Michael Albert’s discussion of democratic decision making, is broadly applicable. That is, he lays out logically the core components which will vary and interact from decision to decision, based on other variables which he also discusses. Albert opens chapter 5 with a discussion of workers and consumer councils, then proceeds into the largest part of the chapter, which focuses on the procedures and decision rules for decision making within these councils, which are present in various locations and are federated from the most local to the most centralized level. 

Two important concepts which Albert focuses on in the chapter are the participatory preparations which should include respect for all interested actors, and consideration of their preferences in proportion to the extent that they will be affected by the outcome of the given policy, information gathering and dissemination, collective assessment by the participants, as well as deliberation and, finally, decision making. In addition to the process of deliberation and arriving at a decision, Albert also focuses on the rules for making the decision, which really have two main components: (1) the consent threshold required for the decision to be implemented (e.g., simple majority, or unanimity (which Albert refers to as “consensus”)), (2) veto power (this may be granted to those with intense and justified opposition to the given policy). 

Under unanimity rule, or “consensus rule”, everyone has veto power, and each individual will determine the degree to which they will be affected by a particular outcome (as opposed to, say, unilateral rule, where one individual takes into account information and determines the extent to which dissenting individuals’ votes should be weighted in proportion to the extent the decider determines they are affected by the proposal). If a policy is not implemented, or if the procedure is to arduous and/or time-consuming, the problem might not be the procedure, but rather the policy proposal itself, Albert notes. Problematic procedures and outcomes may warrant a higher consent threshold. In contrast to the consensus rule, a supermajority, or 2/3 consent rule, plus veto power, might be applied, for instance, by a worker’s council when deciding whether or not to hire a new worker.

Albert observes that decision rules should be chosen so as to “make life easier”, by approximating more closely the appropriate level of input for each individual or party participating in the decision. The decision rule is important, in that it will determine the appropriate input for each voter, however the consent threshold established may differ depending on the circumstance. By “appropriate input” Albert means that the extent to which a dissenting view will (or should) be weighed on the final decision will be a function of the extent to which that dissident is affected by the proposal being voted on.

To illustrate the comparative effectiveness of different decision rules, Albert considers both 2/3 consent + veto and Simple Majority – veto. The effectiveness of the decision rule can be determined, in these cases, either be the veto of the dissident with the intense opposition under the 2/3 + veto rule, or via effective deliberation under the SM – veto rule. Two of the main indicators of decision making effectiveness include the ease of the decision making process and the speed of the process. The accuracy of the proportional weight alloted to each vote will be achieved will be achieved with more or less difficulty depending on the efficacy of the deliberative process (which may itself be effected by the the decision rule which is decided upon before the procedure begins, one might suppose). 

Albert points out two ironies concerning the comparative effectiveness concerning the comparative effectiveness of both the consensus rule and the simple majority rule. The first irony is that while one might expect those who advocate the mediation of views based on mutual assessment of the other participants’ preferences to be for consensus, in actuality, individuals advocating deliberative consensus building should actually favor majority rule (without veto), because without a veto, the effectiveness of the process will require successful deliberation. The second irony is that irony one reverses the logic which should be used by councils: councils ought to favor consensus, but, to be effective, only a passionate veto, respected by a countervailing majority, is required in order to achieve an effective outcome. 

The goals to maximize in a deliberative decision making process include:

Appropriate level of give and take between individuals and/or parties

Exploration of different ideas on the table and different information presented

Mutual understanding of different views expressed

Appropriate levels of influence depending on the level of importance and time to make decision

Communication can be coerced, Albert observes, if the procedure chosen fails because that communication is not optimal, which, in turn, will force people to spend more time deliberating than another procedure would require.

The goal of accurately allotting proportionate say to each individual based on the extent to which they are affected can be done by choosing the right voting procedure. The result of this choice, may be as follows: if the deliberative process chosen doesn’t work well, (e.g., if too much time is consumed, or if the process is too arduous relative to the issue’s importance), then the amount of distortion done to that procedure by the communicative inadequacy is minimized. 

Ultimately, a good process of decision making will require greater effort, especially if we seek to achieve unanimity all the time. This is the case because, without this greater effort, results could be highly inefficient (e.g., if too much time is spent trying to convince others to vote yea, but never reaching consensus). On the other hand, advocates of Simple Majority rule might say, “lets take the middle road”, (i.e., between total effort expended to maximize goals, and no effort). 

Ultimately, the deliberative procedure and voting rule will vary based on local determinants. To illustrate this point, Albert shares a hypothetical worker’s council decision making procedure, concerning the possibility of investing in a certain good or resource. First, the workers will decide on a decision rule: Simple majority – veto may be better for investment decisions. Why? A couple reasons Albert highlights are that it be easier to enact, and also because individuals will be less likely to diverge from their optimal choices due to errors or bad faith. It is reasonable to expect that it will be harder to assess the impact of new heating systems on oneself, for instance, and so one is also faced with a lower degree of certainty concerning whether or not he/she will have a moral right to veto that proposal (i.e., he/she will be more prone to error). Albert offers an illustrative counter-factual: With few people, plenty of time to deliberate, and a thorough information flow, consensus rule would be optimal. However, without these features, consensus rule is likely to bring about inefficient and wasteful procedures and outcomes.  

Thus the optimal rule for investing in a new heater in the worker’s council might be:

One-person, one-vote

Majority Threshold

Veto power for intense opposition (x2)

This rule is deemed the “correct apportionment of influence”. Less pressure to strive for consensus is required under such a rule, in that hypothetical situation, as well. Albert formalizes the situation thusly: majority rule will be appropriate when the degree of sensitivity required for the chosen approach for deciding upon the investment, plus the harm from error due to poor process resulting from that majority rule, is less than, the degree to which the same factors result from the consensus rule. 

Decision rules are a means towards an end, not an end in themselves. This point underscores Albert’s point about local flexibility with regards to the adaptation of decision making procedures and voting rules. The end towards which these means should be aimed, however, are as follows:

Proportionate influence

Informed influence

Participatory influence

Efficient influence

Would should seek to maximize these goals based on principle, but the means to do so are themselves not set in stone.

There is a hypothetical idea formula, which can lead to perfect outcomes, and it is as follows: 

Perfect decision making process + Perfect people (ie., no errors of judgement) + Any decision rule = Perfect Outcome (ie., consensus)

This formula can even apply to a unilateral decision maker, who, taking into account all information and weighing votes perfectly in proportion to the extent individuals are affected by those decisions, a single decision maker can make the right decision (and his decision will obviously be consensual). Still, there are at least four good reasons why decisions ought not be made unilaterally, at least all of the time: (1) Everyone can’t understand everyone else’s situation perfectly. The obstacles can be based on an honest lack of understanding or dishonest self-interest and bias of the decision maker. (2) Even with perfect information, the decision maker will not always act honorably. (3) No dissent will be recorded (only the yea or nay of the unilateral decision maker). Without a record of the preference distributions, the council might forget about the minority and/or overlook their interests. (4) Unilateral decision making would foster steadily reduced participation and self-management, presumably because, given the reduced calls for civic input and exercise in the deliberative process and decision making, individuals will come to over-rely on the unilateral decision maker.

Wrapping up Chapter 5, Albert goes over two of the main reasons to support a flexible approach to decision making: (1) Each person involved in a decision will be more likely to receive an appropriately weighted impact on the final decision; and (2) It will minimize the extent to which a participant can distort decisions by less closely approximating ideal proportionate vote weighting. 

You don’t always need the same rule. That is, according to Albert, there is no one right approach which can be applied in all similar situations, for local situations will carry with them different characteristics which much be evaluated at a local level in all their nuanced richness. (This openness to flexibility seems to suggest that there may even be appropriate times for unilateral decision making). The overarching goal is to maximize self-management, at all levels of workers and consumer councils, from the local to the most centralized levels. To do so, participants need information, confidence, empowerment and skill. They should determine the appropriate decision rules given the time and hassle involved and considering the potential for error and abuse. Furthermore, councils should seek to attain the appropriately informed decision making influence level, in proportion to the degree actors are affected by the outcomes of the policies under consideration.

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