Make America Great Again? Don’t count on it.
Donald Trump was partly voted into office by Americans who felt that the self-proclaimed greatest power on Earth was actually in decline — and they weren’t wrong. Trump is capable of tweeting many things, but none of those tweets will stop that process of decline, nor will a trade war with a rising China or fierce oil sanctions on Iran.
You could feel this recently, even in the case of the increasingly pressured Iranians. There, with a single pinprick, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei effectively punctured President Trump’s MAGA balloon and reminded many that, however powerful the U.S. still was, people in other countries were beginning to look at America differently at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century.
Following a meeting in Tehran with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who brought a message from Trump urging the start of U.S.-Iranian negotiations, Khamenei tweeted, “We have no doubt in [Abe’s] goodwill and seriousness; but regarding what you mentioned from [the] U.S. president, I don’t consider Trump as a person deserving to exchange messages with, and I have no answer for him, nor will I respond to him in the future.” He then added: “We believe that our problems will not be solved by negotiating with the U.S., and no free nation would ever accept negotiations under pressure.”
Laghdaíodh Trump flustered go ag tweetáil go hachomair: “I personally feel that it is too soon to even think about making a deal. They are not ready, and neither are we!” And soon after, the president stopadh ag an nóiméad deireanach, agus cúlú thar a bheith uiríslithe, stailceanna aeir SAM ar shuíomhanna diúracán ón Iaráin a chruthódh fadhbanna níos dothuaslagtha fós do Washington ar fud an Mheánoirthir Mhór.
Coinnigh i gcuimhne, ar fud an domhain, sular cuireadh an Ayatollah síos, go raibh dhá theip ar bheartas eachtrach cheana féin ag riarachán Trump: thit cruinniú mullaigh Hanoi an Uachtaráin le ceannaire na Cóiré Thuaidh Kim Jong-un (ina dhiaidh sin lámhaigh gríosaitheach an réimis sin de roinnt. diúracáin thar Mhuir na Seapáine) agus iarracht bungled chun réimeas Uachtarán Veiniséala Nicolás Maduro a threascairt.
Seasamh Domhanda Mheiriceá ar an leibhéal is airde riamh
What’s great or small can be defined in absolute or relative terms. America’s “greatness” (or “eisceachtúla"Nó"fíor-riachtanach” nature) — much lauded in Washington before the Trump era –should certainly be judged against the economic progress made by China in those same years and against Russia’s advances in the latest high-tech weaponry. Another way of assessing the nature of that “greatness” and what to make of it would be through polls of how foreigners view the United States.
Tóg, mar shampla, suirbhé scaoileadh by the Pew Research Group in February 2019. Forty-five percent of respondents in 26 nations with large populations felt that American power and influence posed “a major threat to our country,” while 36% offered the same response on Russia, and 35% on China. To put that in perspective, in 2013, during the presidency of Barack Obama, only 25% of global respondents held such a negative view of the U.S., while reactions to China remained essentially the same. Or just consider the most powerful country in Europe, Germany. Between 2013 and 2018, Germans who considered American power and influence a greater threat than that of China or Russia léim from 19% to 49%. (Figures for France were similar.)
As for President Trump, only 27% of global respondents had muinín in him to do the right thing in world affairs, while 70% feared he would not. In Mexico, you undoubtedly won’t be surprised to learn, confidence in his leadership was at a derisory 6%. In 17 of the surveyed countries, people who lacked confidence in him were also significantly more likely to consider the U.S. the world’s top threat, a phenomenon most pronounced among traditional Washington allies like Canada, Great Britain, and Australia.
Lorg Méadaithe Domhanda na Síne
While 39% of Pew respondents in that poll rátáil fós the U.S. as the globe’s leading economic power, 34% opted for China. Meanwhile, China’s Chreasa agus Tionscnamh Road (BRI) launched in 2013 to link the infrastructure and trade of much of Southeast Asia, Eurasia, and the Horn of Africa to China (at an estimated cost of four trillion dollars) and to be funded by diverse sources, is going from strength to strength.
Bealach amháin chun é seo a thomhas: líon na n-uaisle a fhreastalaíonn ar an dara bliain Fóram BRI i mBéising. Mheall an chéad cheann de na cruinnithe sin i mBealtaine 2017 28 ceannaire stáit agus ionadaithe ó 100 tír. Bhí 37 ceannaire stáit agus ionadaithe ó bheagnach 150 tír agus eagraíocht idirnáisiúnta ag an gceann is déanaí, go déanach i mí Aibreáin, lena n-áirítear príomhfheidhmeannach an Chiste Airgeadaíochta Idirnáisiúnta (CAI) Christine Lagarde agus Ard-Rúnaí na Náisiún Aontaithe Antonio Guterres.
Ceannairí naonúr as 10 gCumann na Náisiún Oirdheisceart na hÁise i láthair, mar a rinne ceithre cinn de chúig phoblacht na hÁise Láir. Is díol suntais é gur ón Eoraip a tháinig trian de na ceannairí a ghlac páirt. De réir Peter Frankopan, author of The New Silk Roads, more than 80 countries are now involved in some aspect of the BRI project. That translates into more than 63% of the world’s population and 29% of its global economic output.
Fós, tá Uachtarán na Síne Xi Jinping rún ar lorg domhanda an BRI a leathnú tuilleadh, comhartha ar bhrionglóid na Síne maidir le móruaisleacht na todhchaí. Le linn cuairt stáit dhá lá i bhFeabhra ó Phrionsa na Corónach Mohammed bin Salman ar Beijing, mhol Xi, nuair a tháinig sé go dtí plean eacnamaíoch ró-uaillmhianach Riyadh, “gur cheart don dá thír síniú plean forfheidhmithe maidir le nascadh an Chreasa agus an Chreasa a bhrostú. Tionscnamh Bóthair le Fís na hAraibe 2030.”
Flattered ag an togra seo, an prionsa choróin cosanta Úsáid na Síne as campaí “athoideachais” do Mhoslamaigh Uighur ina cúige thiar de Xinjiang, ag maíomh go raibh “ceart” Beijing aige obair fhrithsceimhlitheoireachta a dhéanamh chun an tslándáil náisiúnta a chosaint. Faoi chruth comhrac in aghaidh antoisceachais, tá meastachán curtha ag údaráis na Síne milliún Uighur Muslims in such camps to undergo re-education designed to supplant their Islamic legacy with a Chinese version of socialism. Uighur groups had appealed to Prince bin Salman to take up their cause. No such luck: one more sign of the rise of China in the twenty-first century.
China Enters the High-Tech Race With America
In 2013, the German government launched an Tionscal 4.0 Plean meant to fuse cyber-physical systems, the Internet of things, cloud computing, and cognitive computing with the aim of increasing manufacturing productivity by up to 50%, while curtailing resources required by half. Two years later, emulating this project, Beijing published its own 10-year Déanta sa tSín plean 2025 bonn déantúsaíochta na tíre a nuashonrú trí 10 dtionscal ardteicneolaíochta a fhorbairt go tapa, lena n-áirítear gluaisteáin leictreacha agus feithiclí nua-fhuinnimh eile, teicneolaíocht faisnéise agus teileachumarsáide den chéad ghlúin eile, chomh maith le róbataic chun cinn agus intleacht shaorga, innealtóireacht aeraspáis, bonneagar iarnróid ard-deireadh , agus innealtóireacht mhuirí ardteicneolaíochta.
Cosúil le BRI, rinne an rialtas agus na meáin phoiblíocht agus chur chun cinn go bríomhar Déanta sa tSín 2025. Chuir sé seo eagla ar chorparáidí ardteicneolaíochta Washington agus Mheiriceá. Thar na blianta, bhí cuideachtaí Mheiriceá tar éis gearán a dhéanamh faoi goid na Síne ar mhaoin intleachtúil SAM, góchumadh brandaí cáiliúla, agus goid rúin trádála, gan labhairt faoi bhrú na ngnólachtaí Meiriceánacha i gcomhfhiontair le cuideachtaí áitiúla chun teicneolaíocht a roinnt mar phraghas. chun rochtain a fháil ar mhargadh ollmhór na Síne. D’éirigh a gcuid casaoidí níos glóraí nuair a tháinig Donald Trump isteach sa Teach Bán agus é meáite ar easnamh trádála bliantúil Washington de $380 billiún a ghearradh le Beijing.
Mar uachtarán, d'ordaigh Trump dá ionadaí trádála nua, an Sinophobe Robert Lighthizer, breathnú ar an ábhar. An seacht mí mar thoradh air imscrúdú pegged the loss U.S. companies experienced because of China’s unfair trade practices at $50 billion a year. That was why, in March 2018, President Trump treoir Lighthizer chun taraifí a thobhach ar allmhairí Síneacha de luach $50 billiún ar a laghad.
Thug sé sin le fios gur cuireadh tús le cogadh trádála Sino-Mheiriceánach nach bhfuil ach gaile faighte aige ó shin. Sa chomhthéacs seo, oifigigh na Síne thosaigh ag cur síos ar thábhacht Déanta sa tSín 2025, ag cur síos air mar rud ar bith níos mó ná plean spreagthach. An Mhárta seo, rith Comhdháil Náisiúnta na nDaoine na Síne fiú dlí um infheistíocht dhíreach eachtrach a bhí i gceist le dul i ngleic le cuid de na gearáin a bhí ag cuideachtaí SAM. Bhí a meicníocht forfheidhmithe lag, áfach. Trump go pras á éileamh go raibh an tSín tar éis dul siar ar a gealltanais maidir le hathruithe suntasacha a bhí idirbheartaithe ag an dá thír a ionchorprú i ndlí na Síne agus dréacht-chomhaontú a chur isteach chun deireadh a chur leis an gcogadh trádála. Ansin slapped sé taraifí breise ar $ 200 billiún in allmhairí na Síne.
Is é an príomhchnámh spairne do riarachán Trump dlí na Síne a shonraíonn, i gcomhfhiontar idir corparáid eachtrach agus cuideachta Síneach, go gcaithfidh an chéad cheann acu fios gnó teicneolaíochta a chur ar aghaidh chuig a chomhpháirtí Síneach. Feictear gur gadaíocht é sin ag Washington. De réir Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Yukon Huang, author of Cracking the China Conundrum: Why Conventional Economic Wisdom Is Wrong, however, it’s fully in accord with globally accepted guidelines. Such diffusion of technological know-how has played a significant role in driving growth globally, as the IMF’s 2018 World Economic Outlook report made clear. It’s worth noting as well that China now accounts for almost one-third of global annual economic growth.
Tá méid mhargadh na Síne chomh mór agus is féidir an ardú in its per capita gross domestic product — from $312 in 1980 to $9,769 in 2018 — so steep that major U.S. corporations generally accepted its long-established joint-venture law and that should surprise no one. Last year, for instance, General Motors a dhíoltar 3,645,044 vehicles in China and fewer than three million in the U.S. Little wonder then that, late last year, following GM plant closures across North America, part of a wide-ranging restructuring plan, the company’s management gan aird to a threat from President Trump to strip GM of any government subsidies. What angered the president, as he tweeted, caught the reality of the moment: nothing was “being closed in Mexico and China.”
Is é seo an rud nach féidir le Trump glacadh leis: tar éis beagnach dhá scór bliain d'athstruchtúrú slabhra soláthair agus comhtháthú eacnamaíoch domhanda, tá an tSín tar éis éirí as. an key industrial supplier for the United States and Europe. His attempt to make America great again by restoring the economic status quo ante before 2001 — the year China was admitted to the World Trade Organization — is doomed to fail.
I ndáiríre, cogadh trádála nó síocháin, tá an tSín ag tosú ag scoitheadh na SA san eolaíocht agus sa teicneolaíocht. A staidéar a dhéanamh ar by Qingnan Xie of Nanjing University of Science and Technology and Richard Freeman of Harvard University noted that, between 2000 and 2016, China’s global share of publications in the physical sciences, engineering, and mathmatics quadrupled and, in the process, exceeded that of the U.S. for the first time.
I réimse na teicneolaíochta ard, mar shampla, tá an tSín anois i bhfad chun tosaigh ar na Stáit Aontaithe i idirbhearta íocaíochta soghluaiste. In the first 10 months of 2017, those totaled $12.8 trillion, the result of vast numbers of consumers discarding credit cards in favor of cashless systems. In stark contrast, according to eMarketer, America’s mobile payment transactions in 2017 amounted to $49.3 billion. Last year, 583 milliún Síneach used mobile payment systems, with nearly 68% of China’s Internet users turning to a mobile wallet for their offline payments.
Ard-arm na Rúise
In a similar fashion, in his untiring pitch for America’s “beautiful” weaponry, President Trump has failed to grasp the impressive progress Russia has made in that field.
Agus físeáin agus radharcanna beoite á gcur i láthair aige ar dhiúracáin bhailistíochta idir-ilchríochacha, diúracáin chúrsála faoi thiomáint núicléach, agus drones faoi uisce ag seoladh teilifíse i mí an Mhárta 2018, rianaigh Uachtarán na Rúise Vladimir Putin forbairt arm nua a thíre féin ar chinneadh Washington tarraingt amach as an 1972. Conradh Diúracáin Frithbhallaíoch (ABM) leis an Aontas Sóivéadach. I mí na Nollag 2001, arna spreagadh ag John Bolton, a bhí ag an am sin ina rúnaí stáit um rialú arm agus slándáil idirnáisiúnta, bhí go deimhin ag an Uachtarán George W. Bush. tarraingthe siar ó chonradh ABM 1972 ar na forais bhréige gur athraigh ionsaithe 9/11 nádúr na cosanta do Mheiriceá. Chuir a chomhghleacaí Rúiseach ag an am, an Vladimir Putin céanna, síos ar an tarraingt siar ó bhunchloch sin na slándála domhanda mar bhotún mór. Thug ceann fórsaí armtha na Rúise, an Ginearál Anatoly Kvashnin, foláireamh ansin go n-athródh an tarraingt amach nádúr na cothromaíochta straitéisigh idirnáisiúnta, rud a chuirfeadh saor in aisce ar thíortha chun tógáil arm a atosú, idir thraidisiúnta agus núicléach.
Mar a tharla, ní fhéadfadh sé a bheith níos mó ar an marc. Tá SAM i mbun 30 bliain anois, trilliún-dollar-móide athdhéanamh agus nuashonrú ar a Arsenal núicléach, agus na Rúiseach (a bhfuil fardal de 6,500 arm núicléach i láthair beagán níos mó ná Meiriceá) imithe síos bealach comhchosúil. San aitheasc teilifíse sin dá chuid ar an oíche roimh thoghchán uachtaránachta na Rúise 2018, An liosta de Putin Bhí an Sarmat i gceannas ar airm núicléacha nua, diúracán ballistic idir-ilchríochach 30-tonna, a deirtear i bhfad níos deacra ag namhaid a thascradh sa chéim is leochailí díreach tar éis é a sheoladh. Tá líon níos mó de chinn chogaidh núicléacha á n-iompar aige freisin ná mar a bhí roimhe.
Another new weapon on his list was a nuclear-powered intercontinental underwater drone, Status-6, a submarine-launched autonomous vehicle with a range of 6,800 miles, capable of carrying a 100 megaton nuclear warhead. And then there was his country’s new nuclear-powered cruise missile with a “practically unlimited” range. In addition, because of its stealth capabilities, it will be hard to detect in flight and its high maneuverability will, theoretically at least, enable it to bypass an enemy’s defenses. Successfully tested in 2018, it does not yet have a name. Unsurprisingly, Putin won the presidency with 77% of the vote, a 13% rise from the previous poll, on record voter turnout of 67.7%.
I gcás armra traidisiúnta, tá córas diúracán S-400 na Rúise fós gan sárú. De réir an Cumann Rialaithe Arm atá bunaithe i Washington, “Is córas cosanta ard, soghluaiste, dromchla-go-aer é an córas S-400 de radair agus diúracáin de raonta éagsúla, atá in ann spriocanna éagsúla a scriosadh mar aerárthaí ionsaithe, buamaí, agus diúracáin ballistic oirbheartaíochta. De ghnáth bíonn ocht lainseálaí, 112 diúracán, agus feithiclí ordaithe agus tacaíochta i ngach ceallra.” Tá an diúracán S-400 a raon 400 ciliméadar (250 míle), agus creidtear go bhfuil a chóras comhtháite in ann suas le 80 sprioc a laghdú ag an am céanna.
Smaoinigh sé gur comhartha de na huaire, ach i ar neamhchead of pressure from the Trump administration not to buy Russian weaponry, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, the only Muslim member of NATO, ordaíodh ceannach cadhnraí de na diúracáin an-S-400 sin. Tá saighdiúirí Turcacha á n-oiliúint faoi láthair ar na córais airm sin sa Rúis. Táthar ag súil go dtiocfaidh an chéad cheallraí sa Tuirc an mhí seo chugainn.
Mar an gcéanna, i mí Aibreáin 2015, an Rúis sínithe conradh chun diúracáin S-400 a sholáthar chun na Síne. Tharla an chéad seachadadh ar an gcóras i mí Eanáir 2018 agus rinne an tSín tástáil air i mí Lúnasa.
An Expanding Beijing-Moscow Alliance
Smaoinigh, mar chéim eile i gcomhordú míleata na Rúise-Síneach, dúshlán a thabhairt d'éileamh Washington gurb é an t-aon sárchumhacht an phláinéid. Mar an gcéanna, i mí Mheán Fómhair seo caite, ghlac 3,500 trúpaí Síneach páirt sna cleachtaí míleata is mó riamh sa Rúis ina raibh 300,000 saighdiúir, 36,000 feithicil míleata, 80 long, agus 1,000 aerárthach, héileacaptair agus drones. Cóidainmnithe Vostok-2018, it took place across a vast region that included the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan. Little wonder that NATO officials cur síos air Vostok-2018 mar léiriú ar fhócas méadaitheach na Rúise ar choinbhleacht mhórscála sa todhchaí: “Léiríonn sé le patrún atá feicthe againn le tamall anuas - Rúis níos teanntásaí, ag méadú go suntasach a buiséad cosanta agus a láithreacht mhíleata." D'fhreastail Putin ar na cleachtaí tar éis Óstáil fóram eacnamaíoch i Vladivostok áit a raibh Uachtarán na Síne Xi mar aoi aige. “Tá naisc iontaofa againn i réimsí polaitiúla, slándála agus cosanta,” a dhearbhaigh sé, agus mhol Xi cairdeas an dá thír, a dúirt sé, a bhí “ag éirí níos láidre an t-am ar fad.”
A bhuí le hathrú aeráide, tá an Rúis agus an tSín ag obair le chéile anois san Artach atá ag leá go tapa. An bhliain seo caite an Rúis, a rialaíonn níos mó ná leath de chósta an Artach, sheoladh a chéad long trí Bhealach na Mara Thuaidh gan briseadh oighir sa gheimhreadh. Mhol Putin an nóiméad sin mar “ócáid mhór in oscailt suas an Artaigh.”
Beartas Artach Beijing, ar dtús leagtha amach in January 2018, described China as a “near-Arctic” state and visualized the future shipping routes there as part of a potential new “Polar Silk Road” that would both be useful for resource exploitation and for enhancing Chinese security. Shipping goods to and from Europe by such a passage would shorten the distance to China by 30% compared to present sea routes through the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars per voyage.
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic Tá petroleum reserves equal to 412 billion barrels of oil, or about 22% of the world’s undiscovered hydrocarbons. It also has deposits of rare earth metals. China’s second Arctic vessel, Xuelong 2 (Snow Dragon 2), tá sé sceidealta a thuras tosaigh a dhéanamh níos déanaí i mbliana. Tá infheistíocht na Síne ag teastáil ón Rúis chun na hacmhainní nádúrtha a bhaint amach faoina reo permafrost. Go deimhin, tá an tSín cheana féin ar an infheisteoir eachtrach is mó i dtionscadail gáis nádúrtha leachtaithe (GNL) na Rúise sa réigiún — agus seoladh an chéad lastas GNL chuig cúige oirthear na Síne an samhradh seo caite trí Bhealach na Mara Thuaidh. Tá a chorparáid ollmhór ola ag tosú anois ag druileáil le haghaidh gáis in uiscí na Rúise taobh leis an gcuideachta Rúiseach Gazprom.
Tá Washington faoi bhrón. I mí Aibreáin, ina thuarascáil bhliantúil is déanaí don Chomhdháil ar chumhacht mhíleata na Síne, an Pentagon don chéad uair san áireamh alt ar an Artach, ag tabhairt foláireamh faoi na rioscaí a bhaineann le láithreacht mhéadaithe na Síne sa réigiún, lena n-áirítear an bhféadfadh an tír sin fomhuireáin núicléacha a imscaradh ansin amach anseo. I mí na Bealtaine, d’úsáid an Rúnaí Stáit Mike Pompeo cruinniú d’airí gnóthaí eachtracha i Rovaniemi, san Fhionlainn, chun an tSín a ionsaí as a “iompar ionsaitheach” san Artach.
In óráid níos luaithe, Pompeo faoi deara gur infheistigh an tSín beagnach $2012 billiún sa réigiún Artach ó 2017 go 90. “Táimid buartha faoi éileamh na Rúise ar uiscí idirnáisiúnta Bhealach na Mara Thuaidh, lena n-áirítear a pleananna nuafhógartha chun é a nascadh le Bóthar Síoda Muirí na Síne,” a dúirt sé. Chuir sé in iúl ansin, feadh an bhealaigh sin, “go bhfuil Moscó ag éileamh go neamhdhleathach cheana ar náisiúin eile cead a fháil chun pas a fháil, go n-éilíonn sé ar phíolótaí muirí na Rúise a bheith ar bord long eachtrannach, agus go bhfuil bagairt aige fórsa míleata a úsáid chun aon duine nach gcomhlíonann a n-éilimh a chur faoi uisce.”
An American Downturn Continues
Altogether, the tightening military and economic ties between Russia and China have put America on the defensive, contrary to Donald Trump’s MAGA promise to American voters in the 2016 campaign. It’s true that, despite fraying diplomatic and economic ties between Washington and Moscow, Trump’s personal relations with Putin remain cordial. (The two periodically exchange friendly phone calls.) But among Russians more generally, a favorable view of the U.S. thit from 41% in 2017 to 26% in 2018, according to a Pew Research survey.
There’s nothing new about great powers, even the one that proclaimed itself the greatest in history, declining after having risen high. In our acrimonious times, that’s a reality well worth noting. While launching his bid for reelection recently, Trump proposed a bombastic new slogan: “Coinnigh Meiriceá Mhór”(Nó KAG), as if he had indeed raised America’s stature while in office. He would have been far more on target, however, had he suggested the slogan “Depress America More” (or DAM) to reflect the reality of an uachtarán unpopular atá os comhair iomaitheoirí móra cumhachta atá ag ardú thar lear.
Dilip Hiro, a TomDispatch rialtais é an t-údar Tar éis Impireacht: An Breith Domhanda Ilpolar i measc go leor leabhar eile. Tá a leabhar is déanaí Cogadh Fuar sa Domhan Ioslamach: an Araib Shádach, an Iaráin agus an Streachailt ar son na Ceannasaíochta (ar thaifead sé faoi an podchraoladh seo).
Tháinig an t-alt seo le feiceáil den chéad uair ar TomDispatch.com, log gréasáin de chuid na hInstitiúide Nation, a thairgeann sreabhadh seasta foinsí malartacha, nuacht, agus tuairim ó Tom Engelhardt, eagarthóir fada i bhfoilsitheoireacht, comhbhunaitheoir an American Empire Project, údar The End of Victory Culture, mar úrscéal, The Last Days of Publishing. Is é a leabhar is déanaí ná A Nation Unmade By War (Haymarket Books).
Is trí fhlaithiúlacht a léitheoirí amháin a mhaoinítear ZNetwork.
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