Noam Chomsky

The

events of the past weeks in East Timor should elicit shame as well as horror.

The crimes could easily have been stopped. That has been true since Indonesia

invaded in December 1975, relying on U.S. arms and diplomatic support. It would

have sufficed for the U.S. and its allies to withdraw their active

participation, and to inform the Indonesian military command that the territory

must be granted the right of self-determination that has been upheld by the

United Nations and the World Court.

The

latest chapter in this sordid tale opened after the referendum of August 30,

when the population voted overwhelmingly for independence. At once, atrocities

mounted sharply, organized and directed by the Indonesian military, who reduced

the capital city of Dili to ashes and subjected virtually the entire population

to terror and expulsion. The UN Mission (UNAMET) reported on September 11 that

the "direct link between the militia and the military is beyond any dispute

and has been overwhelmingly documented by UNAMET over the last four

months," warning that "the worst may be yet to come," even a

"genocidal campaign to stamp out the East Timorese problem by force."

Indonesia

historian John Roosa, an official observer of the vote, described the situation

starkly on September 15 in the New York Times: "Given that the pogrom was

so predictable, it was easily preventable… But in the weeks before the ballot,

the Clinton Administration refused to discuss with Australia and other countries

the formation of [an international force]. Even after the violence erupted, the

Administration dithered for days," until compelled by international

(primarily Australian) and domestic pressure to make some gestures. These

sufficed to induce the Indonesian generals to reverse course, illustrating the

latent power that has always been at hand.

The

latest events evoke bitter memories from 20 years ago. After carrying out a huge

slaughter in 1977-78, Indonesia permitted a brief visit by members of the

Jakarta diplomatic corps, among them U.S. Ambassador Edward Masters. They

witnessed an enormous humanitarian catastrophe. The aftermath was described by

the pre-eminent Indonesia scholar Benedict Anderson, in testimony at the United

Nations: "For nine long months" of starvation and terror,

"Ambassador Masters deliberately refrained, even within the walls of the

State Department, from proposing humanitarian aid to East Timor," waiting

"until the generals in Jakarta gave him the green light" — until they

felt "secure enough to permit foreign visitors," as an internal State

Department document recorded. Only then did Washington consider taking some

steps to deal with the consequences of its actions.

The

reasons have sometimes been honestly recognized. During the latest phase of

atrocities, a senior diplomat in Jakarta described "the dilemma" faced

by the great powers: "Indonesia matters and East Timor doesn’t." The

reasoning was spelled out more fully by two Asia specialists of the New York

Times: the Clinton Administration, they wrote on September 14, "has made

the calculation that the United States must put its relationship with Indonesia,

a mineral-rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concern over

the political fate of East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of 800,000

people that is seeking independence."

The

operative principles had been articulated years earlier by Senator Daniel

Patrick Moynihan, who was UN Ambassador at the time of the U.S.-backed

Indonesian invasion. The Security Council ordered Indonesia to withdraw, but to

no avail. In his 1978 memoirs, Moynihan explains why: "The United States

wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The

Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in

whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it

forward with no inconsiderable success."

In

the next few months, Moynihan reports, 60,000 people were killed, ten percent of

the population. Atrocities peaked as his memoirs appeared. Relying on a new flow

of advanced weapons from the Carter Administration, the Indonesian military

carried out a devastating attack against the hundreds of thousands who had fled

to the mountains, driving the survivors to army control. It was then that Church

sources in East Timor sought to make public the estimates of 200,000 deaths that

came to be accepted years later, after constant denial. Washington’s reaction

has already been described.

As

the slaughter approached genocidal levels, Britain and France joined in with

arms and diplomatic support. Other powers too sought to participate, always

following the principles that have been lucidly enunciated.

This

year opened with a moment of hope. Indonesia’s interim president Habibie called

for a referendum with a choice between incorporation within Indonesia

("autonomy") or independence. The army moved at once to control the

outcome by terror. In the months leading to the August referendum, 3-5000 were

killed according to highly credible Church sources — twice the number of deaths

prior to the NATO bombing in Kosovo, with more than twice the population of East

Timor. The terror was widespread and sadistic, intended as a warning of the

consequences of refusal to obey the orders of the army of occupation, which

announced that "if the pro-independents do win, all will be destroyed"

— the grim words of the Indonesian commander in Dili.

In

an awe-inspiring display of courage and dedication, almost the entire population

voted, many emerging from hiding to do so, choosing independence. Then followed

the latest phase of army atrocities — exactly as had been proclaimed, loud and

clear. Within two weeks, more than 10,000 might have been killed, according to

Nobel Laureate Bishop Belo, who fled under a hail of bullets. Hundreds of

thousands have been driven to an unknown fate under army rule in Indonesia,

while most of the survivors face starvation in the mountains. The one country

that could easily have sent extensive humanitarian aid, including air drops,

refuses to do so, preferring that others shoulder the burdens of its years of

betrayal and complicity.

We

cannot undo the past, but should be willing to face it honestly, to accept the

moral responsibility of saving the remnants, and to provide ample reparations as

at least a gesture of compensation for terrible crimes. _