In the commentary on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, the news and infotainment media have predictably framed the discussion by the question of how successful the CIA and the military have been in destroying al Qaeda. Absent from the torrent of opinion and analysis was any mention of how the U.S. military occupation of Muslim lands and wars that continue to kill Muslim civilians fuel jihadist sentiment that will keep the threat of terrorism high for many years to come.
The failure to have that discussion is not an accident. In December 2007, at a conference in Washington, D.C. on al Qaeda, former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin offered a laundry list of things the United States could do to reduce the threat from al Qaeda. But he said nothing about the most important thing to be done: pledging to the Islamic world that the United States would pull its military forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq and end its warfare against those in Islamic countries resisting U.S. military presence.
During the coffee break, I asked him whether that item shouldn’t have been on his list. “You’re right,” he answered. And then he added, “But we can’t do that.”
“किन हुन्न,” मैले सोधें।
"किनभने," उनले भने, "हामीले ती युद्धहरूमा मारिएका सिपाहीहरूको परिवारलाई उनीहरूका प्रियजनहरू व्यर्थमा मरे भनेर बताउनुपर्छ।"
उनको स्पष्टीकरण जाहिर छ। तर अमेरिकाको निरन्तर युद्धले वास्तवमा संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका विरुद्ध आतंकवादको जोखिम बढाउँछ भन्ने कुरामा सहमत हुँदा, बेन्जामिनले खुफिया र प्रतिआतंकवाद समुदायहरू पहिले नै पुगिसकेका निष्कर्षहरू मात्र प्रतिबिम्बित गरिरहेका थिए।
राष्ट्रिय खुफिया अनुमान मा "विश्वव्यापी आतंकवादको प्रवृत्ति" issued in April 2006 concluded that the war in Iraq was “breeding deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim World and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” It found that “activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.” And in a prophetic warning, it said “the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance…particularly abroad but also at home.”
Given the way intelligence assessments get watered down as they ascend the hierarchy of officials, these were remarkably alarming conclusions about the peril that U.S. occupation of Iraq posed to the United States. And that alarm was shared by at least some counter-terrorism officials as well. Robert Grenier, who had been head of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center in 2005-06, was quoted in the July 25, 2007 लस एन्जलस टाइम्स as saying the war “has convinced many Muslims that the United States is the enemy of Islam and is attacking Muslims, and they have become jihadists as a result of their experience in Iraq.”
As the war in Iraq wound down, the U.S. war in Afghanistan — especially the war being waged by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) — was generating more hatred for the United States. As JSOC scaled up its “night raids” in Afghanistan, it never got the right person in more than 50 percent of the raids, as even senior commanders in JSOC भर्खर भर्ना गर्नवाशिंगटन पोस्ट। That indicated that a very large proportion of those killed and detained were innocent civilians. Not surprisingly, the populations of entire districts and provinces were enraged by those raids.
यदि पृथ्वीमा एक ठाउँ छ जहाँ पुरुष जनसंख्यालाई दीर्घकालीन आधारमा विरोध गर्नु स्पष्ट रूपमा तर्कहीन छ, यो अफगानिस्तान र पाकिस्तानमा फैलिएको पश्तून क्षेत्र हो, जहाँ परिवार र साथीहरूको हत्याको लागि सम्मान र बदला लिने आदिवासी संस्कृति हो। ।
Meanwhile, after fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 2001, al Qaeda had rebuilt a large network of Pashtun militants in the Pashtun northwest. As the murdered Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad recounted in अल-कायदा र तालिबान भित्र, President Pervez Musharraf, under pressure from Washington, began in 2003 to use the Pakistani army to try to destroy the remnants of al Qaeda by force with helicopter strikes and ground forces. But instead of crushing al Qaeda, those operations further radicalized the population of those al Qaeda base areas, by convincing them that the Pakistani government and army was merely a tool of U.S. control.
अल कायदालाई समाप्त गर्न मुशर्रफको असफलता र अफगानिस्तानमा तालिवान विद्रोहको तीव्र वृद्धिबाट निराश बुश प्रशासनले ड्रोन युद्ध सुरु गर्यो। ठूलो संख्यामा नागरिक मारिए in northwest Pakistan. An opinion survey by नयाँ अमेरिकी फाउन्डेशन in the region last year found that 77 percent believed the real purpose of the U.S. “war on terror” is to “weaken and divide the Muslim world” and to “ensure American domination.” And more than two-thirds of the entire population of Pakistan view the United States as the enemy, not as a friend, according to the प्यू ग्लोबल एटिट्यूड प्रोजेक्ट.
सीआईए र बुश र ओबामा प्रशासनले बुझेका थिए कि ड्रोन हमलाले पाकिस्तानमा आतंकवादी षड्यन्त्रको खतरालाई कहिल्यै अन्त्य गर्न सक्दैन, सीआईएका निवर्तमान निर्देशक माइकल हेडनले आगामी राष्ट्रपतिलाई भनेका थिए, बब वुडवर्डको अनुसार।ओबामाको युद्ध. And if the Obama administration didn’t understand then that the drone war was stoking popular anger at the government and the United States, it certainly does now. Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair ले संकेत गरेको छ ड्रोन आक्रमणका कारण पाकिस्तानमा अमेरिकाप्रति घृणा बढ्दै गएको छ ।
यद्यपि रातको छापा र ड्रोन हमलाहरू जारी छन्, यद्यपि ती देशहरूमा संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिकाप्रति व्यापक र तीव्र क्रोधको जोखिमले नीति निर्माताहरूलाई कुनै फरक पार्दैन।
यस समस्यालाई बुझ्ने एउटा मात्र तरिका छ: "आतंकवाद विरुद्धको युद्ध" मा जित्ने र हार्नेहरू छन्। सामान्य अमेरिकीहरू स्पष्ट रूपमा हारेका छन्, र सेना, पेन्टागन र सीआईएका संस्थाहरू र नेताहरू र तिनीहरूका राजनीतिक र कर्पोरेट सहयोगीहरू विजेता हुन्। तिनीहरूले ध्वस्त अर्थतन्त्र र समाजमा ठूलो स्रोत र शक्ति जम्मा गरेका छन्।
They are not going to do anything about the increased risk to Americans from the hatred their wars have provoked until they are forced to do so by a combination of resistance from people within those countries and an unprecedented rebellion by millions of Americans. It’s long past time to start organizing that rebellion.
Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam," was published in 2006.
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