Some had feared – while others had hoped – that General Pervez Musharraf’s coup of October 12, 1999, would bring the revolution of Kemal Ataturk to a Pakistan and wrest the country from the iron grip of mullahs. But years later a definitive truth has emerged. Like the other insecure governments before it, both military and civilian, the present regime also has a single point agenda – to stay in power at all costs. It therefore does whatever it must and Pakistan falls further from any prospect of acquiring modern values, and of building and strengthening democratic institutions.
Nõuded praeguse režiimi püsimajäämiseks on selged: ühest küljest teab armee juhtkond, et tema kriitiline sõltuvus läänest nõuab, et seda tajutaks välismaal kui liberaalset režiimi, mis on vastandatud radikaalsetele islamistidele. Kuid teisest küljest peab see võimuhaarde säilitamiseks ja laiendamiseks tegelikult säilitama status quo.
The staged conflicts between General Musharraf and the mullahs are therefore a regular part of Pakistani politics. This September, nearly seven years later, the religious parties needed no demonstration of muscle power for winning two major victories in less than a fortnight; just a few noisy threats sufficed. From experience they knew that the Pakistan Army and its sagacious leader – of “enlightened moderation” fame – would stick to their predictable pattern of dealing with Islamists. In a nutshell: provoke a fight, get the excitement going, let diplomatic missions in Islamabad prepare their briefs and CNN and BBC get their clips – and then beat a retreat. At the end of it all the mullahs would get what they want, but so would the General.
Examples abound. On 21st April 2000, General Musharraf announced a new administrative procedure for registration of cases under the Blasphemy Law. This law, under which the minimum penalty is death, has frequently been used to harass personal and political opponents. To reduce such occurrences, Musharraf’s modified procedure would have required the local district magistrate’s approval for registration of a blasphemy case. It would have been an improvement, albeit a modest one. But 25 days later – on the 16th of May 2000 – under the watchful glare of the mullahs, Musharraf hastily climbed down: “As it was the unanimous demand of the ulema, mashaikh and the people, therefore, I have decided to do away with the procedural change in the registration of FIR under the Blasphemy Law”.
Another example. In October 2004, as a new system for issuing machine readable passports was being installed, Musharraf’s government declared that henceforth it would not be necessary for passport holders to specify their religion. Expectedly this was denounced by the Islamic parties as a grand conspiracy aimed at secularizing Pakistan and destroying its Islamic character. But even before the mullahs actually took to the streets, the government lost nerve and the volte-face was announced on 24 March, 2005. Information Minister Sheikh Rashid said the decision to revive the religion column was made else, “Qadianis and apostates would be able to pose as Muslims and perform pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia”.
But even these climb downs – significant as they are – are less dramatic than the astonishing recent retreat over reforming the Hudood Ordinance, a grotesque imposition of General Zia-ul-Haq’s government unparalleled both for its cruelty and irrationality. Enacted into the law in 1979, it was conceived as part of a more comprehensive process for converting Pakistan into a theocracy governed by Sharia laws. These laws prescribe death by stoning for married Muslims who are found guilty of extra-marital sex (for unmarried couples or non-Muslims, the penalty is 100 lashes). The law is exact in stating how the death penalty is to be administered: “Such of the witnesses who deposed against the convict as may be available shall start stoning him and, while stoning is being carried on, he may be shot dead, whereupon stoning and shooting shall be stopped”.
Rape is still more problematic. A woman who fails to prove that she has been raped is automatically charged with fornication and adultery. Under the Hudood Law, she is considered guilty unless she can prove her innocence. Proof of innocence requires that the rape victim must produce “at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied” who saw the actual act of penetration. Inability to do so may result in her being jailed, or perhaps even sentenced to death for adultery.
President ja armee staabiülem kindral Musharraf ning tema Citibanki peaminister Shaukat Aziz tegid ettepaneku muuta Hudoodi määrust. Nad saatsid eelnõu parlamendi aruteluks 2006. aasta septembri alguses. Ootuspäraselt tekitas see MMA – peamise islami parlamentaarse opositsiooni – fundamentaliste nördimist. MMA liikmed rebisid riigikogu põrandal kokku muudatusettepanekute koopiad ja ähvardasid massiliselt tagasi astuda. Valitsus põikles alandlikult ja taandus.
Musharraf’s government has proved no more enlightened, or more moderate or more resolute and behaved no differently from the more than half a dozen civilian administrations, including two terms of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister and several “technocrat” regimes. None made a serious effort to confront or reform these laws.
Kuid muster on laiem kui austus mullade vastu. Kindral Musharraf on olnud valmis kasutama raudset rusikat ka muudel asjaoludel. Silma jäävad kaks näidet: Waziristan ja Beluchistan. Igaüks pakub juhiseid.
In 2002, presumably on Washington’s instructions, the Pakistan Army established military bases in South Waziristan which had become a refuge for Taliban and Al Qaeda fleeing Afghanistan. It unleashed artillery and US-supplied Cobra gunships. By 2005 heavy fighting had spread to North Waziristan and the army was bogged down.
The generals, safely removed from combat areas, and busy in building their personal financial empires, ascribed the resistance to “a few hundred foreign militants and terrorists”. But the Army was taking losses (how serious is suggested by the fact that casualty figures were not revealed), soldiers rarely ventured out from their forts, morale collapsed as junior officers wondered why they were being asked to attack their ideological comrades – the Taliban – at American instructions. Reportedly, local clerics refused to conduct funeral prayers for soldiers killed in action.
In 2004, the army made peace with the militants in South Waziristan. It conceded the territory to them, which had made the militants immensely stronger. A similar “peace treaty” had been signed on 1 September 2006 in the town of Miramshah, in North Waziristan, now firmly in the grip of the Pakistani Taliban.
The Miramshah treaty met all demands made by the militants: the release of all jailed militants; dismantling of army checkpoints; return of seized weapons and vehicles; the right of the Taliban to display weapons (except heavy weapons); and residence rights for fellow fighters from other Islamic countries. As for “foreign militants” who Musharraf had blamed exclusively for the resistance, the militants were nonchalant: we will let you know if we find any! The financial compensation demanded by the Taliban for loss of property and life has not been revealed, but some officials have remarked that it is “astronomical”. In turn they promised to cease their attacks on civil and military installations, and give the army a safe passage out.
While the army has extricated itself, the locals have been left to pay the price. The militants have closed girl’s schools and are enforcing harsh Sharia laws in all of Waziristan, both North and South. Barbers have been told “you shave, you die”. Taliban vigilante groups patrol the streets of Miramshah. They check such things as the length of beards, whether the “shalwars” are worn at an appropriate height above the ankles, and attendance of individuals in the mosques.
Ja siis on Belutšistan. Kaheksa aastat tagasi, kui armee võimu haaras, ei olnud Belutšistanis nähtavat separatistide liikumist, mis moodustab peaaegu 44% Pakistani maismaast ning on tema gaasi ja nafta hoidla. Nüüd on täielik mäss, mis on üles ehitatud Balochi kaebustele, millest enamik tuleneb arusaamast, et neid juhitakse Islamabadist ja et neile ei anta õiglast osa nende maalt ammutatud loodusvarade hüvedest.
The army has spurned negotiations. Force is the only answer: “They won’t know what hit them”, boasted Musharraf, after threatening to crush the insurgency. The Army has used everything it can, including its American supplied F-16 jet fighters. The crisis worsened when the charismatic 80-year old Baloch chieftain and former governor of Balochistan, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, was killed by army bombs. Musharraf outraged the Baloch by calling it “a great victory”. Reconciliation in Balochistan now seems, at best, a distant dream.
Musharraf ja tema kindralid on otsustanud võimule jääda. Nad kaitsevad oma jõu allikat – armeed. Nad majutavad neid, keda nad peavad – ameeriklasi. Nad abistavad mullasid. Nad purustavad need, kes ohustavad nende võimu ja privileege, ning ignoreerivad ülejäänuid. Ükski hind pole nende jaoks liiga kõrge. Need on Pakistani ebaõnnestumise põhjuseks.
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Autor õpetab Quaid-e-Azami ülikoolis Islamabadis. See artikkel ilmus riigipöörde aastapäeval. (avaldatud Dawnis, 12)