DE US STATE DEPARTMENT stimulearre de Pakistaanske regearing yn in gearkomste fan 7 maart 2022 om Imran Khan as premier te ferwiderjen oer syn neutraliteit oer de Russyske ynvaazje fan Oekraïne, neffens in klassifisearre Pakistaanske regearingsdokumint krigen troch The Intercept.
De gearkomste, tusken de Pakistaanske ambassadeur yn 'e Feriene Steaten en twa amtners fan' e steatsôfdieling, hat it ûnderwerp west fan intense kontrôle, kontroversje en spekulaasje yn Pakistan oer it ôfrûne jier en in heal, as oanhingers fan Khan en syn militêre en sivile tsjinstanners jockeyed foar macht. De politike striid eskalearre op 5 augustus doe't Khan waard feroardiele ta trije jier finzenisstraf op oanklachten fan korrupsje en foar de twadde kear sûnt syn ôfsetting yn finzenis nommen. De ferdigeners fan Khan fersmite de oanklachten as sûnder grûn. De sin blokkearret ek Khan, de populêrste politikus fan Pakistan, fan it meidwaan oan ferkiezings dy't letter dit jier yn Pakistan wurde ferwachte.
Ien moanne nei de gearkomste mei Amerikaanske amtners dokumintearre yn it útlekte Pakistaanske regearingsdokumint, waard in stimming fan wantrouwen hâlden yn it parlemint, wat liedt ta de ûntheffing fan Khan fan 'e macht. De stimming wurdt leaud organisearre te wêzen mei de stipe fan it machtige militêr fan Pakistan. Sûnt dy tiid binne Khan en syn oanhingers dwaande west yn in striid mei it militêr en har boargerlike bûnsmaten, dy't Khan beweart dat hy syn ferwidering fan 'e macht op fersyk fan' e FS manipulearre hat
De tekst fan 'e Pakistaanske kabel, produsearre fan' e gearkomste troch de ambassadeur en oerbrocht nei Pakistan, is net earder publisearre. De kabel, yntern bekend as in "cypher", ûntbleatet sawol de woartels as de stokken dy't de Steatsôfdieling ynset yn syn push tsjin Khan, en belooft waarmere relaasjes as Khan waard fuorthelle, en isolemint as hy dat net wie.
It dokumint, mei it label "Geheim", omfettet in ferslach fan 'e gearkomste tusken amtners fan steatsdepartement, ynklusyf assistint-sekretaris fan steat foar it Buro fan Súd- en Sintraal-Aziatyske Saken Donald Lu, en Asad Majeed Khan, dy't op dat stuit de ambassadeur fan Pakistan wie by de ÚS
It dokumint waard levere oan The Intercept troch in anonime boarne yn it Pakistaanske leger dy't sei dat se gjin bannen hiene mei Imran Khan of Khan's partij. The Intercept publisearret it lichem fan 'e kabel hjirûnder, korrigearret lytse typfouten yn' e tekst, om't sokke details kinne wurde brûkt om wettermerk dokuminten en folgje harren fersprieding.
De ynhâld fan it dokumint krigen troch The Intercept is yn oerienstimming mei rapportearje yn de Pakistaanske krante Dage en op oare plakken it beskriuwen fan de omstannichheden fan 'e gearkomste en details yn' e kabel sels, ynklusyf yn 'e klassifikaasjemarkearrings weilitten út' e presintaasje fan The Intercept. De dynamyk fan 'e relaasje tusken Pakistan en de FS dy't beskreaun yn' e kabel waard letter droegen troch barrens. Yn 'e kabel meitsje de FS beswier tsjin Khan's bûtenlânsk belied oer de Oekraïne-oarloch. Dy stânpunten waarden gau omkeard nei syn fuortsetting, dat waard folge, lykas tasein yn 'e gearkomste, troch in opwaarming tusken de FS en Pakistan.
De diplomatike gearkomste kaam twa wiken nei de Russyske ynvaazje fan Oekraïne, dy't lansearre doe't Khan ûnderweis wie nei Moskou, in besite dy't Washington lilk makke.
Op 2 maart, krekt dagen foar de gearkomste, waard Lu ûnderfrege by in harksitting fan 'e Komitee foar Bûtenlânske Relaasjes fan' e Senaat oer de neutraliteit fan Yndia, Sry Lanka en Pakistan yn it Oekraïne-konflikt. Yn antwurd op in fraach fan senator Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., oer in resint beslút fan Pakistan om har te hâlden fan in resolúsje fan 'e Feriene Naasjes dy't de rol fan Ruslân yn it konflikt feroardielje, sei Lu: "premier Khan hat koartlyn Moskou besocht, en dus ik tink dat wy besykje út te finen hoe't wy spesifyk mei de minister-presidint kinne omgean nei dat beslút. Van Hollen like ferûntrêstend te wêzen dat amtners fan 'e steatsôfdieling net yn kommunikaasje wiene mei Khan oer de kwestje.
De dei foar de gearkomste spruts Khan in rally en responded direkt oan Europeeske oproppen dat Pakistan rally efter Oekraïne. "Binne wy jo slaven?" Khan dondere tsjin de mannichte. "Wat fine jo fan ús? Dat wy jo slaven binne en dat wy sille dwaan wat jo fan ús freegje?" hy frege. "Wy binne freonen fan Ruslân, en wy binne ek freonen fan 'e Feriene Steaten. Wy binne freonen fan Sina en Europa. Wy binne gjin diel fan in alliânsje."
Pakistaanske "beoardieling"
Lu's stompe opmerkings oer de ynterne binnenlânske polityk fan Pakistan makken alarmen oan 'e Pakistaanske kant. Yn in koarte seksje "beoardieling" oan 'e ûnderkant fan it rapport stiet yn it dokumint: "Don koe net sa'n sterke demarche oerbringe sûnder de útdruklike goedkarring fan it Wite Hûs, dêr't hy ferskate kearen nei ferwiisde. Dúdlik spruts Don út syn beurt oer it ynterne politike proses fan Pakistan. De kabel slút ôf mei in oanbefelling "om serieus oer dit te reflektearjen en te beskôgjen om in passende demarche te meitsjen nei de US Cd'A ai yn Islamabad" - in ferwizing nei de chargé d'affaires ad interim, effektyf it waarnimmend haad fan in diplomatike missy as syn akkreditearre holle is ôfwêzich. In diplomatike protest wie letter útjûn troch Khan syn regear.
Op 27 maart 2022, deselde moanne as de Lu-gearkomste, spruts Khan iepenbier oer de kabel, en swaaide in opfolde kopy derfan yn 'e loft by in rally. Hy soe ek in nasjonale feiligensgearkomste mei de haaden fan 'e ferskate feiligens-ynstânsjes fan Pakistan ynformeare oer de ynhâld.
It is net dúdlik wat barde yn Pakistan-US kommunikaasje yn 'e wiken dy't folge op' e gearkomste rapportearre yn 'e kabel. Tsjin de folgjende moanne wiene de politike winen lykwols ferskood. Op 10 april waard Khan ferdreaun yn in stimming fan wantrouwen.
De nije minister-presidint, Shehbaz Sharif, úteinlik befêstige de bestean fan 'e kabel en erkende dat guon fan it berjocht oerbrocht troch Lu wie net geskikt. Hy sei dat Pakistan formeel klage hie, mar warskôge dat de kabel Khan's bredere oanspraken net befêstige.
Khan hat ferskate kearen yn it iepenbier suggerearre dat de topgeheime kabel toande dat de FS syn ûntheffing fan 'e macht hie rjochte, mar dêrnei syn beoardieling herzien om't hy de FS oanmoedige om misbrûk fan minskerjochten tsjin syn oanhingers te feroardieljen. De FS, fertelde hy The Intercept yn in juny ynterview, kin syn ôfsetting oanmoedige hawwe, mar die dat allinich om't it troch it leger manipulearre waard.
De iepenbiering fan it folsleine lichem fan 'e kabel, mear as in jier nei't Khan waard ôfset en nei syn arrestaasje, sil úteinlik tastean dat de konkurrearjende oanspraken wurde evaluearre. Yn lykwicht suggerearret de tekst fan 'e cypher sterk dat de FS de ferwidering fan Khan stimulearre. Neffens de kabel, hoewol Lu net direkt bestelde dat Khan út it amt soe wurde nommen, sei hy dat Pakistan swiere gefolgen soe hawwe, ynklusyf ynternasjonaal isolemint, as Khan soe bliuwe as minister-presidint, wylst hy tagelyk oanwiisde op beleanningen foar syn ûntheffing . De opmerkings lykje te wêzen nommen as in sinjaal foar it Pakistaanske leger om op te treden.
Njonken syn oare juridyske problemen is Khan sels troch de nije regearing rjochte op it behanneljen fan 'e geheime kabel. Ein ferline moanne sei minister fan Binnenlânske Saken Rana Sanaullah dat Khan soe wurde ferfolge ûnder de Official Secrets Act yn ferbân mei de kabel. "Khan hat in gearspanning útbrocht tsjin 'e belangen fan' e steat en in saak sil wurde inisjeare tsjin him út namme fan 'e steat foar de skeining fan' e Offisjele Secrets Act troch it bleatstellen fan in fertroulike siferkommunikaasje fan in diplomatike missy," sei Sanaullah.
Khan hat no oansletten by in lange list fan Pakistaanske politisy dy't har amtstermyn net slagge om te foltôgjen nei't se tsjin it militêr rûnen. Lykas oanhelle yn 'e sifer, waard Khan persoanlik troch de FS beskuldige, neffens Lu, foar Pakistan's belied fan net-oanpassing tidens it konflikt yn Oekraïne. De stimming fan wantrouwen en de gefolgen dêrfan foar de takomst fan bannen tusken de Feriene Steaten en Pakistan wiene yn it heule petear grut.
"Earlik sein," wurdt Lu oanhelle yn it dokumint, ferwizend nei it perspektyf dat Khan yn kantoar bliuwt, "ik tink dat it isolemint fan 'e minister-presidint tige sterk sil wurde fan Jeropa en de Feriene Steaten."
7 maart 2022 Pakistaanske diplomatike sifer (transkripsje)
The Intercept publisearret it lichem fan 'e kabel hjirûnder, korrigearret lytse typfouten yn' e tekst, om't sokke details kinne wurde brûkt om wettermerk dokuminten en folgje harren fersprieding. De Intercept hat klassifikaasjemarkearrings en numerike eleminten fuortsmiten dy't koe wurde brûkt foar folgjen. Label "Geheim", de kabel omfettet in ferslach fan 'e gearkomste tusken amtners fan steatsdepartement, ynklusyf assistint sekretaris fan steat foar it Buro fan Súd- en Sintraal-Aziatyske Saken Donald Lu, en Asad Majeed Khan, dy't op dat stuit de ambassadeur fan Pakistan yn' e FS wie..
I had a luncheon meeting today with Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Donald Lu. He was accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Les Viguerie. DCM, DA and Counsellor Qasim joined me.
At the outset, Don referred to Pakistan’s position on the Ukraine crisis and said that “people here and in Europe are quite concerned about why Pakistan is taking such an aggressively neutral position (on Ukraine), if such a position is even possible. It does not seem such a neutral stand to us.” He shared that in his discussions with the NSC, “it seems quite clear that this is the Prime Minister’s policy.” He continued that he was of the view that this was “tied to the current political dramas in Islamabad that he (Prime Minister) needs and is trying to show a public face.” I replied that this was not a correct reading of the situation as Pakistan’s position on Ukraine was a result of intense interagency consultations. Pakistan had never resorted to conducting diplomacy in public sphere. The Prime Minister’s remarks during a political rally were in reaction to the public letter by European Ambassadors in Islamabad which was against diplomatic etiquette and protocol. Any political leader, whether in Pakistan or the U.S., would be constrained to give a public reply in such a situation.
I asked Don if the reason for a strong U.S. reaction was Pakistan’s abstention in the voting in the UNGA. He categorically replied in the negative and said that it was due to the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow. He said that “I think if the no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister succeeds, all will be forgiven in Washington because the Russia visit is being looked at as a decision by the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I think it will be tough going ahead.” He paused and then said “I cannot tell how this will be seen by Europe but I suspect their reaction will be similar.” He then said that “honestly I think isolation of the Prime Minister will become very strong from Europe and the United States.” Don further commented that it seemed that the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow was planned during the Beijing Olympics and there was an attempt by the Prime Minister to meet Putin which was not successful and then this idea was hatched that he would go to Moscow.
I told Don that this was a completely misinformed and wrong perception. The visit to Moscow had been in the works for at least few years and was the result of a deliberative institutional process. I stressed that when the Prime Minister was flying to Moscow, Russian invasion of Ukraine had not started and there was still hope for a peaceful resolution. I also pointed out that leaders of European countries were also traveling to Moscow around the same time. Don interjected that “those visits were specifically for seeking resolution of the Ukraine standoff while the Prime Minister’s visit was for bilateral economic reasons.” I drew his attention to the fact that the Prime Minister clearly regretted the situation while being in Moscow and had hoped for diplomacy to work. The Prime Minister’s visit, I stressed, was purely in the bilateral context and should not be seen either as a condonation or endorsement of Russia’s action against Ukraine. I said that our position is dictated by our desire to keep the channels of communication with all sides open. Our subsequent statements at the UN and by our Spokesperson spelled that out clearly, while reaffirming our commitment to the principle of UN Charter, non-use or threat of use of force, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and pacific settlement of disputes.
I also told Don that Pakistan was worried of how the Ukraine crisis would play out in the context of Afghanistan. We had paid a very high price due to the long-term impact of this conflict. Our priority was to have peace and stability in Afghanistan, for which it was imperative to have cooperation and coordination with all major powers, including Russia. From this perspective as well, keeping the channels of communication open was essential. This factor was also dictating our position on the Ukraine crisis. On my reference to the upcoming Extended Troika meeting in Beijing, Don replied that there were still ongoing discussions in Washington on whether the U.S. should attend the Extended Troika meeting or the upcoming Antalya meeting on Afghanistan with Russian representatives in attendance, as the U.S. focus right now was to discuss only Ukraine with Russia. I replied that this was exactly what we were afraid of. We did not want the Ukraine crisis to divert focus away from Afghanistan. Don did not comment.
I told Don that just like him, I would also convey our perspective in a forthright manner. I said that over the past one year, we had been consistently sensing reluctance on the part of the U.S. leadership to engage with our leadership. This reluctance had created a perception in Pakistan that we were being ignored and even taken for granted. There was also a feeling that while the U.S. expected Pakistan’s support on all issues that were important to the U.S., it did not reciprocate and we do not see much U.S. support on issues of concern for Pakistan, particularly on Kashmir. I said that it was extremely important to have functioning channels of communication at the highest level to remove such perception. I also said that we were surprised that if our position on the Ukraine crisis was so important for the U.S., why the U.S. had not engaged with us at the top leadership level prior to the Moscow visit and even when the UN was scheduled to vote. (The State Department had raised it at the DCM level.) Pakistan valued continued high-level engagement and for this reason the Foreign Minister sought to speak with Secretary Blinken to personally explain Pakistan’s position and perspective on the Ukraine crisis. The call has not materialized yet. Don replied that the thinking in Washington was that given the current political turmoil in Pakistan, this was not the right time for such engagement and it could wait till the political situation in Pakistan settled down.
I reiterated our position that countries should not be made to choose sides in a complex situation like the Ukraine crisis and stressed the need for having active bilateral communications at the political leadership level. Don replied that “you have conveyed your position clearly and I will take it back to my leadership.”
I also told Don that we had seen his defence of the Indian position on the Ukraine crisis during the recently held Senate Sub-Committee hearing on U.S.-India relations. It seemed that the U.S. was applying different criteria for India and Pakistan. Don responded that the U.S. lawmakers’ strong feelings about India’s abstentions in the UNSC and UNGA came out clearly during the hearing. I said that from the hearing, it appeared that the U.S. expected more from India than Pakistan, yet it appeared to be more concerned about Pakistan’s position. Don was evasive and responded that Washington looked at the U.S.-India relationship very much through the lens of what was happening in China. He added that while India had a close relationship with Moscow, “I think we will actually see a change in India’s policy once all Indian students are out of Ukraine.”
I expressed the hope that the issue of the Prime Minister’s visit to Russia will not impact our bilateral ties. Don replied that “I would argue that it has already created a dent in the relationship from our perspective. Let us wait for a few days to see whether the political situation changes, which would mean that we would not have a big disagreement about this issue and the dent would go away very quickly. Otherwise, we will have to confront this issue head on and decide how to manage it.”
We also discussed Afghanistan and other issues pertaining to bilateral ties. A separate communication follows on that part of our conversation.
Assessment
Don could not have conveyed such a strong demarche without the express approval of the White House, to which he referred repeatedly. Clearly, Don spoke out of turn on Pakistan’s internal political process. We need to seriously reflect on this and consider making an appropriate demarche to the U.S. Cd’ A a.i in Islamabad.
ZNetwork wurdt allinich finansierd troch de generositeit fan har lêzers.
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