Here are lists of worksheets for groups that are organizing action on Representatives and Senators, or for other purposes. These come from books by Roger Fisher of the Harvard Negotiation Project and various co-writers. The worksheets can show some of the “how -to” stuff better than explanations. The list illustrates some of what’s out there. There is, of course, much overlap. If you want to read about a particular approach in various books, however, the check out the overlaps.
Clearly, as you will see by the end, there’s a lot involved in “specifically what to do.” The length of this post is not meant to be discouraging, but rather to show ways to move ahead quickly, to groups geared up for serious work in the long haul. It’s for those who really want to win.
I recommend starting with the book “Beyond Machiavelli,” but here I will start with “Getting Ready to Negotiate: The Getting to Yes Workbook,” as it has two good, brief introductory worksheets. These are:
Sudden Prep (helps you learn where to start in a hurry)
Priority Prep (I set this out as a checklist on a spreadsheet).
Other worksheets are set out under the “seven elements of negotiation” (in CAPITAL letters). These are:
INTERESTS 1: Identify the Relevant Parties
INTERESTS 2: Clarify the Interests
INTERESTS 3: Probe for Underlying Interests
OPTIONS 1: Create Options to Meet Interests
OPTIONS 2: Find Ways to Maximize Joint Gains
ALTERNATIVES 1: Think of My Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement
ALTERNATIVES 2: Select and Improve My BATNA
ALTERNATIVES 3: Identify Alternatives Open to the Other Side
ALTERNATIVES 4: Estimate Their BATNA
LEGITIMACY 1: Use External Standards as a Sword and as a Shield
LEGITIMACY 2: Use the Fairness of the Process to Persuade
LEGITIMACY 3: Offer Them an Attractive way to Explain Their Decision
COMMUNICATION 1: Question My Assumptions and Identify Things to Listen For
COMMUNICATION 2: Reframe to Help Them Understand
RELATIONSHIP 1: Separate People Issues from substantive Issues
RELATIONSHIP 2: Prepare to Build a Good Working Relationship
COMMITMENT 1: Identify the Issues to Be Included in the Agreement
COMMITMENT 2: Plan the Steps to Agreement
Here is the list of charts for Beyond Machiavelli, with page numbers. Some are filled out as informational charts (ie. Syrian Israeli).
1 Partisan Perceptions (Syrian Israeli) 26 2 col
2 Putting Ourselves in Their Shoes (Cuban Missile) 30 2 col
3 Three Positions for Observing a Conflict 33 1 col
4 Positions & Interests (Sikh Hindu) 40 2 col
5 Message Analysis 45 2 col
6 Contrasting Message Intended with Message Sent (US Vietnam) 46 3 col
7 Currently Perceived Choice of a Decisionmaker 51 2 col
8 Consequences Likely to Be Important ot a Decisionmaker 53 1 col
9 Currently Perceived Choice (Saddam Hussein) 55 2 col
10 Target Future Choice of a Decisionmaker 58 2 col
11 Currently Perceived Choice (Cyprus) 60 2 col
12 Currently Perceived Choice (Cyprus) 61 2 col
13 Target Future Choice (Cyprus) 62 2 col
14 Target Future Choice (Cyprus) 63 2 col
15 Currently Perceived Choice (Serb) 65 2 col
16 A Four-Quadrant Analysis for Problem-Solving 69 4 col
17 A Four-Quadrant Analysis (South Africa 70 4 col
18 Seven Elements of a Conflict Situation 75 1 col
19 An Atlas of Approaches 83 2 col
20 Atlas of Approaches (Russia) 84 1 col
21 Implicit Constraints on Meetings and How to Loosen Them 86 2 col
22 Generate Fresh Ideas through Brainstorming 88 1 col
23 Some Guidelines for Brainstorming 89 1 col
24 Draft Invitation to a Devising Session 91 1 col
25 Putting an Idea into Action 103 1 col
26 Target Future Choice of a Decisionmaker 104 2 col
27 Some Ethical Criteria to Consider Before Making a Proposal 113 1 col
28 How a Future Decision Cold Be Announced (Iran/US) 116 1 col
29 How a Future Decision Cold Be Announced (Iran/US) 117 1 col
30 Political Constraints on Choice (NAFTA) 118 2 col
31 Some Third Party Roles for Coping with a Conflict 124 3 col
32 Lọwọlọwọ ti fiyesi Yiyan (Concession-Hunting Mediator) 127 2 col
33 Lọwọlọwọ ti fiyesi Yiyan (One Text) 128 2 col
34 Lọwọlọwọ ti fiyesi Yiyan (End of One Text) 130 2 col
35 Two Ways of Generating a Draft Proposal 131 2 col
36 Lọwọlọwọ ti fiyesi Yiyan (Ni ikọja Machiavelli Reader) 141 2 col
Bold items are blank workbook charts
underlined items are informational and may be typed with fewer columns
The same applies below to charts from Coping with International Conflict. This seems to be a textbook version of the same kind of material, and is more comprehensive. Numbers on the left border (ie. 4.1) refer to chapters (ie. chapter 4).
4.1, Assumptions/Data Tool p. 49
4.2 Russia US example
4.3 Partisan Perception toolSyrian/Israeli p. 52 example
4.4 Partisan Perception tool(Two-party Example p. 53 example
4.5 Cuban Missile Crisis example p. 54
4.6 Emotions and Motives Tool, p. 58
4.7 UK Argentina example p. 59
4.8 UK Mexico example
4.9 akosile of some frequent differences of interest p. 64
4-10 Positions and Interests tool p. 65
4.11 Golan Heights example
5.1 Message to the other side p. 73
5.2 Message tool p. 76
5.3 Northern Ireland example
5.4 Noriega Panama example
5.5 Currently Perceived Choice Tool p. 81
5.6 CPC Tool General Example p. 82
Categories of Consequences for a Decision-Maker p. 83
5.7 CPC tool Israel/?West Bank
Potential Agreements of Differing Strengths p. 131 (adjectives)
9.1 Standard Moves of Two Negotiating Strategies (Hard/Soft) p. 136
9.2 Illustrative Standard Moves of Three Negotiating Games (Friendly, Hard, Congruent) p. 139
9.3 What Negotiating Game Should We Play P.143
9.4 Game Analysis Tool p. 144
9.5 Working Assumptions about the Game Being Played p. 145
l0.1 Is there a Need for Inventing p. 150
l0.2 Aworan Circle (4 quadrant analysis) p. 154
l1.1 Awọn iṣoro to ṣeeṣe (Victory, Power, Peace) p. 162
l1.2 Irinṣẹ Idi p. 164
l1.3 Purpose Tool Cuban Missile Crisis
l1.4 Tool on Educational Ends and Means p. 172
l1.5 German example p. 173
l1.6 German example p. 174
l3.1 Effectiveness of Inflicted Pain p. 201
l3.2 Vietnam example p. 202
l3.3 Costs and Benefits Circle Vietnam Example p. 203
l3.3 Costs and Benefits Circle p. 203-206
l4.1 Elements of First Order Compliance p. 227 1 or
l4.2 Elements of Second Order Compliance p. 229 1 or
l5.1 Questions That May Help Illuminate our Own Moral Criteria p. 240
l5.2 Tool on Policy p. 250
l6.1 Point of Choice Tool, p. 256
l6.2 Point of Choice Tool, Northern Ireland, p. 257
l7.1 Currently Perceived Choice Tool Jerusalem p. 261
l7.2 Currently Perceived Choice Tool Jerusalem p. 262
l7.3 Target Future Choice Tool Jerusalem p. 263
l7.4 Currently Perceived Choice Tool Jerusalem p. 264
l7.5 Future Target Choice Tool (general example) p. 270
l7.6 Posible Iranian Statement p. 272
l7.7 Posible U.S. Statement p. 273
l7.8 Political Restraints on Their Choice p. 274
l7.9 Political Restraints on Their Choice Israel PLO p. 275-6
Here is a list of 63 action ideas from International Mediation. I set them out as a yes/no checklist on a spreadsheet. Each has explanations in the book. Note that an organizer is a facilitator of negotiation, though not quite like a mediator. These are especially useful for a deeper view, or after they say “no.”
Ifihan.
1 How about keeping a working journal? (13)
PART I: THE HUMAN PROBLEM
A. Coping with problems of emotions and motivation.
2 How about discussing a CHART of the problem with each party? (29)
3 How about a session for “letting off steam”? (29)
4 How about giving the parties a joint task? (31)
5 How about building on some common professional training (such as that of military officers or economists)? (32)
6 How about having them work on plans that make an agreed future look more attractive and credible? (32)
7 How about rewarding constructive work with personal credit? (33)
8 How about stimulating symbolic gestures of good feelings? (33)
B. Coping with problems of perception.
9 How about preparing and discussing a CHART of partisan perceptions? (34)
10 How about preparing and discussing some BALANCE SHEETS of each party’s presently perceived choice? (38)
11 How about helping the parties test their expectations against the reality of opposing interest? (42)
12 Might perceptions be helped by informal joint discussion? (43)
13 Might personal accounts help? (44)
“Help me with the facts”
“What’s important?”
“Kini aṣiṣe bayi?”
“Should we divide up?”
“Can this be a joint task?”
C. Coping with problems of communication.
14 How about excluding the public audiences? (47)
15 Might it help to encourage better listening? (49)
16 How about writing what they’re saying and what they’re hearing? (50)
17 Would it help to ask the parties to acknowledge communication received? (56)
18 Would it help communication to have a ground -rule against attributing motives or intentions? (56)
19 How about less communication between the parties? (57)
PART II: THE INVENTING PROBLEM
A. For coping with unawareness of the importance of inventing.
20 How about discussing with the parties a CHART contrasting existing options with better ones? (68)
21 How about LISTING the substantive options currently on the table? (69)
22 How about discussing specific options as an answer to the problem of the slippery slope? (69)
B. For coping with constraints on the inventing process.
23 How about organizing a brainstorming session? (71)
Ti o?
Ibi ti?
Nigbawo?
Idi?
Atmosphere?
Ground-rules?
Roles?
A rapporteur?
24 How about brainstorming with the parties separately? (76)
25 How about using outside inventors? (76)
26 How about doing some private inventing yourself? (77)
C. For stimulating invention of more and better options.
27 How about focusing on divergent interests of the parties? (78)
Are there different assessments of the future?
28 How about looking through the eyes of different disciplines? (82)
29 How about looking for solutions that would be principled, durable, and compliance-prone? (84)
30 How about making existing options more operational? (86)
31 How about changing the scope of a proposed agreement? (88)
32 How about inventing procedural solutions to substantive problems? (89)
33 How about inventing agreements of different strengths? (89)
34 How about multiplying options through the use of the CIRCLE CHART? (90)
35 How about looking at the substantive choice each party would face? (93)
PART III: THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM
A. For making the procedural problems explicit.
36 How about using a simple analogy? (110)
37 How about jointly writing out the operating assumptions of the existing negotiating process? (112)
B. For loosening the parties from their negotiating positions.
38 How about avoiding steps that will tend to commit them more deeply? (113)
39 How about separating the parties interests from their positions? (114)
40 How about making present positions irrelevant to the process? (116)
C. For changing the game that the parties are playing.
(a) So far as the players and their roles are concerned.
41 How about adding a party to the negotiating process? (117)
42 How about going ahead with fewer parties? (118)
43 How about changing the mediator’s role (or the mediator)? (119)
44 How about moving up or down the bureaucratic hierarchy? (121)
(b) So far as the goals of the game are concerned.
45 How about helping each side try to strengthen the moderate tendencies of the other? (123)
46 How about pursuing some new goals? (123)
(c) So far as the standard moves are concerned.
47 How about insisting upon principled negotiations? (124)
48 How about asking for contingent offers? (125)
59 How about leaving positions intact while inventing? (126)
50 How about working with a single negotiating text? (126)
51 How about some middle-level drafting of alternative clauses? (130)
D. For changing the choices faced by each party.
(a) So far as the decision itself is concerned.
52 How about offering them a “yesable proposition?” (132)
53 How about making the decision smaller? (134)
54 How about reducing the number of decisions required? (134)
(b) So far as the balance sheet of pros and cons is concerned.
55 How about changing the domestic political costs and benefits? (135)
56 How about making proposed promises more credible? (137)
57 How about substituting offers for threats? (139)
58 How about making a choice a fading opportunity? (141)
(c) So far as the manner in which the decision is asked for.
59 How about starting low on the asking ladder? (141)
60 How about making suggestions privately first? (143)
61 How about changing the perceived ownership of the idea? (143)
62 How about using CHECK LISTS to stimulate thinking? (144)
63 How about jotting down your own ideas? (144)
Here are other charts from International Mediation:
Aworan 1: RELATING THEORY TO PRACTICE: Whose job is it to use theory to produce better answers? (3)
Aworan 2: CIRCLE CHART: The Four Basic Steps in Applying Theory to Practice (5)
Aworan 3: VARIOUS SYMPTOMS OF A NEGOTIATING PROBLEM (7)
Aworan 4: THE NEGOTIATING PROBLEM DIVIDED INTO THREE STRANDS: eniyan, Eroja ati ilana (9)
Aworan 5: THE HUMAN DIMENSION: Is there a problem with the people? (18)
Aworan 6: ARE THERE PROBLEMS OF EMOTION AND MOTIVATION (28)
Aworan 7: PARTISAN PERCEPTIONS (37)
Aworan 8: PRESENTLY PERCEIVED CHOICE: Of President Sadat of Egypt (40)
Aworan 9: PRESENTLY PERCEIVED CHOICE: Of Prime Minister Begin of Israel (41)
Aworan 10: CROSS-CONFLICT COMMUNICATION: Fifiranṣẹ ati Gba (53)
Aworan 11: WHAT’S THE MESSAGE: Standard Form (54)
Aworan 12: WHAT’S THE MESSAGE: Illustrative example; U.S. and North Vietnam, say, 1965 (55)
Aworan 13: THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSION: Is there a need for inventing? (63)
Aworan 14: BRAINSTORMING: The case for permitting only positive feedback (75)
Aworan 15: LOOKING BEHIND OPPOSING POSITIONS: For interests that may be reconcilable (81)
Aworan 16: HOW THE CHOICE LOOKS: To the Greek Government (95)
Aworan 17: THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS: Is there a problem? (101)
Aworan 18: WHAT ARE SOME WORKING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE GAME BEING PLAYED? (105)
Aworan 19: SOME ALTERNATIVE PERCEPTIONS FOR A MEDIATOR OF THE GAME HE PLAYS (107)
Aworan 20: EACH PARTY’S PRESENTLY PERCEIVED CHOICE: General Example (133)
There are a few more charts in other books by Fisher et al., including:
International Conflict for Beginners, the MAP chart in chapter five (p. 48) is a great overall chart. See the same info as an outline (Demand/Offer/Costs; Who/What/When/Why) in Ni ikọja Machiavelli, ch. 3. See the chapter “Making Threats is Not Enough” and chart here:
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/hnp/writing/books/international3.pdf Fisher’s book Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace, is a sort of companion volume to International conflict for Beginners. Though dated, this book illustrates in detail a variety of specific “yesable propositions.” See http://www.pon.harvard.edu/hnp/theory/tools/yesable.shtml and follow the link “concept excercises” there to learn more about this key method. See also Ni ikọja Machiavelli p. 96-98.
Getting Together, (I make a yes/no checklist (on a spreadsheet) from the questions in “How Good is Our Relationship,” p. 178.)
Ngba Ti o ti kọja No (William Ury), (has simple Preparation Worksheet in appendix, p. 173). See also his The Third Side (Ni akọkọ Getting to Peace) at http://www.thirdside.org/resources.cfm?language=English. Note however that he does not include the role of organizer as a facilator of negotiation between decision makers and “the people.”
Another useful introduction for using these materials together can be found at:
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/hnp/theory/tools/tools.shtml. This page includes links to Currently Perceived Choice charts (blank and filled out examples) and “the Seven Elements of Negotiation” which serves as the structure for Getting Ready to Negotiate [workbook]. It also gives page numbers for various key Fisher books related to this discussion.
Well, I thought I should get some of this material out there into the discussion. Let’s make it happen.
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