Mjadala wa kuwatambua wapiganaji wa msituni wa Kolombia kama jeshi la kivita sasa uko wazi. Ukweli tu kwamba Chavez alisema ukweli wa wazi kuhusiana na sheria za kimataifa umesababisha hofu kubwa duniani kote kwamba kauli yake yenyewe ni ushindi: kuna mgogoro wa silaha nchini Colombia ambao umedumu kwa karibu miaka 50 na ambao hauna nafasi ya ufumbuzi bila. baadhi ya makubaliano ya amani ambayo huenda zaidi ya kujisalimisha kwa urahisi na waasi. Hiyo inamaanisha sio tu amani kama kutokuwepo kwa migogoro, lakini ile inayotokana na urekebishaji wa sera ya kiuchumi inayoongoza moja kwa moja kwenye ugawaji bora wa mali na kukomesha dhuluma ya kijamii.

To reach that peace agreement it is necessary to go through intermediate agreements and one of those is the recognition of the guerrillas as a belligerent force similar to one that allows for the exchange of prisoners. Prisoners, not kidnap victims. Most of the people held by the FARC and included in the humanitarian agreement are soldiers and police. All that is happening is that in Colombia we are witnessing the same spectacle as in Israel where the agressor is turned into a victim – attacking a tank or a soldier is not the same as attacking a bus or a civilian.

Every time a Palestinian resister (guerrilla, insurgent – put whatever term is most appropriate) fires a rocket, attacks a tank, a convoy of soldiers, a settlement or a bus line, Israel catalogues that action as terrorist. It makes no difference that the Palestinian resistance against the occupation of their territory is backed by International  Law or that there is proportionality between the means used by the resisters and the objectives they pursue, which are no more than Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers. Palestinian armed struggle is frowned on. It is all terrorism.

In Colombia, every time the guerrilla capture a soldier or a police officer in combat, it is called kidnapping. And every time the legal recognition of the concept "belligerent force" is put on the table, as recognized in International Law, the reaction is to apply the label "terrorist". Colombia‘s President, Alvaro Uribe, is not exactly an intellectual. He is a simple man, someone without redeeming characteristics, able to say one thing and its opposite without blinking an eye. He is a man obsessed with the military defeat of the guerrillas and somone so submissive to the interests of his big boss, the United States, that he had no qualms at all in being the only Latin American President to support the illegal invasion of Iraq. Uribe put the boot into International Law by supporting the invasion of that Arab country and returns to do it again now someone mentions the possibility of lawfully recognizing a legal concept which applies to the Colombian guerrillas de facto.

Tupende usipende, mashirika ya waasi wa Colombia sio kama Uribe na vyombo vya habari vya kijeshi vilivyomzunguka vinasema "mashirika ya kigaidi ambayo yalibadilisha mawazo yao ya zamani ya kimapinduzi na kuwa mamluki wanaofadhiliwa na dawa za kulevya na zaidi ya hayo yakachochea ugaidi wa kijeshi" (1) lakini badala ya mashirika ya kijeshi ya kisiasa yenye mpango madhubuti wa umma uliorudiwa. Kiasi kwamba mtangulizi wa Uribe kama Rais, Andres Pastrana, mtu ambaye aliendeleza mazungumzo ya amani huko San Vicente de Caguan, aliona asili ya kisiasa ya mzozo wa kijeshi wa Colombia kama jambo lisilopingika na ambalo lina chimbuko lake na kulisha juu ya hali ya kimuundo ya ukosefu wa haki. kutengwa kijamii, kisiasa na kiuchumi.

Lakini Pastrana alikasirika wakati waasi wa FARC-EP walipoweka mageuzi ya sera ya kiuchumi mezani. Oligarchy ya Colombia haina wasiwasi na kutafuta suluhu la mazungumzo ili mradi sera za kiuchumi ambazo zimekuwa zikiwatajirisha ziachwe peke yake. Hiyo na si kitu kingine ilikuwa sababu ya Pastrana kuamua kwa upande mmoja kuvunja mazungumzo ya amani na kufunga eneo la upande wowote. Kuangalia jinsi vyombo vya habari vya kijeshi vilivyoshughulikia mahitaji ya kiuchumi ya FARC ni jambo la kufundisha sana. Na kuchukua fursa ya ukweli kwamba baada ya 9-11 Bush alikuwa akitafuta magaidi ulimwenguni kote waliamuru kwamba FARC na ELN ni mashirika ya kigaidi. Habari Presto! Vile vile tu.

Hobbs na hatua za chuki dhidi ya upinzani

The press release Uribe and his military-media front have issued on why the "terrorist" label should be hung on the guerrilla wastes nothing in its simplicity. First it blames the guerrilla for the development of the paramilitaries. Which is as much as to say that if the guerrillas had not existed the paramilitaries would not have emerged. By that rule of thumb, if capitalism did not exist and grow on conditions of stuctural violence and poverty trades unionists would not appear who would need to be murdered year after year before, under and, sadly,  after Uribe. Nor would there be social activists to be killed year after year before, under and, sadly, after Uribe, since the murder of these activists is an inherent facet of Colombia‘s political system. This fallacy of Uribe and his military-media front is, after all, a fallacy. The paramilitaries were created by the State, they acted under the State’s protection and individuals like Uribe have always thrived on the warm blood the paramilitaries made run throughout the whole country, whom people like Uribe have protected and protect still.
 
Under Uribe’s rule 150 left wing leaders have been murdered, the latest being Alirio Gutierrez, a young man belonging to the Communist Youth who was in exile in Venezuela. During Uribe’s government 282 union leaders have been murdered according to information from the United Workers Central. Under Uribe’s rule 936 extrajudicial executions attributable to the security forces have been counted by Colombia-Europe-USA Coordination in a report published last October in Medellin. The United Nations itself has called for investigation into 37 executions of social leaders by the army, passed off as guerrillas killed in combat. To all those statistics one has to add the people who have been disappeared.

There is State terrorism in Colombia. Colombia‘s political leaders and the security forces have ignored with impunity the values and norms underlying the rule of law they say they represent and have turned legal structures into a weapon to oppress their internal enemies. It is what Hobbes called "hostile actions", or "actions directed at someone who is politically disobedient to the State and legal authority." And for these hostile actions for Hobbes "the imposition of any punishment is legitimate". So, in Colombia there is no limit to violence against dissidents, whether they are leftists, trades unionists or human rights defenders.

Maandishi rasmi ya serikali ya Colombia yanaeleza kuwa wapiganaji hao ni magaidi kwa sababu "wanajifadhili wenyewe kutokana na biashara ya dawa za kulevya, wanateka nyara, wanaweka mabomu ovyo, wanaajiri na kuwaua watoto, wanaua wajawazito na wazee, wanatumia migodi ya kupambana na wafanyakazi. kuwaacha maelfu ya wahasiriwa wasio na hatia katika hali zao; Propaganda za uongo moja kwa moja. Lakini hebu tuseme mambo ni hivyo kweli. Waasi wangepoteza muda mrefu uliopita.

One has to demand from the Colombian government and its military-media front at least a modicum of intellectual rigour and to acknowledge they are dealing with at the very least a revolutionary "terrorism". And in that case we find ourselves with the category of revolutionary parties and movements who use terror as an auxiliary weapon since it is not generally accepted that an attack on a military post or a police station can be considered a terrorist act since its objective is clear. Unles one enters into the same paranoia used by Israel against the Palestinians as indicated above and which is so much in vogue with the Colombian military-media front opposed to any negotiated peace that does not amount to a surrender.

Kila wakati neno "gaidi" linatumiwa, ni kama dharau dhidi ya waasi. Hata hivyo, kuna tofauti muhimu, za kinadharia na vitendo, kati ya vita vya msituni, iwe mijini au vijijini, na ugaidi. Waasi wanaweza kupigana na wafanyakazi wachache au silaha lakini wanaweza kupigana kwa mujibu wa mikataba ya vita na mara kwa mara hufanya hivyo, kukamata na kubadilishana wafungwa na kuheshimu haki za wasio wapiganaji. Mara nyingi magaidi hawafanyi hivyo. Hiyo ni tofauti muhimu kati ya gaidi na msituni.
 
Mkataba wa Geneva

Uribe and his military-media front want to fence off the discussion. They think a simple adjective can change the root and direction of Colombia‘s armed conflict. But even so, the word "terrorist" does not hide that fact that one can still negotiate "for humanitarian reasons", although that negotiation may involve a clearly defined guerrilla discourse with essentially political attributes. That political status of the guerrillas will not go away, now or ever, just as no exponent of State terror, like the US in Iraq, Israel or Colombia, can lose their Statehood.

Nor do the guerrillas lose their status as a belligerent force given that they meet very precisely the attributes recognised in public International Law to attain that condition and which in both its practical and its terminological sense is applicable to Colombia’s internal conflict as allowed by the Geneva Convention of 1948 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, signed by Colombia. Thus, Protocol 1 designates as "legitimate combatants" rebels who a) wear a uniform known to their adversaries; b) openly carry weapons; c)  are subordinate to a command structure; d) respect the laws and customs of war. There is no doubt this is the case in Colombia whether Uribe and his military-media front like it or not. And it is not up to Colombia to recognize this but to third States as happened with France and Mexico in 1984 when they recognized the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation in El Salvador as a "belligerent force".

Uribe anataka vita kabisa. Anajua kwamba kutambuliwa kwa wapiganaji wa msituni kama "jeshi la wapiganaji" kungefanya mzozo kuwa wa kibinadamu wakati huo huo kama kuweka msingi thabiti wa kuanza kwa mazungumzo ya amani. Mazungumzo ambayo yangechukua katika vipengele vyote ambavyo waasi wa msituni walianzia hapo kwanza na ambayo yanabaki kuwa ya sasa. Kubishana vinginevyo ni onyesho la fataki tu, linalozidisha mzozo, kuweka kamari juu ya mateso zaidi.

(1) Comunicado de la Presidencia del gobierno colombiano. 11 de enero de 2008.  

---