Aleksandar Vučić, who ruled Serbia for over a decade, has lost the parliamentary elections held in Serbia on October 25. Some other retrograde political forces that were part of the regime – the “Socialist Party of Serbia” and the “Serbian Radical Party” – will no longer be represented in the Parliament. It took Serbia more than three decades to rid itself of these political termites, who turned the state into ruins for its citizens, while, at the same time, made it into a profitable mafia structure – for themselves and their foreign partners.

What strikes many people, giving them reason to pause before celebrating the victory, is Vučić’s seemingly far too quick and easy admission of the electoral defeat. Given that he headed an unscrupulous regime steeped in crime, many wonder what lies behind it: Is this swift concession only a part of a broader plan to strike back, or, at least, to retain some levers of power? 

Following the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, which killed 16 people, a wave of protests swept across Serbia, accompanied by blockades of roads and institutions. The initial spontaneous outpouring of public dissatisfaction with years of corruption, the criminalization of society, and repression by the regime was first given a concrete goal – to establish responsibility for the canopy collapse and punish those responsible. The demand, then, was not to remove the regime but to make “the institutions function” so that they would start doing their jobs. 

It was clear, however, that the institutions could not function as they should while Vučić and his criminal regime remained in power. The idea that the protests were not about removing the government but about prosecuting those responsible for the canopy collapse and unblocking institutions was subsequently replaced by the idea that not only the regime but the entire “system” needed to be changed. What was particularly interesting was that the change of “system” was pursued through an authentically democratic principle of self-management, across society as a whole rather than only within student plenums. Thus, “citizens’ assemblies” began to be organized. Instead of relying on (corrupt and dysfunctional) political parties, a way forward was sought through direct local discussion and decision-making (modeled on student plenums at universities). Decisions made by local assemblies would then be coordinated with those of other assemblies. This would offer an alternative not only to Vučić’s autocracy, but also to partocracy and corporatocracy – the latter being particularly prevalent in “developed democracies,” that is, in undemocratic systems known as “liberal democracies.”

This opened up a path toward democratizing society through alternative models rather than the established practice of parliamentarism – which, moreover, had not worked as intended since the introduction of multiparty politics in Serbia (see also: https://znetwork.org/znetarticle/democracy-is-happening-in-serbia/). At that point, the sheer number of people protesting in the streets of Serbia (and, particularly, in Belgrade) conferred legitimacy on political action outside the institutions, allowing for the potential implementation of different models of organization and decision-making. Another source of legitimacy for such a course of action was provided by the regime itself – by intensifying repression and demonstrating its unwillingness to accept that it had lost legitimacy, thereby driving society into even greater instability. One important question at the time was how best and most effectively to harness the potential and energy generated by the protests (see: https://vreme.com/drustvo/padaj-silo-i-nepravdo-3/). The culmination of this phase of anti-regime and anti-system action was the protest held in Belgrade on March 15, 2025, attended by around 300,000 people.

Soon, however, it became clear that both Serbian society and the student movement (with its own divisions) had little appetite for more radical change. The prevailing view was that the struggle should continue within the parliamentary system and that preparations should begin for future elections. The struggle against the system was replaced by a struggle against the regime within the existing system.

This was also partly because the student plenums, as the driving force of change, had not developed alternative channels of communication with wider society. Such channels would have enabled them not only to inform the public about their work, ideas, and plans, but also to fill the public sphere with alternative content to that available in both pro-regime and anti-regime corporate media. This gave those media an opening to try to “take over” the protests, in an attempt to suggest that there was essentially no difference between the parties of the “democratic opposition” (represented in Parliament) and the student movement. The aforementioned parties pursued the same aim; they saw in the takeover of protests, or in merging with the student movement, a way out of their own state of political clinical death. 

A further difficulty was that the student plenums had not completed the process of creating a program that would thoroughly and clearly set out the goals of the struggle and the political vision they sought to realize. The problem with formulating such a program was obvious: it would need to address a range of issues, from economic policy to relations with Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Russia, China, the EU, and so on. This would inevitably cause divisions both within the movement and among the public. (Readers can find my contribution to the formulation of such a program here: https://autograf.hr/predlog-programa-progresivnih-snaga-srbije/). 

Bringing the protests within the framework of parliamentarism thus required several contradictory things. A program was needed around which a future list of candidates could unite – but formulating and publishing such a program would, in fact, undermine the movement’s cohesion and mass appeal. A list of candidates – future members of parliament – also had to be assembled, which again meant applying the principle of political representation, at odds with the proclaimed principle of direct democracy and very limited, temporary personal representation for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks.

The solution was found in effectively narrowing the goal: bringing down Aleksandar Vučić’s regime. Work on the program continued, but it has not been completed. An abbreviated version of the (unfinished) program was given to prospective MPs to sign (although it has not been officially published), and even shorter version as it seems was made available to the public just before the election silence began, on the evening of October 22.

Some called this tactic selling a “pig in a poke.” One might argue, however, that even a “pig in a poke” was, under the circumstances, preferable to Vučić’s all-too-familiar pigs already out of the bag. It remains to be seen, of course, whether certain individuals and interest groups entered the process to exploit the student movement and the extraordinary energy it generated for their own interests rather than the common good – thereby effectively privatizing what had been achieved as a major social and democratic accomplishment.

The start of the official campaign was marked not only by the predictable eruption of aggression and madness from the regime and with it associated media and intellectuals, but also by deeply disheartening appearances by individuals on the “student list” of candidates for MPs, some of whom displayed enormous professional and political incompetence, and even an inclination to endorse phrenological theories. Fortunately, because the election had the character of a referendum – “for” or “against” Vučić – this did not significantly affect support for the “student list.”

Through extraordinary effort, tireless work, and the energy of hundreds, even thousands of people, who were subjected to relentless pressure from the regime, an undeniable result was achieved. Serbia’s citizens regained hope that society could be changed for the better. Alongside the removal of the regime, another major result was the elimination from political life of the previously largely parasitic parliamentary opposition, at least in the form in which it had operated until then. The student movement thus eliminated both the government and the existing opposition. Once again, the old historical insight proved sound: society can be changed when people gather around quality ideas, organize well, and coordinate their activities. The power of free and responsible citizens was demonstrated once more.

Instead of a revolution, there was an evolution. The removal of Vučić’s regime pointed to a path that citizens of other European countries might also follow – those who are tired of the empty talk of their corrupt politicians and repressive systems, from which they receive nothing but violence, lies, and ever-declining standards of living. If they can summon the strength, citizens of many EU countries could dismantle their own undemocratic regimes, as well as Brussels’ “ivory tower” itself.

What lies ahead for Serbia is even harder than the task just accomplished: rebuilding a meaningful public sphere, creating a functioning and democratic state, establishing the rule of law, building institutions, resisting external pressures, confronting crime, preventing economic collapse… To begin with, the most important thing is to ensure that the victory achieved does not turn into a delayed defeat, as a result of ego trips or various forms of internal and external pressure, blackmail, bribery… all of which are almost certain to occur.

The carnival is coming to an end, and the duller, more complex work of institutional politics, with all its challenges, is beginning.

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