Since serving as press secretary in Dennis Kucinich’s 2004 presidential campaign, Swanson has fought against the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and tried to alert Americans to the fact that U.S. military spending is the source of most of our economic problems. In his book De Krich ass e Lie, Swanson huet de Fall fir d'Ofschafe vum Krich als Instrument vun der nationaler Politik gemaach. Wann de Weltauslooss Krieg war stellt en historescht Beispill vu wéi mächteg Krichsabolitionismus ka sinn.
Levine: Op enger rezenter Fachhéichschoul Virliesung, hutt Dir gefrot ob iergendeen gleeft datt Krich illegal wier an ob se jeemools vum Kellogg-Briand Pakt héieren hunn. Nëmmen 2 bis 3 Prozent vum grousse Grupp hunn d'Hand opgehuewen. Wann Dir gefrot hutt ob Krich illegal sollt sinn, hunn nëmmen 5 Prozent geduecht datt et sollt sinn.
Swanson: Both responses bothered me somewhat. I knew people in the United States did not believe war was illegal. I knew that only the most serious peace activists had heard of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and that even they didn’t recognize its value, including the degree to which it is stronger than the UN Charter in its prohibition of all wars, not just certain kinds of wars.
But why wouldn’t people want war to be made illegal? To my ear that sounds like not wanting slavery or rape or torture to be illegal. At the end of the 19th century, when the United States snatched up Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, Panama, etc., there was a popular love for war in the air. By the end of World War I, war was widely viewed as an evil disease to be eradicated. From World War II forward there has been an ever-increasing tendency to view war as ordinary, necessary, and patriotic—if not a war in Vietnam or Iraq, then certainly some other war.
Fir déi, déi de Krich nëmmen iwwer Televisioun kennen, kléngt d'Iddi fir et ze kriminaliséieren wéi d'Regierung ze kriminaliséieren. Deen Zoustand ass wat ech beonrouegend fannen, d'Realiséierung vu wéi normal et ass d'Regierung ze denken als wesentlech verantwortlech fir grouss Morden. Dëst ass Meilen ewech vum Warren Harding sengem Retour an "Normalitéit" nom WWI. Zënter dem Zweete Weltkrich si mir ni zréck an d'Normalitéit.
D'Leit hunn haut eng schwiereg genuch Zäit ze gleewen datt se genuch Kraaft hunn fir en eenzege Sënnlosen Krich ze stoppen. Huet d'Friddensbewegung an den 1920er Jore wierklech gegleeft datt se de Krich ofschafen kënnen?
An den 1920er Joren, wéi Dir drop higewisen hutt, war de Fridden eigentlech "patriotesch" an eng Friddensbewegung war guer net géint déi Aart vu militäresch-industrielle Komplex, déi mir haut hunn. An der Fuerschung vun der Geschicht, ass et Äre Sënn datt d'Amerikaner haut - trotz hirer Majoritéit Oppositioun zu lafende Kricher - méi hëlleflos, hoffnungslos an defaitistesch ginn wat d'Erreeche vun enger friddlecher Natioun ugeet?
Back then, war could be seen as something that backward Europeans had dragged the United States into, albeit with help from greatly resented propaganda that had been produced by President Wilson’s PR team. If you ask someone in the United States if they are for peace today, they may tell you that they like peace, but wouldn’t want to oppose war. Even in the 1920s, the United States was making war in Nicaragua and threatening it in Mexico, but peace was still considered the norm. Then wars were imperialistic or humanitarian or racist and, conceivably, avoidable. Now wars are necessary to protect us from evil. In other words, they are defensive.
Pro-war attitudes today are not insurmountable. Popular opinion turned against the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars fairly quickly and never got behind the Libyan War or our various drone wars. But there is a more important difference between the 1920s and today.
Den Opstig vum militäresch-industrielle Komplex ass zënter dem Biergerkrich ronderëm. D'Marine gouf zur selwechter Zäit opgebaut wéi den US Senat de Kellogg-Briand ratifizéiert huet. Awer d'Waffefirmen hunn an den 1920er Joren d'Strings vum Kongress net gezunn. D'Baueren, déi wollten, datt d'Europäer méi Mais a manner Waffe kafen, haten méi Afloss wéi Waffenhändler. Zousätzlech waren d'Kongressbezierker méi kleng, Bestiechung war illegal, d'Zeitunge waren zimlech divers a glafwierdeg, d'Televisioun existéiert net, d'Gerrymandering war net perfektionéiert, an et war üblech datt Membere vum Haus a Senat sech géint d'Positioune vun hire politesche Parteien wieren. . D'Raiberbaronen hunn net déi ganz Show geleet - e puer vun hinnen hunn vill an de Friddensaktivismus investéiert.
Den Deck ass haut géint eis gestapelt a mir wëssen et. Outlawrists hunn gegleeft datt Erfolleg méiglecherweis an enger zukünfteg Generatioun kënnt, Schrëtt fir Schrëtt, sou datt si glécklech geschafft hunn fir wat se gegleeft hunn eng gerecht Ursaach ze sinn, fir wat de William James "de moralesche Äquivalent vum Krich" genannt huet.
Dëst ass Hand-an-Hand, mengen ech, mat hirem Glawen un Demokratie komm. De Frank Kellogg, de mëttlere republikanesche Staatssekretär fir deen de Kellogg-Briand Pakt gehat a verflucht Friddensaktivisten genannt gëtt. 1928 huet hien Dag an Nuecht geschafft fir hir Fuerderungen ze beäntweren. Firwat? Deelweis well d'Friddensaktivisten sech net hannert politesche Leader, engem President, enger Partei oder Kellogg opgestallt hunn. Si hunn déi ganz Kultur, all Parteien an all Politiker, an hir Richtung geréckelt. De Kellogg huet sech hannert hinnen opgestallt.
De Pakt veruerteelt kloer de Krich als Instrument vun der nationaler Politik an entscheet datt all Streidereien mat friddleche Mëttele geléist ginn. Awer seet et datt Krich illegal ass?
No reservations were made to the treaty, but the Senate did pass an interpretive statement. Kellogg had also published his interpretations of the treaty and communicated them to the other national signatories prior to the treaty’s creation. The negotiations were very public, having begun with a statement to the Associated Press from Aristide Briand, the Foreign Minister of France, a statement illegally drafted for him by an American peace activist lobbying France to lobby the United States for peace. The public discussion of the treaty and the U.S. Senate’s view of its meaning suggest that the answer to your first question is yes.
The big looming question for people today is, of course, “What about self-defense?” Levinson’s response was to point to the example of dueling. No nation had banned “aggressive dueling” and yet people could still defend themselves. They did so without making use of “defensive dueling.” It takes two to tango, to duel, or to make war. Nazi Germany did not attack the United States before the United States put its economic muscle into a war against Germany and, indeed, its assistance into attacking German submarines. Japan attacked a U.S. territory stolen from the people of Hawaii, but only after long and deliberate provocation, including U.S. support for and participation in a war against Japan on behalf of China.
More than self-defense, the big concern in 1928-1929 was to make clear—as Kellogg and the Senate made very clear—that the Peace Pact would not place on the United States any obligation to go to war against another nation that violated the pact, or any obligation to join an international alliance to “keep the peace” through the use of war. The League of Nations was voted down in the Senate and the Kellogg-Briand Pact up, not purely out of irrational “isolationism,” but also because the idea of making alliances of war did not seem a wise way to eliminate war. In fact, it looked to many people in the United States all too similar to how World War I had begun. We now have further examples, of course, of the United Nations and NATO launching wars.
Déi meescht Historiker soen datt de primäre Grond fir de Versoen vum Kellogg-Briand Pakt fir Kricher ze verhënneren war datt den Traité keng Mëttele fir Duerchféierung oder Sanktiounen géint Parteien ubitt, déi seng Bestëmmunge verletzen an et huet d'Schleifen net effektiv zougemaach wéini Selbstverteidegung kéint gesetzlech behaapt ginn. Ass dat Är Meenung iwwer den Echec vu Kellog-Briand?
The UN Charter leaves a giant loophole for defensive war, as well as one for any war authorized by the UN. The Kellogg-Briand Pact does not. This is why Kellogg-Briand is stronger. A court to resolve disputes by pacific means and to prosecute war makers was never established and still needs to be. The World Court of the League of Nations, like today’s International Criminal Court of the United Nations, did not fit the bill. Joining the League of Nations without transforming it radically would have brought the United States into World War II more quickly, but would not have prevented it. What might have prevented it would have been punishing war makers after World War I instead of punishing the entire nation of Germany, promoting and funding peaceful parties in Germany rather than Nazis, negotiating arms reductions rather than launching an arms race, and investing in the study of nonviolent dispute resolution instead of in eugenics and chemical warfare.
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Bruce E. Levine ass e klineschen Psycholog an Auteur vun Opstoen, Stand Up: Vereenegt Populisten, Energie déi besiegt, an Kampf der Corporate Elite (Chelsea Green, 2011). Dësen Artikel gouf fir d'éischt vun Alternet.org publizéiert.
Foto vum Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover a Frank Kellogg.
