STATE DEPARTMENT SAD-a ohrabrio je pakistansku vladu na sastanku 7. marta 2022. da smijeni Imrana Khana s mjesta premijera zbog njegove neutralnosti na rusku invaziju na Ukrajinu, prema povjerljivom dokumentu pakistanske vlade do kojeg je došao The Intercept.
Sastanak pakistanskog ambasadora u Sjedinjenim Državama i dvojice službenika State Departmenta bio je predmet intenzivnog ispitivanja, kontroverzi i spekulacije u Pakistanu u proteklih godinu i po dana, dok su se pristalice Khana i njegovih vojnih i civilnih protivnika borili za vlast. Politička borba je eskalirala 5. avgusta kada je Khan osuđen na tri godine zatvora pod optužbom za korupciju i priveden po drugi put od svrgavanja. Khanovi branioci odbacuju optužbe kao neosnovane. Ova kazna također blokira Khana, najpopularnijeg pakistanskog političara, da učestvuje na izborima koji se očekuju u Pakistanu kasnije ove godine.
Mjesec dana nakon sastanka sa američkim zvaničnicima dokumentovanog u dokumentu pakistanske vlade koji je procurio, u parlamentu je održano glasanje o nepovjerenju, što je dovelo do Khanove smjene s vlasti. Vjeruje se da je glasanje organizirano uz podršku moćne pakistanske vojske. Od tog vremena, Khan i njegove pristalice bili su uključeni u borbu s vojskom i njenim civilnim saveznicima, za koje Khan tvrdi da su projektirali njegovo uklanjanje s vlasti na zahtjev SAD-a.
Tekst pakistanske depeše, koju je sa sastanka izradio ambasador i proslijeđen Pakistanu, ranije nije objavljen. Depeša, interno poznata kao "šifra", otkriva i šargarepe i štapove koje je State Department postavio u svom guranju protiv Khana, obećavajući toplije odnose ako Khan bude uklonjen, i izolaciju ako ne bude.
Dokument pod nazivom "Tajna" uključuje izvještaj o sastanku između zvaničnika State Departmenta, uključujući pomoćnika državnog sekretara za Biro za južne i centralne Azije Donalda Lua, i Asada Majeed Khana, koji je u to vrijeme bio ambasador Pakistana u U.S.
Dokument je Interceptu dostavio anonimni izvor u pakistanskoj vojsci koji je rekao da oni nemaju veze s Imranom Khanom ili Khanovom strankom. Intercept objavljuje tijelo kabla ispod, ispravljajući manje greške u tekstu jer se takvi detalji mogu koristiti za dokumenti sa vodenim žigom i pratiti njihovu diseminaciju.
Sadržaj dokumenta do kojeg je došao The Intercept je u skladu sa izvještavanje u pakistanskim novinama zora i na drugim mjestima opisuju okolnosti sastanka i detalje u samoj depeši, uključujući klasifikacijske oznake koje su izostavljene iz prezentacije Intercepta. Dinamika odnosa između Pakistana i SAD opisana u depeši naknadno je potvrđena događajima. U depeši, SAD se protive Kanovoj vanjskoj politici o ratu u Ukrajini. Te pozicije su brzo preokrenute nakon njegove smjene, nakon čega je, kako je obećano na sastanku, uslijedilo zagrijavanje između SAD-a i Pakistana.
Diplomatski sastanak uslijedio je dvije sedmice nakon ruske invazije na Ukrajinu, koja je započela dok je Khan bio na putu za Moskvu, posjeta koja je razbjesnila Washington.
Dana 2. marta, samo nekoliko dana prije sastanka, Lu je bio ispitan na saslušanju Senatskog odbora za vanjske poslove o neutralnosti Indije, Šri Lanke i Pakistana u sukobu u Ukrajini. Odgovarajući na pitanje senatora Chrisa Van Hollena, doktora medicine, o nedavnoj odluci Pakistana da se suzdrži od rezolucije Ujedinjenih naroda kojom se osuđuje uloga Rusije u sukobu, Lu je rekao: “Premijer Khan je nedavno posjetio Moskvu i tako da mislim da pokušavamo smisliti kako da se konkretno sarađujemo s premijerom nakon te odluke.” Činilo se da je Van Hollen ogorčen što zvaničnici State Departmenta nisu bili u komunikaciji s Khanom o tom pitanju.
Dan prije sastanka, Khan se obratio na skupu i odgovorio direktno evropskim poziva da se Pakistan okupi iza Ukrajine. "Jesmo li mi vaši robovi?" Khan grmio je gomili. „Šta mislite o nama? Da smo mi vaši robovi i da ćemo učiniti sve što tražite od nas?” pitao. „Mi smo prijatelji Rusije, a takođe smo prijatelji Sjedinjenih Država. Prijatelji smo Kine i Evrope. Nismo dio nijednog saveza.”
pakistanska “procjena”
Luovi grubi komentari o unutrašnjoj politici Pakistana izazvali su uzbunu na pakistanskoj strani. U kratkom odeljku „procena“ na dnu izveštaja, dokument kaže: „Don ne bi mogao da prenese tako snažan demarš bez izričitog odobrenja Bele kuće, na šta je više puta spominjao. Jasno je da je Don progovorio o unutrašnjem političkom procesu Pakistana.” Depeša se završava preporukom "da se ozbiljno razmisli o ovome i razmisli o pravljenju odgovarajućeg demarša američkom Cd'A a.i u Islamabadu" - upućivanje na privremenog otpravnika poslova, zapravo vršioca dužnosti šefa diplomatske misije kada je akreditovani šef je odsutan. Diplomatski protest je bio kasnije izdat od strane Khanove vlade.
Dana 27. marta 2022., istog mjeseca kada je održan sastanak u Luu, Khan je javno govorio o kablu, mašući njegovom presavijenom kopijom u zraku na skupu. On je također, navodno, izvijestio sastanak o nacionalnoj sigurnosti sa šefovima raznih pakistanskih sigurnosnih agencija o njegovom sadržaju.
Nije jasno šta se dogodilo u Pakistanu-SAD. komunikacije tokom sedmica koje su uslijedile nakon sastanka izvijestile su se u depeši. Do sljedećeg mjeseca, međutim, politički vjetrovi su se promijenili. Dana 10. aprila, Khan je zbačen sa vlasti glasanjem o nepovjerenju.
Novi premijer Shehbaz Sharif na kraju je to potvrdio postojanje kabla i priznao da su neke od poruka koje je Lu prenio bile neprikladne. Rekao je da se Pakistan službeno žalio, ali je upozorio da depeša ne potvrđuje Khanove šire tvrdnje.
Khan je više puta u javnosti sugerirao da je tajna depeša pokazala da su SAD odredile njegovo uklanjanje s vlasti, ali kasnije revidirao svoju procjenu jer je pozvao SAD da osude kršenje ljudskih prava njegovih pristalica. SAD, rekao je za Intercept u junskom intervjuu, možda je pozvao na njegovo svrgavanje, ali je to učinio samo zato što je njime manipulisala vojska.
Objavljivanje kompletne depeše, više od godinu dana nakon što je Khan svrgnut i nakon njegovog hapšenja, konačno će omogućiti da se procijene konkurentne tvrdnje. Sve u svemu, tekst šifre snažno sugerira da su SAD ohrabrile Khanovo uklanjanje. Prema depeši, iako Lu nije direktno naredio da se Kan skine s funkcije, rekao je da će Pakistan pretrpjeti ozbiljne posljedice, uključujući međunarodnu izolaciju, ako Khan ostane na mjestu premijera, dok je istovremeno nagovijestio nagrade za njegovu smjenu . Čini se da su ove primjedbe shvaćene kao signal pakistanskoj vojsci da djeluje.
Pored svojih drugih pravnih problema, sam Khan je i dalje bio na meti zbog rukovanja tajnim telegramom od strane nove vlade. Krajem prošlog mjeseca, ministar unutrašnjih poslova Rana Sanaullah rekao je da će Khan biti krivično gonjen prema Zakonu o službenim tajnama u vezi sa telegramom. "Khan je skovao zavjeru protiv državnih interesa i protiv njega će biti pokrenut postupak u ime države zbog kršenja Zakona o službenim tajnama razotkrivanjem povjerljive šifrirane komunikacije diplomatske misije", Sanaullah je rekao.
Khan se sada pridružio dugačkoj listi pakistanskih političara koji nisu uspjeli završiti svoj mandat nakon što su se sukobili s vojskom. Kako se navodi u šifri, Sjedinjene Američke Države lično su okrivile Kana za pakistansku politiku nesvrstanosti tokom sukoba u Ukrajini. Glasanje o nepovjerenju i njegove implikacije na budućnost američko-pakistanskih veza nazirale su se tokom cijelog razgovora.
"Iskreno", rekao je Lu, citiran je u dokumentu, misleći na izglede da Khan ostane na funkciji, "mislim da će izolacija premijera postati veoma jaka od Evrope i Sjedinjenih Država."
7. marta 2022. pakistanska diplomatska šifra (transkripcija)
Intercept objavljuje tijelo kabla ispod, ispravljajući manje greške u tekstu jer se takvi detalji mogu koristiti za dokumenti sa vodenim žigom i pratiti njihovu diseminaciju. Intercept je uklonio klasifikacijske oznake i numeričke elemente koji bi se mogli koristiti u svrhu praćenja. Depeša sa oznakom "Tajna" uključuje izvještaj o sastanku između zvaničnika State Departmenta, uključujući pomoćnika državnog sekretara za Biro za južne i centralne Azije Donalda Lua i Asada Majeed Khana, koji je u to vrijeme bio ambasador Pakistana u SAD-u.
I had a luncheon meeting today with Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Donald Lu. He was accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Les Viguerie. DCM, DA and Counsellor Qasim joined me.
At the outset, Don referred to Pakistan’s position on the Ukraine crisis and said that “people here and in Europe are quite concerned about why Pakistan is taking such an aggressively neutral position (on Ukraine), if such a position is even possible. It does not seem such a neutral stand to us.” He shared that in his discussions with the NSC, “it seems quite clear that this is the Prime Minister’s policy.” He continued that he was of the view that this was “tied to the current political dramas in Islamabad that he (Prime Minister) needs and is trying to show a public face.” I replied that this was not a correct reading of the situation as Pakistan’s position on Ukraine was a result of intense interagency consultations. Pakistan had never resorted to conducting diplomacy in public sphere. The Prime Minister’s remarks during a political rally were in reaction to the public letter by European Ambassadors in Islamabad which was against diplomatic etiquette and protocol. Any political leader, whether in Pakistan or the U.S., would be constrained to give a public reply in such a situation.
I asked Don if the reason for a strong U.S. reaction was Pakistan’s abstention in the voting in the UNGA. He categorically replied in the negative and said that it was due to the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow. He said that “I think if the no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister succeeds, all will be forgiven in Washington because the Russia visit is being looked at as a decision by the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I think it will be tough going ahead.” He paused and then said “I cannot tell how this will be seen by Europe but I suspect their reaction will be similar.” He then said that “honestly I think isolation of the Prime Minister will become very strong from Europe and the United States.” Don further commented that it seemed that the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow was planned during the Beijing Olympics and there was an attempt by the Prime Minister to meet Putin which was not successful and then this idea was hatched that he would go to Moscow.
I told Don that this was a completely misinformed and wrong perception. The visit to Moscow had been in the works for at least few years and was the result of a deliberative institutional process. I stressed that when the Prime Minister was flying to Moscow, Russian invasion of Ukraine had not started and there was still hope for a peaceful resolution. I also pointed out that leaders of European countries were also traveling to Moscow around the same time. Don interjected that “those visits were specifically for seeking resolution of the Ukraine standoff while the Prime Minister’s visit was for bilateral economic reasons.” I drew his attention to the fact that the Prime Minister clearly regretted the situation while being in Moscow and had hoped for diplomacy to work. The Prime Minister’s visit, I stressed, was purely in the bilateral context and should not be seen either as a condonation or endorsement of Russia’s action against Ukraine. I said that our position is dictated by our desire to keep the channels of communication with all sides open. Our subsequent statements at the UN and by our Spokesperson spelled that out clearly, while reaffirming our commitment to the principle of UN Charter, non-use or threat of use of force, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and pacific settlement of disputes.
I also told Don that Pakistan was worried of how the Ukraine crisis would play out in the context of Afghanistan. We had paid a very high price due to the long-term impact of this conflict. Our priority was to have peace and stability in Afghanistan, for which it was imperative to have cooperation and coordination with all major powers, including Russia. From this perspective as well, keeping the channels of communication open was essential. This factor was also dictating our position on the Ukraine crisis. On my reference to the upcoming Extended Troika meeting in Beijing, Don replied that there were still ongoing discussions in Washington on whether the U.S. should attend the Extended Troika meeting or the upcoming Antalya meeting on Afghanistan with Russian representatives in attendance, as the U.S. focus right now was to discuss only Ukraine with Russia. I replied that this was exactly what we were afraid of. We did not want the Ukraine crisis to divert focus away from Afghanistan. Don did not comment.
I told Don that just like him, I would also convey our perspective in a forthright manner. I said that over the past one year, we had been consistently sensing reluctance on the part of the U.S. leadership to engage with our leadership. This reluctance had created a perception in Pakistan that we were being ignored and even taken for granted. There was also a feeling that while the U.S. expected Pakistan’s support on all issues that were important to the U.S., it did not reciprocate and we do not see much U.S. support on issues of concern for Pakistan, particularly on Kashmir. I said that it was extremely important to have functioning channels of communication at the highest level to remove such perception. I also said that we were surprised that if our position on the Ukraine crisis was so important for the U.S., why the U.S. had not engaged with us at the top leadership level prior to the Moscow visit and even when the UN was scheduled to vote. (The State Department had raised it at the DCM level.) Pakistan valued continued high-level engagement and for this reason the Foreign Minister sought to speak with Secretary Blinken to personally explain Pakistan’s position and perspective on the Ukraine crisis. The call has not materialized yet. Don replied that the thinking in Washington was that given the current political turmoil in Pakistan, this was not the right time for such engagement and it could wait till the political situation in Pakistan settled down.
I reiterated our position that countries should not be made to choose sides in a complex situation like the Ukraine crisis and stressed the need for having active bilateral communications at the political leadership level. Don replied that “you have conveyed your position clearly and I will take it back to my leadership.”
I also told Don that we had seen his defence of the Indian position on the Ukraine crisis during the recently held Senate Sub-Committee hearing on U.S.-India relations. It seemed that the U.S. was applying different criteria for India and Pakistan. Don responded that the U.S. lawmakers’ strong feelings about India’s abstentions in the UNSC and UNGA came out clearly during the hearing. I said that from the hearing, it appeared that the U.S. expected more from India than Pakistan, yet it appeared to be more concerned about Pakistan’s position. Don was evasive and responded that Washington looked at the U.S.-India relationship very much through the lens of what was happening in China. He added that while India had a close relationship with Moscow, “I think we will actually see a change in India’s policy once all Indian students are out of Ukraine.”
I expressed the hope that the issue of the Prime Minister’s visit to Russia will not impact our bilateral ties. Don replied that “I would argue that it has already created a dent in the relationship from our perspective. Let us wait for a few days to see whether the political situation changes, which would mean that we would not have a big disagreement about this issue and the dent would go away very quickly. Otherwise, we will have to confront this issue head on and decide how to manage it.”
We also discussed Afghanistan and other issues pertaining to bilateral ties. A separate communication follows on that part of our conversation.
Assessment
Don could not have conveyed such a strong demarche without the express approval of the White House, to which he referred repeatedly. Clearly, Don spoke out of turn on Pakistan’s internal political process. We need to seriously reflect on this and consider making an appropriate demarche to the U.S. Cd’ A a.i in Islamabad.
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