Even among longstanding supporters of national self-determination for Kosovo, the eagerness with which the Bush administration extended diplomatic recognition immediately upon that country’s declaration of independence on February 17 has raised serious concerns. Indeed, it serves as a reminder of the series of अमेरिका policy blunders over the years that have compounded the Balkan tragedy.
यह पहली बार नहीं है जब कोसोवो ने अपनी स्वतंत्रता की घोषणा की है। 1989 में, सर्बियाई नेता स्लोबोडन मिलोसेविक ने प्रांत की स्वायत्त स्थिति को रद्द कर दिया, जिससे 10% सर्ब अल्पसंख्यक को अनिवार्य रूप से देश के जातीय अल्बानियाई बहुमत पर रंगभेद-शैली प्रणाली लागू करने की अनुमति मिल गई। सार्वजनिक क्षेत्र और सर्बियाई स्वामित्व वाले उद्यमों में बहुसंख्यक जातीय अल्बानियाई लोगों को उनकी नौकरियों से निकाल दिया गया और स्कूलों या सरकार में उनकी भाषा का उपयोग करने से मना कर दिया गया।
जवाब में, प्रांत के जातीय अल्बानियाई - जिनमें 85% से अधिक आबादी शामिल है - ने 1990 में एक स्वतंत्र गणराज्य की घोषणा की, जिसमें लोकतांत्रिक चुनावों, एक समानांतर स्कूल प्रणाली और अन्य अर्ध-राष्ट्रीय संस्थानों के साथ एक समानांतर सरकार की स्थापना की गई। यह आंदोलन भारतीय स्वतंत्रता के लिए गांधीजी के संघर्ष के बाद से सबसे व्यापक, व्यापक और निरंतर अहिंसक अभियानों में से एक था। जवाब में, सर्बियाई अधिकारियों ने बड़े पैमाने पर गिरफ्तारी, यातना और न्यायेतर हत्याओं सहित गंभीर दमन किया।
1990 के दशक के अधिकांश समय में, कोसोवर अल्बानियाई लोगों ने हड़तालों, बहिष्कारों, शांतिपूर्ण प्रदर्शनों और अपने समानांतर संस्थानों को मजबूत करते हुए अहिंसक तरीके से अपना संघर्ष चलाया। यह पश्चिमी शक्तियों के लिए निवारक कूटनीति में संलग्न होने का समय था। हालाँकि, दुनिया ने कोसोवर के अहिंसक आंदोलन को नजरअंदाज करने का फैसला किया और कार्रवाई करने के लिए उदारवादी कोसोवर अल्बानियाई नेतृत्व की लगातार अपील का विरोध किया। दशक के अंत तक, कोसोवो के अहिंसक संघर्ष के समर्थन में संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका और अन्य पश्चिमी देशों की विफलता के कारण कोसोवो लिबरेशन आर्मी के नाम से जाना जाने वाला एक छायादार सशस्त्र समूह का उदय हुआ, जो अति-राष्ट्रवादियों से जुड़ा था। आतंकवाद और नशीली दवाओं का व्यापार, जिन्होंने प्रांत के जातीय अल्बानियाई लोगों की बढ़ती संख्या को आश्वस्त किया कि राष्ट्रीय मुक्ति के लिए उनकी एकमात्र आशा सशस्त्र संघर्ष के माध्यम से है।
By waiting for the emergence of guerrilla warfare before seeking a solution, the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका and other Western nations gave Milosevic the opportunity to crack down with even greater savagery than before. The delay also allowed the KLA to emerge as the dominant force in the Kosovar nationalist movement. Rejecting nonviolence and moderation, KLA forces murdered Serb officials and ethnic Albanian moderates, destroyed Serbian villages, and attacked other minority communities. Some among its leadership even called for ethnic cleansing of the Serb minority to create an ethnically pure Albanian state.
Tragically, former KLA leaders and their supporters now dominate the newly-declared independent कोसोवो गणतंत्र.
वेस्टर्न डिथरिंग
RSI संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका and other Western nations squandered a full eight years when preventative diplomacy could have worked. The संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका rejected calls for expanding to Kosovo the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) missions set up in मैसेडोनिया or to bring Kosovo constituencies together for negotiations. Though many Kosovars and others expected that the U.S.-brokered 1995 डेटन accords would include an end to the Serbian occupation and oppression of Kosovo, the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका and other parties decided it did not merit attention.
जब 1998 के अंत में पश्चिमी शक्तियों ने अंततः लंबे समय से चल रहे संकट के प्रति निर्णायक कार्रवाई की, तो युद्धविराम की व्यवस्था की गई, जहां ओएससीई ने निहत्थे मॉनिटरों को भेजा। हालाँकि, उन्हें बहुत कम समर्थन दिया गया। वे बड़े पैमाने पर अप्रशिक्षित थे, उनकी संख्या बहुत कम थी और नाटो ने उन्हें हेलीकॉप्टर, रात्रि दृष्टि दूरबीन, या अन्य बुनियादी उपकरण देने से इनकार कर दिया जो उन्हें अधिक प्रभावी बना सकते थे।
As Serb violations of the cease fire, including a number of atrocities, increased, Western diplomatic efforts accelerated, producing the Rambouillet proposal that called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomous status within सर्बिया. While such a political settlement was quite reasonable, and the Serbs appeared willing to seriously consider such an agreement, it was sabotaged by NATO’s insistence that they be allowed to send in a large armed occupation force into Kosovo along with rights to move freely without permission throughout the entire यूगोस्लाविया का संघीय गणराज्य.
समस्या यह भी थी कि इसे बिना किसी बातचीत की गुंजाइश के अंतिम दस्तावेज़ के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया गया था। अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संघर्ष समाधान के मूलभूत सिद्धांतों में से एक यह है कि सभी इच्छुक पक्ष शांति प्रक्रिया का हिस्सा हैं। किसी समझौते को सुरक्षित करने के लिए कुछ बाहरी दबाव आवश्यक हो सकता है - विशेष रूप से मजबूत पार्टी के खिलाफ, लेकिन इसे एक समझौते के रूप में प्रस्तुत नहीं किया जा सकता है निपुण तथ्य. "इस पर हस्ताक्षर करें या हम आप पर बमबारी करेंगे" रवैये ने भी राजनयिक पहल को विफल कर दिया। कुछ राष्ट्रीय नेता ऐसी शर्तों के तहत एक समझौते पर हस्ताक्षर करेंगे, जो आत्मसमर्पण की संधि के बराबर है: विदेशी ताकतों को अपने क्षेत्र पर स्वतंत्र लगाम की अनुमति देना और एक अल्टीमेटम के रूप में ऐसा प्रस्ताव जारी करना।
Smarter and earlier diplomacy could have prevented the war. Instead, the U.S.-led NATO allies began bombing सर्बिया in early 1999, prompting a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign against ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces, resulting in nearly one million refugees. After 11 weeks of bombing, a compromise was reached in which Serbian forces would withdraw and the province would be placed under a UN trusteeship.
Though initially set back by the nationalist reaction to the NATO bombing of their country, pro-democracy Serbs were able to gain enough support to mobilize a popular nonviolent insurrection in October of 2000 that ousted Milosevic. सर्बिया has been under a democratic center-left coalition ever since. Meanwhile, UN administrators and a multinational peacekeeping force have tried to keep peace in Kosovo, even as KLA remnants and their supporters have continued to harass the ethnic Serb minority, forcing nearly half of its population to flee.
अमेरिका के लिए सहायता स्वतंत्रता
Despite widespread sympathy for Kosovo independence, many in the international community had hoped for a compromise settlement that would grant the province genuine autonomy under nominal Serbian sovereignty. As with ताइवान and Iraqi Kurdistan, most nations have had to balance their support for the right of self-determination with concern over the threat of the violence and regional instability that could result if the country’s वास्तविक independence became official. In this case, however, no such balance was found, and the fallout from Kosovo’s declaration of independence and recognition by the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका, ग्रेट ब्रिटेन, फ्रांस, जर्मनी, and other countries could be serious.
Any effort by Kosovo to join the UN will be unsuccessful in the foreseeable future given the certainty of a veto by the Soviet Union and चीन. Both countries have their own “autonomous regions” composed of national minorities – a number of which have dreams of formal independence – and thus fear the precedent such international recognition could establish. Kosovo is the only state recognized by the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका not also recognized by the United Nations.
विडंबना यह है कि, संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका refuses to join the more-than-75 nations that have recognized the independence of पश्चिमी सहारा, originally declared back in 1976. Indeed, the Bush administration is on record supporting मोरक्को’s call for international recognition of its unilateral annexation of पश्चिमी सहारा as an “autonomous region” of that kingdom. This double standard is particularly glaring in light of the fact that Kosovo had been legally recognized as part of सर्बिया जहाँ तक पश्चिमी सहारा is legally recognized as a non-self-governing territory under belligerent military occupation, a status confirmed by the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.
RSI संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका has rejected proposals that would allow सर्बिया to annex a small strip of land in the northern part of Kosovo with a predominantly ethnic Serbian population and several sites that the Serbs consider to have important historical significance. At the same time, however, the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका is on record supporting Israeli proposals to annex strips of Palestinian land on the वेस्ट बैंक populated by Israeli Jews and other areas considered by Israelis to be of important historical significance. Ironically, the Kosovar Serbs have mostly lived on their land for centuries while the Israelis in the वेस्ट बैंक are virtually all colonists occupying illegal settlements built recently and in direct defiance of international law and a series of UN Security Council resolutions.
Such double standards help expose the fallacy of अमेरिका claims that its recognition of Kosovo is based upon any moral or legal basis.
संभावित समस्याएं
Recognition of Kosovo independence by the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका and some Western European nations under these circumstances could lead to a number of potential problems.
In सर्बिया, radical national chauvinists – in large part due to the incipient threat of Kosovar independence – came very close to defeating the moderate democratic coalition in the recent national elections. Hostility toward the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका और यूरोप as a result of what most Serbs see as a renegade province could retard the country’s efforts at European integration, worsening its economy and further strengthening reactionary forces. Though the government appears unwilling and unable to try to resolve through force what they see as a secessionist movement and the initial response from most Serbs appears to be more that of resignation than defiance, fears of rekindling Serbian national chauvinism are real. Masked Serb arsonists setting fire to UN and NATO border check posts in recent days is one such sign of looming unrest.
Another potential problem could emerge in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Here, a restless Albanian minority concentrated along its western border with Kosovo could be inspired to resume an armed secessionist movement in an effort to join with its newly independent Albanian-populated neighbor.
One of the most serious potential fallouts could come in the Caucasus region, with the possibility that the autonomous South Ossetia region in जॉर्जिया could declare itself independent and be immediately recognized by its neighbor रूस and its allies. With the Kosovo precedent, the Georgian government could do little diplomatically to garner support and, with Russian troops already in the territory, little militarily either.
The impact of Kosovo’s independence and recognition by the संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका and other Western nations could also seriously worsen U.S.-Russian relations, exacerbating differences that hawks on both sides are warning could evolve into a “new Cold War.”
It is also quite possible that there will not be any serious negative long-term impact of these recent events and, with its legacy of nonviolent struggle and democratic self-governance, an independent Kosovo could prove itself worthy of universal recognition. Nevertheless, अमेरिका policy has contributed a great deal to the tragic political climate in this corner of the Balkans, a climate so poisoned that the international community is greeting Kosovo’s long-awaited independence with more apprehension than joy.
Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics and international studies at the विश्वविद्यालय of सैन फ्रांसिस्को. and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). From 1996 to 1999, he served as chair of the board of Peaceworkers, a U.S.-based group supporting the nonviolent struggle of the Kosovar Albanians and other nonviolent movements and peacemakers in areas of conflict.
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