This research was conducted for the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), an independent charity working towards a fairer, greener, and more prosperous society.

What we wanted to find out

• What is the current level of opposition to Net Zero in the UK and how has this changed over time? Likewise, what are the facts on falling issue salience?
• What are some theories we can evidence on why both outright opposition and apathy may have grown?
• What is the potential for outright opposition to Net Zero to grow? What coalition could such a cause assemble and what are the divides in that coalition?
• What messages and communication strategies best rebut opposition talking points and build salience and with whom?
• What are the implications of all of this for policymaking, especially when it comes to the consumer side such as heat pumps?

What we did

On public opinion: A review of existing datasets, including long-running tracker polling. This includes:

• Ongoing tracker polling of UK public opinion by YouGov for LCEF, commissioned and run by Persuasion UK throughout 2025 up to December of that year (5 waves in total)
• Ongoing tracker polling of UK public opinion by YouGov for Climate Barometer running from October 2022 to October 2025 (8 waves in total)
• Opinion tracker polling of public opinion by Pollfish for Meliore Foundation across 24 key countries, including the UK, from January 2022 to July 2025.
• Ten half-hour qualitative interviews with people who have changed their mind on Net Zero, divided into those who are (a) newly oppositional to Net Zero and (b) those for whom it has become less salient. These were identified and recruited using Opinium’s longitudinal survey panel based on their survey answers to Net Zero related questions over time. The transcripts of these interviews are here or summaries of each are here.
• Two one hour focus groups with ‘Reform curious’ voters – those who did not vote for Reform at the 2024 general election but who are open to doing so at the next election (placing themselves >5/10 on willingness to vote scale). One of these groups was comprised of Labour 2024 voters and the other non-Labour 2024 voters.
• A fresh round of polling among 5,000 UK voters via YouGov conducted in January 2026.
• Two new message testing experiments in the format of a conjoint and RCT experiment conducted among 3,000 UK voters via YouGov.

On elite and media opinion:

• A review of ongoing tracker polling of MPs in the UK Parliament by YouGov for Climate Barometer running from October 2022 to October 2025 (8 waves in total).
• Dedicated media analysis and social listening conducted by Jack Mulholland of the Audience Insight Hub at the Meliore Foundation.
• A review of evidence collected by others, especially ECIU and Climate News Tracker.

What we found out

• There is no evidence of a mass widespread public backlash against Net Zero in the UK. Public support for the principle of Net Zero by 2050 remains strong, with large majorities in favour and outright opposition confined to a consistent minority of around a quarter of voters.
• However, there has been a real shift among political and media elites. Elite opinion has become sharply polarised since 2022, particularly on the centre-right, creating a media environment that is significantly more hostile than public sentiment and leading politicians to overestimate voter opposition.
• Elite polarisation has started to filter through to more partisan anti Labour voters. Support for Net Zero has softened among right-leaning voters, especially Conservatives, while remaining robust among Labour and Liberal Democrat voters. A small group of Reform-curious Labour voters shows some softness, but Net Zero has near-zero salience in their voting behaviour.
• Generally speaking, Net Zero is not widely blamed for high energy bills or economic problems. Most voters attribute rising bills to energy company profiteering and reliance on foreign gas. Only core Reform voters consistently link Net Zero to higher costs, and even among sceptical groups it is not a dominant explanation.
• However, policy support weakens when policies are associated with cost, hassle, or unfairness. While principle-level support remains high, backing is softer for specific consumer-facing policies such as heat pumps and petrol and diesel phase-outs, suggesting sensitivity to inconvenience rather than ideological opposition.
• Relatedly, the biggest strategic risk for climate advocates is falling climate salience, not rising hostility. Climate change has dropped sharply as a top-tier public concern since 2021, reducing the political ‘headroom’ for policies that involve trade-offs, even among otherwise supportive voters.
• Most anti-Net Zero attacks can be rebutted — except fatalism. Arguments that Net Zero is unrealistic or pointless because of other countries’ emissions are the hardest to overcome, reflecting public weariness rather than deep ideological rejection.
• Messages linking Net Zero to real-world climate impacts are the most effective at raising salience. Cost-of-living, energy bills, and national security frames can also increase sympathy, particularly among working-class and right-leaning voters, and these make sense for some elites to adopt, but they are less effective at re-energising salience. First principles messages around climate impacts remain an important tool in campaigners’ arsenal; tying those to affordability potentially offers the opportunity to square the circle between first principles and immediate transactional self-interest.

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