The Israeli Commission which investigated the 2006 Lebanon war handed down its final report last month. Retired Judge Eliyahu Winograd, who headed the Commission, told a press conference in Jerusalem in late January that the war was a “major missed opportunity.” The Report itself is the real missed opportunity.

 

ຄັ້ງ ທຳ ອິດ, ບົດລາຍງານບາງສ່ວນຂອງ Winograd, released in April 2007, had found that Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and the government had displayed lack of judgment. "The decision to respond [to the cross-border attack] with an immediate, intensive military strike,” it said, “was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan…" and blamed the Prime Minister, the then minister of defense Amir Peretz and the Chief of Staff for these failings.

 

The final Winograd Report found shortcomings in the political and decision-making, poor communication and lack of preparedness but failed to address the decision to go to war.

 

ຄະນະກໍາມະການໄດ້ຖືກສ້າງຕັ້ງຂຶ້ນໃນສ່ວນຫນຶ່ງເປັນການຕອບໂຕ້ "to respond to the bad feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon war…”

 

The Report also contains some frank admissions that may have been painful to make. The result of the war was all the more shocking for an Israeli army and public used to quick victories, that the enemy in Lebanon was not a regular army but a small guerrilla organization: “Israel initiated a long war,” the Report said,”… A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages.”

 

The Report admits that Israel did not achieve a military victory that could have been translated into political gains, yet Israel managed to secure a UN Security Council Resolution favorable to it: “At the end of the day,” the Report said, “Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.”

 

The Report gives some credit for this remarkable achievement to the Foreign Ministry. In fact, most of the credit goes to Washington and London who unashamedly worked hard to delay a cease-fire resolution at the United Nations-as Lebanese civilians were dying everyday- to allow the Israelis time to achieve some military goals against the unexpectedly tough resistance from Hizbollah fighters.

 

ຍ້ອນ​ວໍ​ຊິງ​ຕັນ ​ແລະ​ລອນ​ດອນ ​ຄວາມ​ລົ້ມ​ເຫຼວ​ທາງ​ທະຫານ​ຂອງ​ອິສຣາ​ແອ​ລ ​ໄດ້​ກາຍ​ເປັນ​ທ່າ​ໄດ້​ປຽບ​ທາງ​ການ​ເມືອງ​ຢູ່​ອົງການ​ສະຫະ​ປະຊາ​ຊາດ.

 

ບົດ​ລາຍ​ງານ​ຂອງ​ອິດ​ສະ​ຣາ​ແອນ​ສະ​ແດງ​ຄວາມ​ຊົມ​ເຊີຍ​ຕໍ່​ການ​ປະ​ຕິ​ບັດ​ຂອງ​ກຳ​ລັງ​ອາ​ກາດ​ອິດ​ສະ​ຣາ​ແອນ:”The air force,” the Commission said, “should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war.”

 

But the Commission did not say that these impressive achievements included indiscriminate bombings of civilian targets, illegal use of cluster bombs, the commission of acts that may amount to war crimes, and the dropping, in the final 72 hours before the ceasefire, of 1,800 cluster rockets on southern Lebanon, containing 1.2 million sub-munitions, without discriminating between military objectives and civilian targets.

 

ທ່ານຈະບໍ່ພົບຄໍາຖາມຄົ້ນຫາຈິດວິນຍານກ່ຽວກັບບັນຫາເຫຼົ່ານີ້ຢູ່ໃນບົດລາຍງານ Winograd. ແລະນີ້ບໍ່ແມ່ນຍ້ອນການຂາດແຄນຂໍ້ມູນຫຼືການຂາດການສືບສວນເອກະລາດ.

 

ລາຍງານຂອງອົງການສິ້ງຊອມສິດທິມະນຸດ (HRW) ສະບັບນຶ່ງ (ເດືອນກັນຍາ 07) ລະບຸວ່າ “ການຄົ້ນຄວ້າຂອງພວກເຮົາສະແດງໃຫ້ເຫັນວ່າ ສາເຫດຫຼັກທີ່ເຮັດໃຫ້ ພົນລະເຮືອນ ເລບານອນ ເສຍຊີວິດ ສູງແມ່ນຍ້ອນອິດສະຣາແອນ ບໍ່ໄດ້ປະຕິບັດຕາມພັນທະພື້ນຖານຂອງກົດໝາຍສົງຄາມ: ໜ້າທີ່ຈຳແນກລະຫວ່າງທະຫານ. ເປົ້າໝາຍ… ແລະພົນລະເຮືອນ.”

The HRW Report, entitled Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, found that of the 510 cases of civilian deaths it investigated in Lebanon, at least 300 were of women and children,

“In critical respects,” The HRW Report said,” Israel conducted the war with reckless indifference to the fate of Lebanese civilians and violated the laws of war.”

 

“Responsibility for the high civilian death toll of the war in Lebanon, “said the HRW Report, “lies squarely with Israeli policies and targeting decisions in the conduct of its military operations.”

 

HRW estimated that there were as many as one million hazardous unexploded Israeli sub-munitions in towns and villages in south Lebanon.

 

Amnesty International reported that “as many as 40 people, including 27 civilians and 13 de-mining personnel, have been killed by such munitions since the end of the war and over 240 people have been injured.”

 

Moreover, a U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report (November 2006) found:

"A significant pattern of excessive, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Israel Defence Forces against Lebanese civilians and civilian objects, failing to distinguish civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military targets,"

 

You would think the Israeli Commission would have shown sensitivity to the suffering of the innocent; or that it would have raised questions about the disproportionality of the Israeli response, or the obvious futility of the indiscriminate use of force to impose its hegemonic terms on the region. Instead, the whole episode is reduced to issues of decision-making, coordination, inter-agency communication and preparedness. Issues of legality and morality of the war and its conduct are brushed aside.

 

The Winograd Commission dismissed these concerns and reports as being used for propaganda against Israel.

ມັນບໍ່ແປກໃຈເພາະສະນັ້ນ, ຫນຶ່ງໃນບົດຮຽນທີ່ໄດ້ຮຽນຮູ້ໂດຍການສ້າງຕັ້ງ Israeli ແມ່ນຄວາມຕ້ອງການສໍາລັບການ propaganda Israeli ປະສິດທິພາບຫຼາຍ.

ປະທານຄະນະກໍາມະການຄວບຄຸມຂອງລັດໄດ້ຕໍານິຕິຕຽນ ລັດຖະບານ "ສໍາລັບການບໍ່ປັບປຸງຄວາມພະຍາຍາມຂໍ້ມູນຂ່າວສານສາທາລະນະຂອງຕົນເຖິງແມ່ນວ່າໄດ້ປະຕິບັດບໍ່ດີໃນດ້ານ PR ໃນໄລຍະສົງຄາມເລບານອນຄັ້ງທີສອງ." (Haaretz. 4 ກຸມພາ)

 

 

ສາດສະດາຈານ Adel Safty ເປັນຜູ້ຂຽນຂອງ From Camp David to the Gulf, Montreal, New York. ປຶ້ມລ່າສຸດຂອງລາວ, ຄວາມເປັນຜູ້ນໍາ ແລະ ປະຊາທິປະໄຕ ແມ່ນຈັດພິມໂດຍ IPSL Press, New York. 2004.

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