In politicis Palaestinae proximis hebdomadibus unum certum est: coetus Mahmoud Abbas decrevit victoriam Hamas vel regere vel ruinam.
Shocked, disoriented, and visibly outraged, the Fatah elite saw the election results as a total rebuff of their policies, practices, and conduct. Hamas, its main ideological and political rival, which had before shunned participating in Oslo-created institutions, had suddenly come to power and become a serious political force that had to be contended with. The Fatah elite's history of opportunism and denigration of popular sentiment meant, however, that it would not respect or support the newly elected Palestinian government. If before Abbas used his government office to try to curtail Arafat's robust presidential powers, now he is utilizing the presidency to do the reverse: the government's authority is daily undermined and its control of internal security prevented (an issue which had previously led to Abbas's own Renuntiatio in possessione Arafat), et continue pressus est accipere Osloam et alios diktats Occidentales. Sicut New York Times ponunt, Palaestinorum "ieiuna" esse pro electione (vel 'missi ad dietician', ut seniori Israeli regiminis consiliario Dov Weisglass ponatur — omnes legitimi loquuntur, cum Palaestinos vel alios Arabes ad eam rem venerint: potest in Factum est fere aliquid de Arabs his diebus et abstulit cum eo, sicut unum fecit de Iudaeis in diebus anti-semitism). Primum in Palaestinae historiae ergo specum civili bellum disputatur et traded palam publice. Hoc est quod Fatah elite missionis Algerianae vocat: domesticam conflictum cum Hamas in mole ingenti accende ac per vim expellendi. Nihil est singulare de Palaestinis quae eos a tali eventu immunes reddunt: cum commodis coloniarum depravatis delectis tam profusis (de quibus postea) aliquid fieri potest.
Potius quam ut innocens mensura ratiocinii popularis seu consultationis publicae, Abbas ad referendum vocatus hoc loco videri debet. Cur, unum prodigia, postulamus referendum in libello a paucis captivorum tantum hebdomadarum numero post electionem popularem prosperam et impeccabilem concurrendam? Certe non propter nimiam in democratia ex parte elite Fatah collocationem: ipsum Osloam omnesque eius conventiones subsidiarias numquam etiam pro ratificatione publica existimata sunt. Vix realistica est cogitare grapheocratem sicut Abbas ad gaudia rationis popularis subito excitatus esse. No: Abbas uti instrumento referendum conatur ad regimen Palaestinae delegitimandi etiam amplius et eius constituentiam democraticam improbans. Quod Abbas fecit invocando referendum (pro quo nullum exemplum vel statura legalis est) documentum captivorum instrumentalizare et eo uti instrumento politico ad cladem politicam in Hamas imperio irrogandam.
Hoc certe ejus intentio est. Utrum vel non pendeat multus est quomodo hamas decernit ut tractamus hoc provocatione. Eius responsio initialis documentum accepturus est, sed solum fundamentum ulterioris dialogi ac disputationis nationalis (quae nunc concordiam producere neglexit). Quamvis Hamas recte et rationabilis sit de inceptis Abbatis referendis solliciti, et contendere democraticam legitimam gubernationem longe maiorem esse quam verba paucorum non-electorum, licet maxime popularis captivorum globus, procul liquet quod Hamas ideam referendum rejicere tout atrium et MINORIS AESTIMO significationem documenti. Contentum documenti captivorum multo propinquius est ad suas altiore dignitates politicas quam ad rationes Abbas et ad proposita. Immo in multis quaestionibus documentum valide obstat contradictionis propriae caninae capitulationis, improbitatis et dependentiae occidentalis Abbatis.
Valet inspicienda documentum captivorum fusius. Et plenum title is: Inter National Palaestinae Documentiet signatur repraesentantibus quinque majores coetus Palaestinae in Territoriis occupatis et degentium. They are: Marwan Barghouti (Fatah executive member and resistance leader), Sheikh Abdelkhalek al-Natshe (executive committee member of Hamas), and representatives from Islamic Jihad and both the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine. It has 18 main points and covers a whole spectrum of issues relating to occupied and exiled Palestinians ranging from internal Palestinian security issues, to institutional reform, resistance, refugee rights, and negotiations. Tonus fundamentalis et registra documenti unum est unitatis nationalis. The document seeks to affirm the basic political rights of the Palestinians (the 'Palestinian fundamentals') and create a national consensus around pursuing them. It seems to be written in the spirit of a 'united front' alliance: a strategy based on agreement over common aims and objectives without forgoing the legitimate right of political and ideological contestation. Clausula 14 clare affirmat certamina internas esse constitutivas unitatis quandiu pacifice, politice ac legitime componuntur. This indeed is a clear message against civil-war mongering and internal violence, and a strong affirmation of the value of dialogue, discussion, and contestation (including demonstrations) in the resolution of conflicts and political differences within the alliance. Indeed, the document is fundamentally democratic, affirming democratic elections and accountability as the best means of conducting Palestinian politics. Atque haec una maior causa est cur Palaestinae regimen nihil vereatur in eius commendatione signando. Even though the document clearly allows Mahmoud Abbas to pursue a negotiated, diplomatic course with Israel (which, incidentally, is doomed to be sabotaged by the new Israeli unilateralists), and implicitly approves of the Arab peace initiative of Beirut 2002, it also clearly stipulates quamlibet maiorem concordiam conflictus PLO approbationi subesse (quod tunc Hamas et Jihad includunt) et populari ratificatione. Documentum etiam clare suggerit aliquod futurum fatale referendum non solum occupatis sed etiam exulibus Palaestinis esse apertum. The prisoners' document is thus an important political precedent, which celebrates popular Palestinian sovereignty as the ultimate arbiter of national goals and programs and sees popular political participation and mobilization as fundamental values in Palestinian politics. Etiam reactivationem diasporae Palaestinae et boosting solidarietatis internationalis expeditionum circa orbem terrarum. The document also clearly affirms the refugee right of return as a basic tenet of Palestinian nationalism, which is not to be abandoned or negotiated over with the Israelis.
Captivi etiam appellant finem occupationis Israelis et creationis status Palaestinae in Occidente Bank et Gaza, cum Hierosolymis Orientalibus ut caput suum, ita per leges et resolutiones internationales super Palaestinam. Ita efficaciter probet solutionem duplicem statui ut minimam praeconditionem ad certamen Palaestinae-Israelis incipiendum. Etiam evidenter postulat pro continuatione resistendi contra occupationem, cum tractatu et legato, donec recessus caveatur. Clausula 3 sic amplam notionem habet resistendi, quae tam militaris quam popularis est, et cruciabiliter in locis occupatis anni 1967 tendit, id est, clausula implicite bombingis suicidiis contra paganos in Israel tamquam legitima violentiae forma. The prisoners clearly do not think that relying on diplomacy alone is the way forward for achieving Palestinian national aims. Multum extollitur in documento non solum in unitate politica, sed etiam de viribus resistentibus uniens: eo usque ut vocarentur ad Frontem Resistentiam Palaestinae creationem ad coordinandam omnem actionem contra copias occupandas. The right of resistance thus plays a central role in the broad program of Palestinian unity that they are advocating.
Breviter igitur documentum fortiter et sine dubio omnia iura Palaestinae (deliberationis, reditus, et resistentiae sui) affirmat et vocat unitatem imperii ad resistendum impulsibus politicae et oeconomicae obsidionis et internationalis boycotti. Etiam clare affirmat democratiam et repraesentationem democraticam ut unicum medium certaminum internas solvendi et progrediendi ut gentem. Captivi etiam commendant Hamas et Jihad PLO ut membra permanentia coniungere, PLO iterum populum Palaestinae unicum et legitimum efficientes. Considerans quam significant, robust, et ambitiose in scope et mentis documentum est dissensiones circa videtur parum. Quid magni momenti est an Abbas et coetus eius revera studiosi sunt in utendo ad aequam et operabilem concordiam cum Hamas (quod plane dubium est), et an ipse Hamas possit suam claustralem religionis intuitum superare et claras et decretorias decisiones assumere. In rei publicae sphaera, quae procul patet.
Mirum videtur Hamas notioni commissum quod ipsa terra Palaestinae quodammodo portat suam consociationem religiosam, id est sacram islamicam. Waqf proprietas quae supra sphaeram contestationis politicae iacet. Sed illud solum sonat Sionistae, qui Palaestinam Iudaeam terram promissionis asserunt. Land is land: to be divided, shared, ruined, corrupted, or productively and justly utilized. Islamizing it is just as retrograde ideologically as Judaizing it. Doesn't Ismail Haniya himself talk about Palestine in clear political terms in his interview with terra on May 23, 2006: 'If Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, peace will prevail and we will implement a cease-fire [hudna] for many years.' Mundus munditia clare valet fundamentalis ad certamen Palaestinae, quod Hamas primus debet hoc agnoscere: sine eius progressione prosperitatis et eius contra occupationem dimicatio, numquam in Palaestinae vita significantia facta est vis. Quare non liquet, cur religionis commentis fictis uti pergat, cum clare agnoscat id, quod hic agitur, politicum non esse religiosum.
Talis dialectica pervetusta clare problema est, sicut est flos fatah proprium abysmal in re politica. Peior quam pendens in doctrinas fundamentalistas, electa Fatah vix videtur in occupatione finienda, nedum in unita resistentia ante Hamas creando. Gravis est historiam suam brevem, corruptam in memoriam revocare ad veritatem locorum huius temporis perspiciendam. Secundum Osloam, Mahmoud Abbas coetus, incluso Dahlan, Rajoub, et reliqui apparatus securitatis Osloae in territoriis occupatis partes suas manifestas habent. Pro agnitione PLO ut unicus legatus populi Palaestinae legitimus (et non multum aliud), PLO factus est exactor colonialis Israelis. Arafat approved what was earlier rejected in the Camp David talks between Begin and Sadat. As Samih K. Farsoun has put it in his book on Palestine:
'Israel consecutus est quod destinavit facere cum saltem subscriptione Castra David Conveniant cum Aegypto anno MCMLXXVIII: Is Palaestinorum popularium regionum occupantium Palaestinorum functionem civilem functionem et strictam terram, opes, oeconomiam occupavit; et securitatem arearum.'
Nullum imperium , nullum jus gentis , nec finis occupationis , dum coloniae et coloni duplicantur. Electus Fatah hoc negotium approbavit propter plenam exclusionem politicam post primum bellum sinus, positio infirma, quae ab eorum segregatione composita est cum expulsio a Libano anno 1982. Circuli politici desperati paene nihil possunt. And, in the Palestinian case, the PLO sold Oslo as yet another Palestinian victory even though it was a clear political capitulation to Israeli and American diktat. What Oslo created, then, is a colonial Palestinian elite which gains its power, legitimacy, and benefits from the occupying forces themselves and from their international backers. The Israeli occupation was reconstructed to privilege a particular Palestinian social stratum which was raised above the generalized misery and subordinate position of its own people in order to do Israel's bidding in the Occupied Territories. Like all systems of collaboration, it breeds tensions, internal conflicts, and resentments within its structure (or 'partnership,' in diplomatic speak). And it is sustainable as long as the oppressed fail to identify the colonial elite as part and parcel of the occupation problem and to act against their systemic interests. Hoc rite venit in Al-Aqsa intifada in Septembris 2000. Palaestinorum occupati rursus contra suos incolas rebellaverunt, et structura coloniae Osloae exacerbaverunt. Hamas's recent victory is part of the same pattern. Corruptio, auctoritas et cooperatio coloniae locum habere debent in certamine liberationis nationalis, comitia Palaestinae declarata sunt.
Patet igitur quod Abbas non vult documentum captivorum tenere, nec principalia nationalia retinere, quae ipse et socii eius electi omnes fecerunt pro viribus labefactare. Immo optandum est ut cum Israelis Abbas tractando Israelis fines 1967 impellere voluisset et omnes suas illicitas sedes divellere cogeret, sicut documentum suadet. Nequaquam tamen unciae unius terrae propter propriam Abbatis actionem vel in coordinationem cum eo liberata est quia factus est praeses ('discessus,' sicut 'concursus' res unilateralistae Israelis. Neque unam unciam realem sui iuris dominari semper lucrata sub regno suo. Abbas consilium non est de occupatione finienda: hoc est de legitimatione in Israelis et Occidentis oculis recipiendis ut Osloam colonialem systema reaccipiat, quod eum eiusque coetus vivificat. Eius politicae in extremo sunt reactionaria: propositum est corruptam Fatah electam dominationem in vitam Palaestinae restituere et inceptum diplomaticum divulgare. Dicendo uti documentum quod, si effectum est, finem suae regulae tanquam praecipuum colonorum coercitor significaret, id est documentum, quod contra sociales et politicas utilitates suas procedit, Abbas Palaestinos adhuc decipit. Revera Abbas Palaestinis persuadere studet vel Fatah electum esse regulam dependentiae neo-colonialis generis dependentis ab Israel (sicut olim Minister Externorum Ben Ami posuit), vel fame et oppugnatio internationalis apud Hamas, additis adiectis. Passophic Prospectus civilis bello expositione in horizon. Abbas etiam clarum nuntium suis Americanis adiutoribus mittit qui Palaestinae capitulationem liberare possit, et US Israelem ad tractandum in Tabula Via pacti repetendum impellet (et fossatum ab unilateralismo Sharonist). In brevi, Abbas quaerit ut diupe Palaestinorum adhuc iterum in credere quod eius coetus stat ad finem occupationem. Post annos adiuvandi ad instauratam occupationem solidandam, omnino inconveniens est concludere Abbatem subito excitasse facultatem cognoscendi sui ipsius 'fundamenta Palaestinae' quae omnia in sua potestate per tot annos labefactanda gessit. Nulla mutatio cordis hic ergo, tantummodo CRYICISMUS, opportuism et mendacium.
Quomodo solvetur haec contradictio? Suus 'tamen non liquet. Nor is it clear that a referendum will necessarily produce Abbas's desired outcome of reactivating Oslo-style negotiations. Israel in unilateralismo positus (et documentum captivorum haud incerto vocabulo abiecit), et US non interest in serio mutando illam (id est, si umquam in primo loco, quae dubia est cum Bush. in potestate). Iran is now much more important on the foreign policy agenda, at the heart of which lies the quagmire of Iraq. So there's no use looking towards Western elites for any meaningful resolution of the conflict. Soni Europaei hoc modo sunt, et numquam in re publica proposita extraneorum consiliorum US in regione gravissima fuerunt: civitates Europaeae in totum opus optaverunt potius quam extra umbellam US opportunam in Medio Oriente. For Western elites to compel Palestinians to capitulate, submit, or acquiesce to Israeli colonialism is neither fair nor democratic. Worse: it will lead to more suffering, increasing starvation, and death.
In Future De Causa Palaestinae sic tamen pendeat a popularibus mobilization et in Palaestina, Arabum orbis terrarum, Israel, et occidente. Radicals habere ingens negotium in manibus si iustitia in Palaestina est effectum. Domestice tempus est firmare alternationem robustam cum Fatah electae capitulationis et ad fundamentalistam Hamasis societatis Palaestinae islamisantis agendae. Hoc plane tempus non est ob criticum subsidium Hamas: magni momenti est cum Hamas coniungi cum iura Palaestinae defendit et occupatio pugnat et repugnantia clara et cohaerentia stare cum ea quae in agendis agendis religiosis, obscurantistarum, inter alia, quaerit. res studet, religionis ac civitatis separationem ruitura. Hoc quidem est documentum captivorum spiritus.
Est etiam exitus futurae liberationis. Pars discriminis Osloensis est quod difficillimum evasit tempus post occupationem et exclusivam contemplari. Palestinian lives have been so curtailed and repressed, and energies have been so preoccupied with overcoming daily hardships, that a vision of liberation has been lacking. The challenge here is both to remember that the Palestinian struggle is about what Edward Said has called the 'Palestinian idea' (a non-exclusivist, democratic, universalist project) and to renew it in even more harsh conditions than ever before. The Palestinian diaspora has a key role to play here, both in organizing exiles, increasing popular support for the Palestinian cause, standing in solidarity with their suffering brothers and sisters in Palestine, and re-engaging with the interior. A renewed Palestinian struggle should, then, really be an international campaign: only if Palestinians unite their disparate forces, and begin again to think of themselves as individual bearers of a common cause can we begin to think beyond the continuing Nakba. Exilium est Palaestinae exsistentiae constitutivum, et atrox situs et copia spei ac renovationis. Hoc tempus non est misericordiae aut complaceentiae. Multitudo turbata est et obsessa. Sola interrogatio haec est: quid facturi sumus ut eos adiuvent? Certa nostra legitima est, nostra postulat democratica et universalista, nostra iusta causa. Nos autem victus adhuc? Non puto: vivere sic pergere non licet.
Futurum proximum sic spectare potest austerum. Abbas et coetus sunt adhuc potentes; Palestinae imperium adhuc obsessam et impetum; Et Palaestinae gentem adhuc occisus, collective poenas, expositata et terrore per Israelem exercitum. In faciem omnium, pessimism videri realis et desperationem naturalis. Unum autem spei principium est quod agnoscendum est: popularis Palaestinae voluntas (et invitatio referendum est, si quid est, eius virtutis manifesta cognitio). Constans, resistens et politice rigor, multi ex Palaestinis, qui Hamas censebant, clarum commune nuntium in mundum missuros rati: nihil de pace, non deditione amplius, nihil negotiorum amplius mendacium. Quaestio quod manet, utrum Palaestinorum habent popularibus et norma capacitates et subsidium ad portare hoc per nuntium.
Nota
1. What's interesting about this clause is that only islamica Jihad suas reservationes contra tractationes cum Israel emissas esse, et hoc in nota brevissima in fine documenti. It’s clear that Hamas has no objections to Abbas’s diplomatic initiatives.
Bashir Abu-Manneh Latine docet in Collegio Barnard, Novi Eboraci.
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