The de-escalation of US miaramila in Irak has been accompanied by celebrations of American humanitarianism. This week’s withdrawal of troops from Irak’s urban areas is part of the larger agreement made by the Bush administration to remove all military forces by the end of 2011. An Iraqi referendum coming up this month, if passed, would escalate the required deadline to mid 2010. Predictably, it has motivated American officials to pressure the Iraqi government to cancel the vote. Resistance to the required 2011 withdrawal date is also emerging, with General George Casey claiming that troops may remain in Irak amin'ny 2019.
Journalistic discussions of de-escalation concentrate on claims that Irak will destabilize. The Washington Post, for example, ran a June 26th story emphasizing that “Iraqi civilians” will “become less protected.” The story referenced attacks in late June that killed dozens of Iraqis, and “heightened concern about the readiness of Irak’s security forces to operate with limited American assistance.” The Associated Press discussed the deaths of over four hundreds Iraqis in June as raising “concerns about the readiness of Iraqi forces to take over their own security.” Ao amin'ny New York Times, the editors discussed the need “to help Iraqis prepare the withdrawal and to reduce the chances the country will unravel as American troops leave.” This concern revolves around questions of “whether Irak’s army – still plagued by corruption, discipline problems, equipment shortages and security breaches – is ready to keep the peace in the cities.” Such concern is merely a reiteration of the old assumption, repeated by Times reporters this week, “that sectarian violence could return” following withdrawal.
There are strong grounds to question assumptions that Irak is consigned to oblivion without America’s stabilizing military power. For one thing, violence in Irak has fluctuated greatly throughout the six years of the occupation, making it difficult to attribute increasing attacks to any single factor without the benefit of a systematic, empirical study. For example, violence in Irak grew in 2009, despite the continuation of the occupation and the alleged success of the surge. In Baghdad, 200 people were killed in April, a 100 percent increase from March, and a 200 percent increase from February. National trends indicate that over 450 Iraqis died in April, a 25 percent increase from March and a 36 percent increase from February. Such fluctuations could just as easily be attributed to withdrawal, if similar increases occur after the US fanesorana.
The view that the occupation stabilizes Irak is rejected by nearly everyone in Irak as little more than propaganda. As one February BBC poll from Irak revealed, American forces ranked near the bottom of the list of trusted social actors. Occupation forces enjoyed a “great deal” or “quite a lot of confidence” from just 26 percent of Iraqis, and ranked second to last on the list of eight actors, in front of “local militias” which are responsible for the sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing of Irak’s Sunni and Shia. This is a quite damning finding, considering the brutal reputation Irak’s militias have garnered (rightly so) amongst Iraqis and American journalists and politicians.
Irak’s governing institutions are viewed with far more legitimacy. ao amin'ny BBC fitsapan-kevitra, Irak’s police and army receive three times the support of US troops (with 73% and 74% confidence respectively), while confidence ratings for the national Iraqi government and for judges and courts stand at 61% and 68% respectively. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also saw his popularity rise from a low of between 33 to 40% in 2007 and 2008 to 55% in 2009. His slim majority support is contingent upon his insistence over the last eight months that the US set a withdrawal timetable and commit to enforcing it.
The required 2011 timetable, although popular with the Iraqi and American people, is viewed with contempt by the “Paper of Record,” which warns that “Before American troops can really go, Iraq’s Army will need to develop enough of [its] missing [military and governmental] capacities to be able to fight on its own. The Etazonia is going to have to help Irak build an air force and a navy so it can defend its own borders – an effort that will stretch far beyond the 2011 withdrawal deadline.”
Although the mainstream press has finally come around and acknowledged the need for a drawdown of the war, it is not for the reasons subscribed to by the American and Iraqi public. Assumptions that the US must violate its international withdrawal agreement in order to promote the “common good” in Irak are deeply problematic. This plan necessarily negates the understanding of most Iraqis and Americans that the US dia miteraka Irak’s deterioration, not its rejuvenation.
Anthony DiMaggio teaches Global Politics and American Government at Illinois State anjerimanontolo. He is the author of Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Examining American News in the “War on Terror” and the forthcoming When Media Goes to War (February 2010). Afaka mifandray amin'ny [email voaaro]
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