“Going to Tehran” arguably represents the most important work on the subject of U.S.-Iran relations to be published thus far.
Flynt Leverett en Hillary Mann Leverett pakke net allinich it Amerikaanske belied oangeande Iran oan, mar de bredere kontekst fan it Midden-Eastenbelied mei in systematysk analytysk perspektyf ynformeare troch persoanlike ûnderfining, lykas ek heul wiidweidige dokumintaasje.
More importantly, however, their exposé required a degree of courage that may be unparalleled in the writing of former U.S. national security officials about issues on which they worked. They have chosen not just to criticise U.S. policy toward Iran but to analyse that policy as a problem of U.S. hegemony.
Their national security state credentials are impeccable. They both served at different times as senior coordinators dealing with Iran on the National Security Council Staff, and Hillary Mann Leverett was one of the few U.S. officials who have been authorised to negotiate with Iranian officials.
Beide skreaunen yn 2003 memoranda dy't de George W. Bush-administraasje oanmoedigje om it Iraanske "roadmap"-foarstel foar bilaterale ûnderhannelingen serieus te nimmen, mar fûnen dat beliedsmakkers óf net ynteressearre óf machteleas wiene om it beslút te beynfloedzjen. Hillary Mann Leverett hat sels in ferbining mei de machtige American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), nei't se as jeugd ynternearre mei dy lobbygroep.
Nei it ferlitten fan 'e Amerikaanske regearing yn it net iens mei it Amerikaanske belied tsjin Iran, folgen de Leveretts net it normale patroan fan fêstigjen yn' e banen wêr't se de brede linen fan 'e Amerikaanske rol yn' e wrâldpolityk soene stypje yn ruil foar noflike ynkommens en trochgeande tagong ta macht .
Instead, they have chosen to take a firm stand in opposition to U.S. policy toward Iran, criticising the policy of the Barack Obama administration as far more aggressive than is generally recognised. They went even farther, however, contesting the consensus view in Washington among policy wonks, news media and Iran human rights activists that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2009 was fraudulent.
De kompromisearjende posysje fan 'e Leveretts foar it beliedsfoarmingssysteem en dejingen bûten de regearing dy't it Amerikaanske belied stypje, hat har ekstreem ympopulêr makke yn 'e elite-sirkels fan Washington bûtenlânsk belied. Nei it praten mei guon fan har antagonisten, joech The New Republic sels it geroft troch dat de Leveretts shills wurden wiene foar oaljebedriuwen en oaren dy't saken dwaan woene mei Iran.
The problem for the establishment, however, is that they turned out to be immune to the blandishments that normally keep former officials either safely supportive or quiet on national security issues that call for heated debate.
In “Going to Tehran”, the Leveretts elaborate on the contrarian analysis they have been making on their blog (formerly “The Race for Iran” and now “Going to Tehran”) They take to task those supporting U.S. systematic pressures on Iran for substituting wishful thinking that most Iranians long for secular democracy, and offer a hard analysis of the history of the Iranian revolution.
In an analysis of the roots of the legitimacy of the Islamic regime, they point to evidence that the single most important factor that swept the Khomeini movement into power in 1979 was “the Shah’s indifference to the religious sensibilities of Iranians”. That point, which conflicts with just about everything that has appeared in the mass media on Iran for decades, certainly has far-reaching analytical significance.
The Leveretts’ 56-page review of the evidence regarding the legitimacy of the 2009 election emphasises polls done by U.S.-based Terror Free Tomorrow and World Public Opinon and Canadian-based Globe Scan and 10 surveys by the University of Tehran. All of the polls were consistent with one another and with official election data on both a wide margin of victory by Ahmadinejad and turnout rates.
The Leveretts also point out that the leading opposition candidate, Hossein Mir Mousavi, did not produce “a single one of his 40,676 observers to claim that the count at his or her station had been incorrect, and none came forward independently”.
“Going to Tehran” has chapters analysing Iran’s “Grand Strategy” and on the role of negotiating with the United States that debunk much of which passes for expert opinion in Washington’s think tank world. They view Iran’s nuclear programme as aimed at achieving the same status as Japan, Canada and other “threshold nuclear states” which have the capability to become nuclear powers but forego that option.
The Leveretts also point out that it is a status that is not forbidden by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty – much to the chagrin of the United States and its anti-Iran allies.
In a later chapter, they allude briefly to what is surely the best-kept secret about the Iranian nuclear programme and Iranian foreign policy: the Iranian leadership’s calculation that the enrichment programme is the only incentive the United States has to reach a strategic accommodation with Tehran. That one fact helps to explain most of the twists and turns in Iran’s nuclear programme and its nuclear diplomacy over the past decade.
One of the propaganda themes most popular inside the Washington beltway is that the Islamic regime in Iran cannot negotiate seriously with the United States because the survival of the regime depends on hostility toward the United States.
De Leveretts ûntstride dat idee troch in searje ôfleverings te detaillearjen dy't begjinne mei de poging fan presidint Hashemi Rafsanjani om relaasjes te ferbetterjen yn 1991 en wer yn 1995 en it oanbod fan Iran om gear te wurkjen tsjin Al-Qaida yn Afganistan en, mear algemien nei 9/11, wêroer Hillary Mann Leverett hie persoanlike ûnderfining.
Uteinlik jouwe se de meast detaillearre analyze beskikber op it Iraanske foarstel fan 2003 foar in "roadmap" foar ûnderhannelings mei de Feriene Steaten, dy't de Bush-administraasje de rêch fan 'e hân joech.
The central message of “Going to Tehran” is that the United States has been unwilling to let go of the demand for Iran’s subordination to dominant U.S. power in the region. The Leveretts identify the decisive turning point in the U.S. “quest for dominance in the Middle East” as the collapse of the Soviet Union, which they say “liberated the United States from balance of power constraints”.
They cite the recollection of senior advisers to Secretary of State James Baker that the George H. W. Bush administration considered engagement with Iran as part of a post-Gulf War strategy but decided in the aftermath of the Soviet adversary’s disappearance that “it didn’t need to”.
Subsequent U.S. policy in the region, including what former national security adviser Bent Scowcroft called “the nutty idea” of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran, they argue, has flowed from the new incentive for Washington to maintain and enhance its dominance in the Middle East.
De auteurs biede in beknopte analyze fan it regionale en Iran-belied fan 'e Clinton-administraasje as foarrinners fan Bush's Irakoarloch en it belied foar feroaring fan it regime fan Iran. Harren rekken suggerearret dat de rol fan Republikeinske neokonservativen yn dat belied net oerdreaun wurde moat, en dat mear fûnemintele polityk-ynstitúsjonele belangen de Amerikaanske nasjonale feiligenssteat al foar 2001 yn dy rjochting triuwe.
They analyse the Bush administration’s flirtation with regime change and the Obama administration’s less-than-half-hearted diplomatic engagement with Iran as both motivated by a refusal to budge from a stance of maintaining the status quo of U.S.-Israeli hegemony.
Yn oerienstimming mei, mar fierder te gean as de analyse fan 'e Leveretts, is de oertsjûging fan Bush dat de Amerikaanske ynvaazje en besetting fan Irak de Iraniërs skodde, en dat d'r gjin need wie om de minste konsesje te meitsjen oan it rezjym. De Obama-administraasje is blykber yn deselde konseptuele fal fallen, en leauden dat de Feriene Steaten en har bûnsmaten Iran by de kiel hawwe fanwegen syn "ferlammende sanksjes".
Mei tank oan de Leveretts hawwe tsjinstanners fan it Amerikaanske belied fan oerhearsking en yntervinsje yn it Midden-Easten in nije en rike boarne fan analyse om effektiver tsjin dat belied te pleitsjen.
Gareth Porter, in ûndersykshistoarikus en sjoernalist dy't spesjalisearre is yn it Amerikaanske nasjonaal feiligensbelied, krige de UK-basearre Gellhornpriis foar sjoernalistyk foar 2011 foar artikels oer de Amerikaanske oarloch yn Afganistan.
ZNetwork wurdt allinich finansierd troch de generositeit fan har lêzers.
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