Regarding the ongoing situation on the Caribbean island, we interviewed Roberto Livi, correspondent for the newspaper Il Manifesto, who has a deep understanding of the country’s social and political dynamics, having lived there for several decades.

Can you give us a picture of the ongoing crisis?

The situation has long been dramatic, exacerbated by the lack of fuel. Electricity outages last for hours every day. Added to this are rising prices, making costs unsustainable for most of the population, the dollarisation of basic necessities, and the collapse of transportation, meaning Havana now relies on electric tricycles or bicycles.

This is a terrible picture. Many of my neighbours cook with coal or wood, and at the same time, there’s a general, unorganised political discontent, given that throughout the post-revolutionary era in Cuba there has never been a true civil society, because those so-called, like the Women’s Union and the Journalists’ Union, are actually the party’s transmission belts. Likewise, there’s a growing distrust of the state, incapable of solving people’s material problems.

There’s no organised civil society, but have there been moments of self-organisation in the working-class neighbourhoods or elsewhere?

These aren’t neighbourhood groups, but rather moments of protest, with some leaving their homes, taking to the streets, and starting to make “cacelorazos,” while others join in. In the more peripheral areas of Havana, there are genuine popular movements. But there’s no opposition capable of proposing a transitional program. So these are spontaneous outbreaks that, at best, are quelled by the intervention of party officials or “committees for the defence of the revolution” who try to convince people to hope for an improvement, or by police repression.

The situation is made even more problematic by the fact that there are essentially two opposing forces: the “contra” who are aiming to overthrow the government, and the state that resists, because it’s not true that it has failed.

You mentioned the energy issue. Dependence on oil has been a prerogative of the economic model. In recent weeks, renewables have been mentioned several times, which have gradually been chosen as an alternative in recent years. What can you tell us about this?

Regarding renewables, Díaz Canel reported that today—thanks to Chinese aid—solar energy covers about 50% of the energy required during the day. Problems arise at sunset because of a lack of batteries.

Storage, fuel for the power plants. Furthermore, the neighbourhood micro-power plants They don’t work due to the lack of diesel.

Regarding renewables, around 500 panels have already been installed in as many polyclinics and some hospitals. The same is true in areas where people in need of care live, or in isolated locations.

What are the reasons for this outcome? Are structural issues coming to a head? Has the post-Fidel era accelerated the crisis of a model that, beyond the mitigating circumstances of the historic US embargo, had chronic flaws of various kinds from the outset?

Regarding the crisis of the model, it’s clear that the bureaucratic structure hasn’t worked for some time: the country hasn’t produced, has been in recession for four years, and its per capita GDP is the lowest in Latin America. Much depends on the blockade, but there have been tragic planning errors such as the “Tarea ordenamiento,” that is, monetary unification, and excessive investment in hotels to the detriment of electricity generation, healthcare, and education.

For years, many friendly economists have been repeating that decentralisation and autonomy would be necessary, as well as encouraging greater grassroots participation. A law allowing for partnerships between the private and state sectors was recently passed.

How are the party and the government reacting? What could happen? Is a Venezuelan scenario possible?

It’s difficult to say, because, with no transparency and information from the media, the balance of power is unknown. Differences are known, and the crisis situation is highlighted by Díaz-Canel’s admission of ongoing negotiations with the US, a scenario that is changing the political landscape.

Furthermore, the ongoing negotiations appear to be under the control of Raúl’s entourage, and therefore the military. This suggests that the current leadership’s weeks, if not days, are numbered.

It is also expected that the first overtures toward the Cuban-American diaspora will begin soon.

In short, a transition period is possible, with economic openings and perhaps a new leadership linked to Raúl and the military.

However, it’s difficult to envision anything beyond an emergency phase: Cuba needs oil to survive, and the US can provide it for an interim period, but with the clear understanding that strategically, there must be a change of government. Raúl’s men can buy time.

I don’t think there will be a Venezuelan-style surrender; the two countries have different histories, but given the difficult situation, barring surprises in Iran and the US midterm elections, it will be difficult to negotiate with a straight face and defend sovereignty.

Machine translation.