’s secretly built nuclear arsenal and its dismantling in the early 1990s.

South Africa is one of very few states to have acquired a nuclear weapons arsenal, and it is the only state to have destroyed one.  In 1993 then-President De Klerk announced that his government had dismantled its nuclear programme (which included six and a half Hiroshima-type bombs) to the satisfaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Subsequently the local Atomic Energy Corporation published an overview of the programme, and during the following two years or so a spate of interview-based articles were published revealing more details about the programme.

As has been demonstrated again in the debates around Iraq, South Africa accrued considerable moral capital as a result of this process.  In the decade since, South Africa has taken a strong leadership position in international non-proliferation diplomacy.  Now Saddam Hussein is being encouraged to follow South Africa’s example.

But how comprehensive have South Africa’s disclosures been?  The reality is that very little information on the nuclear weapons programme is in the public domain.  Neither the Apartheid government nor the post-1994 government embarked on a systematic release of information.  The disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency were never published.  Unlike in the case of the Apartheid era chemical and biological warfare programme, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chose not to place the nuclear weapons programme under scrutiny.  And the officials who worked in the programme believe that they are still bound by undertakings to secrecy.

Academics, journalists and freedom of information activists who have attempted to find out more have been blocked by an official stance informed by three assertions – firstly, all the key questions have already been answered; secondly, further disclosures would undermine South Africa’s commitment to non-proliferation; and thirdly, most if not all relevant state documentation was destroyed in any case.  Not one of these assertions stands up to close scrutiny.

A myriad key questions remain unanswered.  We cite ten in order to make the case.  Was the secret “peaceful nuclear explosive” programme of the early 1970s always intended to provide a weapons option?  When precisely did the Apartheid government decide to acquire nuclear weapons?  To what extent was the programme intended to gain a military capability, or was it solely intended as a means of gaining diplomatic leverage?  Were foreign sources of technology acquired with the collusion of foreign governments or behind their backs?  Was Armscor preparing for a new generation of missile-based warheads at the time the programme was terminated?  What was the purpose of the reopening of the Vastrap nuclear test site in 1986?  How was worker safety provided for?  What environmental damage has taken place?  To what extent did foreign pressure, and the offering of incentives, play a role in the decision to dismantle?  Was fear of a democratic (ie. a black) government possessing a nuclear arsenal a significant factor?

The non-proliferation argument clearly needs to be taken seriously.  As David Albright, international expert on nuclear weapons, has warned: “not all information should be released … South Africa is sitting on information terrorists would be drawn to.”  However, concern about proliferation is not an adequate reason for shoring up all disclosures.  Clear distinctions can be drawn between technical weapon and materials information, which is a proliferation hazard, and information which is not – for instance, providing answers to the questions cited above would not promote proliferation.  Indeed, systematic declassification of information, as the United States has discovered, can identify sensitive but insufficiently protected technical information.  Obviously, great care must be taken with the disclosure of weapons scientists’ identities and the sources of nuclear-related technologies – information potentially of use to proliferators.

What about the destruction of documents?  This is a recurring theme in late Apartheid history.  As the TRC documented thoroughly, a massive and systematic destruction of sensitive state documents took place in the period 1990-1994.  There is no doubt that nuclear weapons documentation was a part of this process.  However, there is evidence that not everything relevant to South Africa’s nuclear weapons history was destroyed.  Determined researchers have discovered traces in unlikely places and evidence of traces in likely places.  And common sense tells us that dismantling and continuing management imperatives would have ensured the retention of certain documentation.  In any case, at the very least South Africans deserve from their government a thorough account of the destruction process and an equally thorough audit of surviving documents.

For South Africa in truth to deserve its reputation as an example of nuclear disarmament, it needs to come as clean as it possibly can about the history of its weapons programme.  Many of the valuable lessons its experience holds for other countries, including Iraq, remain unshared as a result of official secrecy.  Its own citizens remain in the dark about a highly significant dimension of the country’s history.  A systematic information declassification programme, incorporating the controlled release from secrecy undertakings of Apartheid scientists and other operatives, and taking heed of non-proliferation obligations, would be a fitting expression of the country’s constitutional commitment to freedom of information.

A new page on South Africa’s Nuclear History is at http://www.wits.ac.za/saha/nuclearhistory

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